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Lord Johnston
Lord Nimmo Smith Lord Eassie |
[2007] HCJ 06 XC470/06
OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by THE HONOURABLE LORD JOHNSTON in NOTE OF APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE by HUGH
MULLEN Appellant against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent _____________ |
This is a
Crown appeal against an imposition of a sentence of 300 hours community
service imposed after trial by the trial judge in the context of a verdict of
the jury of attempted murder.
The
background to the matter, as disclosed to us, both in submission and in the
trial judge's report, is that it appears both the complainer and the now
respondent, then accused, were in the same public house on the evening in
question, though not necessarily together.
It appears that the respondent had from time to time worked for the
public house but was not so doing on that evening. It was stated to us that the complainer was
extremely drunk, created a disturbance and was in fact ejected from the pubic
house. At that time, he apparently
directed some remark of some force towards the respondent, who followed him out
of the public and down the street for a short distance. It is not quite clear for how long. Some mention was made that it was merely a
walk of two or three minutes.
However, what matters is that the respondent, using a knife with which
he either armed himself in the pubic house or already had with him, stabbed the
complainer repeatedly, six times in all according to the medical evidence,
without any provocation or any other confrontation, at the time of the stabbing,
with the complainer. The complainer was
hospitalised and had to undergo surgical treatment in respect of the most
serious wound which was to the right upper quadrant of his abdomen. The jury's verdict reflects the fact that
they were plainly satisfied that upon the evidence, the respondent had, at the
very least, revealed a total lack of regard and exhibited recklessness towards
the life of the accused in carrying out this unprovoked attack.
The
presiding judge, having studied various report including a Social Enquiry
Report, reached the view that a non-custodial sentence was appropriate albeit
at the highest end of a community service order and he so ordered. The Crown bring this appeal to this court
upon the basis that in so doing he acted or imposed an unduly lenient sentence,
the test for which is set down in various cases but most notably in that of Her Majesty's Advocate v Bell 1995 SCCR 244 where the
then Lord Justice General said:
"That to be unduly lenient a sentence
must fall outside the range of sentences which the judge at first instance, is applying
his mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably have considered appropriate,
weight always being given to the views of the trial judge especially in a case
which has gone to trial and he has the advantage of seeing and hearing all the
evidence."
We may say that we accept that position at once with regard
to the position of the trial judge.
The basic
submission for the Crown was that, this was a verdict of attempted murder. A knife has been used which the respondent
had plainly armed himself. There were
six wounds, there was no provocation upon any view of the matter. There should be in the public interest, no
leniency in imposing a sentence for this type of crime, having regard to the
prevalence of the carrying and use of knives in our current community which the
courts have deprecated and must do their best to resist. We accept in passing,
that the respondent has always denied any involvement in matter and indeed went
to trial on an issue of alibi, which the jury plainly rejected.
Miss Ogg
on behalf of the respondent submitted that it was quite inappropriate to regard
a custodial sentence as inevitable simply because a knife had been used causing
an assault. In this respect, she refers
to two cases, Her Majesty's Advocate v Herron 1998 SCCR 449 and Her Majesty's Advocate v Gilmore 1004 SCCR 117. These cases she submitted were indications that
the court would not necessarily impose a custodial sentence even when a knife
was being used. In response to those
submissions, the Advocate Depute simply stated to us that these were both
exceptional cases, having a background which did not apply in the present case,
albeit different in each of the two cases.
The present case would appear to suggest, he submitted, that there was
really no background to the matter at all beyond what might have happened
between the two parties in the public house in terms of a verbal exchange or a
one way verbal comment.
Having looked at the matter carefully
in the context of
Aud