APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
|
Lord Justice Clerk
Lord Macfadyen
Lord Penrose
|
[2007] HCJAC 32
Appeal No: XC7/06
OPINION OF THE LORD
JUSTICE CLERK
in the Appeal by
DEAN STEWART
Appellant;
against
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
Respondent:
_______
|
For the Appellant: Moir, Miss
Mitchell; Balfour & Manson
For the Crown: Young, AD; Crown Agent
14 June 2007
Introduction
[1] The
appellant was tried at Glasgow High Court in October and November 2005 on 13
charges of rape and other sexual offences involving nine complainers. Seven were young women. The other two were girls under the age of 16.
[2] The
jury convicted the appellant by a majority verdict on only three of the
charges, namely the following:
"(5) on an
occasion between 1 May 1998 and 3 November 1999, both dates inclusive, the
exact date being to the Prosecutor unknown, at [locus in Barrmill] you did abduct [complainer A] ... pretend to
her that there was a warrant in force for her arrest and induce her to enter a
marked police vehicle, convey her from [locus
in Barrmill] to [locus in Beith]
and there assault her, pull down her trousers ... and place a baton in her
private parts to her injury ...
(7) on
an occasion between 1 September 1999 and 17 December 1999, both dates
inclusive, the exact date being to the Prosecutor unknown, at [locus in Kilwinning] you did use lewd,
indecent and libidinous practices and behaviour towards [complainer B] ... a girl then over the age of 12 years and under the
age of 16 years, and did repeatedly place your hand inside her trousers and
attempt to touch her private parts, take hold of her hand, and attempt to place
her hand on your private member:
CONTRARY to the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995,
section 6 ...
(12) on 4 October 2003, at [locus in
Irvine] you did assault [complainer C] ... and did attempt to pull
down her trousers, and place your hand inside her trousers and pants and place
your fingers in her private parts."
At the time of each of the alleged
offences, the appellant was a serving police officer. From early 1996 to late summer 2002 he was a
uniformed officer stationed at Kilbirnie.
From summer 2002 to summer 2003 he was a plain clothes officer at
Saltcoats. After that he was a uniformed
officer stationed at Irvine.
The evidence for the Crown on charges (5), (7) and (12)
Charge (5)
[3] The
complainer was aged 19 at the date of the incident. She had learning difficulties and was a drug
user. She lived in Barrmill, a village
close to Kilwinning. She said that when
walking through the village, she came upon the appellant at the first locus
libelled. He was sitting in a parked
police van. He was in uniform. He told her that there was a warrant out for
her. He said that his colleague WPC
Fraser was in the van. The complainer
knew the appellant. He had arrested her
on warrants several times. He put the
complainer into the rear of the van. WPC
Fraser was not there. The van had no
cage, which was unusual for a police vehicle.
[4] The
appellant drove the complainer to the second locus libelled, which was a farm
road in Beith. There he joined her in
the back of the van. He took out his
baton and committed the acts libelled.
He then drove her back to Barrmill.
[5] The
complainer was uncorroborated.
Charge (7)
[6] The
complainer was aged 15 at the time of the incident. According to the trial judge, she was a good,
clear and articulate witness. She had
become involved in a sexual relationship with a man aged 42. She also abused alcohol. The appellant was one of the officers called
to the scene when the complainer and the older man were found together in a public
park in Dalry. To be kept away from the
older man, the complainer was sent to Kilwinning to live with an aunt. The appellant and another officer went to the
aunt's house to interview the complainer about the relationship. The appellant was in uniform. At his suggestion, the complainer went with
him to her bedroom to speak privately.
The complainer's aunt and the other officer stayed in the living
room. The appellant then touched the
complainer's inner thigh on top of her clothes. Among other acts, he took her
hand and pressed it on his private parts.
He tried to get her hand inside his trousers. He got her to hold his penis. He forced his hand down the inside of her
trousers.
[7] The
complainer was uncorroborated.
Charge (12)
[8] The
complainer was 28 years old at the date of the incident. She had spent the earlier part of the day at
the home of her next door neighbour in Irvine. They and others were watching a televised
football match. The complainer drank a
large amount of vodka. In the evening
she went to a party at a nearby house at the locus libelled. She continued drinking and became angry. At about 10 pm she became
involved in a fracas with another woman.
She threw over the kitchen table and smashed dishes and glasses. The other partygoers were so alarmed that
they went outside and telephoned for the police.
[9] The
complainer then lay down on a sofa in the living room. The appellant and Special Constable Dominic
Mongiardini were sent to deal with the incident. They were in uniform. The complainer did not know them. They carried her towards the front door as
far as the foot of the stairs. The
appellant then sent PC Mongiardini out to look for the complainer's
partner. The complainer said that when
she was alone with the appellant, he committed the acts libelled. She said that she then "freaked out."
[10] PC Mongiardini said that when he returned, he found the
complainer where he had left her. The
appellant told him that he was refusing to have any more to do with her as she
had claimed that he had touched her up.
The complainer was crying. She
said "That dirty pervert touched me up."
The complainer left the house.
Her distress at the time was seen and remarked on by her partner and her
next door neighbour, among others.
[11] The complainer went home and cried herself to sleep. She awoke during the night and telephoned the
police to complain of "rape."
[12] The complainer handed over her clothing to the police for
examination. At that stage she noticed
that the zip pull in her jeans was missing.
WPC Laura Thomson said that the complainer was surprised. The complainer said that the zip pull had
been in place earlier in the evening.
The trial judge's charge
[13] All thirteen charges went to the jury. The trial judge divided the charges into
three categories; namely, the three rape charges, the other penetrative sexual
assault charges and the charges of indecency of one kind or another. He gave clear and accurate directions on the Moorov principle. He then directed the jury as to how they
should apply that principle to those three categories as follows.
"The charges which are rape - that is to say, the
three charges. Remember that I asked you
to underline all of these words, assault, abduction and other words as they
appeared. Now the reason you have done
that already - the three charges of rape of [complainer on charge (1)], [complainer
on charge (9)] and [complainer on
charge (13)] can be used in accordance with this Moorov doctrine to corroborate one another - for that of course is
this.
As far as [complainer
on charge (1)] is concerned - and I will come back to that - there is only
[complainer on charge (1)] to tell
you about that. There is no
corroboration of that charge at all from anybody and the only way that you can
corroborate is if you use the two later charges to corroborate it - that is to
say, [complainer on charge (9)] and
finally [complainer on charge (13)].
You then have four charges which I have told you ... I
am not going to repeat them again but you have got 3, 5, 11 and 12 which are
what I call penetrative sexual assault charges.
They can corroborate one another because they are of the same type,
provided of course you find time, character and circumstances. The three rape charges I should have already
mentioned can also be used to corroborate the penetrative charges because the
rape charges are more serious and down the scale the penetrative charges are
next and then finally you are left with the non-penetrative - simple indecent,
however unpleasant it was, but it has to stand on a scale of seriousness and it
is lower on the scale of seriousness than these other charges I have given you
which are 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 7.
They can be used individually to corroborate one
another and of course they can also be supported by the penetrative charges and
they can also be supported by the rape charges.
So, you can use the Moorov
doctrine in that way if you find that it applies in this case on the evidence.
Now, I have a couple of qualifications to make about
that and I think that they will be obvious to you. In this case I have said to you the greater
can corroborate the lesser but not the other way around ... "
[14] The trial judge considered that there was sufficient evidence
on charge (12) for it to stand alone and he charged the jury to that
effect. He recognised, however, that it
was also part of what he describes as the "Moorov
web of related charges" (Report, p 6).
The views of the trial judge
[15] The trial judge reports that when the verdict was given he was
troubled as to whether it could properly stand.
He remains of that view. He says
that the jury were entitled to believe all three complainers, since none of
them was so inherently incredible as to be unworthy of belief. However, he observes that the complainer on
charge (7) was not fully believed, the jury having convicted on charge (7) only
in the alternative. He also observes
that all of the complainers gave a number of statements, used at the trial,
that revealed many contradictions.
[16] He comments that if the jury considered charge (12) to be a
stand-alone charge, they were entitled to convict on it. He considers that charge (12) could not be
used to corroborate either charge (5) or charge (7) by reason of the interval
of time.
Submissions of counsel
[18] The
advocate depute submitted that there was sufficient similarity of time,
character and circumstances between charges (5), (7) and (12) for each to
provide corroboration of the others. All
three involved a male police officer who abused his position while in uniform
in the course of his duty. All took
place in the same area. All involved
sexual abuse of a female complainer who was younger than the appellant and who
was vulnerable at the time. All were
opportunistic. In each case the
appellant was able to use his position as a police officer to cause the
complainer to be alone with him. Each
charge involved interference with the complainer's private parts. To the extent that there were differences
between the three charges, it was for the jury to decide to what extent they
were material (Reynolds v HM Adv,
1995 SCCR 505). The argument for the
appellant that the period between charge (12) and charges (5) and (7) was too
long overlooked the fact that for one year of that period the appellant was a
plain clothes officer at Saltcoats.
Significantly, none of the charges related to that year. The trial judge had directed the jury that
since charge (7) related to a non-penetrative sexual assault, the evidence in
support of it could not provide corroboration for the penetrative charges,
including charge (5). It was to be
assumed that the jury followed that direction.
They must therefore have taken corroborative support for charge (5) from
the evidence on charge (12). In turn,
they could find corroboration of the evidence on charge (12) in the evidence on
charge (5). They could find
corroboration of charge (7) in the evidence relating to charges (5) and
(12). In any event, there was sufficient
evidence on charge (12), which could stand alone.
Conclusions
[19] This appeal raises a question similar to that raised in Dodds v HM Adv (supra), with the
added complication that the indictment in this case involved several sexual
offences, some of them charged in the alternative. As in Dodds,
it was open to the jury to find corroboration on any one charge in the evidence
relating to one or more of the other charges.
Accordingly, there could be no question of the trial judge's upholding a
submission of no case to answer. But, as
in Dodds, a problem has arisen in this
case because the jury convicted on only some of the charges and it is argued
that no two of those charges are sufficiently related in time, character and
circumstances to be mutually corroborative.
In these circumstances, in my view, it is for the court to decide
whether the relationship in these respects between any two of the charges was
sufficiently close to entitle the jury to find the necessary corroboration.
[20] In Dodds, there were
seven charges of rape covering a period of over ten years, the latest date
libelled being about twenty years before the trial. The court held that the dissimilarities in
the character and circumstances of the charges on which the jury convicted, and
the lapses of time between them, were such that the Moorov principle could not be applied.
[21] In the present case, counsel for the appellant argued that
charge (7), the non-penetrative charge, could corroborate neither charge (5)
nor charge (12), as the trial judge in effect directed; but that neither charge (5) nor charge (12)
could corroborate charge (7), nor could they corroborate one another, because
all three charges were so dissimilar.
[22] I do not accept the submission for the appellant. In my opinion, the evidence on all three
charges was similar in several significant respects.
[23] In his report, the trial judge expresses the view that charge
(12) could not be used to corroborate either charge (5) and charge (7) because
of the interval of time. I regret that I
differ from the trial judge on this point.
In Dodds (supra), I expressed the view that there is no maximum interval of
time beyond which the Moorov
principle cannot apply and that even a long interval may be acceptable if there
are other compelling similarities (at p 11G-H).
This, I think, is such a case. I
have mentioned the common features on which the advocate depute relied. Of these, the most telling, in my opinion,
are (a) the pattern of conduct by which the appellant, in the course of his
police duties, in each case brought about a situation in which he was alone
with the complainer; (b) the fact that
in each case the complainer was vulnerable, for one reason or another; and (c) the fact that in each case the
appellant's acts involved interference with the complainer's private
parts.
[24] In my view, these similarities in the character and the
circumstances of the appellant's conduct in all three charges are such that
corroboration can be found to exist even though charge (12) is separated from
the latitudes in charges (5) and (7) by almost four years. In any event I consider that the lapse of
time is much less significant in this case than it might otherwise have been
since the incident to which charge (12) relates occurred not long after the
appellant's return to uniform duty at Irvine after a period, to which none of
the charges related, when he was a plain clothes officer elsewhere in Ayrshire.
[25] In the result, I accept the submission of the advocate depute
that the evidence on charges (5) and (12) was mutually corroborative, and that
the evidence on both charges was corroborative of the evidence on charge
(7). I also consider that there was in
any event sufficient evidence on charge (12) if it was looked at in
isolation.
[26] In the course of his submissions the advocate depute suggested
that where there were two charges of an indecent nature and there were the
necessary similarities in the evidence on each, the evidence on the lesser
charge could corroborate the evidence on the greater. That submission is contrary to Brown v HM Adv (supra), which has stood unchallenged for nearly forty years. It may be that in a case where there were
compelling similarities, there could be something in the submission of the
advocate depute, but that is not a point that we can entertain in this appeal.
Disposal
[27] I propose to your Lordships that we should refuse the appeal.
APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
|
Lord Justice Clerk
Lord Macfadyen
Lord Penrose
|
[2007] HCJAC 32
Appeal No: XC7/06
OPINION OF LORD MACFADYEN
in the Appeal by
DEAN STEWART
Appellant;
against
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
Respondent:
_______
|
For the Appellant: Moir, Miss
Mitchell; Balfour & Manson
For the Crown: Young, AD; Crown Agent
13 June 2007
[28] I agree that,
for the reasons given by your Lordship in the chair, the appeal should be
refused.
APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
|
Lord Justice Clerk
Lord Macfadyen
Lord Penrose
|
[2007] HCJAC 32
Appeal No: XC7/06
OPINION OF LORD PENROSE
in the Appeal by
DEAN STEWART
Appellant;
against
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
Respondent:
_______
|
For the Appellant: Moir, Miss
Mitchell; Balfour & Manson
For the Crown: Young, AD; Crown Agent
June 2007
[29] I agree with your Lordship's Opinion and with the disposal
proposed.