APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
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Lord Osborne
Lord Macfadyen Lord Johnston
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[2007] HCJAC29Appeal No: XC900/06OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD JOHNSTON in CROWN APPEAL AGAINST
SENTENCE by HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Appellant; against M. M. Respondent: _______ |
Act: A. Stewart, Q.C.,
A.D.; Crown Agent
Alt: Shead;
This is a
Crown Appeal against sentence consequent upon the respondent being convicted on
"(1) on
various occasions between 1 January 1993 and 31 October 1999, both
dates inclusive, you did use lewd, indecent and libidinous practices and
behaviour towards B.T. born 1 November 1986, c/o Strathclyde Police,
Motherwell, and did handle his private member ... under his clothing, handle your
private member and masturbate in his presence, ... compel him to handle your
private member ..., place his private member into your mouth ... and did attempt to
penetrate his hinder parts with your private member and to have unnatural
carnal connection with him ...".
On
1. That the respondent would, if deemed suitable, attend for
assessment when instructed to do so and would fully participate in any group
work or individual programme of work aimed at reducing his risk of sexual
offending;
2. That the respondent was to attend for alcohol assessment
when instructed to do so by the Social Work department;
3. That the respondent was to accept the direction of the
Social Work department in respect of where he will reside if alternative
accommodation is offered by the local authority;
4. The respondent was to have no unsupervised contact with
anyone under the age of 16 years;
5. The respondent was to inform the Social Work department of
any employment he undertakes; and
6. The respondent was to attend for any counselling as and when
directed to do so by the Social Work department.
It is against that sentence that the Crown has now appealed
on grounds of undue leniency.
The terms of
the conviction speaks for itself and reflects many acts of indecency over a
period of some six years.
This was the
starting point of the position taken up by the Advocate Depute. The essential position was that the sheriff
had concentrated too much on the issue of treatment and rehabilitation for the
respondent and ignored essential elements of the case, including the need for
punishment to be imposed. The respondent
had been on probation for a similar offence at the time before the period
involving the current offence commenced.
We were informed that the victim, now aged 20, remains seriously
traumatised. A report by a clinical
psychologist, Dr Cindy Shiels, which was before the sheriff at the
time of sentence, categorises the respondent as posing a high risk for
re-offending. The Advocate Depute
submitted accordingly that the sheriff had both ignored this aspect of the
matter, he failed to give due weight to the factors that he narrated and, in
particular, had failed properly to address the issue of punishment, which is an
integral part of the sentencing process.
Mr Shead
for the respondent pointed out that the time period in the libel represented a
degree of latitude which should have been taken into account by the
sheriff. The sheriff, he submitted, had
been entitled to consider the public interest against the prospect of the
respondent being successfully treated and this, it was submitted, he had
reasonably sought to achieve by the imposition of the conditions to the
probation order, which should not therefore be categorised as unduly
lenient. The respondent had a very
limited lifestyle being effectively isolated by those who had been around
him. He was of low intelligence and
could well be vulnerable if sentenced to imprisonment.
It was not
disputed that the test for undue leniency is principally found in the case of HMA v Bell 1995 S.C.C.R. 244 to which we make general reference, noting
in particular however that the Lord Justice General at page 250 states to
the effect that a sentence may well be categorised as unduly lenient where,
upon any reasonable view of the matter, custody was the only option and was not
imposed.
We are
entirely satisfied that this case meets that test. Having regard to the period of time involved,
the nature of the offence, the effect on the victim we consider that all these
factors point inevitably to custody before even considering the issue of
punishment which the sheriff appears to have ignored. He also does not appear to have considered
the possibility, if not probability, that the respondent would receive
treatment or at least be offered programmes of rehabilitation while in prison
provided the sentence was long enough to let such a programme take effect.
While we can
understand the motivation of the sheriff in this extremely difficult case, we
consider that for the reasons given he misdirected himself in not imposing a
custodial sentence which accordingly categorises the sentence of probation,
even with the conditions attached, as being unduly lenient. The appeal by the Crown is therefore allowed.
We are now
therefore required to consider what is the appropriate custodial sentence in
the case of a very serious example of sexual abuse of a young boy who was at
the start of the period of the offence only 6 years old. The conviction covers a period of some years
and is exacerbated by the fact that the respondent had a previous conviction
for an analogous offence dated
We have to
recognise also that in the psychology report available to us from
Dr Shiels, as we have already indicated, the opinion is expressed that the
respondent represented a high risk of sexual offending which bore upon our
decision that the sentence imposed by the sheriff was unduly lenient. We have to proceed upon the basis that the
Scottish Prison Service will be able to devise or offer some programme or
treatment that is appropriate to the respondent's needs and it is plain that it
is in the interests of the public, as well as the respondent, that such a
programme should be made available.
Looking at
the matter in general and with particular regard to the circumstances and
factors we have enunciated we consider the appropriate disposal should be an
extended sentence with a custodial term of four years imprisonment with an extension
period of three years to run from the date of sentence because the respondent
has not spent any significant time in custody.