APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
Lord Osborne Lord Nimmo Smith Lord MacLean |
[2006]
HCJAC 50
Appeal No: XC684/05 OPINION OF THE COURTdelivered by LORD OSBORNE in NOTE OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION by BARRY JAMES DUNNIGAN Appellant; against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent: _______ |
Act: Wheatley, Q.C.;
Alt: K. Stewart, A.D.; Crown Agent
The background circumstances
[1] The
appellant was charged on indictment in the following terms:
"(1) on numerous occasions between 1 January
2003 and 31 July 2004, both dates inclusive, at the house at 475 Methilhaven
Road, Buckhaven, and the park area between Sandwell Street and Methilhaven
Road, Buckhaven, all Fife, you ... did use lewd, indecent and libidinous practices
and behaviour towards [child A] ... and did kiss him, handle his naked private
member under clothing, remove his trousers and underwear, lie on top of him and
masturbate yourself to the emission of semen onto said [child's] buttocks;
(2) on numerous occasions between 1 January
2003 and 31 July 2004, both dates inclusive, at the house at 475 Methilhaven
Road, and at the park area between Sandwell Street and Methilhaven Road,
Buckhaven, all Fife you ... did use lewd, indecent and libidinous practices and
behaviour towards [child B] ... and kiss him, handle his naked private member
under clothing, remove his trousers and underwear, place your own naked private
member against the said [child's] naked buttocks;
(3) on numerous occasions between 1 January
2003 and 31 July 2004, both dates inclusive, at the house at 475 Methilhaven
Road, and the park area between Sandwell Street and Methilhaven Road,
(Buckhaven), all Fife, you ... did use lewd, indecent and libidinous practices
and behaviour towards [child C] ... and did kiss him, handle his naked
private member under clothing, remove the said [child's] trousers and
underwear, lie on top of said [child] whilst he was facing downwards, place
your own naked private member against the said [child's] naked buttock and did masturbate
yourself to the emission of semen onto the said [child's] naked buttocks."
[2] The
appellant made an application under section 275(1) of the Criminal Procedure (
"1. The following
evidence is sought to be admitted or elicited:
(a) (i) on 26 November and
indicate concerns having been raised about the sexualised
behaviour of the complainer [child B] in particular towards his sister [child
D], and the complainer, [child C].
(ii) on an occasion
prior to the accused being charged on 5 August
2004 the
complainer [child C] was standing with his trousers down simulating a sexual
act. He was pretending to be having sex
by thrusting his hips back and forward.
This occurred beside the refuse bin area of the houses
(iii) on an occasion
about April 2005, the complainer, [child A] was
holding the fence at the rear garden of the premises
(iv) during the
summer of 2004, prior to the accused being charged,
at the rear garden of
(v) during the
summer of 2004, prior to the accused being charged,
on two occasions, the said [child A] was lying on top of the
said [child B] simulating a sexual act.
He was pretending to have sex with him and rubbing his body on top of
him. These occurred in the front garden
area of the premises at
(vi) on an occasion
in early 2004, the said complainers [child B,
child A, and child C], were behind a shed at
(vii) on many occasions
during the period from September 2002 to
the present, the complainers [child A, child B and child C] have
used sexually explicit language in the presence of the witnesses [persons E, G
and F and the accused]. This had also
been intimated to the Social Work Department anonymously on
(b) That since the accused ... was charged on
complainers [child C and child B] have on numerous occasions
asked the witness [person E] if the accused ... was coming out to play with
them. This has been witnessed by the
said [persons E and F].
(c) On more than one occasion, since the
accused was charged on
2. The nature of the proposed questioning
is as follows: to establish from the
complainers that they have behaved and spoken in the manner indicated in
paragraph 1. They will specifically be
questioned about incidents where they have kissed one another, simulated sexual
acts and used sexually explicit language.
The said witnesses [persons E, F, G and the accused] ... will be asked to
give accounts of these incidents.
Evidence from Social Work records will be sought to be elicited.
3. The issues at the trial to which the
evidence is considered to be relevant are as follows:
(a) to explain an
apparent change in behaviour of the complainers as being
as a result of their own sexually inappropriate actings towards
one another and language and not because of any conduct direct (sic) toward them by the accused ... .
(b) ...
(c) to explain the
motivation for incriminating the accused.
It will be
suggested that the accused was falsely blamed by the
complainers for acting in the way libelled to deflect from the complainers'
actings towards one another.
(d) to explain the
complainers' ability to describe in detail to the police the
sexual acts libelled consistently with the accused's
position that he was not responsible for any such actings, giving concerns
regarding the sexualised behaviour of [child B] towards his siblings prior to
the period of the libel and their subsequent behaviour and use of sexually
explicit language to one another.
(e) the credibility
of the complainers [child A and child B] in relation to
the allegations in the indictment.
4. The reasons why the evidence is
considered to be relevant are as follows:
(a) the allegations
made by the complainers against the accused may have
arisen as a result of an apparent change in their behaviour
noted by their relatives. It is
submitted that this change of behaviour was not to do with anything
attributable to the accused ... , but because of the
behaviour of the complainers themselves and towards each other.
(b) the accused's
explanation for the complainers falsely incriminating
him with these allegations is that they were behaving in a
sexually inappropriate way towards one another.
(c) in the absence
of evidence of any other inappropriate sexual conduct
involving the complainers, other than the matters alleged, the
court might infer that the only explanation for children of this age to have
knowledge of such matters, would be if the alleged offences were truly
committed by the accused.
(d) the credibility
of the complainers [child A and child B] may be
weakened or undermined in relation to the allegations in the
indictment, as a result of the evidence of their prior actions and comments in
paragraphs 1(b) and (c).
5. The inferences which the applicant
proposes to submit to the court that it should draw from the evidence are as
follows:
(a) that the
accused ... was not responsible for any sexually inappropriate
conduct directed towards the complainers and the complainers
were behaving in a sexually inappropriate fashion which they have sought to
blame upon the accused ... by making allegations against him.
(b) that the
complainers were able to give a detailed account of sexual
conduct towards them not because of any actings by the
accused ... but because of actings between themselves.
(c) the complainers
are not telling the truth regarding the allegations
against the accused on the indictment, as evidenced by their
subsequent actions and comments."
[3] On
"In the
present case I have come to the conclusion that I should grant the panel's
application only to the extent conceded by the Crown, with whose concessions I
respectfully agree. I therefore refuse
the whole of paragraph 1(a) of the minute.
I do so because the individual matters sought there fail to meet the
requirements of section 275(1)(a), (b) and (c). More particularly:
(i) disallowed
as not being related to 'a specific occurrence or occurrences
of sexual or other behaviour' in terms of section 275(1)(a);
(ii) disallowed as
not being
(a) sufficiently
specific in terms of time in terms of section
275(1)(a),
(b) relevant to the
question of whether the panel is guilty of the
crimes with
which he is charged in terms of section 275(1)(b) and (c) of significant
probative value likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper
administration of justice in terms of section 275(1)(c). So it fails all the three requirements of
section 275(1).
(iii) to (vii) These
are all sufficiently specific in terms of date, place and
description
but not sufficiently relevant to establishing whether the panel is guilty of
the crimes with which he is charged, nor of such probative value as to be
likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper administration of
justice. Accordingly these parts fail
the requirements of sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 275(1).
My reasons
for finding parts of paragraph (a) of the application not sufficiently relevant
to the guilt of the accused are as follows:
·
in some cases the behaviour described is markedly
different from anything with which the accused is charged (parts (iii), (iv),
(vi) and (vii) fall into that category);
·
in all cases they are instances of behaviour by the
children among themselves and not involving the panel or anyone else; and
·
I agree with the procurator fiscal depute that sexual
knowledge could have other sources, such as she suggested (the media and the
playground), so it is not the case that having experienced the matters
complained of is the only way in which they could have gained knowledge of
these things. Love v H.M.A. 1995
S.C.C.R. 501 is distinguishable on that ground.
My reasons
for finding that the probative value is not likely to outweigh any risk of
prejudice are as follows:
·
the probative value of the evidence is limited, in my
view, precisely because it lacks relevance to the guilt of the panel for the
reasons I have just given; and
·
risk of
prejudice arises in that the asking of such questions carries a significant
risk of causing embarrassment to the complainers and might make it more
difficult for them to give their evidence at the trial.
(a) asked on
numerous occasions whether the panel was coming out to
play with them and
(b) lied in
relation to these matters, do not carry with them the same
degree of risk to the administration of justice as I have
identified in relation to the matters covered in paragraph 1(a) of the
application."
[4] Following
the announcement of his decision, a motion for leave to appeal against that
decision was made to the sheriff, which he refused. Subsequently, on
"1. The sheriff erred in refusing to admit
evidence and allowing questioning of the complainers as referred to in
paragraph 1(a) of an amended application made to the sheriff in terms of
section 275(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
2. The aforesaid evidence and questioning
related to specific occurrences of behaviour; said behaviour was relevant to
establishing whether the appellant was guilty of the offence with which he was
charged.
3. The value of the evidence sought to be
admitted or elicited is significant and outweighs any risk of prejudice to the
proper administration of justice.
4. As a result of the sheriff's failure to
allow the evidence and questioning as referred to in paragraph 1(a) of the said
Minute there has been a miscarriage of justice."
Submissions for the appellant
Submissions for the Crown
The decision
"that occurrence or those occurrences of behaviour or facts
are relevant to establishing whether the accused is guilty of the offence with
which he is charged ... ".
We have reached the conclusion that
the solicitor advocate for the appellant, in his submissions in relation to
that aspect of the case, indulged in what was essentially an exercise of
speculation. We consider that, given the
attempt to satisfy the terms of the subsection that was mounted before the sheriff, he was quite entitled not to be satisfied
concerning the requisite matters. In the
second place, turning to the provisions of section 275(1)(c),
which provides that the court must be satisfied that
"the
probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted or elicited is
significant and is likely to outweigh any risk of prejudice to the proper
administration of justice arising from its being admitted or elicited",
the
discretionary nature of the exercise which the sheriff had to conduct becomes
prominent. In Wright v H.M. Advocate it
was decided that the issue for the appeal court in a case such as this was not
whether the appeal court might have decided that matter differently at first
instance, but whether it was shown that the discretion available to the first
instance judge had been wrongly exercised.
We have not been persuaded that the reasons given by the sheriff for his
decision here demonstrate that that was the case. In all these circumstances, we reject the
grounds of appeal advanced on the appellant's behalf. The appeal is refused.