APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
Lord Osborne Lord Nimmo Smith Lord MacLean |
[2006]
HCJAC 48
Appeal
No. XC703/05
OPINION OF THE COURTdelivered by LORD NIMMO
SMITH in NOTE OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION and SENTENCE by JOHN McINALLY Appellant; against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent: _______ |
Act: Collins; Gilfedder McInnes,
Alt: K. Stewart, A.D.; Crown Agent
[1] The appellant
was charged on indictment with an offence in these terms:
"On
The appellant pled not guilty and went to trial before a
sheriff and jury at
[2] The following
summary of the evidence led at the trial is taken from the sheriff's report:
"Evidence for the Crown was from
three witnesses. A joint minute dealt
with the medical evidence about the complainer's injuries. The complainer gave evidence that he had been
injured after he left the Railway Tavern in Penicuik and was walking home in
Nicola Fox was out with friends, but
not with the complainer, and had also been in the Railway Tavern. On her way to the park she met the complainer
and another man, Thomas Murray. They got
split up and she and Thomas Murray were walking through the park without the
complainer. There were a lot of people
about. She saw someone lying on the
ground. She saw two people walking away
from the person lying on the ground.
They were not running, but sort of jogging. She thought that one was the appellant and
the other was a man called Mark McHugh.
They had also been in the Railway Tavern. She was not 100% sure of the identification
of the appellant. There was no-one else
in front of her. She was not aware of
any argument outside the Tavern or in the park and had not heard anything. She did not know how the complainer came to
be on the ground. She said she was
drunk. She did not hear anybody say 'put
the brick down'.
Detective Constable Bowster gave
evidence about the interview with the appellant. The appellant said that there was an argument
going on in front of him in the park. He
kind of got caught up in all the shouting.
There was a big guy who had a brick.
He shouted at him to put it down.
The man tried to hit the appellant with the brick and after that the
appellant just hit him; and as soon as
the man fell, the appellant turned round and walked away. It was a straight out jab with all his
force. His intentions were to 'stand him
off'. He had to stand his ground so that
he would not get attacked. The person
with the brick blocked his path. ...
The appellant gave evidence. He said he had had a fair bit to drink. He said he was aware of an argument in Lamb's
Pend near the Tavern. He went that way
to the park to go home. He did not see
Nicola Fox although he knew of her. The
argument was still going on in front of him.
As he walked on the argument was escalating. There was a lot of aggression. He went to see what it was about, to see if
any of his friends were involved. He did
not intend to become involved himself but he became involved. The focus of the argument turned on him as if
he were an intruder. He was shouted at
by the complainer. He became aware of
the complainer swinging a brick at him.
The brick caught him on the hand.
After a couple of swings by the complainer, the appellant punched the
complainer because, he said, it was only a matter of time that one of the
complainer's swings was going to contact with him. He thought that turning his back on the
complainer was not the best option because the complainer was intent on hitting
him with the brick. He thought he hit
him once. He agreed that he had accepted
in his police interview that he might have hit him more than once. But if he did it was in the scramble of the
situation. The complainer fell backwards
on his back and the appellant did not know if he banged his head. He thought that the only thing he could do was
to hit the complainer.
In cross-examination he said he was
very drunk by the time he got to the Railway Tavern. He got involved in an argument in the park
because it turned on him when he went to see what was going on, to see if
friends were involved. No-one he knew
was in fact involved. He was very
drunk. He agreed that he could have
walked away, but he could not back down.
There were hedges either side of the path, he said; but he agreed that you could drive a car
along the path. He hit the complainer as
hard as he possibly
could.
Paul Cook, who knew the appellant,
had been out with friends that night and had seen the appellant in the Railway
Tavern. He left the pub with friends
other than the appellant. He could not
remember an argument outside the pub as he left. He walked through the park. He saw the appellant in the distance shouting
'put the brick down'. The appellant was
shouting at the complainer. He had seen
the complainer walking up Lamb's Pend very drunk with one of his mates. He saw that the complainer had something in
his hand in the park and saw him swing the brick, and saw the appellant hit the
complainer once. He did not hear any
other shouting leading up to the appellant shouting 'put the brick down'. In cross-examination he said that there was
no-one else there. Nicola Fox was behind
him. There was nobody else where the
appellant was. The path was tarmacadamed
and wide enough for a car. On one side
there was a football pitch, on the other side there was grass. There was nothing to stop one going off the
path."
"I can tell you that there is
sufficient evidence in law to hold the involvement of the accused proved and
the commission of the crime libelled in the indictment as proved but whether
you do so is for you to decide on the facts.
Give consideration to all the evidence ... ".
From this and other passages it will have been abundantly
clear to the jury that their duty was to return a true verdict according to the
evidence. It is true that the sheriff
did not expressly direct the jury that a statement in a question was not in
itself evidence, but there was no need for this to be done in respect of the
question to which the ground of appeal relates.
It must have been obvious to the jury that the procurator fiscal depute
was putting the Crown case to the appellant, and since he denied assaulting the
complainer the Crown had to rely on other evidence to prove that he did. It is alleged in the ground of appeal that
there was no evidence at all of an unprovoked attack. In his submissions to us, the solicitor
advocate for the appellant submitted that there were two alternative versions,
self-defence or unprovoked attack, and there was no evidence for the
latter. But there was no submission of
no case to answer; the sheriff directed
the jury that there was sufficient evidence in law to entitle them to convict
the appellant; and no ground of appeal
is directed to the sufficiency of the evidence.
In these circumstances we are at a loss to see how this assertion could
be justified. We proceed on the basis
that there was sufficient evidence to entitle the jury to hold it proved that
the appellant did indeed assault, that is to say attack, the complainer.
"[T]he sole function of a special
defence is simply to give notice to the Crown of a line of defence that may be
taken. There is no obligation on the
accused to lead evidence in support of it, it has no effect on the burden of
proof on the Crown to prove the guilt of the accused. Any evidence relating to it simply falls to
be considered along with all the other evidence in the case. If it is believed or if it raises a
reasonable doubt an acquittal must result.
The accused person does not have to prove it. Now, in this case the accused said that he
was acting in self-defence. What does
that mean? What does it mean in law to raise
this defence of self-defence? In our
law, if a person is attacked or is in reasonable fear of attack he is entitled
to use such force as is needed to fend off that attack. So an accused person would not be guilty of
an assault if he acted in self-defence.
He would fall to be acquitted.
Now, three conditions have to be satisfied: firstly, the accused must have been attacked
or must reasonably have believed himself to be in imminent danger of attack and
then acted in that belief. The danger
must be immediate; the belief must be on
reasonable grounds even though that may be mistaken. Secondly, the accused can only use violence
as a last resort. If there were other
ways of avoiding the attack he should have taken them. If he could have disarmed his attacker or run
away he should have done so. Thirdly,
the accused must have used no more than a reasonable amount of force. The aim of self-defence is only to stop the
attack. He doesn't have a licence to use
force which is grossly in excess of what is needed for his defence. If he went beyond what you thought was
reasonable force then he would be guilty of assault. Equally, if someone acted in revenge,
retaliation or anger, that is assault and not self-defence. Now, in applying those three tests you have
to allow for fear and the heat of the moment.
Don't judge the accused's actions too finely, take a broad and
reasonable approach in considering the type and degree of violence he faced and
the type and scale of force in his response if you consider that he was
attacked. If you think each of these
conditions is met you could hold the accused acted in self-defence. Now, consider carefully the evidence in
relation to this and what Mr Kirk (the procurator fiscal depute) for the
Prosecution and Mr Collins (the solicitor advocate) for the Defence said about
it. Was it the case that the accused was
facing an attack by a brick being swung at him and if that were the case then
consider whether what he did was in self-defence."
The sheriff also said:
"If you believe the accused's
evidence or evidence supporting the defence of self-defence or you believe any
evidence which clears the accused from blame, you should acquit. Even if you don't but are left with a
reasonable doubt about the Prosecution case you should acquit but if you are
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty then it would be
your duty to convict him."
[6] The solicitor
advocate for the appellant submitted that the jury were not entitled to take
the appellant's admission that he hit the complainer without its qualification
that he did so in self-defence. The only
direct evidence of what occurred was therefore exculpatory. He founded on a passage in Owens v H.M. Advocate 1946 JC 119, in which the Lord Justice General (Normand)
said at page 124:
"The onus is, of course, on the Crown
throughout. It must prove that the fatal
act was the accused's, and that it was deliberate or committed with a reckless
disregard of the consequences. The panel
relieved the Crown of the first part of the burden by himself admitting the
stabbing with a lethal weapon, but attached to this admission the explanation
of its being done in self-defence in the circumstances explained by him. The Crown cannot, we think, take advantage of
the admission without displacing the explanation or at all events presenting to
the jury a not less strong case that shows directly or indirectly that the
explanation is false."
He also founded on a passage in Higgins v H.M. Advocate
1993 S.C.C.R. 542, in which the Lord Justice Clerk (Ross), at page 557, after
quoting the above passage from Owens v
H.M. Advocate, said:
"Although the trial judge did not
give the jury an express direction in these terms, he did direct them that
whether they were prepared to accept one part of what the appellant ... said and
reject another was a matter for them. He
also directed the jury that the onus was on the Crown throughout, that there
was no onus on the defence at all, and that if they accepted self-defence or if
it raised a reasonable doubt in their mind in respect of ... the accused, then
[the] accused must be acquitted. In
these circumstances we have come to the conclusion that the jury must have
realised that they could only accept the appellant['s] ... admission that he put
the knife into the deceased if they held that his explanation of self-defence
was inconsistent with other evidence which they had accepted."
The solicitor advocate submitted that the sheriff should have
directed the jury along the lines of the direction quoted in Croly v H.M. Advocate 2004 S.C.C.R. 389 at page 393.
"In order to return the verdict of
guilty the jury must have held that the actions of the appellant were not in
self-defence. The jury could only have
reached that conclusion by either accepting that the appellant's actions
amounted to an unprovoked attack, or that there was another course of action
open to the [appellant] and that violence was not therefore justified, or that
his actings were excessive so as to remove the defence of self-defence. There was no support in evidence for any of
the above findings."
In the event, the solicitor advocate for the appellant
advanced only a brief and tentative submission in support of this ground of
appeal. What we have said about the
second ground of appeal is sufficient to dispose of this ground also.