APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
|
Lord Abernethy
Lord Philip
Lord Penrose
|
[2006] HCJAC 46
XC427/05
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD
ABERNETHY
in
APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION
AND SENTENCE
by
ANDREW CHRISTISON MATTHEW
Appellant
against
HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
Respondent
_____________
|
Act: J Johnston, QC; Flynn Russo &
Co., Arbroath
Alt: B McConnachie,
QC, AD; Crown Agent
17 May 2006
[1] Following
a trial in the High Court at Edinburgh the
appellant was convicted of four charges of lewd, indecent and libidinous
practices and behaviour towards three females and one charge of rape of one of
the females, S. Two other charges of
rape of one of the other females, L, were found not proven.
[2] Miss
Johnston, senior counsel for the appellant, informed us that the Crown
presented the case to the jury as a case for the application of the Moorov doctrine. There was a difference in respect of
charge 5, however, the charge of rape of S, in that there was evidence
other than that of the complainer, which came from her sister L and was to the
effect that she had witnessed the events which were said to amount to
rape. There was also evidence from their
mother to the effect that S had come into her bedroom some time after the rape
was said to have taken place, upset and saying that the appellant had hurt
her. In his speech to the jury, the
Advocate Depute submitted that that evidence provided some support for S's evidence
in the form of a de recenti statement
but it was not suggested that it was corroboration for her evidence. In his charge to the jury, however, the trial
judge said this:-
"Now, the
other way round, that is charge 5, you may feel, again the recollection of
the evidence is a matter for you, that there was some or may have been some
corroboration directly of [S]'s account of an incident that happened to her and
you will recall there is the going into her mother's room and you heard about
the potential conflict of the evidence between whether she stayed in the room
and so on but that could be corroboration if you accepted that evidence from
the mother and you have heard the evidence from [S] (it was accepted that this
was a slip of the tongue and a mistake for L), I think about the smell, of
sexual conduct going on and the question of the dog barking and so on. Those are independent pieces of evidence
which, if you accepted them and accepted that they pointed in favour of [S]'s
story, could be regarded as corroboration."
[3] In
his report, the trial judge explained that passage as follows:-
"At [that
passage] I directed the jury that on charge 5 the evidence of [S] could be
corroborated by that of her mother, [EM].
It seemed to me that the account given by [S] was one of an incident
which only finished when she went in tears to her parents' room and said that
her uncle had hurt her. It was properly
to be regarded as part of the res gestae. Her mother's evidence corroborated part of
it. Separately, it also provided
additional support for the corroboration provided by [L], who described the
event from the time she was aware that sex was taking place through to her
sister leaving the room and complaining to her mother that her uncle had hurt
her."
[4] Counsel
submitted that the matter about which EM gave evidence was not part of the res gestae. The alleged rape had finished by that
time. It was not clear how long before
that that it had finished but the statement that S made to her mother could be
no more than a de recenti statement and
could not be corroboration of S's evidence of rape. Reference was made to the case of Bayram Cinci v H M Advocate 2004 S.C.C.R. 267. Accordingly, counsel submitted, this was a misdirection by the trial judge. It concerned an important matter in the trial
and it amounted, accordingly, to a miscarriage of justice in respect of charge
5.
[5] In
response, the Advocate Depute accepted that the direction in question by the
trial judge was a misdirection. The statement made by S to her mother was a de recenti statement but could not be
corroboration of S's evidence of rape.
The Advocate Depute submitted, however, that there had been no
miscarriage of justice. This was because
there was an eye witness to what was said to have happened, namely, L. Her evidence was sufficient to corroborate
S's evidence in relation to this charge.
It was difficult to see how the jury could have taken the mother's
evidence to be corroborative of S's evidence given the passage earlier in the
judge's charge where he had given the jury the definition of rape and directed
them as to what was required for rape to be proved. At that stage he had said, inter alia:-
"Now, the
crime of rape is committed where a man has sexual intercourse with a woman without
her consent, where he has no genuine belief that she was consenting. For a rape to be proved there must be
corroborated evidence that satisfies you beyond reasonable doubt that first,
that sexual intercourse took place and by that I mean that there was
penetration of the vagina ... and that penetration was by the accused's penis."
It was true that the jury had found
charge 3, which was a charge alleging rape of L, not proven but it did not
follow from that that the jury had rejected the evidence that L gave as to rape
of herself, still less that they had rejected her evidence corroborating S's
evidence of rape. The Advocate Depute
submitted that there was ample corroboration here for charge 5 to be found
in L's evidence and that therefore there was no miscarriage of justice.
[6] In
our opinion the concession by the Advocate Depute that the judge's direction to
the effect that the evidence of EM to which we have referred above could be
corroboration of S's evidence of rape was a misdirection
was correctly given. The incident of which
S spoke had finished before she went to her mother's room and told her what had
happened. It was therefore not part of
the res gestae. It was, of course, a de recenti statement but that was not sufficient for it to provide
corroboration for S's evidence of rape.
Authority for this is to be found in the case of Bayram Cinci v H M
Advocate, supra.
[7] Whether
this misdirection amounted to a miscarriage of justice is a more difficult
question. It is not
every misdirection that amounts to a miscarriage of justice. It is important to remember that the question
at this stage is whether a miscarriage of justice has in fact occurred. We are not persuaded that the earlier passage
in the judge's charge to which the Advocate Depute referred can be given much
weight in view of his later direction that the evidence of S's statement to her
mother could be corroborative of her own evidence of rape. However, as we understand it, the evidence of
L on this matter was strongly corroborative of S's evidence. She had said that at the material time she
and S had separate beds in the same room and the appellant was sharing a bed
with S. The trial judge in his report
then described L's evidence as follows:-
"She said
that she heard the appellant doing things to [S]. She said that she could smell it as well,
'the smell that goes with sex'. My notes
read: 'He was having sex with her. I never said or did anything. I never let on I was awake. I didn't think of telling mum or dad then.'"
[8] As
we have said, this evidence was strongly corroborative of S's evidence but with
some hesitation we have come to the conclusion in all the circumstances of the
case that it cannot be affirmed that the jury did not use S's de recenti statement to her mother as
corroboration, which the trial judge had directed them they could do. This is perhaps particularly so given that
the jury found the charge of rape of L herself, for reasons which we cannot
know, not proven. In our opinion,
therefore, the misdirection here did amount to a miscarriage of justice.
[9] For
these reasons we allowed the appeal against conviction in respect of
charge 5 and quashed the conviction on that charge.
[10] Following intimation of our decision the Advocate Depute moved
the Court to grant authority to bring a new prosecution as provided by section 118(1)(c)
of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
After hearing submissions both from the Advocate Depute and from
Miss Johnston, we granted that motion.