APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
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Lord Penrose Lady Cosgrove Lord Bracadale
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[2005HCJAC70] Appeal No: XC587/03 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD PENROSE in APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION by PAMELA REID Appellant; against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent: _______ |
Appellant: M. Scott, Q.C., C. Shead; Wilson McLeod, Edinburgh
Respondent:
G. Bell, Q.C., A.D.; Crown Agent10 June 2005
[1] On 10 April 2002, the appellant was convicted at the High Court at Edinburgh of four of five charges on indictment. In summary, these were:"In respect of charge 5 there was no evidence to entitle the Jury to find that the fatal assault was within the scope of any common criminal purpose embarked upon by the Appellant. Notably:
"In relation to Charge 5, the case for the Crown was that the fatal assault on the deceased, John Brankin, with a knife, was carried out by Clarke. It was argued that the appellant had been acting in concert with Clarke and that what had happened to the deceased fell within the reasonable contemplation of the appellant, at the time when she had returned to Keith Connor's flat with Clarke. In addressing the jury, the Advocate Depute argued that if it had been in the reasonable contemplation of the appellant that Keith Connor, a man the appellant hated and wanted to be stabbed, was going to be stabbed, then it had been also in the reasonable contemplation of the appellant that, as the two men in the flat had been assaulted on the earlier occasion, it was likely that the two men would be assaulted on the later occasion.
In addressing the jury the Advocate Depute founded, in particular, on (i) the history of events prior to 1 August 2001, which had involved the appellant visiting Keith Connor's flat, the police investigating the appellant's visits to the flat and the appellant having ceased visiting the flat, (ii) the appellant having expressed the view, before 1 August 2001, that Keith Connor was a pervert, (iii) the evidence relating to the first visit that the appellant and her three co-accused made to Keith Connor's flat on 1 August 2001, which took place after the appellant had indicated to her co-accused that both Keith Connor and the deceased would be there, (iv) the evidence the jury heard as to the purpose of that visit, which was to go down and fight with the two occupants of the flat, (v) the fact that on account of her presence during the first visit to Keith Connor's flat, the appellant was well aware that both Keith Connor and the deceased had been assaulted, whilst they had been in a drunken stupor and unable to offer any resistance, (vi) the evidence of Marie Cole as to what had been said by the appellant, and by Clarke, in the appellant's presence, when the appellant and Clarke had arrived at Marie Cole's flat, following their first visit to Keith Connor's flat, which had included the appellant stating that she wanted Keith Connor stabbed and that she wanted to go back down to Keith Connor's flat and stab him, because he was a beast, Clarke then saying, on more than one occasion, that she would stab him, Clarke then asking Marie Cole to give her a knife, and on that being refused, Clarke stating that she would get a knife from one of Marie Cole's neighbours, following upon which Clarke and the appellant left the flat, (vii) the fact that the appellant would have known that Keith Connor and the deceased were both likely to be in Keith Connor's flat, in a drunken stupor, when she and Clarke agreed to revisit Keith Connor's flat, (viii) the fact that when the appellant and Clarke left the block of flats, where Marie Cole stayed, the appellant knew that Clarke had a knife and intended to go to Keith Connor's flat and stab him, (ix) the CCTV evidence, (x) what the appellant had stated to the police, when interviewed under caution by PI Boal (Transcript - Crown Production 57), about her hating Keith Connor and wishing he got stabbed because she hated him (Pages 29 and 36), about Clarke leaving Marie Cole's flat to get a knife and obtaining a knife, which the appellant saw and could describe (Page 30), about the route the appellant and Clarke took in returning to Keith Connor's flat, in an effort to avoid being caught on the CCTV with the knife (Page 31), and about what had happened in Keith Connor's flat, after they had entered it on the second occasion (Page 38), (xi) the fact that when the appellant and Clarke reached Keith Connor's flat on the second occasion, the appellant had not stayed outside but had entered the flat with Clarke and (xii) Keith Connor's evidence that when Clarke entered his flat on the second occasion he saw that she had a knife in her hand, which he identified as being Crown Label 1. Crown Label 1 was a black handled kitchen knife, which had been recovered by the police from the flat in Moncrieffe House occupied by the Crown Witness Stephen Smith and his girlfriend Emma Chalmers."
"In all that has been said this limitation is plainly implied, That to effect all concerned, the homicide must be done in pursuance of the common enterprise. For if the killer strike on some accidental and peculiar quarrel of his own, nowise connected with or subservient to the original design; or, though it be in some sort connected with that design, if a resolution of the whole party to accomplish their object by such extreme means cannot reasonably be inferred in the whole circumstances of the case, certainly all the reasons fail for which, by the construction of the law, the act of one may be carried over into the persons of his associates..."
The Lord Justice General proceeded to comment on the effect of this passage in relation to homicide carried out in prosecution of another felony. The present case does not fall easily into the category of cases in which murder is committed in furtherance of, say, a housebreaking. Rather it is of the nature of a case in which a murder is proceeding, and another becomes involved, becoming an additional victim of the initial perpetrators. It would be a matter of circumstances whether liability for a second killing extended to all of the participants in what must be taken, ex hypothesi, to have been an initial criminal purpose of limited scope. One test would be Hume's: whether the second incident was some accidental and peculiar quarrel nowise connected with or subservient to the original design. It would be a matter for the jury to conclude on the evidence whether the extended assault was of that nature. So it was, in this case, wholly for the jury to decide what inferences fell to be drawn from the evidence they accepted.
[24] In our opinion, the jury had ample evidence to support the inference that the appellant was party to a common criminal purpose that was likely, indeed highly likely, to extend to include Brankin if, as anticipated, he were found drunk and incapable in Connor's flat, when the attack on Connor was resumed by the appellant and Clarke. [25] Accordingly, whether one takes the view that there was one continuing criminal purpose reflected in two successive incidents, or two separate criminal enterprises, there was a basis in evidence on which the jury could properly conclude that the appellant was guilty art and part with Clarke of the murder of John Brankin. The appeal is refused.