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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> Haggart v. Procurator Fiscal [2003] ScotHC 40 (10 July 2003)
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Cite as: [2003] ScotHC 40
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Haggart v. Procurator Fiscal [2003] ScotHC 40 (10 July 2003)
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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
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Lord Osborne Lady Paton Temporary Judge C.G.B. Nicholson, C.B.E., Q.C.
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Appeal No: XJ574/02 OPINION OF LORD OSBORNE in APPEAL under Section 174(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 by JULIE HAGGART Appellant and Minuter; against PROCURATOR FISCAL, Airdrie Respondent: _______ |
Appellant and Minuter: Shead; Drummond Miller (for Dunipace Brown, Cumbernauld)
Respondent: Dewar, Q.C., A.D.; Crown Agent
10 July 2003
[1] This is an appeal under section 174(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 from a decision of the sheriff at Airdrie dated 14 May 2002. In that decision, the sheriff repelled a plea by the appellant to the competency of the proceedings which was based on the ground that an infringement had occurred of the appellant's right under Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights by the denial to her of a hearing "within a reasonable time". That plea was originally stated in a Minute lodged in the proceedings in Airdrie Sheriff Court at the instance of the appellant raising a devolution issue within the meaning of Schedule 6 of the Scotland Act 1998 on the grounds set forth in it.
[2] The factual circumstances upon which the sheriff made his decision are set out in a written Decision by the sheriff, dated 14 May 2002, which followed a hearing before him on 2 May 2002. It is appropriate for me to summarise those circumstances here. The sheriff was informed that the appellant had been employed as an assistant manageress by McCashin's Service Stations, working at three of their premises between 15 October 1998 and 4 February 1999. Her duties had included making up wages and preparing takings for banking. In October 1998 discrepancies in cash had been noted and, on enquiry by one of the managers, it had appeared that it was always the appellant who was involved in the banking on the occasions when discrepancies arose. Enquiries had been continued within the organisation of the appellant's employers and by 4 February 1999, the firm's accountant confirmed the earlier suspicions. The appellant had been confronted with these suspicions on 4 February 1999, when she admitted her wrongdoing and told her employers that the missing money was in her house. She had then gone to her home with her employer and a sum of £2,000 was recovered. The police had been contacted and had attended on that day. The appellant had been detained and interviewed under tape recorded conditions, when it was alleged that she had admitted the embezzlement and described the method used by her. She had then been released pending further enquiries. It was a matter of agreement before the sheriff and before us that the period of time to be considered in relation to Article 6(1) of the Convention commenced on 4 February 1999.
[3] The sheriff was further informed that thereafter, at the request of the police, the area manageress of the appellant's employers had checked all their business documentation, accounts, ledgers, bank pay-ins, etc. for all of the three garages involved for discrepancies. Following that, all of the paperwork had been delivered to the police and examined by the reporting CID officer. After the police had examined this material, it appeared that they had contacted the appellant's employers again to have further checks carried out. The area manageress who had carried out the original checks had been able to provide some further documents, but not all of those desired by the police. The police had then sought further evidence from the appellant's employers in relation to the banking of money. The area manageress involved in these investigations had been expected to undertake this work on behalf of the police at the same time as she had been doing her own job for her employers. By 22 November 2000, she had told the police that no further documentation could be traced. The police had checked the documentation and had traced witnesses. However, there had been further enquiries in relation to the banking of takings, which involved the reporting officer trying to obtain confirmation from the bankers of the appellant's employers of the amounts lodged on various dates. Those bankers had produced, in error, information for the wrong year, namely 1999 to 2000, as opposed to 1998 to 1999. When the bankers were asked for the information for the correct year, the police had been told that they had been asked not to provide this, since it would have cost the employers of the appellant money for them to do so. Subsequently the employers of the appellant had produced banking sheets themselves which showed the information which the police desired to have.
[4] In elaboration of this information, the sheriff was informed that the police had requested the appellant's employers to locate and collate all the relevant documentation bearing on the discrepancies and defalcations and thereafter examine and check them for discrepancies. This was part of the work which had been undertaken by the area manageress who had been expected to do this work in addition to carrying out her usual duties. Following this procedure and after further discussions between the police and the appellant's employers, a report was eventually prepared and submitted to the procurator fiscal on 15 December 2000. Thus from the date of the detention and interview of the appellant to the submitting of a report to the procurator fiscal a period of some 22 months elapsed.
[5] The police report having been sent to the procurator fiscal on 15 December 2000, due to what was described as "the normal pressures of business within the fiscal's office" the report had not been allocated to a specified depute fiscal for precognition until 24 April 2001, just over four months after its receipt. The report was in fact allocated to a depute fiscal who was, at the material time, on maternity leave, from which she did not return until 30 April 2001. The first date on which she had been allocated precognition duties and was thus able to consider the report fully was 10 May 2001. Thereafter, she had instructed that the police lodge the productions in the case, including the tape recording of the interview with the appellant. On 18 May 2001 this tape recording was lodged and on 21 May 2001 a transcription of the tape was instructed by the depute fiscal. Other information had been requested from the reporting officer and he had attended for precognition on 8 June 2001. On 14 June 2001 the depute fiscal involved asked a senior member of the staff in the office of the procurator fiscal for further time to prepare the case. On 4 July 2001 the principal depute had instructed the depute involved to send a report to the Crown Office outlining the nature of the case, the delay which had occurred and other circumstances and to seek Crown Counsel's instructions. That report had been sent on 27 July 2001. Crown Counsel responded with an instruction that the appellant should be placed on petition. The respondent sought and obtained a petition warrant following which the appellant appeared on petition by arrangement on 11 September 2001. Thus from receipt of the police report in the respondent's office until the appearance of the appellant on petition, there elapsed a period of nine months. Thereafter the case was fully precognosced and again reported to the Crown Office at the beginning of 2002, when instructions were given that the case should be reduced to one under summary procedure. The sheriff was informed that the documentary evidence in the case occupied some seven bound volumes. Thus, from the appearance of the appellant on petition there elapsed a period of five months before the reduction of the case to summary procedure.
[6] A further feature of the case, about which the sheriff was informed, involved several steps being taken by the appellant's solicitor with a view to securing that progress should be made. In particular, the appellant had consulted a solicitor in April 1999, some two months after her detention and interview by the police. He had written to the respondent on 27 April 1999 advising that he had been instructed in the matter and requesting an indication of the status of the enquiries. The respondent had replied, saying that he had had no report from the police in relation to the matter. There had then been written certain further letters by the appellant's solicitor up to November 2000, which all elicited the same response, namely that there was no trace of any police report. The solicitor had provided his client's full particulars and date of birth. On 23 May 2000, the respondent had written to the solicitor informing him that the police "say they have no trace of the incident". However, in September 2001, the respondent wrote directly to the appellant advising her of the existence of the petition warrant and giving her the opportunity to answer the warrant on 11 September 2001. Despite the earlier correspondence, the respondent did not write to the appellant's solicitor.
[7] It is also appropriate to notice the history of the case following upon the issue of the sheriff's decision on 14 May 2002. On 21 May 2002 the present appeal was lodged. The grounds of appeal are set forth in the Note of Appeal. The appeal came before this court on 4 December 2002, when, in respect of lack of time to hear the appeal on that date, it was continued to a date to be afterwards fixed, the court directing that an early diet should be fixed. Thereafter, on 4 March 2003, the appeal once again came before the court. On this occasion, on the motion of the appellant, it was continued to a date to be afterwards fixed in order to enable a further devolution issue minute to be lodged, relating to the period of delay which had occurred during the appeal process. On that occasion it was accepted on the appellant's behalf that that further minute should have been lodged previously, so as to enable the matter to be dealt with on that date. However, an undertaking was given on behalf of the appellant that the delay occasioned by the lodging of the further minute would not be founded upon. On 20 March 2003, the further minute just mentioned was lodged. In it criticisms are made of the Lord Advocate in respect of an alleged failure by him to "invite Justiciary Office to fix a hearing of the appeal despite the obligations laid upon him by the Act (the Scotland Act 1998)." Eventually, the appeal came before us on 29 April 2003, when it was argued.
[8] On behalf of the appellant, it was pointed out that the sheriff, having examined the circumstances of the case, had considered that an explanation of the passage of time prior to the institution of proceedings had been required from the prosecutor. It was contended that no real explanation had been given for the delay involved in the case while it was being handled by the police. Furthermore, there was no real explanation available as to the delays in the handling of the matter in the office of the respondent. It had been suggested to the sheriff that the case was one involving complexity. While there might have been a considerable volume of documentation necessary to prove the case, it was contended that there was nothing unusually complex about it; it was a simple case of embezzlement, which had been admitted by the appellant. In view of the inadequate and unsatisfactory explanations given to the sheriff for the delays involved, the sheriff was in error in concluding that no breach of the appellant's right under Article 6(1) had occurred. Certain features of the handling of the case were astonishing. In particular, the reaction of the respondent to the correspondence directed to him by the appellant's solicitor. There had been an early interest in progress on the part of the appellant. A major criticism could be made of the handling of the matter by the police, in respect that they could and should have conducted the necessary investigations themselves in an expeditious manner, as opposed to leaving the matter to the manageress of the appellant's employers, who had been expected to conduct investigations at the same time as undertaking her ordinary employment; furthermore the police had failed to notice the progress, or lack of it, made by her.
[9] At page 6 of the sheriff's decision, he narrated that he did not understand that the solicitor for the appellant was seriously attacking as unreasonable the period of time following the submission of the police report to the respondent, although he did draw attention to the period of four months which had elapsed prior to the allocation of the case to any particular depute and some of the periods thereafter. Counsel for the appellant made clear that he was not adopting that position. Criticism was made of those periods.
[10] It was clear that the sheriff had relied heavily upon the decision in Reilly v. H.M. Advocate 2000 S.C.C.R. 879. He had been wrong to do so. As appeared from paragraph 7 of that decision, the circumstances there differed materially from the position in the present case, where there had been a detailed confession on the part of the appellant. In that case there had apparently been a necessity for a very substantial investigation, going far beyond what had occurred or had been necessary here. The admission made in that case had been vague and unspecific. Reilly v. H.M. Advocate could readily be distinguished from the present case. For that reason, the sheriff had misdirected himself at page 6 of his decision, where he stated that Reilly v. H.M. Advocate was "... entirely in point in relation to this case. Indeed, although the amount involved in the charge was considerably greater than the amount alleged to have been embezzled here, the circumstances surrounding the history and preparation of the case are remarkably similar". In O'Brien and Ryan v. H.M. Advocate 2001 S.C.C.R. 542 it was made plain by Lord Prosser at page 546 that if delay occurred as a result of work having been overlooked through carelessness, or having simply been put aside with no place in the queue, the delay would be unnecessary and without a reasonable basis and might result in a breach of Article 6(1) of the Convention. That was what, in effect, had occurred here. The police had allowed the initial investigation of the matter to become very prolonged through neglect on their part. Furthermore there had been, against that background, unexplained and unnecessary delay in the office of the respondent. Delay having occurred while the case was in the hands of the police, it might reasonably have been expected that it would have been given some priority by the respondent. There was no indication that that had occurred. In these circumstances, the sheriff ought to have concluded that, by 14 May 2002, a breach of Article 6(1) had occurred. At that stage a trial was scheduled to take place in July 2002, some three and a half years after the starting point for the consideration. Counsel for the appellant next proceeded to consider the history of the matter following upon the decision by the sheriff. The case had not been treated with sufficient urgency by the Lord Advocate following upon that decision. Looking at the history of the case as a whole, a period of more than four years had elapsed from the starting point of the consideration, which was an unreasonable period in all the circumstances. The appeal ought to be allowed. [11] The Advocate depute for the respondent submitted that the approach followed by the sheriff could not be faulted. It was accepted that he had placed considerable reliance upon Reilly v. H.M. Advocate, but he had been careful not to say that that case was in all respects the same as the present one. In that case there had been certain unexplained gaps of time, but an ultra-critical line had not been taken by the court. Careful consideration was necessary in each case. It was difficult to draw parallels between different cases. Looking at the matter generally, it was plain from what had been said by the sheriff that the present case did not involve a straightforward investigation. It had not been unreasonable for the police to enlist the assistance of the management of the appellant's employers. It was not correct to say that the investigation had simply been handed over to the management. It was accepted that the accountant of the firm in question had made enquiries before the police had become involved; however, that had merely triggered the subsequent more detailed enquiry. There was no material distinction between the circumstances of this case and those of Reilly v. H.M. Advocate. The appellant had not chosen to criticise the conduct of the matter by the respondent before the sheriff, although she had resolved to do so here. As regards the handling of the case in the office of the respondent, it was submitted that he would not have seen the need for any particular priority in dealing with it. The reference at page 3 of the sheriff's decision to "the normal pressures of business" indicated that the matter of the priority to be given to the case had been considered by the respondent.
[12] Turning to deal with the significance of the period of time which had elapsed since the date of the sheriff's decision, 14 May 2002, counsel for the appellant had accepted that no point was to be taken regarding the period from 4 March 2003. In the Minute lodged on 20 March 2003 the appellant made certain specific criticisms of the Crown. That contained in paragraph 3(e) of the Minute was wholly unreasonable. The fact was that the Crown had no power to cause particular cases to be allocated to a particular appeal court roll or to prioritise cases which were before the court.
[13] In connection with delay in the appeal court, the Advocate depute relied upon Procurator Fiscal of Elgin v. Cunningham and Others 22 March 2002 (unreported). In that case there had been delay amounting to around nine and a half months in the hearing of an appeal, a period comparable with that which had elapsed in the present case. The court had considered that, while the delay was certainly longer, indeed substantially longer, than would have been desirable, no breach of Article 6(1) of the Convention had occurred. That case was a complete answer to the criticism of the Lord Advocate in connection with the handling of the present appeal. Accordingly, on any view, the second devolution issue minute should be refused. The Advocate depute also relied upon Gillespie v. H.M. Advocate 2003 S.C.C.R. 82. It had there been indicated, in paragraph 38, of the Opinion of the Court that, during the course of 2002 new systems had been introduced to prevent the recurrence of problems of delay in the appeal court. While there might still be certain delays in the hearing of appeals, it could not be said that those delays were unreasonable.
[14] Counsel for the appellant in reply said that he did not intend to depart from the undertaking given on 4 March 2003. That date was the limit of the time which was criticised in the second devolution issue minute. Despite what had been said by the Advocate depute, the Crown did have the opportunity to influence the prioritisation of appeals. So far as Gillespie v. H.M. Advocate was concerned, the improvements in practice described in that case had an application only to solemn appeals, of which this was not one. Reference was also made to Warnes v. H.M. Advocate 2000 S.C.C.R. 1127. It was the duty of the State to allocate sufficient judicial resources to ensure that criminal appeals were determined within a reasonable time, as appeared from paragraph 10 at page 1130.
[15] In the course of the hearing before us, there was no dispute between counsel for the appellant and the Advocate depute as to the starting point in the history of the case from which the running of time had to be considered for the purposes of Article 6(1). That date was agreed to be 4 February 1999, the date on which the appellant was detained and interviewed under tape recorded conditions, during which the allegations involved were put to her. That date had also been the subject of agreement before the sheriff. So far as the end point of the period is concerned, I consider that it should be regarded as being the contemplated date of the trial of the appellant, as that was recognised to be before the sheriff. That date was one in July 2002. Thus the total period requiring to be considered is one of three years five months. The question which I consider then arises is whether that period of delay is, in the context of this case, a cause for real concern. I have little hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it is. In these circumstances, it is appropriate to look to the Crown as the prosecuting authority for an explanation of that period. While it is the whole period which requires to be considered in the present context, attention was focused in the course of the discussion before us on two particular parts of that period. The first of these was the period between 4 February 1999 and 15 December 2000, on which latter date the police sent their report to the respondent. The second period upon which attention was focused was that between 15 December 2000, when the police report was sent to the respondent and 10 May 2001, when the work of precognoscing the case actually began. As regards the first of these periods, it was indicated to us, as it had been to the sheriff, that, following upon the reporting of the matter to the police, they had relied heavily upon the assistance of a manageress of the appellant's employers in collecting business documentation, accounts, ledgers, bank pay-ins etc., which had to be examined for discrepancies. Following that, the paperwork involved was delivered to the police and examined by them. However, thereafter, the police again communicated with the appellant's employers concerning further material which they required. The same manageress was engaged to provide further documentation. The manageress concerned undertook the work required by the police at the same as she was doing her own full-time job for the appellant's employers. While it may be understandable that the police adopted the approach which they did, I do not consider that it was satisfactory for this work to be dealt with in the time-consuming way that it was. The involvement of a manageress, who was undertaking a full-time job, in the investigation was likely to involve substantial delays in the completion of the work, which in fact occurred. No specific indication was given as to why the police themselves did not undertake the work concerned. In any event, the outcome was that the police investigation was conducted without reasonable expedition and occupied a period of twenty two months.
[16] The second period upon which attention was focused was that between the reporting of the case to the respondent and the commencement of the work of precognition, a period just short of five months. During that period of time no action at all was taken towards precognoscing the case. Beyond its being said that this was due to "the normal pressures of business within the fiscal's office" no explanation was forthcoming as to this particular period of time. Although it was argued that the case would have been accorded appropriate priority, no information as to that was available. In my opinion, it is both surprising and regrettable that, the case having been the subject of a police investigation extending over twenty two months, it was not even allocated to a depute for precognition for a further 5 months.
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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
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Lord Osborne Lady Paton Temporary Judge C.G.B. Nicholson, C.B.E., Q.C.
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Appeal No: XJ574/02 OPINION OF LADY PATON in APPEAL under Section 174(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 by JULIE HAGGART Appellant and Minuter; against PROCURATOR FISCAL, Airdrie Respondent: _______ |
Appellant and Minuter: Shead; Drummond Miller (for Dunipace Brown, Cumbernauld)
Respondent: Dewar, Q.C., A.D.; Crown Agent
10 July 2003
Devolution minute: alleged delay
[19] On 4 February 1999, the appellant, Julie Haggart, was interviewed and detained by the police in connection with alleged embezzlement. Following investigations by the police and by the respondent, her trial was expected to take place in about mid-2002. However the appellant lodged a devolution minute, contending that the passage of about 31/2 years between 4 February 1999 and the expected trial date constituted such a delay that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been breached. The sheriff considered the minute in May 2002, and rejected it. He issued a report dated 14 May 2002, and repelled the appellant's plea to the competency. The appellant appeals against the sheriff's decision.
[20] In my view, the period of 31/2 years was not unreasonable in the circumstances of the appellant's case. Any allegation of financial misappropriation requires careful investigation and preparation prior to trial. The fact that the appellant's employers had concluded that embezzlement had taken place, and that the appellant had made an alleged admission, described a modus operandi, and produced £2,000 said to have been taken during the alleged embezzlement, did not remove the need for painstaking work by the police and the respondent's department in collecting, checking, and collating all the evidence necessary for the presentation of a corroborated case in court: cf. dicta of Lord Prosser in Reilly v. H. M. Advocate, 2000 S.C.C.R. 879, at page 883C: "Notwithstanding the fact that the eventual indictment can be described as simple, with a quite limited number of witnesses, it is important to have regard to the very substantial enquiries which were seen as appropriate, and the work which would be required, and was clearly carried out, in reaching decisions as to what could be established, corroborated and used as a foundation for indictment." [21] In the present case, the indictment ultimately concerned a fairly moderate sum (£4,507) and a relatively brief period of alleged embezzlement (5 November 1998 until 4 February 1999). Nevertheless, three garages were involved, each with individual transactions, records, and business documentation. The sheriff described the police investigations as follows: " ... at the request of the police, the complainers' area manageress checked all their business documentation, accounts, ledgers, bank pay-ins etc for all three garages for discrepancies. Thereafter all the paperwork was delivered to the police and examined by the reporting CID officer. After the police had examined the material they apparently contacted the complainers again to have further checks done. The area manageress who had carried out the checks was able to provide some more documents but not all. The police then sought evidence from the complainers in relation to the banking of monies. I was told that the area manageress was doing this work for the police at the same time as she was doing her own job for the complainers. By 22 November 2000 she told the police that no further documentation could be traced. The police checked the documentation and traced witnesses. There was further enquiry in relation to the banking of takings and the reporting officer tried to obtain confirmation from the complainers' bank of the amounts lodged on various dates. The bank produced in error the information for the wrong year, namely 1999/2000 as opposed to 1998/1999. When the bank was asked for the information for the correct year, the police were told that the bank had been asked not [to] do this as it would cost the complainers money to do so. The complainers then produced bank sheets which showed the information. Accordingly the timetable following interview and detention on 4 February was as follows. The police requested that the complainers locate and collate all the relevant documentation bearing on the discrepancies and defalcations and thereafter examine and check them for discrepancies. This was undertaken by the area manageress who carried out the work during her working hours and in addition to carrying out her usual duties. Thereafter the police examined the material and then requested further information. The results of the enquiries were considered by the police and following further contact with the complainers, a report was eventually prepared and submitted to the procurator fiscal on 15 December 2000. From the date of detention and interview, there was a period of some 22 months before a report was submitted to the procurator fiscal ..." [22] At a later stage in his report, the sheriff notes: "From the receipt of the police report, there was a period of 9 months until the appearance of the petitioner on petition." Some 5 months later, the matter was reduced to summary level. [23] The police were in my view fully entitled to carry out thorough investigations. It is understandable that they relied upon a member of the complainers' staff, who was more familiar with the book-keeping and banking practices of the garages, to assist them. Further, while the police were making their investigations, it was in my view quite proper of the respondent simply to await their report. Allegations of financial dishonesty cannot be unravelled, clarified and checked with the same expedition as a less complex crime such as an alleged assault.
[24] Once the police reported the matter to the respondent on 15 December 2000, further careful investigation, assessment, and cross-checking by the staff in the respondent's office became necessary: cf. dicta of Lord Prosser in Reilly, quoted above. At that time, the respondent's office would have other cases requiring attention, some of greater gravity or urgency than the appellant's case. Bearing in mind certain features of the appellant's case (for example, the relatively modest sum involved; the fact that no young children were required as witnesses; the possession by the respondent of documentation evidencing transactions; the lack of any 110-day time-limit, as the appellant was on bail; and the fact that ultimately seven volumes of evidence were collated) it would not in my opinion be surprising if other cases were given greater priority and were processed with greater rapidity. The fact that the appellant's case was reported to the respondent on 15 December 2000, but was not allocated to a member of staff within the fiscal's office until 24 April 2001 (when a depute fiscal returned from maternity leave), has to be viewed against the background of an existing case-load, with certain matters demanding higher priority. I do not accept the suggestion that the length of the police investigation (22 months) automatically rendered the appellant's case high priority when it reached the procurator-fiscal's office.
[25] While possible prejudice to the appellant was not debated to any extent at the appeal hearing, paragraph 3(d) of the appellant's Note of Appeal states: "The appellant has suffered prejudice as a result of the unwarranted delay in the bringing of the prosecution. With the passage of time, the appellant and the relevant witnesses will have their recollection of the various office procedures operated by the complainers diluted. Records helpful to the appellant's case may have been routinely destroyed in the ordinary course of business by the complainers since 4 February 1999." Further, in paragraph 3(e) of the Note of Appeal, the appellant adds that: " ...[she] has suffered and continues to suffer from stress and depression as a result of the case against her not being able to be concluded timeously." [26] I accept that the appellant has suffered uncertainty and anxiety. But in my view those consequences are the inevitable result of any investigation into alleged financial misconduct. So far as documentation is concerned, the information placed before the appeal court tended to suggest that the documentation finally selected as relevant to the alleged embezzlement had been safely collected in seven bound volumes. Such documentation is likely to provide at least some record of past events, despite the passage of time. As for documents which might assist the appellant, the appellant's lawyers had ample time to consult with their client, make further investigations, and if necessary apply to the court to recover any such documentation. On the whole matter therefore I am not persuaded that the passage of about 31/2 years resulted in any significant prejudice to the appellant.
[27] In all the circumstances, I agree with the sheriff's conclusion that there was no breach of Article 6. I would refuse the appeal against the sheriff's decision on that matter.
Second devolution minute: overall passage of time including period between sheriff's decision in May 2002 until appeal court hearing on 4 March 2003 [28] Counsel for the appellant advised that the appeal against the sheriff's dismissal of the first devolution minute came before the appeal court in December 2002, but could not be argued due to pressure of business.
[29] The case subsequently came before the appeal court on 4 March 2003. On that date, counsel for the appellant sought a continuation of the appeal in order to lodge a second devolution minute reflecting the overall passage of time from the charge on 4 February 1999 until the appeal court hearing on 4 March 2003. Counsel on that occasion undertook not to found upon any further time passing following upon the granting of his motion for a continuation. On that undertaking, the motion was granted, and the appeal was continued.
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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY |
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Lord Osborne Lady Paton Temporary Judge C.G.B. Nicholson, C.B.E., Q.C.
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Appeal No: XJ574/02 OPINION OF TEMPORARY JUDGE C.G.B. NICHOLSEON, CBE, QC in APPEAL under Section 174(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 by JULIE HAGGART Appellant and Minuter; against PROCURATOR FISCAL, Airdrie Respondent: _______ |
Appellant and Minuter: Shead; Drummond Miller (for Dunipace Brown, Cumbernauld)
Respondent: Dewar, Q.C., A.D.; Crown Agent
10 July 2003