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Lord Kirkwood Lord Osborne Lady Cosgrove
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C804/99
OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD KIRKWOOD in CONTINUED APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE by WILLIAM SCOTT ELLIS Appellant against HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE Respondent _____________ |
Appellant: R. Anderson, Q.C.; Douglas Thomson & Co
Respondent: D. Batchelor, Q.C., A.D.
31 August 2001
[1] The appellant is William Scott Ellis who pled guilty in the High Court at Glasgow on an indictment containing a number of charges in an amended form. In effect, in respect of the two common law charges, the sentencing judge imposed a cumulo sentence of nine years' imprisonment and on the other charges he imposed concurrent sentences. The appellant has appealed against the sentence of nine years' imprisonment in respect of the two common law charges.
[2] The first of these, which is charge 4 on the indictment as amended, was a charge of breaking into his wife's house, assaulting her, presenting a handgun at her, compelling her to consume a quantity of drugs and thereafter abducting her, carrying her to a motor vehicle and then between 3 and 7 June 1999, at various places confining her in the car against her will, repeatedly applying handcuffs to her arms and legs, repeatedly presenting the handgun at her and placing her in such a state of fear and alarm for her safety that she jumped from the car when it was in motion, all to her injury.
[3] The second charge to which he pled guilty, which is number 5 on the indictment, was a charge of assaulting the daughter of the first complainer and of compelling her to consume a quantity of tablets, all to her injury and to the danger of her life.
[4] The circumstances of the two offences are not in dispute. They are set out in full in the report of the sentencing judge and we do not need to rehearse them.
[5] At the time of the offences the appellant had been unemployed for about thirteen years. His previous marriage had ended in divorce and he had subsequently married his present wife, but in June 1999 they had separated. This led to the appellant becoming clinically depressed, especially because he was unable to accept that the marriage was at an end. In early 1999 he was admitted to Hairmyres Hospital and was treated there for his depressive illness, both as an in-patient and as an out-patient. On one occasion he took an overdose of the tablets prescribed for him and at one point he was kept under observation because of suicidal tendencies.
[6] Counsel for the appellant submitted to us that the sentencing judge had not given sufficient weight to the personal circumstances of the appellant and, in particular, counsel referred to the effect which the estrangement from his wife had had on the mental and emotional state of the appellant. Counsel stressed that when the offences were committed he was 40 years of age, he had only a minor record and had never previously served a custodial sentence. He had no intention to harm his wife or his step-daughter with the gun which he had obtained. We were told that the marriage had been under considerable strain, and that had been recognised by the appellant and his wife and they had sought guidance from the pastor of their church. In May 1999 his wife told him that their marriage was finally over. He had previously suffered from periods of marked depression and after she told him that the marriage was at an end he had spent two periods in hospital after taking an overdose. He had apparently received a prescription drug, but due to error he had been able to obtain larger amounts of the drug prescribed for him than he should have received. From 28 May to 2 June he had ingested large quantities of that drug and he had found it difficult to distinguish between fantasy and reality. He had eventually decided that he would kill himself if he could not achieve a reconciliation with his wife and it was for that reason that he had acquired the handgun. After the offences had been committed he had tried to commit suicide. Counsel submitted that in the foregoing circumstances the sentence of nine years' imprisonment had been excessive.
[7] We note that the sentencing judge regarded the appellant's conduct as both predetermined and deliberate in execution, and we have no doubt that, on the narrative which he gives, he was more than entitled to take that view. As he points out, the appellant's conduct involved leaving a young girl in a drugged, unconscious state alone in the house. His own counsel described his treatment of his wife as that of an animal. Again the sentencing judge was entitled to note that her ordeal must have been terrifying and humiliating and that it continued over a period of days and it has undoubtedly had serious psychological consequences for her.
[8] In our view, even giving full weight to the personal, and indeed, sad circumstances of the appellant, it is quite impossible to say that the sentence of nine years was excessive. Indeed, had it not been for those circumstances, we consider that a more severe sentence would have been merited. We are therefore unable to regard the sentence which was imposed as being excessive and the appeal against sentence is accordingly refused.
VA