Scottish Court of Session Decisions

OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION [2013] CSOH 63

A191/10

OPINION OF LORD BRAILSFORD in the cause (FIRST) GARRY RICHMOND STEWART; (SECOND) CALUM RODERICK RENTON STEWART; (THIRD) LINDEN JANE ROSS STEWART or STEPHEN; and (FOURTH) LEONIE ELIZABETH DENHOLM STEWART or GRIFFIN Pursuers; against (FIRST) CLIVE RICHARD MICHAEL FRANKS; (SECOND) GIFFORD WILLIAM BRUCE; (THIRD) ROANO DORIAN PIEROTTI; (FOURTH) FIONA DUBOIS HAY; (FIFTH) TOBY KENNEDY; (SIXTH) DR HARRY MOSELEY; (SEVENTH) PROFESSOR M. SAMUEL EMJAMEL; and (EIGHTH) MS CAROL GOODMAN Defenders: ________________

Pursuers: McNeill QC, Ross; Turcan Connell

Defenders: Mitchell QC, Olson; Balfour + Manson LLP (First, Second and Third Defenders)

Party (Fourth Defender)

26 April 2013

[1] In this action the pursuers are the children of the late Alfred George Denholm Stewart ("the testator") who died on 29 April 2008. The first, second and third defenders are the executors nominated by the testator in a will dated 26 August 2005 ("the 2005 will") as amended by a codicil dated 10 January 2008 and further by a further codicil dated 2 April 2008. The fourth defender is the beneficiary of a specific bequest in terms of the 2005 will. The fifth defender is the son of the testator's stepdaughter. The sixth, seventh and eighth defenders are trustees of the Medical Laser Research Fund. The testator established a trust, the Barbara Stewart Scottish Laser Trust Centre for Cancer ("the Barbara Stewart Trust") in January 1999. That trust was a beneficiary in terms of a will made by the testator on 22 March 2000. The Barbara Stewart Trust was wound up in August 2009 and its assets were transferred to the Medical Laser Research Fund. There was no appearance in this action by the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth defenders. In this action the pursuers sought a number of remedies. By the time the action came to proof before answer only three conclusions remained of concern to the parties and for determination by the court. These were the first, second and third conclusions in which the pursuers seek production and reduction of the 2005 will and production and reduction of the two codicils to the said will dated respectively 10 January and 2 April 2008. There also remained extant for determination by the court the first plea-in-law for the compearing defenders, that the pursuers had no title and interest to sue.

[2] At proof, the pursuers adduced the evidence of the second named pursuer, Calum Roderick Renton Stewart ("Mr Stewart") a son of the testator born in 1967, Leonie Elizabeth Denholm Stewart or Griffin ("Mrs Griffin"), being the fourth named pursuer who is a daughter of the testator born in 1968, Mrs Lynne Buchan, the first wife of the testator, Colin McLeod, a son of the testator's second wife and Professor Graeme Yorston, a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist. In addition to these witnesses, the pursuers tendered as evidence, without objection, an affidavit of a daughter of the said Colin McLeod. It will be noted that two of the pursuers, the testator's children Garry Richard Stewart born in 1963 and Linden Jane Ross Stewart or Stephen born in 1966 did not give evidence. It was explained by their siblings who did give evidence that both of these persons had suffered very serious illness and as a result thereof were not in a position to give evidence. I accept that in those circumstances no adverse inference was to be drawn from those persons' failure to give evidence.

[3] Before setting out the evidence of these witnesses, I will set forth some undisputed outline facts which emerged from the evidence and give some structure and chronology to the background against which evidence was led in the case. The testator was born in 1937. He was brought up in Dunfermline, attending the high school in that town and progressed to the University of Edinburgh where he took a degree in agriculture in 1958. He married his first wife, Lynne Richmond, in 1961. They had four children, the first to fourth pursuers. The testator met Barbara McLeod in about 1968 and conducted an adulterous relationship with her. In 1980 the testator and his first wife separated. They were divorced in 1986. The testator married Barbara McLeod in or about 1989. In the summer of 1993, Barbara Stewart (as she by then was) was diagnosed with inoperable lung cancer. She died of that disease on 1^st April 1999.

[4] I turn now to the evidence. Mr Stewart spoke to he and his siblings experiencing what would be regarded as an unhappy childhood. His father was a wealthy man, a self made builder and property developer who had prospered in business. There was no complaint as to his father's ability or willingness to provide for Mr Stewart or his siblings in a material sense. However, at an emotional level, the witness spoke to his father being distant. He did not participate in what might be regarded as normal family activities such as taking Mr Stewart and his siblings to football matches, social activities and the like. He also spoke of his father behaving in an abusive manner towards his mother. Whilst his mother appeared to devote her time to looking after her children and cleaning and cooking for the family, Mr Stewart described his father as being strict and controlling and possessing a short temper. He appears to have been particularly unpleasant towards his wife, Mr Stewart's mother. According to Mr Stewart, he displayed no patience towards the lady. On a number of occasions this "stepped over into physical abuse". As a boy, Mr Stewart remembered being closer to his maternal grandparents, in particular his grandfather than he was to his father. His maternal grandfather died when Mr Stewart was aged about 15. While Mr Stewart spoke to his father displaying violence and aggression towards his mother on more than one occasion, he remembered one instance in particular. His mother had been out visiting a female friend and left Mr Stewart and his siblings in the care of their maternal grandparents. When the testator returned and discovered his wife was absent from the home he was very angry. According to Mr Stewart, when his mother returned home later that evening, his father "went ballistic". Mr Stewart and his siblings were terrified and ran to their bedrooms. He could hear what he believed was his father assaulting his mother. He said that his grandfather tried to intervene and prevent the physical abuse being perpetrated by the testator. This was apparently to little avail. Mr Stewart also remembers discovering at some stage in his childhood that his father was carrying out an adulterous affair and was apparently consorting with a lady who lived with her family in Dunfermline relatively close to where Mr Stewart lived with his parents in Dalgety Bay. The lady with whom the testator was conducting the affair was Mrs McLeod, although that was unknown to Mr Stewart at the time. Eventually in about 1980 when Mr Stewart was about 12 years of age, his mother asked his father to leave the matrimonial home which he did. They subsequently divorced.

[5] Following his parents' divorce Mr Stewart and his siblings, continued to reside with their mother. Their father continued to visit them on a weekly basis. His behaviour towards his children and indeed his ex-wife did not, on the evidence of Mr Stewart, improve appreciably following the divorce. At a slightly later stage, presumably when he was approaching the end of his schooling or had embarked on student life, Mr Stewart spoke to working for his father on his various building projects during his holidays. He became interested in building and construction and his father wished him to become involved in his companies. Mr Stewart spoke to the same process having been experienced by his elder brother Garry a few years earlier. Mr Stewart attended college and studied construction. When he was about 21 years of age before he had completed his studies, he spoke to his father being pressed and requiring assistance in his business. At that stage Mr Stewart said his father informed him that he "needed him" in the business. He gave up his studies a year before their completion and went to work for his father. Mr Stewart dated this as being in about 1988. The testator's principal company was named Richmond Homes (Scotland) Limited, a house building company. When Mr Stewart first started working for that company full time, his elder brother Garry was already working for the company. Mr Stewart spoke to a period of time, presumably in the late 1980s, when he and his brother Garry and his father, the testator, managed that company. Garry appears to have worked as the managing director and Mr Stewart took responsibilities as construction director. He spoke to the brothers' relationship with their father being "fairly fraught". He said that the relationship between the three men "wasn't easy". He also spoke to his father having a poor relationship with the workforce of the company and with local planning authorities with whom he required to work in the everyday course of business. Despite this, the company appears to have continued to have been successful during this period. In about 1990, the testator decided that he wished his two sons and his stepson Colin McLeod to take the company over. The testator appears to have taken the lead in this project. He arranged the finance whereby his sons and his stepson were able to purchase his house building company from him. Mr Stewart stated that it was originally envisaged that he and his brother Garry would each purchase 45% of the shareholding of the company and his step-brother Colin McLeod would purchase 10%. At the last minute this was changed, at the instigation of the testator, whereby Garry Stewart acquired 45% of the business, Mr Stewart 35% and Colin McLeod 20%. Following their acquisition of the company, the Stewart brothers and Colin McLeod continued to operate it in essentially the way it had been before. So far as the testator's role was concerned by this time he had married Barbara McLeod and so far as I could determine those persons were involved in the operation of the company to a minor extent, albeit they had no proprietorial interest. After he sold his house building company to his sons and stepson the testator's principal business concerns were progressing proposals for the development of areas for residential purposes to the east of Dunfermline where the testator held significant land holdings. This general arrangement appears to have persisted until December 1997 at which date there was a significant falling out between Mr Stewart and his brother Garry on the one hand, and the testator on the other.

[6] In or about December 1997, Mr Stewart and his brother Garry received a request from the testator to convene a board meeting. He attended that meeting with his brother Garry and Colin McLeod, all of whom were directors of the company. The testator and Barbara McLeod also attended the meeting. On the basis of Mr Stewart's evidence, his father appeared agitated at the beginning of the meeting. After some initial questions posed by the testator, all of an apparently anodyne nature, Mr Stewart spoke to his father "erupting like a volcano" and essentially abusing Mr Stewart and his brother. In Mr Stewart's words, the testator said to them "You pair of bastards, you've caused 30 years of misery to me, you've caused my life to be a failure". Mr Stewart and his brother Garry were both aghast by this outburst which they regarded as wholly unwarranted. They asked the testator and Barbara McLeod to leave and the meeting terminated. In the period of approximately two or three months following the meeting there were a series of faxed letters sent by the testator to Mr Stewart and his brother Garry and on at least one occasion (a faxed letter dated 7-1-98, number 6/64 of process), to their two sisters Linden and Leonie. These faxes were produced and form productions in the case. It would be fair to characterise the letters as abusive and insulting. The letters made financial demands and in one instance (letter dated 24-12-97, number 6/60 of process), stated that his two sons were to be excluded from the testator's will and testament.

[7] The meeting in December 1997 and the subsequent faxed letters caused a permanent rupture between Mr Stewart, and on Mr Stewart's evidence his brother Garry, and their father. Mr Stewart never spoke to his father again.

[8] There are two other aspects of Mr Stewart's evidence with which I must deal. First, Mr Stewart spoke to an event in 1993, about which he had no direct knowledge, involving an incident between his step-sister and the testator. In evidence-in-chief, he said the testator "attempted to rape" his step-sister. In cross examination he retracted that statement stating it was "a mistake" and his understanding was that the testator had made an inappropriate sexual approach to his step-sister. Second, Mr Stewart prepared a document entitled "Alfred Stewart Biographic Timeline". This document was prepared for the proof and was sent with other documents to Professor Yorston, the expert in psychiatric medicine who was instructed by the pursuers to assist the preparation of his report. This document contained a number of factual inaccuracies. I will return to these aspects of Mr Stewart's evidence when I considering the reliability and credibility of witnesses.

[9] The second witness for the pursuers was Mrs Griffin. She too spoke to an unhappy childhood and to her father's aggression towards herself, her mother and her siblings. She said that she didn't really understand why her father behaved the way he did. From her earliest years she remembered one particular incident when her father was physically abusive to her mother. She and her siblings retreated to a bedroom where they heard him abusing and physically hurting her mother. She described this situation as being "beyond horrible". She corroborated Mr Stewart's evidence that the testator continued to behave in a broadly similar pattern following his separation from their mother. She confirmed that following the separation her father visited their home and on occasions took herself and her siblings out. She said she did not really enjoy such excursions as she felt she was always "walking on eggshells" so far as her father and his temper were concerned. Mrs Griffin did however say that her relationship with her father improved when she was in her twenties. She had gone to Edinburgh University and at this stage she indicated that she and her sister Linden developed some form of relationship with their father. She, and apparently her sister Linden, were living in Edinburgh and approximately once a month would meet their father for a Chinese meal. This appeared to be pleasant and enjoyable for all parties. In addition to this she would have occasional telephone conversations with her father which appeared to be amicable. Mrs Griffin married in 1997 and her father gave her away at the wedding. She was aware, having been informed by her brothers, of the meeting in December 1997 which caused a rupture in relations between the testator and her brothers. She had no active part in the business and had not been a party to the meeting. She did however receive at least one of the abusive and insulting faxes that followed and had seen the others. She felt that her brothers were the innocent parties in this rupture and took their side. As a consequence she, like her brother Mr Stewart, did not see her father again following the breakdown in relations in December 1997. Unlike her brothers she did not however completely lose contact with her father. She spoke to him sending her and her family Christmas cards. She thinks that in the period between 1997 and her father's death in 2008, she had perhaps three telephone calls with him. They appear to have been of relatively short duration, she estimated the total time she spent speaking to her father on the telephone in the eleven or so years that followed the rupture as being about 30 minutes. On one occasion in about 2004 she was cleaning her son's bedroom in the upstairs of her house in Edinburgh when she saw her father walking away from the front door. She went downstairs but he had left before she got there. She found he had left a booklet for a cancer charity he had created through her letterbox. The booklet was about cancer therapies. It was perhaps not insignificant that at that time she had been diagnosed as suffering from cancer. In the spring of 2008 shortly before he died, the testator sent her by post some press cuttings and photographs of his investiture as an M.B.E.

[10] The third witness for the pursuers was Mrs Lynne Buchan who had formerly been married to the testator and had divorced him in 1986. Mrs Buchan gave brief evidence. She is as an elderly lady and seemed to have a fairly poor recollection of events, at least in detail. I did not consider that she was being obstructive in any respect but no doubt because of advancing years, could probably not be relied upon to give evidence accurately of any detailed matters. She was however in a general sense able to confirm that her marriage to the testator had been unhappy. She remembered that her former husband had unjustifiably accused her having adulterous relationships. She had been aware that he himself had conducted an adulterous affair with the lady he married following their divorce. She also confirmed that her husband had been verbally and physically abusive towards her. She confirmed that following the rupture in business relationships between her son and the testator, she received correspondence from the testator. She ignored this because of her negative and very poor view of the character of her former husband.

[11] The pursuers adduced evidence from Colin McLeod, the son of the testator's second wife Barbara McLeod. Colin McLeod first met the testator in July 1977 when he, Colin McLeod, was aged 17. He was aware that his mother was in a relationship with the testator. Mr McLeod had been brought up in Portsmouth. His mother, no doubt because of her relationship with the testator, had left her former matrimonial home and moved to Fife. Mr McLeod came to visit his mother in 1977 during his school holidays. The testator offered him part time employment on one of his building sites. After this period of employment Mr McLeod returned to Portsmouth but the following year came to Scotland to attend university. He did not enjoy university and left after a relatively short period to commence employment with the testator. Thereafter he worked for the testator continuously until, as spoken to by Mr Stewart, he acquired an interest in the testator's building company. He was aware of the break down in relations between Mr Stewart, Garry Stewart and their father in December 1997. His own working relationship with the testator remained cordial. Garry Stewart, the managing director of the company did however after the December 1997 break down in relations with his father, impose a rule that no officer or employee of the company should speak to the testator. For a period of about six months following its imposition Mr McLeod adhered to that rule. However at this time, approximately the middle of 1998, his mother was seriously ill with carcinoma. Naturally, he wished to speak with and see his mother. In a practical sense this meant some contact with the testator. He did not inform Garry Stewart or Mr Stewart of the fact that he was seeing the testator at this period. Barbara Stewart died on 1 April 1999. Following her death Mr McLeod spoke to a noticeable change in the testator. He was apparently grief stricken and careless of his diet following his second wife's death. Mr McLeod and an employee of the company, a Mr Masson, were so concerned about the testator's general welfare that they assumed responsibility, with their spouses, for providing him with meals for a period of time. Garry Stewart became aware of this relationship and took objection to it. At this stage, the testator indicated that Mr McLeod should come and work for him. This was done and in about late 1999 Mr McLeod commenced employment with a company owned by the testator which was concerned in the development of land for residential housing in the east side of Dunfermline. Mr McLeod's specific purpose was to oversee the construction of a "spine" road, the creation of which was necessary in order that the site could be developed in such a way as to be capable of sale to the company who was actually going to carry out residential development. Mr McLeod worked on this job until August 1990. In August 1990 the spine road was completed and the appropriate certification of its suitability for purpose obtained from the relevant roads authority. Immediately after this was obtained, the same day in fact, Mr McLeod was summoned to see the testator to be told he was redundant. Mr McLeod had no further dealings with the testator after this time. He did say that some time after he left the testator's employment he met another former employee. This person told him that the testator was telling people that Mr McLeod and Mr Masson had been poisoning him. He was also said to be putting the frozen meals which Mr McLeod and Mr Masson had provided to him following Mrs Stewart's death in the bin. As Mr McLeod readily accepted he had no actual knowledge of these matters and was simply recounting what he had been told by an unnamed third party.

[12] The final witness for the pursuers was Professor Graeme Yorston, a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist. Professor Yorston prepared a principal report dated 20 November 2009 and two supplementary reports in the case. At paragraph 1.2 of his report dated 20 November 2009, Professor Yorston listed all the materials he had been provided with in order for him to prepare the report. I do not rehearse the list of documents, they all appeared to me to be pertinent and relevant to the issue which the professor was asked to consider. I should however, draw attention to one document on this list, the timeline prepared by Mr Stewart. This was a document I have already referred to which was prepared by the second pursuer identifying what he regarded as key incidents or events in the life of his father. I will return to the content of this note and its effect or potential effect on Professor Yorston's report and opinion at a later stage. In addition to this material, Professor Yorston was permitted to hear the evidence adduced by the pursuers, and of an interposed defence witness, Dr Lawson, before giving his own evidence.

[13] The issues addressed by Professor Yorston in his principal report of 20 November 2009 were focused in the questions the pursuers' agents put to him. These were:

1. Whether Mr Stewart suffered from paranoid personality disorder and/or any paranoid illness or any other form of mental illness.

2. If so, how this would have impacted on his capacity to validly understand and sign his will and/or codicils from 1997 onwards.

3. Whether there was anything else that might have affected his capacity.

4. If he suffered from paranoid personality disorder or other mental illness, whether or not this would have been apparent to those who had contact with Mr Stewart, including his professional advisers.

The form in which Professor Yorston's evidence was adduced was to take him through his report of 20 November 2009 cross referencing passages in that report to documentary productions in the case. The same procedure was followed with his two supplementary reports. At the end of his evidence in chief, he was asked to comment upon a written report by Dr Ian Matson, a consultant psychiatrist who was named on the defenders' witness list. At the conclusion of his evidence, Professor Yorston confirmed that he adhered to the opinions he had expressed in his written report of 20 November 2009. The evidence that he had heard had not caused him to change his opinion. His opinion was that there was "clear evidence" that the testator "had an abnormal pattern of interacting with members of his family". Further that:

"(H)e clearly bore a long standing and deep rooted grudge against his sons, which appears to have arisen from his belief that his sons had tried to obtain some financial advantage over him."

[14] Professor Yorston believed that this behaviour had been manifest for many years. He further considered that the testator's "sensitivity and suspiciousness tipped into more obvious paranoid thinking at times". Professor Yorston considered the World Health Organisation's International Classification of Diseases in relation to "Paranoid Personality Disorder". The definition of that disorder has seven key features. Professor Yorston considered that there was "clear evidence" from a number of sources that the testator exhibited all seven of these defining features in the course of his later adult life. On the basis of this, it was the professor's opinion that "it is highly likely at times, his [the testator] abnormal beliefs reached delusional intensity, tipping him into periods of psychosis during which he lost contact with reality". The professor did at least to some extent, qualify that opinion by stating further:

"What is not clear is whether these beliefs remained for prolonged periods at delusional intensity, which would be more in keeping with a diagnosis of delusional disorder or whether he only briefly tipped into delusional thinking between periods of less intense paranoia associated with his paranoid personality disorder. Brief psychotic episodes can occur in personality disorders and also in individuals drinking harmful quantities of alcohol (alcohol induced psychosis). Psychotic symptoms can also occur in cerebro-vascular disease, after lacunar infarcts, and Alzheimer's disease. However, there is insufficient evidence to make a definite diagnosis of delusional disorder or alcohol induced psychosis."

[15] On the basis of the foregoing, the opinion of Professor Yorston was that the testator suffered from a paranoid personality disorder.

[16] I turn now to consider the first, second and third defenders' evidence. These defenders adduced the evidence of 16 witnesses of fact and one expert, Dr Andrew Barker, a consultant in Old Age Psychiatry. The witnesses of fact fell into four broad categories. The first second and third named defenders, Clive Franks, Gifford Bruce and Roano Pierotti, who were the executors nominated by the testator in the said Will and codicils which the pursuers seek to reduce in this action. Second, Dr Alexander Lawson, Professor James Ferguson, Dr Robert Durham, Dr Andrew Reid, Dr John Chalmers and Mrs Carole Goodman who were all, with the exception of Mrs Goodman, persons qualified in various medical disciplines who had either treated or worked with the testator at some stage in his life. Mrs Goodman was a nurse who had been employed by the medical charity established by the testator. Third, Mr Richard Girdwood, Mrs Helen Eadie MSP, Mrs Susan Bree, Mr Peter Allan and Mr Tom McGregor who were all professionals who had been either, in the case of Mr Girdwood, Mr Allan and Mr McGregor engaged to act on behalf of the testator, or in the case of the other two named persons individuals who were involved in some respect or other with the testator's charitable ventures. Fourth, Christopher Darling and James Thomson who were lay persons who regarded themselves as friends of the testator.

[17] It is not necessary to deal with the evidence given by these witnesses of fact in as much detail as that I have devoted to the pursuers' witnesses. This is because their evidence in relation to the issue in this case, that is the capacity of the testator, was remarkably consistent. Each of these persons knew the testator for varying periods in the last 20 years of his life. In the case of Mr Thomson he had known the testator for much longer having met him in 1966 and remained friends for the rest of the testator's life. Each of these witnesses was firmly of the view that the testator was an astute and able businessman. All of them considered that the testator was very committed to the various charitable enterprises to which he lent support. In particular they all expressed the view that he was very committed to the cancer charity he had established following his second wife's death in April 1999. Each of these witnesses was specifically asked as to their views on the testator's capacity. Dr Chalmers who was asked to express a professional opinion on the testator's capacity falls to be considered separately. These witnesses were assiduous to preface any view on the subject of capacity with the qualification that they were not professionally qualified to judge a person's capacity or, in the case of Dr Reid who was so professionally qualified, that he had not been asked to address that question when he consulted with the testator. Subject to those quite properly stated caveats, each of these witnesses expressed the view that they considered that the testator did not lack capacity. In some cases that view was expressed forcefully. Against that overall background I shall briefly consider these witnesses' views.

[18] Mr Clive Franks is a solicitor. He has been a principal of his own firm which has operated under a number of different names since 1985. He first met the testator in January 1998 when he was asked to act on behalf of him in relation to a single matter. That piece of work was carried out in 1998 and 1999. There was thereafter a gap when Mr Franks did not appear to have been engaged to carry out any work on behalf of the testator. He was again instructed by the testator in about 2000 and from that time until the testator's death he acted on his behalf in personal matters. From about 2002 he appears to have been regarded by the testator as his personal solicitor. He was not in the main, the solicitor for any of the testator's companies, that work being carried out initially by Burness and latterly by McGrigors, both firms of Scottish solicitors specialising in commercial work. His contact with the testator was frequent. The practice appears to have been that the testator, when in Scotland, saw Mr Franks most weeks. It appears to have been the testator's practice to phone Mr Franks usually on a Tuesday and arrange a meeting which normally took place on the Thursday of each week. The meetings usually took place in Mr Franks' offices in Edinburgh, although there were occasional visits by Mr Franks to Pitconnachie House, the testator's residence in Fife. Mr Franks drafted the 2005 will and the two codicils of 2008 which are the subject of challenge in this action. He also prepared a Trust Deed which was intended to establish the charitable vehicle which was to be the beneficiary of the residue in the testator's final testamentary instructions. This Trust Deed was not prepared in a form which was satisfactory to the Office of the Scottish Charities Regulator ("OSCR"). The Trust Deed had to be redrafted after the testator's death, a task which Mr Franks said he delegated to Maclays, another firm of Scottish solicitors. In its redrafted form, the charity was registered by OSCR in 2010 and has functioned since that time with Mr Franks, Mr Pierotti and Mr Bruce as trustees. Mr Franks accepted that he saw the testator in his professional capacity more frequently than would normally be the case with clients. He did not however, consider that of itself worthy of particular note. He knew that the testator was a wealthy man with a variety of farming, commercial and charitable interests. He did not think it particularly strange that a person in that category would require frequent contact with a professional advisor such as a personal solicitor. He made it clear that he always attempted to carry out the precise instructions he had received from his client. He never had the impression that the testator did not understand anything he was being advised upon. He was asked specifically as to whether he had any concerns about the testator's ability to give him instructions. He said that he had no doubts at all as to his client's capacity to give him instructions. When asked whether he considered that his client might suffer from delusionary thoughts he stated categorically "on no occasion did I see him labouring under delusions".

[19] The other two executors Mr Pierotti and Mr Bruce had rather less contact with the testator than Mr Franks with the testator. Mr Pierotti is a chartered surveyor. He first met the testator in around 1994 when a firm of chartered surveyors he was then working for acted on behalf of the testator. At that time he had merely one meeting with the testator. He had no further contact with the testator until about 10 years later in about 2004. The testator contacted the firm of chartered surveyors he had used in 1994 specifically wishing to consult Mr Pierotti. Mr Pierotti had left the firm's employment by that time but they passed the request on to him and he contacted the testator. In this period the testator was involved in a proposed development in Dunfermline town centre, particularly involving a building which the testator owned. He wished Mr Pierotti to act on his behalf on that project. Mr Pierotti acted for him in that transaction and from that time until the testator's death he acted in his professional capacity for him. He had regular contact, with the testator in person and by telephone. Their meetings were usually conducted at Pitconnachie House. Mr Pierotti thought that his client was a "nice man". He was polite. He thought him a well‑respected entrepreneur in the local community of Dunfermline and West Fife. He was quiet and unassuming and Mr Pierotti admired him. Mr Pierotti had never argued with him and had never seen him abusing other persons. Mr Pierotti continued to see the testator up until the time of his death. He noticed no decline in his cognitive powers in the last two years of his life. He never had any doubts as to the testator's ability or capacity to conduct business. He saw the testator immediately prior to his departure for Spain on holiday in late March 2008, approximately one month before his death. He talked to the testator by telephone on his return from Spain which was very shortly prior to his death. The testator was by this time hospitalised having been admitted more or less immediately on his return from Spain. The testator wished him to arrange a transfer from the local hospital in Dunfermline to a private hospital. Mr Pierotti attempted to arrange that but was advised by medical personnel that the testator's physical condition precluded such a transfer. He last saw the testator a day or so before he died in hospital in Dunfermline. At that stage the testator was close to death and very ill. Up until that very last meeting Mr Pierotti had no doubts as to the testator's capacity.

[20] Mr Bruce is a solicitor and formally a partner in W & A S Bruce, a firm of solicitors in Dunfermline. He resigned from that partnership in 1995. Since that date he has been involved in property development. He had come to know the testator in the late 1980s when he was a partner of W & A S Bruce. His firm had been engaged to carry out legal business on behalf of the testator. The firm did so until the mid‑1990s when the professional contact ceased. It would appear that the testator's instructions to Mr Bruce's firm terminated because of a disagreement about the level of a fee. Notwithstanding that, the testator again approached Mr Bruce in about 1998 and asked him to go to Pitconnachie House to discuss a legal matter. Mr Bruce did so and thereafter was asked by the testator to become a trustee in the Barbara Stewart Trust. He agreed and acted in that capacity until 2006. During that period he would see the testator on trust business about two or three times each year. After 2006 his contact with the testator lessened somewhat albeit he retained contact. He had a high opinion of the testator. He stated that there was "nothing in my mind to suggest any lack of capacity" on the part of the testator.

[21] I will now turn to the witnesses who are qualified in either medicine or nursing. Dr Lawson had known the testator at school and university in the 1950s. After university he had lost contact with the testator until approached by him in 1993. At that stage the testator was seeking advice and assistance in relation to his efforts to establish a facility for Photo Dynamic Therapy, a cancer therapy, which he and his second wife were trying to establish. The testator's second wife had been diagnosed with an inoperable lung carcinoma. In seeking palliative treatment for this condition they had come across Photo Dynamic Therapy which was then unavailable in Scotland. The testator and his wife had travelled to a facility in Hull where she received this treatment which provided her with considerable relief and apparently improved her quality of life. The testator and his second wife were anxious that such treatment should be available in Scotland and the testator was prepared to fund the provision of such treatment. His efforts to establish a facility had proved difficult. In particular, he had been unable to persuade the hospital authorities in Edinburgh or Glasgow to accept his charitable donations. With Dr Lawson's assistance he was able to establish a centre for the provision of Photo Dynamic Therapy in Ninewells Hospital, Dundee. Following the testator's second wife's death in April 1999, the Barbara Stewart Trust, was established to fund this facility. That trust operated until 2006. During that period the testator gave very substantial financial contributions to the facility. The extent of the testator's benefaction appears to have been in the order of £1.4 million.

[22] Dr Lawson was a trustee in the Barbara Stewart Trust from its inception until his resignation in 2004. During that period Dr Lawson had regular contact with the testator. The contact was essentially professional and there does not appear to have been any social intercourse to speak of. Dr Lawson formed a favourable impression of the testator. He was aware that he was a successful businessman. He considered him to be a "driven man", but regarded that as a not unusual trait in men who had made a great success of business careers. He thought he could be single minded but did not regard that trait as being the result of any delusional thoughts. He considered that he was focussed on goals. Dr Lawson had no doubts as to the capacity of the testator.

[23] Professor Ferguson is the Head of the Department of Dermatology at Ninewells Hospital, Dundee and a professor in Dundee University. He became acquainted with the testator at the time the Photo Dynamic Treatment Centre was being established at Ninewells. He became a trustee of the Barbara Stewart Trust. He would meet the testator in that capacity and had regular contact with him. He had been sufficiently impressed by the testator's philanthropic gifts to the Barbara Stewart Trust and his work for that body to support a formal proposal for the award of an honour to the testator. In relation to the testator's character, Professor Ferguson thought that he was "undoubtedly driven" and sometimes a little lacking in sensitivity to other people's views as a consequence. At times he could be mildly eccentric and he cited an instance when he brought a "psychic adviser" to a meeting of the Barbara Stewart Trust. There was however nothing to suggest to Professor Ferguson that he was not of sound mind. He saw nothing to suggest that the testator was delusional and personally saw no signs of paranoid psychosis.

[24] In 1993 as a result of an inappropriate approach to his adult stepdaughter, the testator's marriage to his second wife came under considerable strain. The couple lived apart for a number of months, in the spring or early summer of 1993. During that period and as an understandable pre-condition imposed by the testator's wife before she would consider resuming cohabitation, the testator was seen on two occasions by Dr Reid, a consultant psychiatrist, and on nine occasions by Dr Durham, a Clinical Psychologist. Dr Reid has now retired. Both these persons were professionally qualified in disciplines which would have given them insight into the testator's personality and cognitive functioning in such a way as to enable them to form opinions as to his likely testamentary capacity. Importantly however, as both gentlemen made clear when giving evidence, this was not the focus of their work with the testator.

[25] As already noted, Dr Durham saw the testator on nine occasions over the summer of 1993. The testator was referred to Dr Durham by his general practitioner. At the first consultation during which time the testator was accompanied by his wife, it was explained that the testator "had...made improper sexual suggestions to his stepdaughter". This had "sparked off a major crisis" in the family and within the marriage. The couple wished counselling and Mrs Stewart was worried that her husband "had been behaving in a somewhat disinhibited and uncharacteristic manner for some time". She made reference to sexually inappropriate remarks by her husband to his secretary and to a friend of hers. Dr Durham's preliminary view after this consultation was that the episodes might be the result of marital tensions and stresses at work. He was however concerned that there "might be a more sinister explanation" and accordingly arranged a psychiatric explanation with Dr Reid. Dr Durham saw the Stewarts on eight further occasions over the summer of 1993. In May 1993 Dr Reid, whom I will address in a little more detail, reported that there was no underlying pathology causative of the testator's behaviour. In September 1993, Dr Durham reported that the testator had made "very significant progress over the last few months" and with the approval of the testator and his wife terminated his counselling. In evidence he said that he considered that a satisfactory outcome had been achieved. The testator and his wife were reconciled and again cohabiting. Dr Durham had not conducted any tests on the testator in relation to cognitive ability. He had seen no reason to suggest that such testing was required. Dr Durham thought the testator had suffered from anxiety and stress but beyond that saw no sign of any psychological issue. Dr Reid was concerned to establish whether the testator suffered from some underlying pathology such as a tumour, early dementia, or had suffered a stroke which could account for behavioural changes such as sexual disinhibition. After referral to a neurologist, an organic source of any behavioural problem was excluded and Dr Reid concluded that any problem was psychological in nature. Dr Reid did not consider that the testator was in need of any psychiatric treatment. He was told of the testator displaying "pathological jealousy about his wife's behaviour, of almost delusional intensity" but stated that the testator was "not delusional" when he saw him. He accepted that the testator's thoughts were suggestive of paranoia, but saw "no evidence of delusional behaviour". Whilst, as he made clear, he was not "focused on testamentary capacity" he "would be pretty sure that he (the testator) had testamentary capacity" at the time he saw him.

[26] Dr Chalmers is a retired GP. The testator was a patient of his practice from about the mid-1980s, although until about 2000 the testator was more often than not seen by one of his partners. From about 2000, Dr Chalmers had more contact with the testator. He saw him on a number of occasions. At one stage the testator consulted Dr Chalmers complaining of feeling unwell in a vague and unspecific way and raised the possibility that he might be suffering from poisoning caused by organophosphates. Given that the testator lived on a farm, Dr Chalmers did not think this suggestion far-fetched and took blood samples which he referred to an appropriate specialist for analysis. At or about the same time, an issue of possible radiation contamination was considered. Dr Chalmers thought, although he could not be definite, that he himself may have been the source of this suggestion, pointing out to the testator that his farm lay close to or adjacent to the Rosyth naval dockyard where retired nuclear submarines were mothballed. In any event, at a subsequent consultation the testator arrived with a Geiger counter by which he was able to demonstrate an increased level of radioactivity in or around his throat. Whilst Dr Chalmers had certainly never experienced behaviour like that, pointing out for one thing that the testator was probably the only patient in his practice who could afford a Geiger counter, he did not, given the background, think it irrational. In any event, the Geiger counter showed increased levels of radioactivity in the testator's throat. In conclusion, Dr Chalmers did not find any evidence of irrational behaviour by the testator when he was his patient. Equally he saw no signs of delusions or psychosis. Dr Chalmers was also of the view that the testator was not incapable of proper reasoning. Following the testator's death in April 2008, Dr Chalmers was approached by Turcan Connell, solicitors acting for the pursuers in the present action who sought information "concerning the late Mr Stewart's mental capacity and/or his state of mind at the time of signing his Will and Codicils". Dr Chalmers wrote to Turcan Connell by letter dated 31 July 2008 explaining that he had retrieved the testator's general practitioner's records and examined his own practice's computer held records. He had also considered his own recollections of his "later dealings with Mr Stewart up to and at the time he was admitted with his final illness". On the basis of this information Dr Chalmers expressed the view that:

"Nothing in my own recollection of Mr Stewart, nor from an examination of his records, lead me to believe that there was any concern over Mr Stewart's mental capacity on or around the dates that you quote."

[27] Dr Chalmers was asked about this letter in his evidence and confirmed that he had not changed the views he expressed therein.

[28] The last witness with a medical background was Mrs Goodman, a Macmillan nurse who had worked at the Photo Dynamic Therapy Unit in Ninewells Hospital, Dundee. Her experience with the testator was predominantly in the period from 2001 to 2004 although there was some contact after 2004. Her relationship with the testator was always business-like and in connection with the work of the Photo Dynamic Therapy Unit. He had always been polite and friendly towards her. In her dealings with him she had no impression of delusions or mental illness. Her impression was that he was in control of his business. It was apparent to her that he regarded the cancer charity as very important. She never had any impression that he was unable to deal with his own affairs and thought that she would have been aware if that had been the situation. She never saw anything to show he acted on irrational beliefs and indeed went further and expressed her surprise at that suggestion.

[29] The next category of persons were professionals who had dealings with the testator. Mr Girdwood is a retired solicitor who acted for the testator in connection with the preparation of a will in 2000. Mr Allan is a retired planning consultant who acted for the testator over a fairly extensive period from the mid-1990s up until the time of the testator's death. Mr McGregor is a consultant civil and structural engineer. He had known the testator since the 1980s from which period he had acted, apparently on a fairly regular basis, offering engineering advice to the testator or the testator's companies. Mrs Eadie is the local MSP for Dunfermline and came to know the testator through his charitable works in Dunfermline. Mrs Bree had been in the earlier years of the twenty first century the chief executive of an organisation designed to encourage enterprise in Dunfermline. She too had got to know the testator through his charitable work in the town of Dunfermline. All of these persons spoke positively of the testator. All of them were questioned in relation to the testator's character and the witnesses' perceptions of his capacity. None of them expressed any views adverse to the testator as a person or any doubts as to his capacity. Mr Girdwood was clear that had he harboured any doubts as to the testator giving him instructions in relation to the preparation of a will, he would not have acted for him and drafted a will. He expressed himself forcibly saying the testator was "a perfectly sensible successful businessman", and there was "nothing wrong with the man". He concluded, "I disagree 100% that he lacked capacity. You couldn't make a will for anybody in the land if Alf Stewart couldn't make a will." Mr Allan thought that the testator was a very able and successful property developer expressing the view that he was "near the top of that type of business". He saw no irrationality in his business dealings with the testator. When asked if he saw any evidence of the testator acting on irrational beliefs he said, "That doesn't sound like the man I knew". He saw no evidence of him being delusional. He harboured no doubts as to the testator's cognitive abilities.

[30] The last category were the two lay witnesses, Mr Darling and Mr Thomson. Mr Darling was a joiner, now self employed, who had for a number of years been employed by the testator. He had a high opinion of the testator. He had known him for many years and regarded him as a friend. He knew the testator up to the time of his death. He saw no evidence of delusional or irrational behaviour. He thought the testator able and successful. With the exception of the testator's first wife, Mr Thomson, a retired photographer, was the witness who had known the testator longest. He met the testator in April 1966 through his wife who was a teacher and had in that capacity come into contact with the testator and his family. Mr Thomson and his wife became friends with the testator and initially his first wife and latterly his second wife. The friendship had continued following the death of the second Mrs Stewart in 1999. Mr Thomson knew Mrs Hay, who is the fourth defender and was partner of the testator in the latter years of his life. Mr Thomson continued to socialise with the testator in this period. Throughout this entire period of 40 or more years it would seem that Mr Thomson had fairly regular contact of a social nature with the testator. The pattern appears to be that the two couples would meet for a meal either in one or other of their houses or at a restaurant every couple of months or so. Mr Thomson had a very high opinion of the testator. He knew that his friend was very successful in business. He knew that the testator had been a substantial benefactor to the cancer charity in Ninewells. On occasions he accompanied the testator to Ninewells for meetings of the Barbara Stewart Trust. He knew of the other charitable works which the testator had benefacted in Dunfermline. He regarded the testator as a clever man. He had last seen the testator about two or three weeks before his death and at that time, so far as Mr Thomson was concerned, "his mind was in perfect condition". Mr Thomson said "I'd be very surprised if he showed signs of mental disorder, I have never seen that." Mr Thomson did not agree with the suggestion put to him that the testator had paranoid hostility towards his children. He was aware that the testator had fallen out with his sons. He thought that sad and hoped they would make up. He did not know the reason for the fallout but the testator did not talk about his sons in a way which indicated paranoia.

[31] There remains in the defenders' case only the expert evidence of Dr Barker. Like Professor Yorston, the pursuers' psychiatric expert, Dr Barker had been provided with a significant number of documents in order to prepare his opinion. He had seen all of the testator's medical records and, in addition, had seen precognitions from the three executors on the testator's last will, from two of his legal advisors, from Mrs Hay and from a former legal adviser of the testator. In addition to that material Dr Barker had, like Professor Yorston, been afforded the privilege of hearing some of the evidence of fact. In Dr Barker's case, he had heard the evidence of Mr Stewart in its entirety. He had also heard the evidence of Dr Lawson in its entirety. He had heard part of the evidence of Mrs Griffin. On the basis of all that material Dr Barker had formed views which were broadly similar, save for their ultimate conclusions, to those expressed by Professor Yorston. He agreed with Professor Yorston that there was evidence in the testator of "paranoid traits that are more common than in the general population". He also agreed that there were at least two occasions when those paranoid traits achieved "almost delusional intensity". The incidences he had in mind were the testator's reporting to the police of concerns about his company being infiltrated (although in the event there was no evidence other than Mr Stewart's that he had in fact so reported) and his jealousy of his wife. Dr Barker was "not enthusiastic about classifying people as having personality disorders", his reason being that there was a large spectrum of personality traits, many of which are common in a large proportion of the population. Notwithstanding that view, I did not understand him to disagree with Professor Yorston's opinion that the testator suffered from a paranoid personality disorder. Dr Barker did however point out that "personality disorder is a lifelong disorder present from early adulthood". The implication of this was that the testator must have suffered from this condition throughout his adult life, despite which he achieved the success which was clear from the evidence. Having regard to all these features, Dr Barker's conclusion was that he did not find evidence of a mental condition which would have affected the testator's testamentary capacity rendering him of unsound disposing mind and incapable of determining the nature and consequences of making a will or codicils.

[32] The fourth defender Mrs Fiona Hay represented herself. At the close of the case for the first, second and third defenders she gave a brief statement to the court and was thereafter cross-examined by counsel for the pursuers' and the first to third defenders.

[33] Mrs Hay met the testator at a function in late 1999. They got on well and he invited her to dinner. The dinner went very well but she did not see him for some months thereafter and it transpired he had been unwell. In early 2000, Mrs Hay was invited by the testator to lunch and thereafter the relationship between them appeared to blossom. In about June 2000 she moved into his residence at Pitconnachie House and they lived together for the remainder of the testator's life. At first she performed some secretarial duties for the testator. She was however primarily interested in writing, she is the author of two published novels, and the testator encouraged her in this. She consequently gave up her secretarial duties and concentrated on writing and being a companion to the testator. During the course of her relationship with the testator, she met his step‑grandson and two of his step‑granddaughters. She did not meet any of the testator's children until they visited their father in hospital in the final day of his life. She was aware that the testator had fallen out with his children, particularly his sons. She did not know any of the details surrounding the breakdown in that relationship. It was not a subject which the testator talked to her about. She described her relationship with the testator as being happy and fulfilling. They had become engaged to be married but any marriage was postponed a number of times because of the pressure of the testator's workload. She said this did not cause her undue concern and she appeared to have been content with the relationship that she had with the testator. The testator was never violent or abusive towards her. She was adamant that she would have left him if he had behaved in that way towards her. Judging as best I can from the tenor of her evidence, and also having regard to the evidence I heard from the other witnesses who had met the testator and Mrs Hay, the relationship appears to have been close and loving.

[34] Mrs Hay saw no signs of irrationality in relation to the testator's character and capacity. She did not regard the testator as delusional. She thought that he was capable of understanding his actions and, in particular, thought that "he knew what he was doing in all the Wills". One small piece of evidence from Mrs Hay should be noted for its potential insight into the testator's thought process very late in his life. At around the time the codicils were drafted, Mrs Hay recalled the testator saying that his daughters appeared to have given up on him and that consequently they should be excluded from his testamentary disposition. She herself did not realise that she was a testamentary beneficiary of the testator until after he had died. She thought that up until his death the testator was in full control and possession of his mental faculties.

[35] In considering the law against which the evidence falls to be considered, there was no significant dispute between the parties. The pursuers did not contend that the testator suffered from any general incapacity and proceeded upon the basis that he lacked capacity because of delusions. It was accepted that the following passage accurately reflected the law:

"Where there is no general incapacity on the part of the testator but merely delusions, it must appear that these delusions influence the dispositions made in the will in order to deprive them of effect"

(Gloag & Henderson, 13^th edition - paragraph 39.02, page 991.). There appeared to be consensus that this statement of the law was long established being founded, in Scotland, on the authority of Sievewright v Sievewright Trustees 1920 (SC HL) 53. The law in England was essentially the same, being founded in that jurisdiction upon the authority of Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR, 5QB 549. In Sievewright (supra) Viscount Haldane stated the law of Scotland as follows (at page 64):

"The question whether there is such unsoundness of mind as renders it impossible in law to make a testamentary disposition is one of degree. A testator must be able to exercise a rational appreciation of what he is doing. He must understand the nature of his act. But, if he does, he is not required to be highly intelligent. He may be stupid, or he may even be improperly, so far as ethics go, actuated by ill-feeling. He may, again, make his Will only in the lucid intervals between two periods of insanity. The question is simply whether he understands what he is about. On the other hand, if his act is the outcome of a delusion so irrational that it is not to be taken as that of one having appreciated what he was doing sufficiently to make his action in the particular case that of a mind sane upon the question, the will cannot stand. But in that case if the testator is not generally insane, the Will must be shown to have been the outcome of the special delusion. It is not sufficient that the man who disposes of his property should be occasionally the subject of a delusion. The delusion must be shown to have been an actual and impelling influence."

In Banks (supra) Cockburn CJ expressed the law of England as follows (at page 565):

"It is essential to the exercise of such a power that a testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties - that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made. ... If the human instincts and affections, or the moral sense, become perverted by mental disease; if insane suspicion, or aversion, take the place of natural affection; if reason and judgement are lost, and the mind becomes a prey to insane delusions calculated to interfere with and disturb its functions, and to lead to a testamentary disposition, due only to their baneful influence - in such a case it is obvious that the condition of the testamentary power fails, and that a will made under such circumstances ought not to stand."

The principles enunciated in these statements have effectively guided the law in both jurisdictions since they were pronounced. I was referred by both parties to a number of authorities subsequent to those two leadings case. (Boyle v Boyle's Executor 1999 SC 479 per Lord Eassie at 481; Boughton v Knight (1873) LR 3 P&D 64; Sharp v Adam [2006] EWCA Civ 449 per May LJ at paras 66-67 and 76 to 79; In Re Kay, deceased [2010] 1 WLR 202 per Briggs J at paras 6, 28 and 66-70; Re Ritchie deceased [2009] EWHC 709 (Ch) paras 177-192; Gill v Woodall [2011] Ch 380). There was no suggestion on either side that any of those authorities innovated on the principles ennunciated in the two leading cases. They were provided to me merely as illustrations of these principles in operation.

[36] In his approach to the evidence, senior counsel for the pursuers started with a consideration of the expert medical evidence. He submitted that there was evidence before the court from three consultant psychiatrists, Professor Yorston, Dr Barker and Dr Matson. I should observe that whilst a report from Dr Matson was one of the defenders' productions and that report had been commented upon by Professor Yorston in examination in chief, the court had not heard the evidence of Dr Matson and had been referred during the course of the evidence to only selected paragraphs in his report. My initial reaction was that this precluded me having regard to Dr Matson's report, save for those parts which Professor Yorston had commented upon. Senior counsel for the defenders however expressly conceded when he came to make submissions that it would be unrealistic for him to preclude the court from both reading and having regard to Dr Matson's report. Senior counsel for the pursuers proceeded by submitting that there was significant common ground between the views of all three experts. He observed that all three experts agreed that the testator suffered from a paranoid personality disorder. He drew attention to the approach of Professor Yorston which was to identify from the material available to him, significant features of the medical and family history of the testator. These features were: anxiety and unusual behaviour in the 1980s with specific reference to the dividing of tablets into pieces; physical abuse of his first wife and of the pursuers as children to the extent of that being traumatising; the referral by the general practitioner to Dr Durham in 1993 and the subsequent referral to Dr Reid; attempted rape/propositioning of his step-daughter (precipitating referral to Dr Durham and Dr Reid); paranoia in relation to sexual infidelity of wife (raised at consultation with Dr Reid); suspicions in relation to his son's paternity; delusions in relation to poisoning to the extent of obtaining a Geiger counter; hearing voices in the night and decision making by reference to the testator's psychic or faith healer; suspicions in relation to sexual behaviour of a former personal assistant; sexual offences against his step-granddaughter; the contents of faxes sent by the deceased to Garry Stewart, Mr Stewart and his first wife in 1997 and 1998 and the manner in which they had been written. On the basis of this material, it was submitted in Professor Yorston's conclusions that:

"It is highly likely that, at times, his abnormal beliefs reached delusional intensity, tipping him into periods of psychosis during which he lost contact with reality"

was justified.

[37] After consideration of this expert medical evidence, senior counsel for the pursuers explained that the pursuers' case was that throughout the period during which the 2005 will and 2008 codicils were executed, the deceased was suffering from a longstanding paranoid personality disorder which was likely to have disordered his mind as to have prevented the exercise of natural faculties of reasoning, that it poisoned his affections and perverted any sense as to the right manner of dealing with his testamentary instructions and, therefore, interfered with the proper understanding of the nature of his instructions. It was submitted the disordered thinking could be seen by consideration of the various testamentary writings of the testator which displayed a "surprising combination" of lack of direction as to who should be beneficiaries and executors, the extent to which, if at all, grandchildren and step grandchildren should benefit, whether there was any identified residuary beneficiary and if so, whether it was a charity or had charitable purposes. It was also submitted that the evidence plainly showed that the testator had developed a "considerable antipathy" towards his two sons. There was said to be no indication whatsoever in the evidence that this antipathy had any rational justification.

[38] For the foregoing reasons, it was submitted that the pursuers' case on record had been made out and that decree in terms of the first, second and third conclusions of the summons was justified.

[39] In response, senior counsel for the defenders submitted that the pursuers' emphasis on the need to demonstrate that the testamentary deeds were rational, was incorrect. It was said that this proposition proceeded upon the incorrect assumption that it was in some way for the defenders to show rationality whereas in fact the onus always rested with the pursuers. Senior counsel developed this by submitting that there was a complete absence of evidence as to the testator's thinking process in relation to the disposition of his estate after death at any stage. Despite extensive averments by the pursuers in the closed record (article 6, pages 19-25) of irrational behaviour and thinking, there was no evidence to substantiate any of the averments. There was no evidence of insane delusion. In particular there was nothing in the period after December 1997 which could be said to prove irrationality or unsoundness of mind.

[40] It was submitted that the evidence of the meeting in December 1997 between the testator, his two sons and Colin McLeod plainly showed that the testator had lost his temper. It was also accepted that in the months thereafter at the very end of 1997 and in the early part of 1998, the testator sent faxes to members of his family which were abusive. There was however, no evidence to suggest that any of this behaviour was the result of an insane delusion. There was no dispute with the pursuers' proposition that the testator had developed an antipathy towards his sons by December 1997. There was nothing to show that this antipathy was delusional. It may have been based upon the perceived actings of the sons, even if that perception was misconceived or wrong. There was simply no evidence of what the cause of the outburst and subsequent antipathy was. Even if the belief that led to this antipathy were incorrect, that of itself did not render it irrational. Moreover, there was evidence to support the belief that the antipathy which the testator plainly harboured had been developing for some time prior to December 1997 and was mutual. Mr Stewart spoke to the relationship between himself and Garry Stewart and their father, and the period both before and after they acquired Richmond Homes as being "fraught". Their father was not an easy man to work for or with.

[41] It was pointed out that Mr Stewart's time line of events (itself based on a time line prepared by Garry Stewart) was in a number of material respects demonstrably incorrect. The errors were all of factors within the knowledge of Mr Stewart and the conclusion must therefore be that he had deliberately fabricated these matters in order to affect, in a way which was advantageous to him, the views of Professor Yorston. Senior counsel for the defenders submitted that having regard to deliberate errors in the time line, the court should only accept the evidence of Mr Stewart when it was corroborated by evidence from another source. Mr Stewart and his brother had not seen their father after the December 1997 meeting. They simply had no knowledge of his state of mind throughout the entire period from December 1997 and in particular, during the period when the three testamentary writings being challenged were being prepared and were executed.

[42] Senior counsel for the defenders accepted that the position of the testator's daughters was somewhat different from the sons. There was no evidence of antipathy by the testator to his daughters. There were in fact some pieces of evidence which suggested that the testator wished to re-establish relations with his two daughters, telephone calls after 2000, the occasion in about 2004 when he delivered the cancer leaflet to his daughter Leonie's house, the "olive branch" telephone conversations and the sending of photographs of his installation as MBE to Mrs Griffin. It may be that these placatory efforts by the testator could be regarded as somewhat half-hearted and less fulsome than one might normally expect from a father towards his estranged children but nonetheless, it did appear on the evidence of Mrs Hay, that the testator was somewhat resentful that they were not successful. It was submitted that there was some evidence from Mrs Hay to suggest that their failure to have any effect ultimately led the testator to conclude that his daughters should also be excluded from any testamentary benefit.

[43] Having regard to these features it was submitted that it was not proved that there was any evidence to prove that the challenged testamentary instruments were the result of irrational delusion. There was, further, no evidence to prove delusional irrationality in the period when the challenged testamentary instruments were executed. The defenders were entitled to decree of absolvitor.

[44] There is a further tranche of argument which I require to deal with. There remained outstanding on record the first plea-in-law for the first, second and third defenders and the fourth defender that the pursuers had no title or interest to sue. This argument proceeded on a consideration of the fact that the effect of the present action by the pursuers if successful would be the revival of the testamentary instrument of the testator immediately prior to the will of 2005. This was the 2000 will prepared by the witness Mr Girdwood. The problem for the pursuers it was contended, was that no provision was made for the pursuers in this will. Accordingly, their position is no better under this will than it was under the 2005 will and subsequent codicils. Even if the 2000 will was successfully challenged, there being of course no challenge in the present action to that instrument, the effect would be the revival of the will before that, an instrument from 1998 drawn up by W & AS Bruce. Similar considerations applied. The position of the pursuers was no better under that instrument. Accordingly, before the pursuers would be in any better position, they would require to reduce both these prior wills. In the circumstances it was said to follow that the pursuers had no interest in the current action. The pursuers' response to this submission was based upon Swanson v Manson 1907 SC 426. In that case the Lord President (Dunedin) said (at page 430);

"... The pursuer does not allege either that he is in a position to reduce the first settlement upon any ground analogous to those upon which he seeks to reduce the second, or that he is in a position to allege that the persons who have an interest to maintain first settlement are prepared to allow that settlement to be reduced and go by the board."

It was submitted that the reasoning there was that if there were "any grounds analogous" to those being advanced in the current action to justify the reduction of an earlier instrument then the pursuer would qualify an interest. Any future challenge to the 2000 and 1997 wills would be on grounds analogous to those being advanced in the present case. It was therefore submitted that the pursuers in the present action had an interest and should be allowed to pursue the present action.

[45] In considering these arguments I should first make some observations on the reliability and credibility of witnesses. There were in fact only two witnesses whose evidence was challenged on grounds of reliability and credibility. The pursuers challenged the reliability and credibility of Mrs Hay and the defender challenged the reliability and credibility of Mr Stewart.

[46] I can be brief in relation to the challenge to the credibility of Mrs Hay. It was based upon one incident. Shortly after she had commenced co-habitation with the testator, which was in 2000, the testator's step grandchildren, two girls and one boy, visited Pitconnochie House. Mrs Hay estimated one of the step-granddaughters age at about 4 at the time whereas, as the evidence shows, she was aged 10. Further, it was said that that particular step-granddaughter's conduct that afternoon, she repeatedly asked Mrs Hay the time, was sufficiently strange that it should have alerted Mrs Hay in some way to some problem the child was experiencing. I assume, although it was not expressly suggested by counsel, that this could have been one of the instances when that step-granddaughter was assaulted by the testator and her behaviour should have alerted Mrs Hay in some way. The point in relation to the mistake about the child's age is correct. I do not however see anything sinister in that. Mrs Hay met that particular step-granddaughter only on a very few occasions. Those were all some 13 years or so before she gave evidence. Given that passage of time it would in my view be very easy to make an error of this sort in relation to a child's age. I am bound to say that I did not understand the second point at all. It is true that Mrs Hay said that the step-granddaughter asked on a number of occasions what the time was in circumstances where there was apparently a clock on the wall which could have provided the information. I failed to see anything sinister in that. It seems to me that children, especially if they are perhaps bored in the company of far older persons, often ask the time. I can see nothing in that behaviour which could, on any reasonable interpretation, have alerted Mrs Hay to any misconduct by the testator to the child, if indeed there was any such conduct on that occasion. Beyond that, Mrs Hay appeared to me to give her evidence in a calm and objective manner. Other witnesses spoke to events she was speaking about and broadly corroborated what she was saying. I found her a reliable and credible witness.

[47] The position with Mr Stewart is different. There is no doubt that the timeline of events which he prepared specifically for the purposes of this litigation and his oral evidence in court were in a number of important matters incorrect. Moreover, and importantly, they were demonstrably incorrect. The matters in which there were inaccuracies were all within the knowledge of Mr Stewart. These were; characterising the propositioning of his step-sister as "attempted rape"; asserting that his father's grasp on business had declined after 1997; asserting that his father was at loggerheads, to the detriment of his business interests, with the Fife Planning Department; asserting that his company had "won" the action raised against it by the testator, whereas in fact the action had been compromised with a payment of £150,000 to the testator; asserting that the testator's company had lost an action raised against it and McDonald Estates Ltd, whereas in fact the company had obtained decree of absolvitor in its favour in that action. I am forced to conclude that the inaccuracies in the timeline were deliberate and, moreover, were designed to influence Professor Yorston. Presumably the intention was to provide material which would persuade Professor Yorston to conclude that the testator was acting in an irrational matter. That conclusion plainly affects the way in which I require to approach the evidence of Mr Stewart. I accept the defenders' proposition that I can only accept the evidence of Mr Stewart as reliable and credible if corroborated from another source.

[48] I should now consider the law against which the evidence requires to be considered. I do not consider there was any significant dispute between the parties as to the applicable law. Sivewright (supra), a Scottish decision in the House of Lords, has stood unquestioned since 1920. The ratio in that case is binding upon me. The ratio is set forth in the passage from the speech of Viscount Haldane already quoted. In a case such as the present where the testator is not "generally insane" it must be shown, if a challenge to a testament is to succeed, that the challenged testament was "the outcome of a special delusion". Moreover the delusion "must be shown to have been an actual and impelling influence" on the testamentary disposition under question. It follows that in the present case, as in Sivewright (supra) the question for the court is whether the testator "was subject to a delusion which a sane person would not have entertained, and which was the operative reason of the disposition complained of". It is to be noted that the requirement is of a "delusion" that a sane person would not have entertained. A delusion is "a fixed false opinion or belief with regard to objective things, esp as a form of mental derangement"
[1]. The requirement for the pursuers must therefore be to show that the testator's will and codicils were the result of thinking that was truly the result of mental disorder, mere antipathy towards his children, prejudice, intolerance or even caprice will not suffice.

[49] Turning to the evidence in general I am of the view that a fairly clear picture emerges. I am satisfied that the testator behaved in an abusive manner towards his first wife. He also plainly conducted an adulterous relationship with the lady who, following his divorce, became his second wife. For reasons that were not explained in evidence, and are perhaps incapable of explanation, the testator also behaved in a distant and remote way towards the children of his first marriage. He seems to have shown them less love and emotional support than one would expect and hope to see from a parent. At the same time as the testator was behaving in this way towards his wife and children he pursued a highly successful business career as a builder and property developer, the fruits of which labours resulted in his becoming a wealthy man.

[50] In relation to his conduct outwith his immediate family there was evidence of other aspects of behaviour which did not reflect well upon the testator. I accept that there was evidence to support the proposition that on a number of occasions he behaved in what was described as a "sexually disinhibited" fashion. He propositioned an older lady who was his secretary, a female friend of his second wife and, most significantly, his stepdaughter. It is to be observed that all these instances occurred in or before 1993 and all antedate the testamentary deeds under challenge in the present action. There is also the evidence of the step-granddaughter to be considered. This was presented by affidavit. Senior counsel for the first, second and third defenders made no objection to this, he was candid enough to accept that he had no basis upon which he could have cross examined the deponent. The result was that the evidence was untested and, moreover, the court had no opportunity to assess the reliability or credibility of the deponent. These are important caveats when considering this evidence. I have to recognise that Professor Yorston, who had considered the affidavit, said that he had no reason to doubt its veracity, albeit he gave no explanation for this position. Against that background I am prepared, with hesitation, to accept the contents of the affidavit as accurate. The evidence is of a number of sexual assaults perpetrated by the testator on the deponent starting when she was about four years old, which would have been in 1994, and continuing until she had been in primary school for a couple of years, which would put her at about age six or seven. These assaults therefore lasted two or three years. Secondly, there was a single incident when she was aged ten. The assaults were plainly very serious criminal behaviour, albeit I use that characterisation very cautiously against a person who is dead and who has had no opportunity to respond to the allegations. It is to be noted that the earlier incidents when the deponent was aged between four and six or seven pre-dated, or are at least likely to predate the testator's 1997 fallout with his sons. The single incident when the deponent was ten was after the fallout.

[51] The conclusions I feel compelled to draw from the evidence of "sexual disinhibition" are not favourable to the testator's moral character. He seems to have been sexually predatory, selfish and careless for the feelings and wellbeing of others. That is however, irrelevant so far as the present action is concerned. Whilst the psychiatric experts refer to the behaviour they do not regard it as showing mental disorder. The behaviour described may be repugnant but it does not in my view shed light on the testator's capacity, or lack thereof, to dispose of his estate by testamentary disposition. I should add that, as a matter of probability, all of these events save for the single incident involving the step-granddaughter when she was 10, predate the testator's fallout with his sons in December 1997.

[52] The other aspects of the testator's behaviour which the pursuers seek to characterise as delusional are, in my view, equally problematic. Distrust as to his first wife's sexual fidelity or the paternity of his sons is capable, as all the expert psychiatrists spoke to, of being construed as delusional ideation. It has not however been proven to my satisfaction that such thinking was necessarily delusional. Concerns over poisoning by either organophosphates or radiation cannot, having regard to the evidence, even be characterised as delusional. It was plain that Dr Chalmers, an impressive witness, did not dismiss the testator's concerns over chemical poisoning and thought it necessary to refer him to an appropriate specialist. In relation to radiation poisoning, the best evidence suggests that that idea may have in fact come from Dr Chalmers himself. Other episodes founded upon by the pursuers, allegations that the testator disposed of food prepared for him by Colin McLeod's wife and Mr Masson's wife and gossip that he said those persons were trying to poison him were simply unfounded in the evidence before this court. Likewise allegations that he had some irrational interest in a neighbour's and an employee's sexual behaviour had, in my view, no proper evidential foundation. It is correct that there was evidence before the court that on one occasion the testator took a psychic or faith healer to a meeting of the cancer trust he had benefacted. Whilst this behaviour would conventionally be regarded as odd it is not, in my view, evidence of delusional thinking.

[53] Against that background consideration requires to be given to the significant body of lay evidence which the court heard. This evidence came from an impressively wide range of persons all of whom had had significant contact with the testator over a lengthy period of time. In the case of the defenders' witnesses they all had dealings, in a variety of capacities, with the testator in the period after the 1997 rupture with his sons. A number of them had contact throughout the time when the testamentary instruments with which this action is concerned were created. The evidence was consistent. Not one of the witnesses had any doubts as to the testator's capacity and none saw any evidence of delusional ideation.

[54] Consideration also requires to be given to the pursuers' submission that disordered thinking indicative of irrationality can be seen from the content of the testator's testamentary dispositions after 1997. In relation to that argument, I firstly note that as early as 24 December 1997 (faxed letter no. 6/60 of process), in the immediate aftermath of the fallout, the testator expressed an intention to exclude his sons from his "will and testament". That intention remained constant throughout the remainder of his life. It follows that the pursuers require to show that the intention to exclude his sons from his will was delusional in December 1997 and that his thinking remained corrupted by that delusion thereafter. Evidence against that proposition was in my view to be found from Mr Girdwood who saw nothing delusional in the testator's thinking when he acted for him in preparing the 2000 will. Mr Franks, who acted in relation to the preparation of the later testamentary instruments, was also aware of the testator's desire to exclude his sons and saw nothing delusional in that desire. The pursuers sought to make something of the testamentary instructions given by the testator to Mr Franks. It is true that Mr Frank's file in relation to these matters appears a little thin, although absent any expert evidence from a solicitor as to the ordinarily competent way to keep such a file I take little from that. It is also true that on occasions Mr Franks in writing to the testator about his testamentary wishes and instructions used language which could be regarded as partisan or emotive. On those occasions his letters certainly lacked the professional objectivity seen, for example, in Mr Girdwood's correspondence with the testator. Mr Franks acknowledged this criticism. Further, in relation to the creation of a trust which was to be the residuary beneficiary of the testator's estate Mr Franks gave, as he acknowledged, advice which required correction by another firm of solicitors after the testator's death. This evidence may raise questions as to the standard of professional service rendered by Mr Franks, to his client the testator. I am not however persuaded that it is evidence of irrational or delusional thinking by the testator. If, and I make no judgment on the point, the quality of Mr Franks' advice was less than optimal it is a reflection on him, not evidence of delusional thinking by the testator. There remains one further aspect of the evidence, the position of the testator's daughters. They remained beneficiaries up until the final codicil of April 2008. In relation to this there is no evidence of any irrationality or delusional thinking being the cause of the removal of specific bequests to them at this time. There is however one small, but important piece of evidence that shed light on the thinking of the testator at the time. I have already noted the testator's efforts, albeit somewhat limited, to effect reconciliation with his daughters. These did not succeed and Mrs Hay recalled the testator saying at around the time of the last codicil that, his efforts having failed, his daughters did not deserve their specific bequests.

[55] It is against all the foregoing that the psychiatric evidence requires to be considered. I have no difficulty in accepting it was common ground between Dr Yorston and Dr Barker and for that matter Dr Matson, that the testator had a paranoid personality disorder. The critical question is therefore whether that disorder was at times of such intensity that it affected the testator's mind in such a way as to deprive him of testamentary capacity. If that question were to be answered in the affirmative the further question arises as to whether that occurred at the times when the will and two codicils were signed.

[56] I am not satisfied that the pursuers have established that there were periods when the testator's paranoid personality disorder was of such delusional intensity as to deprive him of testamentary capacity. Whilst the testator was, on the basis of all the evidence I have heard, clearly a driven man and capable of ruthless and even harsh behaviour at times close examination of the evidence does not suggest that his behaviour was the result of delusional thoughts. This of itself is sufficient to dispose of the issue in the case in the favour of the defenders. I should however go further and state that even if I were incorrect in my first decision I would still not be satisfied that there was any evidence of delusional ideation in the period when the testamentary deeds under consideration were drawn up. There was, in my view, simply no evidence of delusional thinking in the period after 1997. I accept the proposition advanced by the defenders that delusional thoughts cannot be determined by consideration of the testamentary deeds under challenge themselves.

[57] There remains the issue of the defenders' first plea in law of no title and interest. Having regard to my conclusions on the evidence I do not strictly require to answer that question. Subject to that caveat it does however appear to me that the ratio in Swanson v Manson (supra) is binding upon me. That ratio was that a person in the position of the pursuers in the present case requires to show that he could challenge any further deeds "upon any ground analogous to those upon which he seeks to reduce" the present deeds. Any challenge to the 2000 and 1997 wills would be on grounds analogous to those advanced in the present case. It accordingly appears to me that the pursuers have satisfied a title and interest to sue this action.

[58] Having regard to the foregoing I shall uphold the third pleas in law for each of the first, second and third defenders and the fourth defender and pronounce decree of absolvitor in their favour.