OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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CA114/11
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OPINION OF LORD HODGE
in the cause
HASTINGS & CO (INSOLVENCY) LTD Pursuer;
against
THE ACCOUNTANT IN BANKRUPTCY Defender:
________________
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Act: Currie QC; bto Solicitors
Alt: O'Neill, Solicitor Advocate; Scottish Government Legal Directorate
Third Party intervener (Wylie & Bissett): Cormack, Solicitor Advocate; Pinsent Masons LLP
27 March 2013
[1] This is an
application by the Accountant in Bankruptcy (the "AiB") under regulation 47(9)
of the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2012 (the "2012 Regulations")
for an interim order to bring to an end the prohibition from entering into a
framework agreement in relation to the provision of insolvency services.
[2] On 10 May
2012 the AiB published a prior information notice and a contract notice in
relation to the insolvency services in the Official Journal. It stated that
the procedure to be used was the restricted procedure. On 7 December the
AiB invited tenders by issuing an invitation to tender ("ITT") for inclusion in
a framework agreement for the provision of insolvency services.
[3] The
proposed framework agreement, which was scheduled to commence on 1 April
2013, was designed to replace a framework agreement dated 24 March 2009. Under
the current framework agreement five organisations have been providing
insolvency services to the AiB. They are the pursuer, KPMG, Wylie &
Bissett, Armstrong Watson, and MMG.
[4] The
pursuer submitted a tender in response to the ITT on 24 January 2013. The
tender and competing tenders were analysed by a panel of four scorers whom the
AiB established to assess the tenders. On 13 February 2013 the AiB wrote by email
to the pursuer to inform it that its tender had not been successful. The AiB
informed the pursuer that the winning tenderers were Insolvency Support
Services ("ISS"), KPMG and Wylie & Bissett.
[5] On 13
February 2013 the AiB sent the pursuer a document entitled "Debrief of the
Hastings & Co (Insolvency) Ltd Tender" (the "debrief document").
Solicitors for the pursuer wrote to the AiB on 20 February 2013. They
expressed concerns about the AiB's decision to exclude the pursuer from the
framework agreement and drew attention to concerns that the pursuer had with
the tendering process and the evaluation of its submission. The AiB responded
by letter dated 21 February 2013. The pursuer was not satisfied by that
response and commenced this action.
[6] In its
summons the pursuer mounted ten challenges to the tender process. When the
case came to be heard last week, Mr Heriot Currie QC for the pursuer intimated
that the pursuer did not insist in four of those challenges.
[7] Before I
consider the merits of the six challenges, I have to address two preliminary
issues which Ms O'Neill, solicitor advocate, raised. They were, first that the
action was not competent because the pursuer had not given prior notice of the
action as regulation 47(6) of the 2012 Regulations required and, secondly and
in any event, because certain claims were time-barred under regulation
47(7)(b).
The preliminary
defences
(i) Failure to give proper notification
[8] Regulation 47(6) so far as relevant provides:
"Proceedings under this regulation may not be brought unless -
(a) the economic operator bringing the proceedings has informed the contracting authority ... of -
(i) the breach or apprehended breach of the duty owed to it in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2); and
(ii) of its intention to bring proceedings under this Part in respect of that breach or apprehended breach; and
(b) the proceedings are brought in accordance with paragraph (7)."
In this case the relevant allegations of breach of the duty owed to the pursuer as an economic operator are the duties in regulation 4(3), which provides that
"a contracting authority must -
(a) treat economic operators equally and without discrimination; and
(b) act in a transparent and proportionate manner."
[9] Ms O'Neill
submitted that the letter of 20 February from the pursuer's solicitors failed
to meet the requirements of regulation 47(6) in two respects. First, it did
not give notice of all of the specific breaches of duty which the pursuer later
asserted in this action. Secondly, the letter did not inform the AiB of its
intention to bring proceedings.
[10] Dealing
with the second challenge first, I am satisfied that the letter gave notice of
an intention to raise proceedings. In its fourth paragraph the solicitors
stated:
"However, on behalf of Hastings, we give notice that any breach of the regulations will cause Hastings to suffer loss and Hastings gives notice to you of its intention to raise an action to preserve its legal position and recover all such sums lost. Hastings reserves in full its rights to make a claim, and initiate legal proceedings."
While the letter concluded in a more emollient tone by stating that Hastings was considering its options and calling on the AiB to reconsider its position, I have no doubt that the letter gave sufficient notice of an intention to bring proceedings.
[11] To my mind
the regulation contains a notification requirement for a practical reason and
not as a matter of form. It is to allow the contracting authority to
re-consider its position in response to a focused challenge or challenges to
its decision and a notification of an intention to raise proceedings absent
that reconsideration. In the letter of 21 February 2013 Mr Charles Keegan, the
Executive Director of Corporate Services of the AiB, responded in detail to the
solicitors' letter and concluded that the AiB was satisfied that there had been
no breach of the 2012 Regulations. When he did so I think he can have had no
doubt that he had received a notification of an intention to bring legal
proceedings.
[12] What is
more problematic for the pursuer is the first challenge, namely that the
pursuer is now barred from the raising in these proceedings of challenges of
which it gave no notice in the solicitors' letter.
[13] The
principal challenge, which Mr Currie characterised as a root and branch attack
on the AiB's approach to the procurement exercise, was that the process had
been deliberately "weighted ... against small and medium sized enterprises ("SMEs").
The letter then sought to particularise that charge and focused on questions
4-7 of the ITT. While the letter did not state specifically in its discussion
of each of those questions that its criticism amounted to a breach of the 2012 Regulations,
a fair reading of the letter leaves no doubt that the charge of discrimination
against SMEs underpinned the discussion of each question. The criticism of the
approach to question 7 also raised an issue of undisclosed or irrelevant
criteria. I therefore do not accept Ms O'Neill's submission that the
comments on the individual questions were not allegations of breaches of the
2012 Regulations.
[14] But the
pursuer did not criticise the AiB's approach to questions 1 and 3 of the ITT,
which concerned "continuous improvements" and "customer services". In my
opinion, having failed to raise any issue on the wording of those questions and
the assessment of the tenderers' answers to them in the regulation 47(6)
letter, the pursuer is barred by that regulation from challenging those matters
in this action.
[15] An economic
operator may develop its arguments in support of a particular notified
challenge in the course of a legal action. But it would defeat the practical
purpose of the notification requirements if it were allowed to open up new
fronts on raising legal proceedings. That would enable an economic operator to
mount challenges to parts of the process, which it had not given the
contracting authority the opportunity to reconsider. Without such notice, the
possibility of avoiding expensive litigation is lost. In my view, the policy
of the legislation is that the economic operator has to particularise its
complaints when the effect of any legal action that follows is to bring into
operation the regulation 47(9) prohibition. I consider that this approach is
consistent with the guidance which the courts have given in Luck v London
Borough of Tower Hamlets [2003] 2 CMLR 12, Rix LJ at paras 30-31 and 42, Gillen
v Inverclyde Council 2010 SLT 513, Lord Woolman at para 19, and Clinical
Solutions International Ltd v NHS 24 and Capgemini UK plc [2012] CSOH 10, at paras 12 and 13.
(ii) Time bar
[16] The relevant time restriction in this case is contained in regulation
47(7)(b) which provides:
"For the purpose of paragraph (6)(b), proceedings must be brought - ...
(b) ... within 30 days beginning with the date when the economic operator first knew or ought to have known that grounds for starting the proceedings had arisen unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which proceedings may be brought, in which case the court may extend that period for up to a maximum of 3 months from that date."
[17] Ms O'Neill
submitted that in so far as the pursuer criticised the ITT as lacking in
transparency, time ran for the date on which it received that document in
December 2012, because on reading that document it ought to have known of the
grounds on which it now founded. She referred to Uniplex (UK) Ltd v
NHS Business Services Authority [2010] 2 CMLR 1225 at para 35; Clinical
Solutions (above) at paras 16 and 17; and Traffic Signs and Equipment
Ltd v Department for Regional Development [2010] NIQB 138, Weatherup
J at paras 21 and 22. She submitted that the pursuer's challenges to questions
1, 3 and 6 were time barred.
[18] Mr Currie
submitted that the pursuer was able to discover the lack of transparency of the
impugned questions only when it received the debrief document, which showed
that the AiB had adopted an interpretation that differed from its
understanding.
[19] I am
satisfied that the pursuer's criticisms of questions 1 and 3 could not have
been formulated before it saw the debrief document which disclosed how the AiB
interpreted the questions. As I discuss below, the pursuer considered the
meaning of question 1 and reached a view on what it meant. The criticism of
question 3 on the ground of lack of transparency, which is misconceived, arises
from a misreading of the debrief document. Part of the challenge to question 6
involves an allegation that the ITT failed to disclose the weight attached to
stated sub-criteria. As I discuss below, I do not think that the criticism is
well founded because the relevant list was not a list of criteria or
sub-criteria. Arguably, if there had been substance in that challenge, it
should have been raised shortly after the pursuer received the ITT. But the
other criticisms of question 6 arose out of what was said in the debrief
document.
[20] I am
therefore not persuaded that Ms O'Neill has demonstrated that those challenges
are time-barred or that a defence of time bar is likely to succeed.
[21] I therefore
turn to consider the merits of the challenges, of which the pursuer gave notice
in its letter of 20 February 2013, before commenting on the challenges that I
have excluded in para [14] above, in case a higher court were to take a
different view of their exclusion.
The merits of the
challenges
(iii) The Law
[22] Counsel agreed that there was no dispute as to the applicable law.
They were content to use as a workable statement of the relevant principles my
opinion in Healthcare at Home Ltd v The Common Services Agency [2012] CSOH 75, and in particular paras [10] to [20] and [22]. But I must qualify the
expanded discussion (in paras [23] to [28] of my opinion in that case) of the
requirement in the case law of the European Court that the award criteria must
be formulated in such a way as to allow all reasonably well-informed and
normally diligent tenderers to interpret them in the same way.
[23] On the
first day of the hearing in this case, the Second Division issued its opinion
in the reclaiming motion from my opinion in the Healthcare at Home ([2013] CSIH 22). While the judges of the Second Division adhered to my
interlocutor, they expressed doubts about the formulation that looks to what
was reasonably foreseeable by the hypothetical reasonably well-informed
tenderer. The Second Division understandably expressed concerns about the use
in this context of a "reasonably foreseeable" formulation, which is drawn from
and more familiar in the law of contract and delict.
[24] In the
light of the Second Division's guidance, I would restate the approach thus.
The test is a purely objective one. The court asks itself whether the
hypothetical reasonably well-informed and normally diligent tenderer would have
expected that a particular matter was required by and included within a
criterion. If that hypothetical tenderer would see that there was ambiguity in
the criterion or criteria, they would not be sufficiently transparent.
[25] In relation
to the contracting authority's duty to give reasons for its decision, I refer
to what I said in para [22] of my opinion in Healthcare at Home. In
regulation 32(2) of the 2012 Regulations the contracting authority must give
(a) a summary of the reasons why the economic operator was unsuccessful and (b)
the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender. In
discussion Ms O'Neill explained that she was aware of at least three approaches
that contracting authorities adopted to meet this obligation. One was that adopted
in this case, in which the contracting authority took comments from the
individual scorers' score sheets that showed points in favour or against
particular tenders and recorded them in the notice. Another is to compose a
narrative of the reasons. A third is to disclose the scorers' evaluation
sheets to the tenderers. It seems to me that the first method is legitimate if
it accurately records the relevant comments. It inevitably may result in some
apparent contradictions as individual scorers will often have differing views
on the quality of a particular tender. Those differences are ironed out by the
averaging of the marks awarded by the scorers to each question when determining
a tenderer's score on that question.
[26] I accept Ms
O'Neill's submission that the law is clear on the nature of the court's review
of the contracting authority's decision. The court will interfere with the
decision of the contracting authority only if it is manifestly wrong or if the
process has been unfair: Lion Apparel Systems Ltd v Firebuy Ltd [2007] EWHC 2179 (Ch), Morgan J at paras 37-38 and 93; By Development Ltd v Covent
Garden Market Authority [2012] EWHC 2546 (TCC), Coulson J at para 8; Healthcare
at Home at para 20.
(iv) The surviving
challenges
[27] Question 4 - Service delivery:
The question asked the tenderers to provide an organisational structure for providing the service to the AiB, demonstrating a management hierarchy and the key individuals responsible for managing the service. It asked for CVs of the named individuals involved in managing the service.
[28] The pursuer
in its response provided a table listing its personnel in a hierarchy but did
not reveal the organisation of line management. It disclosed that there were
three key personnel, being two insolvency practitioners and one senior manager,
and fourteen other staff, whose functions were listed. It provided its
training policy in Appendix 4 and also a CPD plan for one of its insolvency
practitioners. In the debrief document the comments critical of the tender
included a lack of detail of proposals for new/ongoing professional
development, that the organisational chart did not give a clear picture of the
organisation, that there was no skills matrix and no reference to staff
appraisal, that there was a lack of detail on the process of monitoring
performance and that CVs were provided for only three staff.
[29] The
comments on the merits of successful bidders included such things as
comprehensive organisational structural plans and CVs and comprehensive
training programmes.
[30] Mr Currie
submitted that the pursuer had shown the hierarchy of its organisation and that
it had set out its training policy in appendix 4 of its tender. He suggested
that the process discriminated in favour of large organisations and involved
the use of undisclosed criteria. It was an example of the pursuer's
overarching complaint of discrimination against SMEs.
[31] I am not
persuaded that there is any manifest error in the assessment. The scorers were
entitled to comment that the pursuer's presentation of its staff hierarchy did
not reveal line management responsibilities. They were entitled to compare the
detail of the presentation of professional development in the different tenders.
The court is not in a position to make judgments on the relative merits of
tenders in terms of detail. While larger organisations were able to disclose
more complex and detailed arrangements than an SME such as the pursuer, I am
not persuaded that it amounts to discrimination to mark up responses which gave
more detail on matters directly relevant to the provision of the requested
service. Nor do I accept that the debrief document discloses previously
undisclosed criteria. In my view the scorers' comments relate to the methods
by which tenderers responded to the disclosed criteria.
[32] Question
5 - Training of AiB staff:
This question asked tenderers to set out their ability and commitment to support the training and development of AiB staff by stating specifically the nature and level of investment in such training that they would make.
[33] The pursuer
offered in-house training, mentoring and secondments of staff to the AiB. It
set out in appendix 5 of its tender proposals for training AiB staff in the
year to 31 March 2014 and stated that it would offer both the monthly and
additional programmes annually.
[34] In the
debrief document the scorers' comments on the pursuer's tender included that
there was not as much depth of information as others and no detail of actual
investment. In the feedback on the merits of successful bidders the comments
included praise for structured programmes of training, the high level of
training hours committed, the range of support offered, and the willingness of
one tenderer to discuss with the AiB its training needs.
[35] The
pursuer's criticisms were essentially the same as those made against the
scoring of question 4: the AiB's approach to the marking of the tenders
involved undisclosed criteria and also discrimination against SMEs as only
larger organisations could offer some of the services that were praised in the
comments on the successful bidders. Mr Currie also pointed out that the
criticism that the pursuer had not given detail of its actual investment was simply
wrong as appendix 5 of the tender gave that detail. He also criticised the
giving of credit to tenderers which offered training in such matters as audit
and taxation, which were not a necessary component of the insolvency service.
[36] In my view
there is an apparent error in the scorer's comment that the pursuer had not
given detail of its investment. Ms O'Neill did not suggest otherwise. I am
not persuaded that it was an error to give bidders credit for offering training
on audit and taxation. I recognise that the AiB staff could benefit from some
knowledge of those matters in handling insolvency cases. But, as Ms Hastings
stated in her affidavit, the pursuer offered to meet the AiB and adjust the
training offered to its needs. Otherwise my approach is the same as in
relation to question 4: I do not see any undisclosed criteria or illegal
discrimination against SMEs.
[37] Question
6 - Sustainability:
This question stated that the AiB supported the Scottish Government's objectives on sustainability. It listed those objectives that it had adopted into its organisational policies and invited each tenderer to demonstrate how its organisation supported those objectives. The ITT gave links to websites that contained details of the Scottish Ministers' policies.
[38] In its
response the pursuer listed ten initiatives which promoted responsible
environmental practices such as minimising the use of paper, reducing the need
to travel and employing local people. It also set out in appendix 6 its
environmental policy and sustainability action plan. In the debrief document
the pursuer's response was criticised for a lack of detail. The comments on
successful bidders praised specific initiatives, including supporting youth
employment through apprenticeships, school mentoring support and team-building
charity events.
[39] The pursuer
criticised this question and its scoring both because it discriminated in
favour of large organisations that could do more and because the question did
not disclose the weight to be attached to the listed sub-criteria. It observed
that one scorer had stated that it had "a good understanding of the
requirements" and another had described the tender as "an acceptable response",
yet the pursuer's answer had been scored last of the four listed tenderers.
The AiB had also taken into account matters that were irrelevant to
sustainability.
[40] I do not
doubt that large organisations can offer to undertake more than smaller
organisations. But that does not of itself make a criterion discriminatory. I
see no basis for the assertion that the list of the sustainability objectives
were criteria. They were simply a list of those objectives. The method of
recording individual scorers' comments and averaging their scores may create a
mismatch between a comment and a score without demonstrating any
inconsistency. In any event, the pursuer's quotations from the scorers'
comments were incomplete as each scorer went on to criticise the pursuer's
answer for lacking depth or detail. I share the pursuer's puzzlement as to the
relevance to the framework agreement of one scorer's favourable comment on a
tenderer's offer to provide team-building charity events.
[41] Question
7 - Understanding our requirements:
This question asked a tenderer to outline its understanding of how the framework would operate in order to demonstrate its commitment to the AiB's requirements. Among the matters listed to be covered by the response was "maximising income for creditors".
[42] The
pursuer's only challenge to the question and the scoring was that it had been
criticised for not giving specifics about maximising creditor income in
practical terms. This, it said, was an undisclosed criterion as the question
had not asked for solutions. I am satisfied that there is no substance in this
challenge. The question asked for a demonstration of commitment to the
requirements. The hypothetical tenderer could expect that the AiB would see as
relevant to the answer some indication of how creditors' income could be
enhanced.
A cumulo approach
[43] Mr Currie urged me to look at the complaints cumulatively as they
supported the charge of discrimination against SMEs. I will do so.
[44] I am not
persuaded that there is any basis for a general rule that an invitation to
tender is invalidated because it is easier for larger enterprises to meet the
tender requirements than SMEs. In Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin
Kaupunki [2003]3 CMLR 20 the contracting authority included in its
assessment of the economically most advantageous tender criteria connected with
the protection of the environment. The European Court held that that was
consistent with the principle of equal treatment, even though only a few
undertakings would be able to make an offer which would satisfy those criteria
(the Advocate General at paras 91-93 and the Court at paras 59-64 and 85-86).
[45] But a
contracting authority may risk breaching the equal treatment principle if it
adopts criteria which are not sufficiently linked to the subject matter of the
contract and which favour one type or size of economic operator over another.
It will also do so if it takes into account in its scoring of tenders matters
beyond the disclosed criteria that breach the principle of equal treatment.
[46] In this
case, while there are stray comments from individual scorers that may suggest
that they were on occasion giving credit for things that were at best loosely
linked to the subject matter of the contract, I do not detect a clear case of
discrimination against SMEs in relation to such matters. On a prima facie assessment
I do not infer that those matters materially reduced the pursuer's score or
significantly inflated the scores of the successful tenderers.
[47] As Ms
O'Neill pointed out, the ITT sought to encourage economic operators of
different sizes to compete for inclusion in the framework agreement (a) by
fixing a maximum allocation to one provider of 60% of cases in each regional
lot and (b) by providing that there would be a minimum of three providers in
each lot and accordingly that there could be more.
(v) The
excluded challenges
[48] As I have rejected the challenges to questions 1 and 3 on the ground
that they were not raised in the pre-action notification, I deal with them more
briefly.
[49] Question 1,
which was concerned with continuous improvement of AiB's processes, asked
tenderers to provide a commitment to being actively involved in continually
improving the processes of working with the AiB. It stated:
"You should demonstrate how you intend to fulfil this commitment with suggestions for improvement to the current Operating Manual, detailing proposals for collaborative working to achieve mutual benefits and positive change in processes."
In the debrief document one scorer criticised the pursuer for focusing only on the operating manual and not putting forward ideas outwith sequestration processes or collaborative working. Ms Hastings in her affidavit explained that she had read the question as calling for a focus on the operating manual. That had surprised her and she had shown the question to the pursuer's managing director, who confirmed her interpretation. I do not doubt that she did so. But I do not think that the hypothetical tenderer would have read the question as the pursuer did. The quoted sentence needs to be read in the context of the ITT as a whole, including its discussion of the operating manual, and in particular the wording of the whole question. In context I do not think that the question was ambiguous but I recognise that the sentence, considered by itself, could have been worded more clearly in order to show that suggestions of improvements to the operating manual were only part of the required answer.
[50] Question 3
concerned customer services. Tenderers were asked to demonstrate how their
organisation would "work with AiB and AiB customers/stakeholders to ensure they
receive a consistently high standard of service." Among the comments recorded
in the debrief document were criticisms of the pursuer for not providing
evidence in support of its statements and for not providing detail of who the
stakeholders were or how it would work with them. Comments on the winning
bidders included praise for providing representation on a number of stakeholder
boards, a proposal to provide a separate quality management section dedicated
to the AiB and a dedicated telephone line.
[51] The pursuer
submitted that it had provided ample evidence of its customer service and that
it considered the ITT to be unclear as it did not ask who the pursuer's stakeholders
were. I am surprised by the criticism of the pursuer's tender for not
providing evidence in support of its statements as it appears to me to have a
considerable amount of evidence in relation to its customer care service,
including an independent audit, in appendix 3. But I think that the pursuer
has misunderstood the debrief document if it considers that the scorer was
looking for disclosure of the pursuer's stakeholders. Further, I do not see
any basis for criticising the AiB for failing to specify who its stakeholders
were. The recipients of the ITT were all insolvency practitioners who would be
well aware of the parties interested in the work of the AiB. I consider that
scorers were entitled to give credit to the winning bidders for providing
further customer services although it was difficult for a small business to do
so. The matter was directly linked to the subject matter of the contract and
the contracting authority was entitled to take into account such additional
benefits without offending the principle of equal treatment. See paras [44]
and [45] above.
[52] Even if I
took into account the excluded challenges, I consider that the pursuer has only
a weak prima facie case of any infringement of the Regulations.
The test for an interim
order
[53] Parties agreed that I should consider the strength of the pursuer's prima
facie case and also the balance of convenience. Regulation 48(2) instructs
how the court should assess that balance. It provides that the court may
decide not to grant an interim order when the negative consequences of such an
order are likely to outweigh the benefits, having regard to the considerations:
"(a) that decisions taken by the contracting authority must be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible;
(b) the probable consequences of an interim order for all interests likely to be harmed; and
(c) the public interest."
[54] There is
now considerable case law in this jurisdiction on the court's approach to such
orders (Elekta Ltd v The Common Services Agency 2011 SLT 815,
Lord Glennie at para 26; Shetland Line (1984) Ltd v The Scottish
Ministers [2012] CSOH 99, Lord Malcolm at paras 11 and 12; and my decisions
in Clinical Solutions International Ltd at paras 7 and 8 and Amey AG
Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2012] CSOH 181 at para 36 f).
[55] I am
satisfied that it is appropriate to make the order under regulation 47(9)
bringing to an end the prohibition. In reaching that view I have had regard to
the following considerations. First, I consider that the pursuer has at best a
weak prima facie case of infringement of the 2012 Regulations.
Secondly, I doubt whether the criticisms, if made out, would demonstrate that
but for them, the pursuer would have been one of the successful bidders. The
pursuer was ranked fifth in the scoring of the tenderers and the quality
criteria made up only 40% of the overall score while price accounted for 60%.
[56] Thirdly, I
am satisfied that a significant delay in the introduction of the new framework
would cause serious loss to at least two of the three successful bidders and
that they would have no recourse against the pursuer if its challenge
ultimately failed. I have had regard to the affidavit of Ms Christine
Convy of ISS, which disclosed that it is an SME and its investment to enable it
to provide services under the framework agreement. I have also had regard to
Mr Cormack's submissions on behalf of Wylie & Bissett, another SME,
and in particular its mobilisation to perform its tasks under the framework agreement,
including the recruitment of new staff. [57] Fourthly, the public
interest points towards the avoidance of delay in the introduction of the new
framework agreement which is expected to yield some savings of public money as
well as an improved service. While the public interest in avoiding delay is
not as strong as it often is in the provision of vital healthcare services, and
I think that the AiB could make adequate arrangements for the interim provision
of services, the public interest remains a relevant factor especially where it
is not alleged that there has been any fundamental breach of the Regulations
and its governing principles.
[58] Considerations
that point towards the maintenance in place of the prohibition are, first, the
fact that a challenge has been made to the decision which must be effectively
reviewed, and, secondly, the damage which the pursuer's business would suffer
if it were to lose the work but ultimately succeed in its challenge. I
recognise that, if the pursuer were ultimately held entitled to claim damages
for breach of the regulations, it might be difficult to value the chance of
succeeding as a bidder. It is never easy to place a value on a chance and it
is rendered more difficult in this case in which the framework agreement
involves several participating economic operators. But the remedy must be
proportionate to the gravity of any breach of the regulations.
[59] The public
interest is unquestionably part of the balance of convenience. In so far as it
is to be considered separately, the need for certainty in the procurement
process and the avoidance of delay when a challenge does not have reasonable
prospects of success are factors which weigh against the continuance of the
prohibition.
[60] I am
satisfied that the factors pointing towards the grant of the interim order
significantly outweigh those pointing towards its refusal.
Conclusion
[61] I therefore grant the motion and pronounce an interim order under
regulation 47(9) of the 2012 Regulations bringing to an end the
prohibition on the contracting authority from entering into the proposed framework
agreement.