OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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A68/12
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OPINION OF LORD TYRE
in the cause
DEREK WATTERS
Pursuer: against
THE MASTERS GOLF COMPANY LIMITED
Defenders: and
URATHON (EUROPE) LIMITED
Third Party:
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Pursuer: O'Brien; Digby Brown LLP
Defenders: Balfour; Simpson & Marwick
Third Party: M McGregor; HBM Sayers
30 July 2013
Introduction
[1] The
pursuer carries on business as a golf professional at Gourock Golf Club. In
the course of that business he operates a retail golf shop in premises there
which are provided to him rent-free by the club. The pursuer owns the stock in
the shop. During the early hours of Monday 10 January 2009, a battery powered
golf trolley which was temporarily stored in the shop caught fire, causing
extensive fire and smoke damage to the pursuer's stock. The trolley had been
sold to the pursuer by the defenders and was manufactured and supplied to the
defenders by the third party. Quantum of the pursuer's loss and damage was
agreed at £34,000 inclusive of interest.
Description of the trolley
[2] The
Masters MT-E510 golf trolley is equipped with a 150 watt motor powered by a 12
volt battery. It has two large rear wheels and a smaller front wheel and can
be folded for transportation, for example in the boot of a car. The motor is
attached to the middle of the axle between the two rear wheels, with the
gearbox located near the left wheel. The battery, which is supplied by the
manufacturer along with the trolley, sits in a bag (for ease of carrying) on a
plastic tray above the axle, near the right wheel. It can be removed for
charging by disconnecting a lead, i.e. not by disconnecting the battery
terminals. When the battery lead is connected, the system is energised.
Forward motion of the trolley is controlled by a rotary on-off speed control
switch in the trolley handle. When supplied, the trolley has a 12-month
warranty and the battery has a 6-month warranty. The trolley is supplied with
a user manual that includes a number of "do's and don'ts" with which the user
is advised to comply in order to avoid damage to the trolley or to the
battery. One of these is in the following terms:
"Connecting to a poorly conditioned battery with a voltage below 10.5V will cause the trolley to lose its speed. It will also cause damage to the transistors in the controller box and could result in overheating."
[3] Attached
beneath the plastic battery tray there is a control box containing a printed
electrical circuit board mounted on a metal plate. Two black and red section
conductors run from terminals on the circuit board to the battery and to the
motor. The underside of the control box has a thick black plastic cover
designed to protect the contents of the control box from damage by impact or by
ingress of moisture.
[4] The
Masters MT-E510 trolley is manufactured by the third party in China and
transported to the defenders in containers. Mr Hugh Sims-Hilditch, the third
party's managing director, explained in evidence that trolley components are
inspected before assembly. After assembly but before shipping, the following
checks are carried out:
- that the electronics are working;
- that the trolley runs in a straight line;
- that the trolley is capable of carrying a measured load on a predetermined slope.
If a fault is identified it is rectified before shipping. The third party has been supplying trolleys to the defenders since about 2006 or 2007. In that time it has supplied 8,500 trolleys of differing specifications. The present case was the first report Mr Sims-Hilditch had received of a trolley catching fire. Other problems had been identified in the past, such as mud causing damage to the bearings in the trolley wheels, and with the speed control in the handle. The third party had tried to produce engineering solutions to these problems. There was no formal system for complaints to the defenders about trolleys to be relayed to the third party, and members of the public who purchased trolleys were never in direct contact with the third party.
[5] The
defenders' warehouse manager, Mr William Denyer, gave unchallenged evidence
that trolleys would arrive from the third party in printed boxes, taped
together in batches of about six. On arrival the seals would be checked and
the goods would be palletised, counted and stored. The boxes containing the
trolleys (and batteries) would not normally be opened before onward delivery to
a purchaser such as the pursuer.
Circumstances prior to the occurrence of the fire
[6] The
trolley with which this action is concerned was one of three purchased by the
pursuer from the defenders and sold to customers of his shop. This particular
trolley had been sold about three or four months before the date of the fire to
a club member named Euan McGregor. For reasons which were not explained, Mr McGregor
did not give evidence at the proof although the pursuer indicated that he was
still an active member. The pursuer knew Mr McGregor well and was aware
that he played golf every Saturday and perhaps also one evening during the
week. According to the pursuer, Mr McGregor called him during a round of
golf and explained that the trolley had stopped at about the 12th or
13th hole. Mr McGregor told the pursuer that he had been using
the trolley for a few months, during most of which time it had been going
"absolutely fine" (the pursuer's words), but that he had felt for a few rounds
that it had been struggling to the extent that he was almost having to push it
round the course. The pursuer apologised and, as the trolley and battery were
both still under warranty, he asked Mr McGregor to bring the trolley to
the shop to be returned to the defenders. The date of this conversation is
unclear. In his evidence to the court, the pursuer stated that it took place
on the Thursday evening (6 August) before the fire. However, in a
statement given two days after the fire to Mr Douglas Grant, a fire
investigator who gave evidence and to whom I refer below, the pursuer is
recorded as having stated that Mr McGregor had contacted him on Saturday
8 August, having last charged the battery at home the day before. This
conflict was not pursued and remains unresolved.
[7] In
any event, Mr McGregor brought the trolley into the pursuer's shop on
Sunday 9 August. The pursuer, who had no engineering expertise, had a
quick look at the trolley but could not see anything wrong with it. He told
Mr McGregor that he would send it back to the defenders and would provide
him with a replacement to use in the meantime. The pursuer then left the
trolley sitting in the shop overnight. The rotary on-off switch was in the
"off" position. In his evidence in chief the pursuer stated initially that he
was certain that the battery was disconnected; however, having been referred to
the statement he gave to Mr Grant in which he had stated that the battery
had been left connected to the trolley, he accepted that this was correct. It
was common ground between the expert witnesses that the fire could not have
occurred unless the battery had been left connected, and I so find. At about
7.00 am on Monday 10 August 2009 the fire alarm in the shop
activated, a fire was discovered, and the emergency services were called.
After the fire had been extinguished, attention focused upon the trolley as
having been the seat of the fire. Parts of the trolley, including the battery
terminals, were found to be undamaged. However, the battery base plate and the
plastic casing of the control box were missing and were presumed to have been
destroyed in the fire. The metal plate to which the circuit board had been
attached was discovered among debris in a severely fire-damaged condition. The
terminals on the plate could still be identified but the printed circuits had
been burned away.
The
cause of the fire: expert evidence
[8] The
pursuer led evidence from Mr Douglas Grant, a senior investigator with
International Fire Investigators and Consultants Ltd, Glasgow. Mr Grant
had served 32 years with Strathclyde Fire & Rescue, obtaining the rank
of Divisional Officer before his retirement in 1998. He is a Graduate of the
Institute of Fire Engineers. He was instructed by the pursuer's insurers to
attend at the locus on Wednesday 12 August 2009. He took photographs and,
as already noted, a statement from the pursuer, and produced a report dated
19 August 2009. He took possession of the fire-damaged golf trolley and
the remains of the metal plate. The third party led evidence from Mr
Daniel Pointon, a consulting scientist with Burgoynes, Glasgow, who has
23 years' experience in fire investigation. He is a Chartered Physicist
and a Member of the Institute of Fire Engineering. He was instructed in August
2012 and produced a report dated 23 November 2012. His investigations
included examining the trolley (which was produced in court for the proof) and
discussing the case with Mr Grant. Mr Pointon did not meet the pursuer
and neither Mr Grant nor Mr Pointon met Mr McGregor. It was
common ground between the experts that the fire had originated in the
electrical circuitry of the trolley and not in the battery. The issue was what
had caused the fire to develop.
[9] Mr
Grant described the fire as a "slow, smouldering event" in its initial stages
which took all night in the shop to pass through the transition from
overheating of a component within the control unit to flaming combustion. In
his opinion the fire was the result of a manufacturing defect. Because of the
extent of the damage to the trolley and the absence of some of the parts, it
was not possible to be sure what the defect had been: it could have been a
poorly constructed circuit board; a defect within the circuit board; a poor
connection; loose cabling; or wiring with insufficient capacity for the load.
Mr Grant agreed that the choice of cause lay between a manufacturing
defect and damage caused to the control box in the course of use of the trolley
by its owner. He regarded the reported description by Mr McGregor of a
fault developing progressively after 2-3 months of trouble-free use as
consistent with a manufacturing defect. The trolley was still relatively new
and this problem could not be regarded as fair wear and tear. If a weakness
develops in an electrical circuit it will become progressively more severe with
continued use. Mr Grant did not consider it likely that the electrical
circuitry had been damaged in the course of use of the trolley. The control
unit was protected in front by a cross-member bar, it was attached to a metal
plate and was protected underneath by robust plastic casing. The motor was
located at a lower level than the plastic casing containing the control unit;
if the axle area of the trolley had been damaged by misuse it would have been
reasonable to expect the motor to show signs of such damage, which it did not.
In cross-examination, Mr Grant fairly accepted that his investigation had been
restricted to ascertaining where the fire started and that further information
regarding the owner's use of the trolley during the period since purchase would
have been helpful in reaching a conclusion as to the cause of the fire.
[10] Mr
Pointon agreed that the overheating within the control unit must have occurred
over a period of hours, although he took issue with use of the word
"smouldering" as descriptive of the process leading to ignition. In his
opinion, without being able to identify the precise cause, the nature of any
defect was unclear. It was not possible to distinguish between a fault
initiated by a manufacturing defect, a fault initiated due to prolonged
connection to a faulty or flat battery, or a fault caused by mechanical damage
to the control box by the user. Choosing from among these three possibilities
would be speculative. In order to reach an informed view it would be necessary
to question the user more closely about the development of the problem. A
progressive fault could develop for any of the above reasons. A manufacturing
defect would have been more likely to manifest itself immediately rather than
after two or three months of satisfactory use. Mechanical damage during use
was a possibility because the plastic cover could crack or puncture, for
example as a result of impact with rock. This might allow water ingress,
causing corrosion which would lead in turn to resistive heating, becoming hot
enough to ignite plastic. Such damage might not be obvious on casual
inspection. He accepted that the plastic cover was fairly robust and would not
crack easily but it could be damaged if, for example, the trolley was dropped
off a kerb at an angle. The wiring could also be damaged if care was not
exercised while the trolley was being lifted into or out of a car boot:
snagging a wire could damage a terminal in the control unit. Mr Pointon
was critical of a design in which damage could occur as a result of a user
leaving the battery connected through forgetfulness. The simplest explanation
was that there had been damage during use but neither a manufacturing defect
nor damage during use was more likely than the other.
Submissions on behalf of the parties
Argument for the pursuer
[11] Counsel
for the pursuer based his case against the defenders upon section 14 of
the Sale of Goods Act 1979. In terms of section 14(2), where a seller
sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied term that the
goods supplied are of satisfactory quality. Subsection (2A) provides that
goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the standard that a reasonable
person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any description of the
goods, the price (if relevant) and all other relevant circumstances. Among the
aspects of quality of goods listed in subsection (2B) as potentially relevant
are fitness for all purposes for which goods of the kind in question are
commonly supplied, safety and durability. It was submitted that the defenders
were in breach of the contractual term implied into their contract with the
pursuer by section 14. A trolley which, during its anticipated lifespan,
developed into a fire hazard in the course of ordinary use was not of
satisfactory quality. The question was therefore whether the trolley was
defective in that respect when supplied or whether the fault developed as a
result of misuse by its owner, Mr McGregor. Counsel invited me to prefer
the view of Mr Grant that the evidence pointed more strongly to the existence
of a defect at the time of supply. The scenarios suggested by Mr Pointon
for damage to the plastic cover protecting the control unit, namely contact
with a rock or a kerb, or careless lifting into or out of the boot of a car,
were all within the normal range of use of the trolley. It would be surprising
if a properly designed trolley could become a fire hazard as a result of such
an occurrence. A golf trolley which could not withstand travel over rough
ground would not be of satisfactory quality. There was no positive evidence of
misuse of the trolley, and in particular no impact damage to the left side of
the trolley which was undamaged by the fire. The third party's case depended
upon Mr McGregor having used the trolley in a manner which caused damage
yet without that damage being observed by the pursuer when the trolley was
returned to him. Any conclusion as to misuse by Mr McGregor would be
entirely speculative. Mr Pointon had accepted that the account given by
Mr McGregor to the pursuer was consistent with the existence of a
manufacturing defect.
Argument for the defenders
[12] Counsel
for the defenders submitted that on the evidence before the court there were
only two possible scenarios: either there was a manufacturing defect or it was
not possible to determine what caused the fault to develop that led to the
fire. On the first scenario the defenders and the third party were both in
breach of contract and the defenders had a right of relief against the third
party. On the second scenario the pursuer's case failed and the defenders were
entitled to be assoilzied. There was no scenario in which the defenders were
liable to the pursuer without a right of relief.
Argument for the third party
[13] Counsel
for the third party accepted the defenders' proposition that there were no
circumstances in which the defenders could be found liable to the pursuer
without a right of relief by the third party. It was submitted, however, that
the pursuer had failed to discharge the onus of proving that the fault which
caused the fire to develop was caused by a manufacturing defect. The only
witness led at the proof who had seen the trolley before the fire was the
pursuer. His evidence that he had a quick look at it when Mr McGregor brought
it in was insufficient to establish that there was no damage to the plastic
cover. In the absence of evidence of Mr McGregor, which could apparently have
been led, the court should be slow to decide the case in the pursuer's favour
on his evidence alone. Reference was made to Morrison v J Kelly
& Sons Ltd 1970 SC 65, Lord President Clyde at 79, and to McLaren v Caldwell's
Paper Mill Co Ltd 1973 SLT 158, Lord Kissen at 165. The expert
witnesses were agreed that there were two possibilities: a manufacturing defect
or damage during use. Mr Pointon's view that the evidence was
insufficient to entitle the court to find either possible cause more probable
than the other should be preferred. Mr Grant could not point to any positive
indication that a manufacturing defect was more likely. It was not the case
that the fault should be presumed have been caused by a manufacturing defect
unless proved otherwise: it was for the pursuer to demonstrate that this was a
more likely cause than damage during use. Reference was made to McGlinchey v
General Motors UK Ltd [2012] CSIH 91, Lord Justice-Clerk Carloway at
paragraphs 32-36, referring in turn to the well-known dictum of Lord Brandon of
Oakbrook in Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds (The Popi M)
[1985] 1 WLR 948 questioning the validity of the observation attributed to the
fictional detective Sherlock Holmes that once the impossible had been
eliminated, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
Decision
[14] The
issue for the court, as it appears to me, is whether the evidence is such that
I should conclude, on balance of probabilities, that the fire was caused by a
manufacturing defect in the electrical circuitry of the trolley. This is not,
in my view, a case in which I am being asked to hold that an event resulted
from some inherently improbable cause, as was the position in The Popi M and
in McGlinchey. The parties in the present case are agreed that the
choice lies between a manufacturing defect and damage to the control box during
use of the trolley. Neither of these causes could, in my opinion, be described
as inherently improbable. The question is whether the evidence establishes
that the former is more likely than not to have been the cause of the fire. I
bear in mind that it is for the pursuer to prove, on balance of probabilities,
that the trolley was not of satisfactory quality when supplied, and not for the
defenders to prove that it was. As Lord Brandon observed in The Popi M at
page 955-6:
"...The judge is not bound always to make a finding one way or the other with regard to the facts averred by the parties. He has open to him the third alternative of saying that the party on whom the burden of proof lies in relation to any averment made by him has failed to discharge that burden. No judge likes to decide cases on burden of proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so. There are cases, however, in which, owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just course for him to take."
[15] In
the present case, evidence is lacking in two important respects. Firstly,
because of fire damage, the control box and circuit board were not available for
inspection to identify the precise reason why an electrical fault developed.
The probable mechanism of resistive heating resulting in outbreak of fire could
have occurred as the consequence of either a manufacturing defect or damage
during use, and is too general a description to found a distinction between the
two. Secondly, Mr McGregor was not called as a witness to describe his
use of the trolley during the months prior to the fire. This had two important
consequences: in the first place his evidence might have assisted in
establishing or, alternatively, eliminating misuse by him as a likely cause of
the fault in the electrics. In the second place, his account of the
progression of the difficulties that he experienced with the trolley might have
afforded a more detailed factual basis for the expression of expert opinion
than the brief second-hand report provided by the pursuer. In this regard I do
not regard the dicta cited from Morrison v J Kelly & Sons
Ltd and McLaren v Caldwell's Paper Mill Co Ltd as
directly in point: these cases were concerned primarily with the significance
of a failure to lead the evidence of an available corroborating witness
following the abolition in 1968 of the requirement for corroborative evidence
in civil cases. The situation in the present case is rather different: Mr McGregor,
had he been called, would not have been a witness corroborative of the
pursuer's evidence but rather a witness speaking to matters of fact of which
the pursuer had no first-hand knowledge. If anything, however, the absence of
such evidence seems to me to cause greater difficulty than the absence of a
witness called to corroborate first-hand evidence given by a party.
[16] I
have carefully considered the factual evidence (such as it was) and the opinion
evidence led by the parties, and I have concluded that there is no sufficient
evidential basis upon which I could hold that it is more likely than not that
the fault in the trolley's electrical circuit that resulted in the fire was
caused by a manufacturing defect. Mr Grant's view that such a defect was the
more likely cause was based upon the time taken for problems with the trolley
to emerge, the robustness of the plastic cover of the control box, and on the
fact that it was further from the ground than the motor which showed no sign of
damage during use. The submission by counsel for the pursuer proceeded upon
the basis that one would expect a properly designed trolley to be able to
withstand being taken over some rough terrain, up and down kerbs, and in and
out of the boot of a car without sustaining damage that could result in it
catching fire. I agree that one might have such an expectation, and the
evidence of Mr Sims-Hilditch that this was the only case of fire of which he
was aware, having manufactured and supplied around 8,500 trolleys, might
suggest that that expectation has been met. I accept Mr Pointon's
evidence that the plastic cover could sustain damage in various ways leading to
either mechanical damage to or corrosion of the electrical circuit and/or
components inside; this was accepted as a possibility by Mr Grant. In the
absence of Mr McGregor's evidence I do not consider that I am entitled to
make any assumption as to whether the plastic cover is likely to have sustained
damage in the course of use by him. The occurrence of such damage would not
necessarily imply misuse, but in any event I cannot rule out misuse. The fact
that the motor sat closer to the ground than the plastic cover does not in my
opinion justify a conclusion that the latter could not have been damaged if the
former showed no sign of damage. The timescale within which the problems with
the trolley became manifest appears to be equally consistent with either
possible cause. I should note that neither party invited me to regard
overheating of the electrics due to connection to a battery running at a low
voltage as a separate possible cause, presumably because it is difficult to see
how operation at low voltage could occur other than as a result either of a manufacturing
defect or of user misuse.
[17] The
case therefore appears to me to fall within the category described by
Lord Brandon (above) where the party upon whom the burden of proof lies
has failed to discharge that burden. In my opinion, there is nothing in the
evidence placed before the court to demonstrate, on balance of probabilities,
that a manufacturing defect was responsible for the fault in the electrics
which caused the fire.
Disposal
[18] In
the light of my opinion, I shall repel the pleas in law for the pursuer,
sustain the second and third pleas in law for the defender, and grant decree of
absolvitor. All questions of expenses are reserved.