EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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Lady PatonLord BracadaleLord Wheatley
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XA13/13
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD BRACADALE
in the APPEAL
by
J B Appellant;
against
The General Teaching Council for Scotland Respondent: _______________
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Alt: Murray; Anderson Strathern LLP
24 December 2013
Introduction
[1] In 1996
the appellant, who was by then in his forties, qualified and registered with
the General Teaching Council for Scotland (GTCS) as a teacher of English and
History. He went on to teach, apparently with success, in a secondary school
in the West of Scotland. In 2003 his two sisters and his brother made
allegations against the appellant that he had sexually abused them when they
were children and he was between the ages of 14 and 19 years. As a result of
the investigation into these allegations the appellant was indicted in the High
Court. After trial in 2005 he was convicted of charges relating to each of the
complainers and he was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment. In 2009 his
conviction was quashed on the ground of defective representation at his trial.
Authority was given to the Crown to raise a new prosecution as a result of
which, after a retrial in 2010, all the charges against the appellant were
found not proven.
[2] His
registration with the GTCS having lapsed while he was imprisoned, after his
acquittal in 2010 the appellant applied for re-registration as a teacher. When
the GTCS became aware of the history of the appellant they considered the
question of his fitness to teach. After sundry procedure, which we shall
examine in more detail later, on 17 December 2012 the Fitness to Teach Panel of
the GTCS directed that the appellant's application for registration be refused
and that he should be prohibited from making a further application for a period
of two years. Against that decision the appellant has appealed to this
court.
The General Teaching Council for Scotland: statutory provisions
[3] The
Teaching Council (Scotland) Act 1965 (the 1965 Act) provided for the
establishment of the GTCS. Section 6 of the 1965 Act provided for the
establishment of a register of teachers. Section 10 provided for the setting
up of a Professional Conduct Committee with two sub-committees: the
Investigating Sub-committee and the Disciplinary Sub-committee.
[4] In terms
of section 10B of the 1965 Act the Investigating Sub-committee was required to
conduct a preliminary investigation in a case where it appeared that a person
who had applied to be registered may have been convicted of a relevant offence
or may otherwise have been guilty of relevant misconduct. "Relevant
misconduct" was defined as meaning "conduct which falls short of the standard
expected of a registered teacher".
[5] When the
appellant's case was first considered by the GTCS in 2011 the relevant rules
made under the 1965 Act were the Conduct, Competence and Disciplinary Rules
2006 (the 2006 Rules). Rule 7, so far as relevant for present purposes,
provided:
"7.1 The duty of the Investigating Sub-Committee of the council in terms of section 10B of the Act is to carry out preliminary investigations into complaints received by the Council and to consider whether or not any complaint is relevant and whether or not it is just to refer the complaint to be heard before the Disciplinary Sub-Committee.
7.2.1 A complaint shall be a relevant complaint if it demonstrates evidence from at least one source that a teacher or Applicant for registration or re-registration:
(a) may have been convicted of a relevant offence;
(b) may have been guilty of relevant misconduct..."
In rule 1.1 "relevant misconduct" is defined as meaning "conduct which falls short of the standard expected of a registered teacher" thus reflecting the definition in section 10B of the 1965 Act.
[6] On
23 August 2011, after conducting an investigation, the investigating
sub-committee decided to refer the appellant's case to the disciplinary
sub-committee.
[7] The statutory
regime under which the GTCS operated was revised by the Public Services Reform
(General Teaching Council for Scotland) Order 2011 (the 2011 Order).
Schedule 4 of the 2011 Order makes provision for fitness to teach and
provides for the making of rules on fitness to teach. The relevant rules are
the General Teaching Council for Scotland Fitness to Teach and Appeals
Rules 2012 (the 2012 Rules). These replaced the 2006 rules. The
2011 Order and the 2012 Rules came into force on 2 April 2012. The
appellant's case was an application for re‑registration under
section 10C of the 1965 Act. It was therefore subject to the
transitional provisions set out in paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 to the
2011 Order which provided that where a case under section 10C was
being considered by the disciplinary sub‑committee prior to 2 April
2012, it must, on and after 2 April 2012, be considered by the GTCS under
Schedule 4 of the 2011 Order. The effect of this was that after 2 April
2012 the appellant's case became subject to the 2012 Rules.
[8] Article 16
of the 2011 Order provides that the GTCS must include an individual in the
Register of Teachers if it is satisfied inter alia that the individual
is not unfit to teach. Article 18 deals with fitness to teach. It provides
that the GTCS must investigate the fitness to teach of any individual seeking
registration and must refuse to register any individual seeking registration
whom it considers to be unfit to teach. Article 18(3) stipulates:
"An individual is 'unfit to teach' for the purposes of this Order if the GTCS considers that the individual's conduct or professional competence falls significantly short of the standards expected of a registered teacher (and 'fitness to teach' is to be construed accordingly)."
We note that while competence is qualified by the word "professional" no such restriction is placed on the reference to conduct.
[9] The
2012 Rules introduced a new provision in relation to the initial consideration
by the investigating panel convenor and introduces a new definition of
"relevant complaint". We need not concern ourselves with this because, as
explained above, by the time the 2011 Order and the subsequent
2012 Rules came into force the appellant's case was already being
considered by the disciplinary committee, having been referred by the
investigating sub-committee on 23 August 2011. It now came before the Fitness
to Teach Panel which adjudicated on the appellant's case. The Fitness to Teach
Panel is defined in rule 1.2.1 as meaning a panel of individuals appointed
by the GTCS to adjudicate, in accordance with the 2012 Rules, any case
referred to it and, where the context so requires, may also mean its historic
equivalents, the disciplinary sub-committee and the professional standards
panel.
[10] In terms of
the 2012 Rules, reflecting the definition in the 2011 Order, "unfit to
teach" means that the person's conduct or professional competence falls
significantly short of the standards expected of a registered teacher. In
addition, a new concept of "impairment of fitness to teach" is introduced
meaning that the person's conduct or professional competence falls short of the
standard expected of a registered teacher. The question of impairment to teach
does not arise in this appeal.
The hearing on 17 December 2012
[11] As already
noted, when the GTCS became aware of the background of the appellant they
considered the question of his fitness to teach and on 23 August 2011 the
investigating sub-committee agreed to refer the case to the disciplinary sub‑committee
for further consideration.
[12] The hearing
before the Fitness to Teach Panel was due to take place in July 2012. For
reasons which we shall examine later, that hearing did not proceed and the
appellant's case was heard by a Fitness to Teach Panel on
17 December 2012.
[13] For reasons
which we shall come to examine in more detail, the appellant did not attend the
hearing on 17 December 2012. After waiting for a period of
15 minutes to see whether he might appear, the panel determined that it
would be appropriate to proceed in the absence of the appellant.
[14] The
complaint against the appellant considered at the hearing was in the following
terms:
"1 On various occasions between 1 May 1970 and 27 February 1975, both dates inclusive, the precise dates unknown, you used lewd, indecent and libidinous practices and behaviour towards Mrs A and placed your hand over her mouth threatening to kill her, inserting your fingers into her private parts and attempted to force her to take your private member into her mouth.
2 On various occasions between 1 May 1970 and 27 February 1975, both dates inclusive, the precise dates unknown, you instructed Mrs A to enter your bed, forced her to lie face down on said bed, placed your hand over her mouth, threatened to kill her and you raped her.
6 Whilst subject to an investigation by the GTC Scotland [you did] engage in offensive and inappropriate correspondence to the GTC Scotland whilst it was seeking to discharge its regulatory functions."
There then followed a series of 35 extracts from letters sent by the appellant to the GTCS between 9 June 2010 and 29 August 2012.
[15] In support
of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint the Fitness to Teach Panel heard
evidence from one of the appellant's sisters, who, for the purposes of the
hearing was identified as "Mrs A". In support of paragraph 6 the panel was
provided with copies of the correspondence between the appellant and the GTCS
and, at the request of the appellant, his correspondence with other bodies.
[16] By a
majority the panel found paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint proven.
While the whole panel accepted the evidence of Mrs A as credible and reliable,
there was a minority view that, albeit that corroboration of her evidence was
not required, it would have been preferable for the evidence of Mrs A to
have been supported by further evidence, particularly in view of the serious
nature of the allegations. However, the majority accepted that the allegations
had been proven on a balance of probabilities.
[17] The panel unanimously
found paragraph 6 of the complaint proven. The panel accepted that the GTCS
had a duty to investigate the serious sexual allegations which had been drawn
to their attention. Having considered the terms and nature of the
correspondence between the appellant and the GTCS and other organisations the
panel found that the terms of the correspondence were offensive and
inappropriate whilst the GTCS was attempting to discharge its regulatory
function. The panel concluded that the appellant had failed to engage in
correspondence with the GTCS in an appropriate manner and had levelled
unfounded accusations against staff members and officials in terms which were
both offensive and inappropriate.
[18] The panel
determined that the appellant's conduct fell significantly short of the
standards expected of an applicant for registration and that he was therefore
unfit to teach. The panel gave the following reasons for reaching that
determination:
"The nature of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint, although of some antiquity, were sufficiently serious to satisfy the Panel that the Respondent's conduct fell significantly short of the standards expected of an applicant for registration. The terms and nature of the correspondence set out in paragraph 6 of the complaint, and the unfounded and gratuitous allegations, demonstrated behaviour which also fell significantly short of the standards expected of an applicant.
The Panel considered that its duty to the public interest and the maintenance of the public's confidence in teachers and in the integrity of the teaching profession required that such a finding be made.
The Respondent's conduct is fundamentally incompatible with being a registered teacher."
The panel directed that the appellant's application for full registration be refused and that he should be prohibited from making a further application for a period of two years.
Appeal to the Court
of Session
[19] The appellant appealed to this court under article 24 of the
2011 Order, which, so far as relevant for present purposes, provides as
follows:
"(1) Subject to paragraph (6), an individual may appeal to the Court of Session against any decision of the GTCS in respect of which notification is required under article 23.
...
(3) The Court of Session may determine an appeal giving such directions as it thinks fit (including directions as to the expenses of the appeal).
(4) The Court of Session's decision is final."
Article 23 provides:
"(1) The GTCS must notify an individual of a decision-
(a) to refuse to register the individual because the GTCS considers that the individual-
(i) is unfit to teach..."
Submissions
The appellant's submissions
[20] At the
earlier stages of his appeal the appellant was represented by solicitors and
counsel who lodged the appeal, which contained six grounds, and, subsequently, a
note of argument. At the hearing of the appeal the appellant represented
himself. He adopted the submissions in the note of argument without further
development and advanced a number of separate submissions of his own. The
effect of his submissions was to introduce an additional ground of appeal,
namely, bias.
[21] The
appellant based his oral submissions to us on a letter written by him, dated
27 September 2013, addressed to the Court of Session, together with a
bundle of additional productions which we permitted him to lodge. He contended
that the panel's decision was the product of bias on the part of GTCS personnel
and committee members. This bias led to what the appellant described as a "dereliction
of duties and responsibilities" and to the inevitable outcome of the decision
on 17 December 2012. While the appellant made reference to bias, false
allegations, presumption, deception and "deeming" as being the fundamental
components of this ground of appeal we consider that essentially the complaint
is one of bias.
[22] The
interaction between the appellant and the GTCS began on 9 June 2010
when, in the wake of his acquittal earlier that year, the appellant wrote to
the GTCS in the following terms:
"Following upon the false and malicious (and therefore itself criminal) conviction I was abused with in April 2005 the GTC cancelled my registration, thereby removing my ability to teach in Scotland.
That evil conviction was quashed by their Lordships - Osborne, Eassie and Kingarth - in the court of appeal, at 3rd February 2009.
The Crown Office - a miserable corruption and Mafia of corrosive gangsterism - unable to face the fact of miscarriage successfully argued for a retrial. This took place in Glasgow High Court in February of this year. I was acquitted of all the matters contained in the false, malicious, wicked and evil indictment.
I intend resuming my teaching career, and I would be obliged to receive your confirmation you have reinstated my registration with the council."
This marked the beginning of a very lengthy correspondence between the appellant and officials of the GTCS. In the course of this correspondence the appellant made allegations against the officials of the GTCS. In particular he made complaints in relation to Mr Mark Paxton, the investigating officer, Miss Irene Hunter, the director of corporate and legal governance, and Mr A Finn, chief executive. In his submission to us he summed up their behaviour in the following way:
"1. From the outset, GTC personnel abused me with a presumption of guilt, lied to me and subjected me to fabricated allegations, rigged and fixed proceedings.
2. GTC personnel undertook no independent and impartial investigation, failed to consider evidence of malice, including admitted criminal threats and purposes, extensive premeditated perjury, self and mutual contradictions and changing tales by their clients, they refused to consider the homophobia evident throughout since 2003 and their common law duty of care. There is no evidence in the decision notice of 17th December 2012 the members of this Panel applied their minds to these matters.
3. GTC personnel acted contrary to their legal duties as expressed in the Public Services Reform (Geneneral Teaching Council for Scotland) Order 2011..."
[23] The
appellant complained that the officials had demonstrated repeated examples of
bias directed against him. He drew our attention to a letter dated 25 October
2011 from Mr Paxton to the appellant's sister, who was subsequently referred to
as Mrs A at the hearing before the Panel. In his letter Mr Paxton told Mrs A
that the GTCS believed that she may be able to provide them with further
information in relation to allegations of rape and sexual assault by the
appellant. He explained that the GTCS had been informed that she had been a
witness during the earlier criminal case. In the letter Mr Paxton went on to
explain that the investigation by the GTCS was distinct from, and went beyond, what
was considered by employers and the police or courts. He explained that
employers were concerned with the impact that such allegations have on employment
and the police and the courts were concerned only with whether the criminal law
had been broken. He explained that in order to maintain standards of
professionalism and conduct within teaching it was essential that the GTCS
considered the allegations from that distinct perspective. He went on to
explain that while the police and the courts required proof of a criminal
allegation beyond reasonable doubt, in order to take disciplinary action the
GTCS required proof on the balance of probability. He explained that this was
an easier threshold to meet. He sought to make an arrangement to take a
statement from Mrs A.
[24] Before us
the appellant characterised this letter as an example of the biased approach of
Mr Paxton. The appellant explained that references by him in his correspondence
and in his submissions to "the clients" or "criminal clients" of the GTCS were
references to his siblings who had given evidence against him. Describing Mrs
A as a "client" of the GTCS, he said that Mr Paxton was essentially promising
the "criminals" who had threatened him, that is to say, his siblings, "an
outcome, conforming to their admitted threats and purposes by means of an
easier threshold of purported proof". Mr Paxton had advised these clients that
the "criminal threats and fabrications would be deemed 'information' relating
to their victim [i.e. the appellant], inciting them to further criminal
activity in pursuit of established criminal threats and purposes". In
addition, the appellant submitted that in his letters to the appellant Mr Paxton
had repeatedly demonstrated bias.
[25] The
appellant claimed that Ms Hunter had lied to him and levelled false allegations
against him. He referred to a number of items of correspondence, and, in
particular, to the events which occurred on 19 July 2012 when the case was
scheduled for a hearing before the Fitness to Teach Panel. According to the
appellant, on that occasion Ms Hunter falsely accused him of making threatening
comments against her and behaving in a threatening manner. In addition, she lied
to the appellant and Mr McLaughlin, of the Miscarriages of Justice Organisation
(MOJO), who was accompanying him, when she told them that she had put her
allegations to the GTCS committee members and they had instructed that the
appellant and Mr McLaughlin should leave the building on pain of the police
being called. That this was a lie was demonstrated by what was said on 27 July
2012 by the legal adviser to the GTCS, who advised Mr McLaughlin and Ms Molloy of
MOJO that Ms Hunter had not spoken to the committee on 19 July and they had
taken no such decision as that reported by her to the appellant.
[26] In relation
to Mr Finn, among other allegations, the appellant complained that Mr Finn was
present at the meeting of the investigating committee on 23 August 2011
at which, according to the appellant, certain documents were withheld from the
committee. These included a document dated 12 April 2011, which had
the appearance of a police report, passed by the Crown Office to the GTCS, and
the enhanced disclosure certificate dated 24 March 2011 relating to the
appellant which had been obtained by him and submitted to the GTCS. This
approach did not reflect fairness and impartiality.
[27] In his
submissions the appellant made repeated reference to an admission by Mrs A in
her evidence in the High Court in 2010 that she had threatened to ruin the
appellant's life and damage his career. This evidence, which demonstrated
malice on the part of Mrs A, had not been taken into account by the Fitness to
Teach Panel.
The respondents' submissions
[28] Mr Murray,
on behalf of the GTCS, submitted that the evidence in support of paragraphs 1, 2
and 6 of the complaint was ample to constitute misconduct. The decision
of the panel, as a professional panel, should be accorded a substantial degree
of deference.
[29] In relation
to the question of bias, Mr Murray submitted that the letters written by the
chief executive and others were expressed in an even-handed and fair manner and
responded appropriately to the appellant's letters to the GTCS which were extensive
and diffuse. The officials went to considerable length to clarify the
procedures for the appellant and were scrupulously fair in explaining these
procedures. No bias could be detected in the correspondence of the officials.
[30] In
addition, the structure of the GTCS and the constitution of the Fitness to
Teach Panel was such as to exclude or, at least, to minimise the risk of bias
at the stage of the hearing and the making of the decision. The panel operated
under the rules and constituted an independent and impartial tribunal. It was
a panel of five members, three of whom were members of the teaching profession appointed
by an appointments committee for a four year term, together with two lay
members. The panel members operated independently of the GTCS and its officials.
The panel were assisted by a legal assessor who had security of tenure. The
case was presented by a presenting officer. There was no apparent or real bias
in the case.
[31] As to the
criticism of lack of reasons, under detailed reference to the decision document,
Mr Murray submitted that the appellant could have been left in no substantial
doubt as to the reasons for the panel's decision.
Discussion
[32] We
shall address the grounds of appeal in the following order: first we shall
consider grounds 1, 2 and 4, followed by the additional ground of bias;
thereafter, we shall consider grounds 3 and 6, and finally ground 5.
Ground 1: "relevant complaint"
[33] The first
ground of appeal lodged on behalf of the appellant was that the conduct alleged
to have been committed by him between the ages of 14 and 19 years did not
fall within the definition of a relevant complaint for the purposes of the
2012 rules. As we have already noted, the decision in relation to the
question of a relevant complaint was decided by the investigating sub-committee
under the 2006 rules. By the time the 2012 rules came into force the
appellant's case was under consideration by the disciplinary sub-committee.
Accordingly, the 2012 rules definition of a relevant complaint had no
bearing on the appellant's case.
Ground 2: the test to
be applied
[34] The
second ground of appeal was that the GTCS had misdirected itself as to the
meaning of and correct test to be applied in determining whether an individual
was unfit to teach. The panel had found that the appellant's conduct fell
significantly short of the standards expected of an applicant for registration
and that he was therefore unfit to teach. The correct standard was set out in
article 18(3) of the 2011 Order as being "expected of a registered
teacher". In our opinion nothing turns on the use of language by the panel
which clearly applied the correct test.
Ground 4: the appellant's letter dated 8 December 2012
[35] The fourth
ground of appeal was that the panel had failed to have any, or any proper
regard, to the appellant's statement sent by letter dated
8 December 2012. In answer the respondents pointed out that the
panel had given careful consideration to all of the evidence adduced. In
addition, it was submitted that the letter of 8 December 2012 did not
bear to be a submission or representation to the panel but was one of a very
large number of lengthy letters written by the appellant. We agree with that observation.
Additional ground: Bias
[36] We now turn
to the additional ground of bias. Where the issue of bias is raised the test
to be applied is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having
considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the
tribunal was biased (Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357, per
Lord Hope of Craighead at p 494).
[37] We can
readily understand the deep sense of frustration experienced by the appellant
in circumstances in which, in his view, his siblings' allegations were without
foundation; a lengthy criminal process, during which he spent years in prison,
resulted in his acquittal; one of his siblings admitted on oath at the trial in
2010 to having threatened to ruin his life and his career; and, when he had
hoped to resume his teaching career, the GTCS embarked on an investigation into
the allegations. But it seems to us that once these matters were drawn to the
attention of the GTCS they were bound to investigate them. While it is clear
that in his own mind the appellant was satisfied that his siblings had lied on
oath in the evidence in the High Court, given the serious nature of the
allegations, it seems to us that by investigating them the GTCS was carrying
out its statutory obligation. This was repeatedly explained to the appellant
in the letters sent to him by the officials.
[38] We are
unable to accept the contention of the appellant that the decision of the panel
was the inevitable result of bias on the part of the employees and committee
members of the GTCS and that the decision of the panel was tainted by the
behaviour of the employees. First, having read the correspondence placed
before us we are unable to detect bias on the part of the officials of the GTCS
who communicated with the appellant. Having read the letter written by Mr
Paxton to Mrs A we are quite unable to accept the description of it by the
appellant. It seems to us that the terms in which Mr Paxton wrote to Mrs A
were no more than would be expected of an investigating officer making contact
with a potential witness in the course of carrying out a proper inquiry into
allegations which had been drawn to the attention of the GTCS.
[39] We regard
the appellant's criticism of the Crown Office as misconceived. It does not follow
that because the Crown Office provided the GTCS with the police summary in
relation to the allegations against the appellant that the Crown Office were
prejudiced against him and were not acting independently.
[40] We are not
in a position to have a full understanding of what transpired at the hearings
in July. The case had been set down for a hearing before the Fitness to Teach Panel
on 19 and 27 July. As we have explained above, according to the appellant, when
he attended at the premises of the GTCS on 19 July Ms Hunter falsely
accused him of making threatening comments against her and behaving in a
threatening manner. She then told the appellant and Mr McLaughlin that the
panel had instructed that the appellant and Mr McLaughlin should leave the building
on pain of the police being called.
[41] In a letter
to the GTCS dated 23 July 2012 Mr McLaughlin gave his account of what happened
on 19 July. There appears to have been an issue in relation to unwillingness by
the appellant to sign in at reception and wear a name tag or badge. Mr Reid,
the presenting officer, became involved. Mr McLaughlin went on to describe the
circumstances in which they were asked to leave as follows:
"Ms Hunter followed, returning to inform us that [the appellant] would not be able to appear at the hearing because of the threatening comments she claimed had been made I assume by either [the appellant] or myself. We were then asked to leave the building. I asked her on three occasions to tell me what threatening comments had been made. She could not tell me this because no threats had been made. She changed tack and then said we were being asked to leave because of aggressive behaviour... [the appellant] and myself left under protest and make this clear."
We note that in his letter to the GTCS Mr McLaughlin did not suggest that Ms Hunter was communicating a decision of the Fitness to Teach Panel that the appellant should leave the building.
[42] While we do
not have Ms Hunter's account of what happened on 19 July, it is clear that some
sort of incident occurred which culminated in the appellant having to leave the
building without the hearing going ahead. Whatever was the precise nature of
the events of 19 July, what is in our view significant is what happened on 27 July
2012, which had been allocated as the second day of the hearing. On that day the
appellant attended at the GTCS office. The Fitness to Teach Panel decided that
the hearing should not go ahead. The note of the outcome of the meeting is in
the following terms:
"The Panel has carefully considered a number of factors specifically the circumstances of [the appellant's] attendance on Day 1 and day 2 of this hearing and all documentation provided to it.
In considering the circumstances the Panel was fully mindful of its obligation to ensure that cases are dealt with fairly and justly and that all parties are able to participate fully in proceedings in terms of the GTCS Fitness to Teach and Appeals Rules 2012 sections 1.3.5 and 1.3.6.
The Panel has considered this objective and has concluded that as [the appellant] did not have an opportunity to hear the witness's evidence on day 1 or to respond to that evidence, he could not be considered to have been afforded the opportunity to participate fully in the proceedings. Therefore, this Panel has decided to recuse itself and this particular hearing will proceed no further.
It is a matter for the Presenting Officer to consider how to proceed."
It was against that background that the hearing before a fresh Fitness to Teach Panel was scheduled to take place in December. By letter dated 8 December 2012 the appellant advised the panel that he did not intend to attend the hearing on 17 December. He wrote in the following terms:
"Given the nature of GTC committee members inevitable criminal deeming of criminal fabrications got up in conformity with an established criminal threat and the criminal abuses done to me as a consequence of my attendance at Clerwood House at 19th and 27th July 2012 it is unsafe for me to repeat the error. I will not expose myself to further such criminal abuses."
[43] Before us the
appellant gave an additional reason for not attending the hearing in December.
He said that there would be no point in his taking part because he would not be
permitted to cross-examine his sister in relation to the allegations of a
sexual nature. So far as we can see he had never made this suggestion at any
earlier stage. Whatever his motivation, and whatever feelings he had about what
happened in July, the fact remains that the appellant made a deliberate
decision not to engage with the process at the critical point of the hearing in
December 2012. By doing so, he denied himself the opportunity to put to his
sister that her evidence was untrue. He denied himself the opportunity to confront
her with the threat that she had made, and admitted under oath having made, to
ruin his life and his career. He denied himself the opportunity to put his own
position before the panel and to make submissions to them.
[44] In our
opinion, the structure and composition of the Fitness to Teach Panel is such
that, even if some degree of bias on the part of officials could be
demonstrated, which, in the event, we have not found to be the case, the
independence of the panel cannot be impugned. The make-up of the panel, as
explained to us, means that the members of the panel were independent of the
GTCS; they would not have had any dealings with the appellant's case before.
They were assisted by a legal assessor. The case was presented by a presenting
officer. In our view the decision of the panel in July to recuse itself is, in
itself, indicative of an independent approach by the Fitness to Teach Panel.
[45] When we
apply the test set out in Porter v Magill (supra) we are
satisfied that the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the
facts in the appellant's case, would conclude that there was no real
possibility that the decision of the panel was in itself biased or was the
inevitable outcome of bias at earlier stages. We are unable to detect any real
or apparent bias in the case.
Ground 3: Article 6 ECHR
[46] The third
ground of appeal was that the GTCS had erred in law in finding the appellant
unfit to teach as the conduct complained of in paragraphs 1 and 2 was
of such an age as to render any prospect of the appellant receiving a fair
hearing negligible in violation of article 6 of ECHR. The conduct was
alleged to have taken place thirty-five to forty years ago; it was
alleged to have been perpetrated by the appellant when he was a child and a
young person between the ages of 14 and 19 years; his conviction had been
quashed on appeal; and the charges had been found not proven at his retrial. We
have already explained why we are satisfied that the Fitness to Teach Panel
which heard the appellant's case was an independent and impartial tribunal. In
our opinion, although old, the allegations were of a very serious nature and,
on any view, relevant to the question of the appellant's fitness to teach. The
panel heard the evidence of Mrs A; they considered evidence of late
disclosure of sexual abuse. The appellant chose not to engage in the
proceedings. We are unable to see any basis on which it could be said that he
did not have the opportunity to have a fair hearing.
Ground 6: Reasons
[47] The sixth
ground of appeal was that the GTCS had failed to provide adequate reasons for
its decision. In particular, it had failed to specify what material and
information it had before it in connection with the complaints and how it
approached that material and information. We have already set out in some
detail the findings of the panel. The panel stated that they bore in mind that
the burden of proof rested on the presenting officer and that the standard of
proof required was that used in civil proceedings, namely, the balance of
probabilities. It is also clear that the panel were aware that corroboration
of the evidence of Mrs A was not required. In their findings the panel
carefully assessed the credibility and reliability of Mrs A. They noted her
distress. They analysed her evidence in some detail. They dealt with the
issue of late disclosure of sexual abuse. The panel explained why they arrived
at a majority verdict in relation to the complaints in paragraphs 1 and 2.
[48] In relation
to the complaint in paragraph 6 of the panel set out in very considerable
detail extracts from the letters written to the GTCS by the appellant and
reported that they had read all of the correspondence. It is clear that they
applied their minds to the correspondence.
[49] The panel
went on to explain why, on the basis of the evidence which they accepted, they
determined that the appellant's conduct fell significantly short of the
standards expected of an applicant for registration. The panel recognised the
age of the allegations but had regard to their seriousness. They explained why
the terms of the letters demonstrated behaviour which fell significantly short
of the standards expected of an applicant.
[50] We
are satisfied that when the decision of the panel is read as a whole the
informed reader, such as the appellant, would be in no real or substantial
doubt as to the reasons on which the panel arrived at its decision (South
Bucks District Council v Porter [2004] 1 WLR 1953; Uprichard
v Scottish Ministers [2011] CSIH 59 per Lord Justice Clerk (Gill)
at para [26]; Wordie Property Co Ltd v Secretary of State for
Scotland 1984 SLT 345, per Lord President (Emslie) at p 348).
Ground 5: Correspondence
[51] The fifth
ground of appeal was that the GTCS erred in finding that the appellant's
correspondence specified in paragraph 6 of the complaint rendered the
appellant unfit to teach in that they fell "short of the standards expected of
an applicant". The extracts were taken out of context. It was contended that
the tone and content of the correspondence, while admittedly intemperate, when
read in the context in which they were written were indicative of a distressed
individual of good character who found himself accused of serious crimes,
arrested, tried, imprisoned, appealed, retried, acquitted, released from prison
and finally, refused re-entry to a profession which he had worked in for
7 years on the basis that he was still considered guilty of the alleged
crimes, irrespective of a decision of the jury. Before us the appellant went
as far as to suggest that his letters were relatively moderate in their terms
and tone. In our view the content and tone of the letters written by the
appellant were far from moderate It is sufficient, in order to illustrate
that, to quote a few extracts from the letters. On 31 May 2011, under
reference to the report passed to them by the Crown Office, the appellant wrote
to the GTCS in the following terms:
"This submission is a malicious and criminal fiction: a tissue of lies from first to last. It conforms to the Crown Office's reckless determination to act in conformity with, and to further the purposes of the criminal threat to destroy my career in teaching, issued by the Criminal Complainers in February 2003.
Further, it seeks to cover up the collusion of Strathclyde police, the Crown Office Procurator Fiscal Service, and a criminal masquerading as a High Court Judge, in that criminal purpose.
Strathclyde police and the Crown Office Procurator Fiscal Service are institutionally homophobic; the supposed judge a vicious homophobe.
The Crown Office submission, offered the General Teaching Council in support of a criminal threat, is false and malicious in every particular. It is a work of criminal fiction. Its author is a criminal, as are both Lord Advocates and all other Crown Office and supposed justice personnel who, setting aside duty upon duty, acted in conformity with the purpose of a criminal threat, thereby deserting their duty in favour of the criminal interest. It is filleted as well as fabricated..."
On 21 January 2012 he wrote in the following terms:
"It comes as no surprise you seek to misrepresent the matter at hand for your own illicit purposes. This is the course you and your colleagues have pursued since 2010.
Your threats and the threats of the other pro-criminal thugs, owe nothing whatsoever to ensuring high standards throughout the teaching profession, but are in fact aspects of a continuing campaign of criminal abuse by various degenerate agencies and sick individuals who seek to deliver to criminals the purpose expressed in criminal threats.
You, Paxton, Hunter and Anderson are scoundrels, worse indeed. Each of you is unfit to exercise public authority."
On 6 April 2012 he wrote this:
"I accuse you, Paxton, Hunter, Skirving, Anderson, and any other of your associates complicit in these crimes and abuses: the torture, inhuman and degrading treatment done to me, of collusion in the purposes of a criminal threat and associated threats. In this regard you each have actively and maliciously made common cause with your criminal clients and their cheerleaders in the supposed justice system.
It is abundantly clear you and your colleagues have systematically sought to mislead me in pursuit of a criminal purpose, not the least example of which is the repeated lie the GTC would, and has, conducted an independent investigation."
There were many letters in similar terms and tone written over a considerable period of time.
[52] We have already
recognised the extreme stress under which the appellant must have been
functioning. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the panel were entitled to
come to the conclusion that the letters written by the appellant were offensive
and inappropriate and demonstrated behaviour which fell significantly short of
the standards expected of a registered teacher.
Disposal
[53] For
the reasons set out above we are of the opinion that none of the grounds of
appeal is well founded and the appeal must be refused.