EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
|
|
|
|
Lord MenziesLady Clark of CaltonLord Clarke
|
P898/12
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LADY CLARK OF CALTON
in the Reclaiming Motion
in Petition of
WILLIAM ROBIN GRAHAM BARR Petitioner and Reclaimer;
against
EAST RENFREWSHIRE COUNCIL Respondents;
AND
STEWART MILNE HOMES LIMITED Interested Party:
_______________
|
Respondent: MacKenzie, Solicitor Advocate; Shepherd & Wedderburn LLP
Interested Party: McKay; DWF Biggart Baillie
20 December 2013
Summary
[1] This
opinion relates to a reclaiming motion brought by the petitioner and reclaimer against
the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary dated 4 June 2013. The Lord Ordinary
refused the prayer of the petition in which the petitioner had sought reduction
of a decision of the respondents dated 18 April 2012 which granted planning
permission to the interested party to construct 44 houses and 14 flats on land
in Newton Mearns adjacent to land owned by the petitioner and reclaimer. On
part of said land there was built Fa'side House, a B listed property with
an access drive of mature trees.
[2] There were
two grounds of appeal for the petitioner and reclaimer but senior counsel in
the event did not insist upon the second ground. Accordingly we deal only with
the first ground of appeal which criticised the approach of the Lord Ordinary on
the basis that he failed to recognise that the respondents had not taken
account of a key requirement in their own planning brief and thus failed to
take account of a material consideration namely, "delivery of protection of the
existing tree boulevard along the access to Fa'side House". The respondents'
failure was described as a material omission which vitiated their decision.
Factual background
[3] The Lord
Ordinary set out the factual background in his opinion. In summary he stated:
"[4] The physical context of the petitioner's property so far as material to these proceedings is as follows: the petitioner and his family live in Fa'side House. That house is reached by a drive which runs from Ayr Road to the house, from a point on the south carriageway of Ayr Road about 20 meters west of the Malletsheugh roundabout to the house itself, a distance of about 400 metres in all. The drive is flanked on both sides by mature trees, the tree belt. To the immediate east of the drive and the eastmost line of trees lies a 10 metre strip, which is in the ownership of the petitioner. The 10 metre strip is physically part of the land, in that it lies in the same field. The land itself lies to the east of the strip.
[5] The background to the
decision was this: In August 2011 when the petitioner became aware that the
interested party was making a planning application for a residential
development on the land he intimated to the respondents formal opposition to
the application citing six grounds of opposition. Only one of these grounds is
of relevance to the present proceedings and that was in the following terms:
'The proposed development would inevitably, for safety reasons, require the removal of the trees alongside our driveway (the tree belt) with a further loss of amenity in the area - and specifically in relation to the approach to one of a limited number of listed buildings in Newton Mearns'".
[4] The Lord
Ordinary made reference to the Ayr Road planning brief dated June 2011 ("the
planning brief"). He summarised that document (9 of the Appendix) which is
fundamental to the submissions on behalf of the petitioner and reclaimer. The
planning brief set out the proposals for the land referred to in the planning
brief. The proposals included residential development and "reinforcement of
the green belt through creation of a 'green' corridor along the southern
boundary of the site" (paragraph 1.6). It was noted that,
"the site is located in a relatively prominent location when viewed from Ayr Road, being located in the edge of the urban area, and set against the backdrop of the adjacent Right of Way and tree belt ...". (Paragraph 2.2).
Having reflected on the prominent location and the importance of existing tree belts, the planning brief stated that development should deliver inter alia "protection of the existing tree boulevard along the access to Fa'side House" (paragraph 2.10).
[5] The Lord
Ordinary also made reference to various planning policies and the report on
handling which provided a context to the respondents' decision making.
Submissions on behalf of parties in the reclaiming motion
[6] The oral submissions
made to the court were consistent with the written notes of argument lodged on
behalf of the parties and were also reflected in the submissions recorded by the
Lord Ordinary. It is unnecessary to record the oral submissions in detail.
[7] The
principal submission made by senior counsel for the petitioner and reclaimer
was to the effect that there had been failure by the respondents in their
decision-making to take account of a key requirement contained in their own
planning brief. He submitted that this was a failure to take account of a
material consideration which, if properly understood and applied, would have
made a difference to the decision of the respondents. Reference was made to Wordie
Property Company Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland 1984
SLT 345; Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Secretary of State
for the Environment (1991) 61 P&CR 343; Tesco Stores Limited v Dundee
City Council 2012 SC (UKSC) 278. In developing this submission which was
fundamental to the reclaimer's case, senior counsel criticised the approach of
the Lord Ordinary on the basis that the Lord Ordinary had failed to identify
the correct question and had therefore fallen into error in his approach.
[8] Senior
counsel referred in detail to the planning brief (9 of the Appendix) under
reference to various documents which explained the history and the site plan.
He emphasised that the planning brief stated that development should "as a
minimum" deliver "protection of the existing tree boulevard along the access to
Fa'side House". He submitted that the planning brief recognised the particular
importance of the existing trees and that the protection was intended to be for
the viable life of the trees so that they did not pose a danger following
construction. He submitted that if the relationship of the trees to the
proposed development was properly understood, it was obvious that there was a
risk for the safety of the houses and their occupiers in proposing to locate
these "within the fall area" of the existing tree boulevard. Senior counsel
echoed submissions he had made to the Lord Ordinary based on a document
which was not before the planning committee of the respondents. This was
recorded by the Lord Ordinary in paragraph [21] of his opinion. This
emphasised, in general terms, the risk of storm damage and debris even for
healthy trees. Senior counsel submitted that it was obvious from the plans,
the documents produced and simple calculation that the gardens of the proposed
houses within the development are located sufficiently close to the line of
trees that those trees pose a real danger to the back gardens and to persons in
the gardens, or perhaps in extreme wind event to the houses themselves.
[9] As counsel
developed his submission, it became clear to us that the principal risk to the
trees, contended for by counsel, was that the reclaimer as landowner, would have
no alternative but to fell the trees if the development proceeded because of
the risks involved for which the reclaimer as landowner would be responsible. Senior
counsel accepted that the legal obligations of a prudent landowner would
include taking reasonable care to maintain and check the trees and that this
might include, for example, planned felling of diseased trees and other
maintenance work. Counsel submitted, however, that this would not be
sufficient to avoid the obvious dangers which might occur in the event of a
destructive storm. He submitted that any conclusion that such a risk was
trivial was wrong. The risk was obvious and easily avoided by adherence to the
respondents' own guidance in their own planning brief. That guidance was a
material consideration. It should, as a matter of law, have been taken into
account in the decision-making process. The respondents' failure to do so was
a material omission which vitiated the decision.
[10] Both the
solicitor advocate for the respondent and counsel for the interested party
supported the approach of the Lord Ordinary and submitted that the
Lord Ordinary was entitled to refuse the prayer in the petition for
judicial review.
[11] On behalf
of the respondents, the solicitor advocate submitted that there had been no
specification or explanation of the safety reasons that "inevitably" required
the removal of the trees along the driveway. Reference was made to the expert
arboricultural report prepared by the respondent (18 of the Appendix) and the
report prepared on behalf of the petitioner (12 of the Appendix). The
solicitor advocate submitted that there was no significant factual dispute
about the condition of the trees along the driveway. It was accepted that, as
for any trees, risk exists but such risk can and ought to be properly managed.
[12] It was
submitted that both the respondents and the Lord Ordinary had regard to
the planning brief. The planning brief does not specify a safe set-back
distance or any particular design. It is not intended to be prescriptive or
overly restrictive. It is plain from the history of the planning
considerations that the planning brief was taken into consideration by the
respondents and, in particular, consideration was given by the respondents to
the existing trees along the driveway. Specific protective measures were
specified by the respondents in condition 11 to protect the trees from the
danger posed by the proposed development during construction. Such danger
included damage, for example, to tree roots which might adversely affect the
trees even after construction works were completed. Condition 11 recognised
that the long term welfare of the trees was important in reaching a decision
which had proper regard to the planning brief.
[13] Counsel for
the interested party submitted that it was plain from the history that the
planning brief design objective in relation to the trees was part of the
overall decision-making process. The relevant design objective of the planning
brief had not been left out of account. The planning brief provided no
specification about a particular design or set-back or "fall back" distance.
These matters were all matters to be considered by the respondents as planning
authority. The criticisms made by senior counsel for the reclaimer about the
decision-making was really an attack on the merits of the decision-making in
circumstances where the petitioner had never raised in his objection that there
should be a different design or particular set-back distances.
Discussion
[14] The general
legal principles were not in dispute. It was accepted as a general principle
that failure to take account of a material consideration which, properly
understood and applied, would have made a difference to the respondents'
decision would be liable to render the decision unlawful.
[15] We consider
that the issue raised on behalf of the petitioner and reclaimer is the narrow
issue that the respondents failed to take account of their own planning brief
in the decision making in the present case. Senior counsel for the petitioner
and reclaimer was critical of the Lord Ordinary for failing to identify that
issue as the correct legal issue to be determined and counsel submitted that
error led to the wrong conclusions by the Lord Ordinary. We consider this
criticism to be unfounded. It is plain from paragraph [53] of the opinion
that the Lord Ordinary correctly identified the legal issue, as submitted by
the petitioner. The Lord Ordinary stated:
"On the basis of the argument as it developed before me the first issue for the court is this: have the respondents left out of consideration a material planning consideration, namely: the following part of its own planning brief which states that one of the design objectives is this: 'protection of the existing tree boulevard along the access to Fa'side House'".
Having addressed the legal issue, he considered in paragraph [55] the factual circumstances of the case and the underlying bases of the argument presented on behalf of the petitioner to the effect:
"that because of the proximity of certain of the houses... to the tree belt the petitioner would require to cut down all of the trees in the tree belt because of the significant risk of damage to their properties or injury to the occupiers of the said properties arising from the fall of said trees, or material parts thereof".
The Lord Ordinary then dealt with the various submissions on behalf of the parties against the factual background relating to the planning brief policies and the report on handling set out earlier in his opinion. The Lord Ordinary was drawn into some discussion about the factual issues which strictly may be unnecessary in the light of the legal issue he required to address. But taking into account the detailed submissions about factual matters which were made to him, we consider that understandable.
[16] We do not
accept that the respondents did not have regard to the material consideration
in question, namely the content of its planning brief and in particular the
statements in that document which addressed the need to protect "the existing
tree boulevard along the access to Fa'side House". In the Report of Handling
(10 in the Appendix at page 9) there is express reference to the planning
brief and its objectives, including the aforementioned need to protect the tree
boulevard. As was pointed out, on behalf of the interested party, it should be
noted that the planning brief itself said nothing about required set-back
distances between the trees and the garden ground of the proposed development.
[17] In our
opinion the reclaimer's complaint was, in essence, not that the respondents had
failed to have regard to the objectives of the planning brief but that they had
failed to reach a conclusion that the proposed development would, in some
material way, offend the said objectives. The letter of objection, asserted
"the proposed development would inevitably for safety reasons require the
removal of the trees". It was submitted that was because of the risk of wind
throw from the trees damaging the gardens and houses, comprising the proposed
development, and possibly causing injury to occupiers of the property
themselves, or visitors thereto. It was further submitted that should have
been obvious to the respondents as a matter of planning judgment.
[18] We are not
persuaded to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and
reclaimer. Senior counsel was unable to point to any evidence before the
respondents to support his general contention about the effect of the proposed
development on the trees. Nor could he demonstrate, by relevant evidence, any
risk posed by the proposed development of such a kind as to result inevitably
in the removal of the trees. The risks which were contemplated by the
respondents, which might affect the trees, were addressed in their imposition
of condition 11. In that situation there is no basis, to support the
reclaimer's position in law that the respondents had failed to take into
account a relevant consideration or had acted irrationally. The criticism of the
respondents' decision in our opinion relates to the merits of that decision and
in particular to matters in respect of which the
respondents reached conclusions which they were entitled to reach. The
reclaimer, as owner of the trees in question, will continue to have obligations
in relation to their management, which a reasonable and prudent landowner owes
to his neighbours, particularly as in the present case, where there is an
existing right of way adjacent to the trees.
[18] For the
reasons expressed, we refuse the reclaiming motion.