OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2012] CSOH 51
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P163/12
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OPINION OF LORD HODGE
in the cause
BRYAN JACKSON, OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF WEIR CONSTRUCTION (CONTRACTS) LIMITED
Noter;
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Noter: Mrs Delibegović-Broome; Biggart Baillie LLP
20 March 2012
[1] This is an application by the official liquidator of Weir
Construction (Contracts) Limited ("WCC") for (i) sanction
to pay its creditors in full and (ii) directions on the rate of interest
applicable to its creditors' claims.
[2] This is an unusual case. The winding up has taken twenty
eight years. Lord Stott pronounced the first order on 6 April 1984 and the winding up order was made on 2 May 1984. The explanation for the passage of time is that WCC's principal asset was land which required to be
decontaminated before it could be advantageously sold. I was not informed why
it has taken so long to clean up the land but that is not relevant to the
application. The liquidator now holds funds of г1,073,342.64. The amount
due to the creditors of WCC before interest is г43,202.29.
The statutory provisions
(a) in relation to the payment of creditors
[3] The winding up commenced under the Companies Act 1948 and
is governed by Part XX of the Companies Act 1985. See section 436
of and paragraph 4 of Schedule 11 to the Insolvency Act 1986
("the 1986 Act"). Accordingly the liquidator is required by section 539(1)
of the Companies Act 1985 to obtain the authorisation of the court to pay
any class of creditors in full.
(b) in relation to the payment of interest on creditors' claims.
[4] Paragraph 9 of Part II of Schedule 9 to the
Insolvency Act 1985 provided that in relation to a winding up which had
commenced before the new provisions of that Act entered into force, the former
law, which included section 613 of the Companies Act 1985 and thereby
section 48 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 ("the 1913 Act"),
was to continue to apply. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 11 to the
1986 Act preserved the former law. Accordingly, the entitlement of the
creditors of WCC to interest on their claims is derived
from section 48 of the 1913 Act. That section, so far as relevant,
provides:
"... if there be any residue of the estate after discharging the debts ranked, [a creditor] shall be entitled to claim out of such residue the full amount of the interest on his debt in terms of law."
The liquidator's application for directions
[5] Mrs Delibegović-Broome
on behalf of the liquidator addressed the two issues on which the liquidator sought
directions. They were (i) what rate of interest was the liquidator to pay
as "the full amount of the interest ... in terms of law", and (ii) whether
there should be one rate of interest for the whole period from the making of
the winding up order until payment or should the interest rate vary over time.
I am grateful to her for her succinct and helpful submissions. I refer to the
authorities which she placed before the court in my discussion below.
Discussion
[6] There is no
doubt that it is appropriate for the court to sanction the payment of WCC's creditors in full. The only issue which requires
more detailed consideration is the appropriate rate or rates of interest which
the liquidator should pay on their claims.
[7] The creditors' entitlement to interest does not rest on a
common law ground of mora or wrongful withholding, which Lord Reed
discussed in Wilson v Dunbar Bank plc 2008 SC 457. It
has been created by statute. Originally section 49 of the Payment of
Creditors (Scotland) Act 1814 conferred an entitlement to
interest in the event of a surplus in a bankruptcy and subsequent enactments
have preserved that right. Thus the issue is a question of statutory
interpretation.
[8] Had the question arisen in 1914, it is likely that the
court would have held that "the full amount of interest" which was due "in
terms of law" was, in the absence of a contractual rate, interest at five per
cent a year. For a long time before 1913, the courts had treated the
"standard rate" or "legal rate" of interest on debt to be five per cent. See,
for example, Dunn & Co Anderston Foundry Co Ltd (1894) 21
R 880, Wilson's Trustees v Watson & Co (1900) 2 F 761,
and Mason's Trustees, Petitioners 1902 9 SLT 464. Thus the
contemporary texts on the law of bankruptcy interpreted section 48 of the
1913 Act as authorising interest at five per cent on the surplus of the
bankrupt's estate. See Goudy on Bankruptcy (4th ed. 1914) p. 180,
Wallace "The Law of Bankruptcy in Scotland" (2nd ed.
1914) p. 287. As late as 1971 the Working Party of the Scottish Law
Commission recorded in its "Memorandum on Insolvency, Bankruptcy and
Liquidation in Scotland" (at pp. 66-67) that the rate of interest
under section 48 of the 1913 Act was five per cent.
[9] But doubts had crept into the judicial mind long before then.
There was a move away from the view that there was a "legal rate" and a
recognition that the concept of legal rate had emerged from a statute of Queen
Anne, the Usury Act 1713, which had fixed the maximum rate at 5%.
Although that Act did not fix any standard rate and had been repealed by the
Usury Laws Repeal Act 1854, the courts had become used to awarding
interest at that rate. This may have been because it corresponded roughly with
commercial rates. Yet it was a rate set by practice and unquestioning custom
rather than by statute. It came to be challenged. In Inglis' Trustees v
Breen (1891) 18 R 487 the court held that a legatee could not claim
interest on a legacy at a higher rate than that which the trustees had earned
where there had been no delay and that there was no general rule entitling a
legatee to five per cent. Thereafter, in Ross v Ross (1896) 23 R 802, a case concerning interest on legitim, Lord McLaren,
with whom the Lord President and Lord Kinnear concurred, pointed out
that there was no statutory rate of legal interest and that five per cent had
been only a maximum rate. Finally, in Kearon v Thomson's Trustees 1949
SC 287, which again was a case concerning interest on legitim, the Lord President
(Lord Cooper) exposed the hollowness of the concept of "legal interest"
stating:
"... the only justification that can today be alleged for the supposed 'general rule' of 5 per cent is the dying echo of the last relic of the laws against usury, prolonged, long after it should have been silenced, by that blind adherence to old tradition which is one of the less admirable characteristics of certain aspects of the common law."
In that case the court rejected the submission that it could not fix the rate of interest and awarded a rate which reflected that which the trustees could have earned at the time through prudent investment.
[10] In this case, there is no question of the liquidator having
earned interest on the assets of WCC over many years as
it was only recently that he was able to sell the heritable property.
Nonetheless, the creditors have a statutory right to interest on the surplus
from the date of the winding up and funds are available to pay that
entitlement. Like Lord Cooper in Kearon (at p. 295), I see no
reason to embark on a detailed investigation of what interest might have been
earned in a particular case and prefer the application of a broad general rule
which will work substantive justice.
[11] The liquidator wrote to WCC's
creditors in July 2011. None has claimed a contractual entitlement to a
specific rate of interest. Only one creditor, James S. Pearson Limited
("Pearson"), responded. It pointed out that if the liquidation had been
governed by the 1986 Act- namely section 189 of that Act and rule 4.66(2)(b)
of the Insolvency (Scotland) Rules 1986 (SI 1986/1915) - the
specified rate of interest from the commencement of the winding up would have
been fifteen per cent. That rate was four per cent above the base rate when it
was introduced in 1986 but that it was now fourteen and a half per cent
above that rate. It explained that the weighted average of base rates during
the period of the liquidation was 6.81% and that if one allowed 4%
above base rate, the weighted average would be 10.81%. Pearson submitted
that that rate ought to be the minimum which WCC's
creditors received.
[12] The prescribed rate under the 1986 Act reflected the
judicial rate when the Insolvency (Scotland) Rules came
into force on 29 December
1986. It has not changed
over time. By contrast, in personal bankruptcies the initially specified rate
of fifteen per cent, which under section 51(7) of the Bankruptcy
(Scotland) Act 1985 applied unless a higher rate was applicable to the
debt apart from the sequestration, was reduced on 1 April 1993 to eight
per cent when the judicial rate under Rule 7.7 of the Rules of the Court of
Session was similarly reduced. See regulation 8 of the Bankruptcy
(Scotland) Regulations 1985 (SI 1985/1925)
as amended by regulation 4 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 1993 (SI 1993/439). It is
anomalous that the rules for corporate insolvencies in Scotland have not been amended to reflect the changes in the judicial rate of
interest.
[13] In most cases there is the merit of simplicity in the current
statutory provisions which fix a default rate of interest at the date of the
winding up or personal bankruptcy because insolvencies lasting decades are
fortunately rare. In unusual cases, such as this, it would not achieve
substantive justice between the creditors and the shareholders for the court to
award the judicial rate of interest which was current in 1984, namely
twelve per cent. In my view section 48 of the 1913 Act does not
require me to do so. In the absence of any contractual right to interest, I
consider that the court should award interest on the creditors' claims at the
judicial rate from time to time, which has been used by the courts as a default
rate of interest in other circumstances. There are parallels in the court's
approach to interest on loans which specify no interest rate (Neilson v Stewart 1991 SC (HL) 22, Lord President Hope at p.35). This would mean that
between 2 May 1984 and 15 August 1985, interest would run at twelve per cent on
the claims; from 16 August
1985 to 31 March 1993 the rate of interest would be fifteen per cent; and
from 1 April 1993 the rate would be eight per cent. Since
the financial crisis of 2008 the judicial rate has ceased to be even
broadly compensatory: see Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Limited [2011] CSOH 153. But, in contrast with its power under section 1 of the
Interest on Damages (Scotland) Act 1958 as amended, the court has
no discretion in fixing the rate of interest to achieve a result which is
consistent with the principle that interest is compensatory. In any event, in
my opinion the use of the judicial rate as varied from time to time will
achieve substantive justice in the context of this twenty-eight-year winding
up.
[14] Section 48 of the 1913 Act does not prevent the rate
of interest due to creditors from changing over time with the judicial rate set
under Rule 7.7 of the Rules of the Court of Session. I am aware that the
Scottish Law Commission in its report (no. 68), "Bankruptcy and Related
Aspects of Insolvency and Liquidation" (1982) suggested (in paragraph 16.46)
that because sequestration fixed the rights of creditors inter se in
relation to the bankrupt estate, the creditors' claim was to a species of
moratory interest in respect of their lying out of their money during the
period of the sequestration. This supported their recommendation, which may
have contributed to the thinking behind the statutory provision in the
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 mentioned above, that there
should be a prescribed rate of interest effective from the date of
sequestration. But I do not find this a persuasive argument for fixing the
interest due on the surplus of the estate under section 48 of the 1913 Act
at the judicial rate applicable on the date of the commencement of the winding
up. In personal and corporate insolvency there is a pressing need to freeze
the transactions of the insolvent and the rights of creditors in the insolvent
estate at a specified date at the start of the formal insolvency. By those
means the insolvency practitioner is able to rank the rights of the creditors
in an estate which is insufficient to meet all their claims. But where, as
here, we are concerned with an estate which was initially insolvent but which
has produced a surplus, there is no need to treat the rights of creditors as
fixed for all time. Rather the creditors should be entitled to interest on
their claims as if there was no insolvency. In the absence of a higher
contractual rate of interest, there is no reason why that rate should not vary
with the changes in the judicial rate.
Conclusion
[15] I have therefore (i) granted an order under section 539 of
the Companies Act 1985 authorising the liquidator to pay the creditors of WCC in full and (ii) directed that he is to pay
interest on their claims at the judicial rates specified from time to time in
Rule 7.7 of the Rules of the Court of Session until payment.