EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
Lady Paton Lady Dorrian Lord McGhie	[2012] CSIH 95 X112/12 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LADY PATON in the appeal from the Sheriff Court at Edinburgh by I S Appellant; against THE CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL Respondents: _______________

Act: (Natural mother) Dowdalls; Thorley Stephenson SSC

Alt: Sharpe; Solicitor for City of Edinburgh Council

18 December 2012

Introduction

[1] This appeal concerns a child R born on 24 May 2008. Her mother, the appellant, was aged 18 when R was born, and was not married to R's father TT. The question at issue is whether the sheriff erred by including a provision granting authority for adoption in a permanence order relating to R. There is no challenge to the permanence order itself.

The factual background

[2] The sheriff heard evidence at a proof in January and February 2012. In his judgment, he sets out the factual background, which (read short) is as follows.

[3] The appellant was born in the Gambia. When aged 12, she came to Scotland. She lived with an aunt until she was aged about 16 or 17. She had a relationship with a Scottish man TT, and became pregnant. Her daughter R was born on 24 May 2008. As the appellant did not wish to return to live with TT (whom she accused of abuse) she was referred to the Child and Family Department at Craigentinny Social Work Centre, and also to Shakti Women's Aid, an ethnic support organisation. The appellant had the support of health visitors and Shakti, but nevertheless experienced problems with finances and accommodation. Concerns were raised about her parenting capacity, living conditions, her isolation, the health and well-being of R, and the appellant's lack of response to attempts to help her. With the respondents' assistance, the appellant moved into a flat in Edinburgh in November 2008. R was admitted to hospital with stomach and skin problems. During visits by the health visitor and the social worker, R was noted to be lying in bed, propped up, with a bottle of milk. The appellant was repeatedly warned against this practice because of the danger of choking. In December 2008, as the appellant had accommodation and the continuing support of the health visitor and Shakti Women's Aid, the Child and Family Department closed their file.

[4] However problems recurred. R had a number of admissions to hospital because of her skin problem. There were also concerns about the lack of stimulation for R. The appellant did not attend a Children and Families Centre at Viewforth despite being encouraged to do so. On 29 June 2009 R was admitted to hospital with an exacerbation of eczema and a viral-induced wheeze, and was described as being distressed. R remained in hospital until 13 July 2009. The hospital staff were concerned about the appellant's level of understanding in relation to R's skin and allergies, and her ability to manage these. There were concerns about the appellant's failure to interact with R, and R was noted initially to be "withdrawn and uninterested in contact". The appellant's apparent lack of interest in R during hospital visits, and her failure to keep appointments to meet medical staff, were worrying.

[5] A child protection case conference was initiated, involving social work, medical staff and police. The conclusion was that R should not be returned to her mother's care. A Child Protection Order was granted on 13 July 2009, with a condition that the appellant should have contact with R. Thereafter R was taken into foster care. She lived with Mr and Mrs S in Livingston until August 2010, with the appellant visiting once to three times a week.

[6] Initially, the social work department plan was to return R to the appellant's care. An independent parenting assessment (conducted by Charlotte Grieve, an employee of the respondents) was undertaken between 2 February and 10 June 2010. The appellant continued to have contact with R, supervised by the respondents' social work assistant Kevin Burney. However there came a stage when the respondents presented Grounds of Referral in terms of section 52(2)(c) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. The admitted grounds are detailed in paragraph [20] of the sheriff's Note as follows: R was admitted to hospital on six occasions; there was a failure to attend a dermatology appointment in June 2009 leading to a delay in diagnosis and a more rigorous treatment regime; staff noted that the appellant was inattentive to R's needs whilst in hospital; the appellant defaulted on the admission appointment on two occasion; the appellant defaulted on contact sessions.

[7] Children's hearings took place. Miss Foy was pointed as safeguarder to R by the Children's Hearing, and also as curator in the present process. As set out in paragraph [22] of the sheriff's Note, she reported that the family of TT should not be carers for R; there should be no contact between R and her paternal family; the appellant was disadvantaged by the fact that R's allergies were not fully identified before she was accommodated; R's medical problems were exacerbated by neglect on the part of the appellant before and after R was admitted to hospital; the appellant did not have the commitment or the capacity to meet all of R's needs; the attachment between R and her mother was a poor one which had not improved, even with significant professional advice and guidance; there were no indications that R felt able to trust her mother; rehabilitation in the absence of a loving or even developing mother/child bond would be bound to fail, and without a prospect of rehabilitation, there was a need to re-evaluate the purpose of contact. Miss Foy supported the social work department's conclusion that permanency planning was the appropriate way forward. In conclusion, she recommended to the Children's Hearing that R should be made the subject of a supervision requirement, naming her then carers as her place of residence with supervised contact with the appellant no more than once every two weeks.

[8] In paragraph [24] of the sheriff's Note, it is recorded that the appellant was reluctant to give any information about her relationship with a man living in London. In the course of that relationship, she had become pregnant.

[9] In about August 2010, R moved from her foster carers in Livingston to her present foster carers in Edinburgh. She began to thrive. Her skin became more stable; her allergies were recognised and catered for; she had various inhalers; she was described as very sociable, caring and affectionate, with good language; she played well, and a recent nursery report was described as "excellent".

[10] In the context of R's potential adoption, the sheriff heard evidence from Caroline Kerr, an employee of the respondents whose task it was to identify a suitable placement for R. As at the date of the proof, no such placement had been found. However Miss Kerr was of the opinion that R was "very adoptable" (sheriff's Note paragraph [27]). She was confident that a placement could be found. The respondents do not intend to delay in identifying a suitable family for R on the basis of R's ethnic and cultural background, but mean to look for a family likely to provide a suitable home for her (sheriff's Note paragraph [27]).

The sheriff's judgment

The findings-in-fact

[11] Based on the evidence heard, the sheriff made findings-in-fact reflecting the above sequence of events (pages 50 to 59 of the Appeal Print). His findings-in-fact are not challenged.

The findings-in-fact-and-law

[12] The sheriff found in fact and in law:

"1. That the [appellant] has the right to have R living with her or otherwise to regulate her residence.

2. That R's residence with the [appellant] is or is likely to be seriously detrimental to the welfare of R.

3. That the [appellant] is unable satisfactorily to discharge parental rights and is unlikely to be able to do so in relation to R.

4. That it is better for R that a permanence order should be made than it should not be made.

5. That having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare throughout childhood R should continue to have contact with the [appellant]."

The sheriff's Note

[13] The sheriff's Note contains the following passages.

"[32].....The [appellant] was very young when she gave birth to R. She had no extended family support. As a matter of fact she and the birth father separated almost immediately after R was born. On any view, after R was born the [appellant] struggled to cope. She was a young, single mother. The accommodation in which she was first living was unsatisfactory. R had health difficulties. The full extent of R's health issues were not immediately apparent. It is fair to conclude that by June 2009 eczema was clearly established. The extent of complexity of the allergies were not and did not become clear until R was in the care of Mr and Mrs M. Whereas there may have been some concerns it was not until June 2009 the [respondents] felt it was necessary to take direct action.

[33] The catalyst for action was R's admission to hospital. However, this was not an isolated incident. The medical records disclose a pattern of failures to attend for hospital appointments and a background of some concern but not enough to warrant emergency measures..... The evidence discloses that the [appellant] did not engage with the medical staff; failed to attend scheduled appointments; on other occasions demanded to see doctors when they were not available; was often absent from R's bedside; on occasions took little interest in her welfare; spent much time on the phone. In her evidence the [appellant] denied the accuracy of much of the foregoing. I regret to say that I am unable to accept her evidence upon those issues. I can see no reason whatsoever for the medical and nursing staff to lie about these issues, nor does it seem to me that they could have been mistaken. The medical and nursing staff were so concerned as to R's welfare that they contacted the social work department of the petitioners in order to ensure R's continuing welfare....

[34] ....much of the difficulties seem to have been the refusal of the [appellant] to engage in the rehabilitation process. She continues to reject the evidence surrounding the events in June 2009. The reports of Mr Burney and Charlotte Grieve conclude that there were issues in their relations with the [appellant]. She seems not to have engaged or to have retained information that was communicated to her both as to R's behaviour and her medical condition. Miss Foy also had concerns as to the [appellant's] engagement. She sent two separate letters to the [appellant's] agents setting out what she considered the [appellant] needed to do in order to allow Miss Foy to recommend to the Children's Hearing that R be returned to her. No substantive reply was ever received nor was anything done in implement of the letters. In relation to the [appellant's] current circumstances, she said, and I accept, that she is in a relationship. So much was known to the social work department and Miss Foy. They both considered that the relationship might well have a significant bearing on R's return to the [appellant] and, I think in fairness, felt that this might indeed be a positive development. However, the [appellant's] partner declined to meet with the social work department or Miss Foy to provide them with relevant information. The [appellant's] evidence was that she saw no reason why her partner ought to do so and that she did not trust the social work department of the [respondents]. I also have no clear evidence as to what, if any, plans the [appellant] and her partner have. Although a judgment as to what is 'likely to be' is an assessment of the future, it is based partly at least upon evidence as to the past and the present. In my opinion, as at June 2009 there was a basis for real concern as to the [appellant's] ability to look after R......

The consistent theme in the evidence is that attempts at rehabilitation failed. Whether that was because [she] refused to engage or simply felt unable to do so does not greatly matter. The result is that none of the professionals engaged in this matter, including Professor Tresiliotis, feels able to support the return of R to the [appellant]. In short, the evidence is that the [appellant] was plainly not managing to care for R up to June 2009 and showed little evidence of being able to do so thereafter. She maintains that she is now older and more mature. In my judgment, and with regret, looking at the evidence over the past number of years it does not seem to me that I can have confidence in the [appellant]. There has been something consistently present which has led the [appellant] to distance herself from R and the process of securing rehabilitation of R to her. I can only proceed on the basis of the evidence as to what has happened in the past. I conclude that the terms of section 84(5)(c)(ii) are met......

[38] I turn now to section 83(2)(c) which relates to the question of authority for the child to be adopted. The conditions for the making of such an order are set out in detail in section 83. In addition, both parties referred me to the provisions of section 14. Both Mr Sharpe, [counsel for the respondents], and Mr Aitken, [solicitor for the appellant], were of the view that section 14 does apply. I shall proceed upon the basis that it does (for a contrary view see the judgment of Sheriff Pyle in the case of City of Edinburgh Council dated 25^th July 2011)......

[42] Returning to section 83, section 83(1)(a) and (b) can be dealt with shortly. The [respondents] request that the order includes a provision granting authority to adopt. In relation to section 83(1)(b) I am also satisfied that the child is or is likely to be placed for adoption. That is the plan of the [respondents]. I also have the evidence of Caroline Kerr as to the steps taken to find an appropriate match. As a matter of fact, at the date of the proof no such match had been found. The evidence of Miss Kerr was to the effect that she was confident a match would be found. Although the factual conclusion is easy enough to state, the implications are important. As Mr Aitken commented, in cases such as this, it is far more common for adoptive parents to have been identified by the date of the proof. The practical effect is that the issues of parental contact are very much a live issue. It is important to remember that, should a permanence order be granted, the issue is not one of post-adoption contact but pre-adoption contact.

[43] The [appellant] does not consent to authority being granted for the child to be adopted. Accordingly the next matter is whether her consent should be dispensed with (section 83(1)(c)(ii)). In the present case it is agreed that the issues are those set out in section 83(2)(c) and (d) and subsection (3).....

[45].....As both Mr Sharpe and Mr Aitken observed one of the features of the legislation is that in order to reach the stage of considering section 83 the court will first have made a finding of serious detriment in terms of section 84(5)(c)(ii). Indeed, Mr Sharpe rightly accepted that if no such finding were made, the process never reaches the stage of considering the application of section 83. It seems to me that the evidence for both matters is the same. Indeed, given my interpretation of section 84(5)(c)(ii) I have, in effect, dealt with section 2(1)(a). I do not recall being addressed as to the potential separate aspects of section 2(1) but, as I understand it, the [respondents] say that the relevant findings would lead to such a conclusion; the [appellant] says otherwise. I do not think it is necessary to rehearse all of the evidence which I have set out in relation to my findings as to serious detriment. I incorporate them for the purposes of considering section 83(3) and hold that the provisions of section 83(3)(b)(i) and (c) are satisfied. In view of the conclusion I have reached it is unnecessary for me to consider the application of section 83(2)(d).

[46] On the approach taken by the parties I have now to consider the terms of section 14(2)-(4). I do not consider that I need say anything about section 14(2) and 14(4)(b). Of major importance is section 14(3) which establishes a welfare test based upon the whole of the child's life and not, as described by section 84(4) (the duration of childhood). Section 14(4)(a) also makes reference to the value of a 'stable family unit' without specifying any particular composition. Section 14(4)(c) is in identical terms to section 84(5)(b)(ii). In applying these tests I do not see that section 14(4)(a) adds anything of significance to this matter. The need for stability in R's life is accepted by both parties. To a certain extent a similar consideration applies to section 14(4)(d). An adoption order will give R stability and the prospect of family life should give her a proper foundation for the future. Section 14(4)(c) is more difficult. The [appellant] is from Ghana. She is Catholic. R's father is Scottish. R is of mixed parentage. Section 14(4) directs the court to have regard to the factors set out in paragraph (c). On the evidence, at one point it is clear that such matters weighed heavily with the [respondents] in their identification of who might be suitable adoptive parents (that is no longer the case). In short, Mr Aitken submitted that the [appellant] had a unique contribution to make in this respect in that only she could give R the information and background relevant to her heritage. As a matter of fact I have little difficulty in accepting that proposition. However, I am not inclined to the view that this is a determinative factor. It has to be taken into account along with all the other evidence. The [appellant] herself has lived in this country since she was aged 12. I do not recall there being any significant evidence before me in relation to matters specified in subparagraph (4)(c) which calls for any particular consideration. Having regard to all of the foregoing I conclude that I ought to grant authority to adopt".

The sheriff's decision

[14] The sheriff ultimately made a permanence order which inter alia specified that there should be direct contact between the appellant and R three times per annum, and once annually on an indirect basis; granted authority for R to be adopted; and dispensed with the consent of the appellant for R to be adopted.

The legislation

[15] The Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007 provides inter alia as follows:

"14 Considerations applying to the exercise of powers

...(3) The court ... is to regard the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout the child's life as the paramount consideration.

(4) The court ... must, so far as is reasonably practicable, have regard in particular to -

(a) the value of a stable family unit in the child's development ...

(c) the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background, and

(d) the likely effect on the child, throughout the child's life, of the making of an adoption order ...

80 Permanence orders

...(2) A permanence order is an order consisting of -

(c) if the conditions in section 83 are met, provision granting authority for the child to be adopted.

83 Order granting authority for adoption: conditions

(1) The conditions referred to in section 80(2)(c) are ...

(c) that, in the case of each parent or guardian of the child, the court is satisfied -

...(ii) that the parent's or guardian's consent to the making of such an order should be dispenses with on one of the grounds mentioned in subsection (2),

(d) that the court considers that it would be better for the child if it were to grant authority for the child to be adopted than if it were not to grant such authority.

(2) Those grounds are -

... (c) that subsection (3) or (4) applies ...

(3) This subsection applies if the parent or guardian -

(a) has parental responsibilities or parental rights in relation to the child ...

(b) is, in the opinion of the court, unable satisfactorily to -

(i) discharge those responsibilities, or

(ii) exercise those rights, and

(c) is likely to continue to be unable to do so.

84 Conditions and considerations applicable to making of order

... (5) Before making a permanence order, the court must ...

(b) have regard to -

(i) any views the child may express,

(ii) the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background, and

(iii) the likely effect on the child of the making of the order, and

(c) be satisfied that ...

(ii) where there is [a person who has the right to have the child living with him or her], the child's residence with the person is, or is likely to be, seriously detrimental to the welfare of the child."

Submissions for the appellant

[16] Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appeal should be allowed; the permanence order should be affirmed, together with the contact condition; but the grant of authority to adopt should be removed.

[17] The first contention was that the sheriff had failed properly to consider and analyse whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that he reached in respect of section 83(3)(b) and (c) of the 2007 Act in relation to the ability and likely future ability of the appellant satisfactorily to discharge parental responsibilities and exercise parental rights. The sheriff had relied upon evidence relevant to section 84 to satisfy the requirements of section 83(3)(b) and (c), when in fact the requirements of the two sections were quite distinct.

[18] In particular, there was no reference in the sheriff's judgment to any evidence about the appellant's current capabilities in 2012 (the time when the sheriff's decision was made). There was no finding-in-fact and no analysis relating to the appellant's present and future ability satisfactorily to discharge parental responsibilities and exercise parental rights. The sheriff's view, stated at its highest in his Note at page 83 of the Appeal Print, was:

" ... In my judgment, and with regret, looking at the evidence over the past number of years, it does not seem to me that I can have confidence in the [appellant]. There has been something consistently present which has led the [appellant] to distance herself from R and the process of securing rehabilitation of R to her. I can only proceed on the basis of the evidence as to what has happened in the past ..."

[19] That view related to the failed rehabilitation attempts which ceased in 2010. There was no reference in the judgment to the appellant's circumstances after 2010, nor any analysis of future ability.

[20] Counsel conceded that evidence about the appellant's current circumstances, her abilities, her partner, and her likely future abilities and circumstances, were for the appellant to lead at the proof. As counsel had not represented the appellant at the proof, she could not assist the court further on this matter. It was accepted that if there had been a lack of evidence from or on behalf of the appellant, the sheriff had no option but to reach a view on the evidence led before him, such as it was.

[21] Counsel's second argument was that the sheriff had failed to have regard to the condition in section 83(1)(d), and to consider or explain the basis upon which it would be better for the child if the court were to grant authority for the child to be adopted than if it were not to grant such authority, as required by section 80(2)(c). In that respect, he had also failed to have regard to the requirements of section 14(3) and (4). In any event the sheriff had failed adequately to explain the basis upon which he reached his conclusion.

[22] In developing this argument, counsel submitted that the sheriff had not weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of adoption as opposed to the current situation, and had given no analysis about whether, and if so why, adoption was better for the child. At pages 89 to 90 of the Appeal Print, he considered certain factors and then concluded that he "ought to grant authority to adopt". That was not the exercise desiderated in section 83(1)(d). The sheriff required to consider all the circumstances in terms of section 14, and then to analyse the evidence in order to assess whether it would be "better" for the child if authority to adopt were granted, rather than not. But in his judgment, particularly paragraph [46], the sheriff did not do so. The judgment did not set out with sufficient clarity to what circumstances the sheriff had given weight, as was required by section 83(1)(d). A matter as critical as this should not be left to inference: cf TW and JW v Aberdeenshire Council [2012] CSIH 37 paragraph [16].

Submissions for the respondents

[23] Counsel for the respondents invited the court to refuse the appeal, and to adhere to the judgment of the sheriff dated 22 May 2012. The sheriff was entitled to rely upon the same evidence in respect of sections 84 and 83(3)(b) and (c). He had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses, and the appeal court should be slow to disturb his conclusions (Thomas v Thomas 1947 SC (HL) 45). The sheriff had addressed the correct issues raised by sections 80(2)(c), 83, 84, and 14. He had given careful consideration to those issues with the welfare of the child throughout the child's life as the paramount consideration. Implicit in the sheriff's decision was that authority to adopt was necessary.

[24] In relation to the first argument advanced on behalf of the appellant (the sufficiency of the evidence enabling the sheriff to take a decision in terms of section 83(3)(b) and (c)), the sheriff had relied upon a substantial body of evidence. Reference was made to the sequence of events, as set out in the sheriff's findings-in-fact. The sheriff's assessment of the future was based on the present and the past (page 83 of the Appeal Print). He was entitled to adopt that approach on the basis of the evidence before him. The sheriff had sufficient evidence which he had analysed, and from which he was entitled to draw a conclusion. He had used the same evidence for section 83 and section 84(5)(c)(ii) - paragraph [45] of his judgment - and in this particular case he was entitled to.

[25] As for the appellant's second argument, the sheriff had done what was required by the 2007 Act. He had fully discussed the evidence, and had implicitly applied the statutory tests set out in sections 80, 83, 84, and 14. In paragraphs [42] and [36] he examined the possible disadvantages of the current position and the advantages of adoption. When looking to the future he was entitled to have regard to a past pattern of behaviour which caused the professionals concern. The appeal should be refused.

Discussion

Sufficiency of evidence: inability to discharge parental responsibilities

[26] In terms of section 83(3)(b) and (c) of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, if a parent is, in the opinion of the court, unable satisfactorily to discharge parental responsibilities or exercise parental rights, and is likely to continue to be unable to do so, the court may dispense with the parent's consent to adoption.

[27] In this case, the sheriff heard evidence from a substantial number of witnesses, namely Julie Kyle, social worker; Lesley London, social worker; Dr Reeves; Kay Scott (health visitor); Marion Foy; Charlotte Grieve; Caroline Kerr; Kevin Burney; WM and FM (the present foster carers of R); the appellant; FA (a long-standing friend of the appellant); Samira Ashraf; Professor John Triseliotis. In relation to FA, the sheriff's view (which he was entitled to take) was as follows:

" ... Without doubting his honesty, it seemed to me that he was keen to portray the [appellant] in the best possible light and, at the end of the day, his daily knowledge of R and the [appellant] was limited. I do not attach much weight to his evidence."

[28] On the basis of the evidence, the sheriff made findings-in-fact which disclosed a developing pattern of concern on the part of various professionals (including health visitors and social workers) during the period 2008 to 2010. In particular there were concerns about the appellant's parenting capacity and her living conditions; her inability properly to look after or to interact with R; her lack of response to advice and recommendations made by health care professionals; her failure to attend appointments or to be responsive to assistance. A Child Protection Order relating to R was granted on 13 July 2009. Grounds of Referral to a Children's Hearing (namely that R was likely to suffer unnecessarily or be impaired in her health or development due to lack of parental care) were accepted - in amended terms - by the appellant. R was then placed with foster parents. She moved to her current foster parents in August 2010. The appellant continued to have contact with R, and the respondents had hoped to return R to the appellant's care. However there continued to be concerns about the appellant's parenting skills with R, as set out in the sheriff's finding-in-fact 48, 49, and 53. The sheriff also found that the appellant did not respond to the safeguarder's requests for certain commitments as a fundamental part of the rehabilitation process (paragraph [22] of the Note); and that neither she nor her partner had given the respondents information about their relationship. He found that all involved in R's care had come to the view that a permanence order with authority to adopt was appropriate in her case.

[29] In the circumstances of this case, we agree with the sheriff that he was entitled to rely upon the same body of evidence for the purposes of both section 84 and section 83(3)(b) and (c). Absent any reliable evidence (which the sheriff accepted) demonstrating a change in the pattern of behaviour which had caused the concerns in the past, it is our opinion that the sheriff was entitled to base his assessment of the future upon the substantial body of evidence relating to the present and to the past: cf the Sheriff's Note at page 83 of the Appeal Print. That evidence was, in our view, clearly sufficient to entitle the sheriff to reach the view that the appellant was (and remained) unable satisfactorily to discharge parental responsibilities or exercise parental rights, and was likely to continue to be unable to do so.

Section 83(1)(d): "better for the child ... to grant authority for the child to be adopted"

[30] An order granting authority for adoption cannot be made unless certain conditions are fulfilled. One condition (section 83(1)(d)) is in the following terms:

"(d) that the court considers that it would be better for the child if it were to grant authority for the child to be adopted than if it were not to grant such authority."

[31] Counsel for the appellant submitted that the sheriff had failed properly to articulate and to apply the test set out in subsection (d), always bearing in mind the requirements of section 14.

[32] We do not agree. The judgment must be read as a whole. In that judgment the sheriff clearly has regard to section 14(3) - "the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout the child's life as the paramount consideration". He also has regard to the value of a stable family unit in the child's development, the child's racial origin and cultural background, and the likely effect on the child, throughout the child's life, of the making of an adoption order (section 14(4)(a), (c), and (d)). He carefully sets out, analyses, and weighs various factors when assessing whether or not to grant authority for adoption. For example, in paragraphs [27] and [42] of his Note, he acknowledges factors unfavourable to the grant of authority to adopt, such as R's health issues; her mixed Gambian and Scottish parentage; the unique contribution which only the appellant could make to R's religion and cultural background; and the fact that, as at the date of the proof, no suitable placement for adoption had been found. But in paragraphs [27] and [46] of his Note, he weighs up factors favourable to the grant of authority to adopt, such as the need for stability and family life; the fact that R's medical condition had improved and stabilised; the respondents' intention not to delay in identifying a suitable family on the basis of R's ethnic and cultural background; and the fact that R is considered to be the right age and "very adoptable", resulting in confidence that a placement will be found. The sheriff's whole approach was one of careful consideration of the question whether or not it would be better for the child if the court were to grant authority for R to be adopted than if the court were not to grant such authority. Ultimately, in paragraph [46], the sheriff concludes that he ought to grant such authority which, when read in the context of the judgment as a whole, is in effect a conclusion that it would be better for the child to grant such authority. In our opinion, on the basis of the evidence before him, the sheriff's approach, analysis, and conclusion cannot be faulted.

Decision

[33] For the reasons given above, we refuse the appeal and affirm the interlocutor of the sheriff dated 22 May 2012.