SECOND DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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Lord Justice ClerkLord CarlowayLord Philip
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[2012] CSIH 16XA133/10
OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD PHILIP
In the appeal by
WILLIAM REID Pursuer and Appellant;
against
D B SCHENKER RAIL (UK) LIMITED (FORMERLY EWS RAILWAYS LTD) Defenders and Respondents: ______
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Alt: I G Armstrong, QC, Middleton; Tods Murray LLP
22 February 2012
[1] This is an appeal from a decision of the sheriff
principal of the sheriffdom of Lothian and Borders at Edinburgh in an action by
the appellant against the respondents for damages for the loss sustained by him
as a result of developing plantar fasciitis in his left foot due to the nature and
conditions of the work he was required to carry out in the respondents'
employment. He avers that his condition was caused by the respondents' breach
of regulation 4(1) of the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992 which
provides:
"4(1) Each employer shall:
(a) so far as is reasonably practicable, avoid the need for his employees to undertake any manual handling operations at work which involve the risk of their being injured."
[2] The respondents admit a breach
of that statutory duty, conceding that the need for the manual handling
operation in question could have been avoided, but they contend that the
development of the appellant's condition was not caused by his work with them.
[3] The circumstances of the
case were as follows. The appellant, who was born on 26 July
1947, was employed by the respondents at
Longannet Power Station from 1994, latterly as a rail operator supervisor. His
duties included manually closing doors on wagons of trains which had not closed
automatically as the trains left a hopper shed after delivering coal. Trains
of wagons of coal arrived daily at the power station to discharge coal at the
hopper shed. Normally the doors on the underside of the wagons were closed
automatically by equipment called "daleks" as the wagons were hauled out of the
hopper shed. Sometimes the daleks failed to close individual doors. The
appellant's duties included closing such doors manually using an instrument
known as a yale pull, a long chain and ratchet device, which weighed
30 kgs.
[4] Prior to 31
August 2000 the appellant was in the habit of
crawling under or between wagons in order to close doors on the far side of the
wagons from his work station. On 31 August 2000 he was forbidden to crawl between the wagons without telling the driver
because it was dangerous. He interpreted that instruction as forbidding him to
crawl under or between wagons at all, an interpretation which the sheriff found
to be reasonable in the circumstances. As a result, it became necessary for
him to walk some distance along the side and round the front or rear of trains
to close doors on the far side from his work station and back again. The
trains were about 1000 feet long. On these occasions he had to carry the yale pull on his
shoulder. Sometimes a wheelbarrow, not specially provided for the purpose, was
available to carry the yale pull. The appellant was never instructed to use
the wheelbarrow, but when one was available, he used it.
[5] The sheriff found that in
each eight hour shift about six or seven trains went through the hopper shed.
The number of doors that the appellant had to close manually was at least two
on each shift, of which one would be on the far side of the train from his
workstation. The sheriff also found that the maximum distance the appellant
had to walk along the side of a train in order to close a door and back would
be two-ninths of a mile.
[6] The ground beside the
railway line on which the appellant had to walk was, prior to July 2001, compacted
through use. The rails themselves were set in ballast and the appellant had to
walk across it to get to the far side of the wagons. Prior to July 2001 the
ballast was not unstable or loose. In July 2001 the appellant went on
holiday. During his absence the ballast around the tracks was renewed and at
the same time the ground beside the trains became rough and uneven.
[7] As a result, in August and
September 2001, after his return from holiday, he had to walk along the side of
trains on rough and uneven ground and, in order to attach the yale pull to
wagons, he had to step on fresh loose ballast which was unstable. These
changed conditions in which the appellant had to work are described in the
sheriff's note as "the increased activity".
[8] On 17 September
2001 the appellant ceased work. On the
following day he saw his general practitioner complaining of pain in his left
heel and ankle which he had then been suffering for about six weeks. The
condition was subsequently diagnosed as plantar fasciitis. The appellant has
had a deformity of his right foot since childhood and has no dorsiflexion in
that foot. As a result he walks with a limp. The sheriff found that the
dorsiflexion of his left foot was limited to about 5°. He was not obese. The
appellant was subject to compulsory retirement on ground of ill-health because
of his condition on 1 March 2003.
[9] The principal issue in the
case was whether the increased activity caused the appellant's condition of
plantar fasciitis. The sheriff heard evidence from three orthopaedic surgeons
who were not agreed as to the causes of or risk factors associated with plantar
fasciitis. Mr John De Leeuw, a consultant orthopaedic surgeon at Falkirk
Royal Infirmary, who was called as a witness by the appellant, was of the
opinion that plantar fasciitis developed when something changed in the load of
the foot. He said that 85% of his patients did not know what caused the
condition but on further questioning he was usually able to identify the event
which had caused it. In his view the cause in the majority of cases was increase
in body weight over a short period of time, as well as changes in footwear,
leisure activities and changed activity at work. The condition occurred
predominantly in the 40-60 age group and all that was needed was something the
foot was not used to. While he was on holiday the appellant had a period of
relative rest. After his return to work his work involved picking up heavy
weight and walking on unstable ground. Dr Leeuw's view was that the
carrying of a heavy weight and the requirement of the appellant to walk on
uneven ground were both, independently, causes of his plantar fasciitis.
[10] Mr Frans Denolf was
the consultant orthopaedic surgeon at Falkirk Royal Infirmary to whom the
appellant was referred by his doctor in October 2001. His view was that there
were numerous causes of plantar fasciitis but little was known and there was
much speculation. Risk factors were said to be obesity and middle age. Since
not all middle aged people developed the condition, age alone was not a
sufficient cause. There had to be another factor. In his view the sudden
increased activity undergone by the appellant could be that factor. Although
not medically proved he thought there was a relationship between walking
surfaces and plantar fasciitis. He also thought that the deformation of the
appellant's right foot had to be taken into account when considering the cause
of his plantar fasciitis.
[11] Mr James
Christie, who was until his retirement in 2005 the lead orthopaedic consultant
and Director of the Trauma Unit at Edinburgh Royal Infirmary, one of the
largest trauma units in Britain, was called by the defenders. His opinion was that plantar fasciitis
was an age-related degenerative condition of the foot accompanied by gross
thickening of the plantar fascia, most commonly seen in the 40 to 60 age group
in patients with no risk factors, for example, office workers, doctors and
lawyers. He did not see any relationship between injury and activity in the
development of the condition, and did not think that the appellant's increased
activity was a cause or that his plantar fasciitis was work related. Limited
dorsiflexion was however an important risk factor. He made reference to an article
from the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery by Riddle and Others which
dealt with risk factors relating to plantar fasciitis. The authors of the
report found evidence of association between plantar fasciitis and the risk
factors of ankle dorsiflexion and work-related weight bearing. Mr Christie
called the appellant back specifically to measure the dorsiflexion of his left
ankle and found it to be restricted to 5o. His concluded view was
that the appellant had developed plantar fasciitis quite independently of his
work but that his work had accelerated the onset of his symptoms by a few
months. He did not accept that the uneven ground or the ballast on which the appellant
had to walk was the cause of the appellant's condition.
[12] The sheriff
found as a fact that limited dorsiflexion in the left foot was a risk factor in
the development of the appellant's plantar fasciitis and that it was a probable
cause of the appellant's condition. He further found that the increased
activity which the appellant had to undertake in August and September 2001 was
not a cause of his plantar fasciitis nor had it materially contributed to it. He
nevertheless found that the increased activity accelerated the onset of the appellant's
symptoms by a few months. It is clear that in making these findings the
sheriff accepted the evidence of Mr Christie.
[13] The sheriff
granted decree in the sum of £7376.95 on the basis that the breach of duty
merely accelerated the onset of the appellant's condition. The pursuer
appealed to the sheriff principal and submitted that, the sheriff having erred
in his findings on the question of causation, decree should be granted in
favour of the appellant on the basis that the breach of duty caused the
appellant's condition, at the agreed sum of £63,690.95. The respondents'
cross-appealed on the submission that the sheriff had erred in holding that
although the breach of duty did not cause the appellant's condition, it
accelerated its onset, and therefore that decree of absolivitor should
be pronounced. The sheriff principal refused the appeal, sustained the
cross-appeal and granted decree of absolivitor. In the present appeal
the appellant moves us to recall the sheriff principal's interlocutor in its
entirety; to amend the findings in fact and to grant decree in favour of the
appellant at the agreed sum of £63,690.69, or if the onset of the appellant's
condition had been accelerated, but not caused by the breach of duty, at the
agreed sum of £7,373.95. In answer to the appeal counsel for the respondents
moved us to refuse the appeal; failing which to find for the appellant in the
sum of £7,376.95.
[14] On behalf of the
appellant, it was argued that the sheriff had applied the wrong standard of
proof. He had considered scientific and epidemiological papers without proper
instruction and, in doing so, sought to ascertain what had been proved in the
scientific sense rather than in the legal sense by application of the standard
of a balance of probabilities. He treated the questions raised in the
epidemiological papers as actual variations of the body of medical knowledge
rather than matters worthy of further study. Accordingly his findings in fact
on aetiology should be set aside. Further the sheriff failed to give reasons
for his finding on the cause of the appellant's condition by reference to
expert medical evidence. In particular he failed to say whose evidence he
preferred.
[15] Secondly, it was
argued for the appellant that carrying excessive weight at work was an accepted
risk factor in relation to the development of plantar fasciitis in the same way
as was sudden weight gain over a short period of time. The sheriff erred in
failing to find on a balance of probabilities that the respondents' breach of
the regulations made a direct and material contribution to the development of
the condition.
[16] Thirdly, and
alternatively, the appellant argued that the sheriff was entitled to hold that
the breach of the manual handling regulations accelerated the onset of the
appellant's condition by a few months. The sheriff principal had erred in
concluding that he was not entitled to do so.
[17] Counsel for the
respondents argued that there was ample evidence before the sheriff to entitle
him to conclude that the appellant's condition was not caused by the increased
activity. The evidence of Mr Christie was clearly to that effect and he
found support in the report by Riddle and Others. There was a dispute among
the medical witnesses with the result that, on the evidence, there were a
number of different risk factors or causes which could have given rise to
plantar fasciitis. In that situation the sheriff had been unable to find that
the appellant had proved on a balance probabilities that the condition had been
caused by the increased activity. This was not a case in which a causative
link between the increased activity and the development of plantar fasciitis
could be deduced from what usually happens since there was dispute in relation
to, and limited understanding of, the causes of plantar fasciitis.
[18] We reject the
appellant's argument that the sheriff applied the wrong standard of proof. The
contention was that he sought proof of the cause of the appellant's plantar
fasciitis to a standard which a scientist would require in order to regard it
as established, rather than considering whether he was satisfied that the
appellant's contention as to the cause of the condition was probably sound.
Counsel for the appellant did not point us to any specific passage in the
sheriff's note which indicated that he had applied any other standard of proof
than the balance of probabilities, nor have we been able to find any such
indication. On the contrary, the sheriff made frequent reference to the
appropriate standard.
[19] The Riddle
report was referred to in evidence by both Mr Christie and
Mr De Leeuw. The appellant's complaint was that the sheriff had
regard to its contents in coming to his conclusion on causation "without proper
instruction", and that he treated the questions raised in it and the other
paper referred to as variations in the body of medical evidence. This argument
misunderstands the sheriff's purpose in mentioning these papers. He was faced
with a conflict of medical evidence. In the course of assessing the evidence
he looked at the contents of the papers the witnesses had referred to in
evidence. He found that Mr Christie's view was consistent with some of
the results reported in Mr Riddle's paper. That weighed with him in his
assessment of the evidence. He did not require "instruction". He had already
heard the witnesses explain the relevance of the contents of papers to their conclusions.
He was merely giving appropriate consideration to the evidence before him.
[20] In so doing he
gave sufficient explanation of his acceptance of Mr Christie's evidence
and of his reasons for his finding on causation. Mr Christie found that
the appellant had limited dorsiflexion of the left foot. He called him back specifically
to examine the dorsiflexion after reading the Riddle Report which indicated
that limited dorsiflexion was a possible factor in the onset of plantar
fasciitis. Since Mr Christie had made a particular point of examining the
dorsiflexion with some care, the sheriff was entitled to prefer his evidence on
that matter. On the other hand, since little was known about the aetiology of
plantar fasciitis, there was no body of published research which could be said
to be directly supportive of Mr De Leeuw's view of the cause. The
onus of proof was on the appellant and the sheriff had sufficient doubt about
the cause put forward by Mr De Leeuw that he was not satisfied that
it was proved on a balance of probabilities
[21] The appellant
relied on the decision in Gardiner v Motherwell Machinery & Scrap
Co Ltd [1961] S.C. (H.L.) 1 in support of the argument that he had contracted plantar fasciitis after
being subjected to an activity which was known to be likely to cause that
condition and had shown that it had started in a way typical of a condition
caused by that activity. There was therefore a prima facie presumption
that the condition was caused by the increased activity. The sheriff found on
the evidence that the increased activity could not be said to be a typical way
in which plantar fasciitis occurred. In the state of the evidence before him
the sheriff was entitled to take that view. There was no body of evidence
showing that individuals had contracted plantar fasciitis in circumstances
similar to those experienced by the appellant. There had been little research
into the causes of plantar fasciitis, and certainly insufficient to establish
one or more causes which were generally accepted by the medical profession. We
therefore reject the argument based on Gardiner.
[22] Mr Christie
expressed the view that the onset of the appellant's condition, although caused
by factors other than the increased activity, was probably accelerated by that
activity by a few months. The sheriff accepted that evidence and made an award
of damages on the basis on that the appellant's condition became symptomatic a
few months earlier than it would otherwise have done. The respondents
cross-appealed to the sheriff principal arguing that if the appellant's
condition was not caused by the defender's breach of duty it could not, either
legally or medically, have been accelerated by it. Before the sheriff principal
the solicitor for the appellant accepted that that proposition was sound and
the sheriff principal proceeded on that concession. Before this court the
appellant argued, if we were against him on his principal submissions, that the
sheriff was entitled to hold on the evidence that the breach of the manual
handling regulations had accelerated the onset of the condition by a few
months. We see nothing illogical in the sheriff's approach. He found, as he
was entitled to do, that the respondent's breach of duty was not the cause of
the appellant's plantar fasciitis. Mr Christie's evidence was that the
appellant's plantar fasciitis was a degenerative condition which had developed
asymptomatically but which would have become symptomatic at some stage.
Because of the increased activity it became symptomatic earlier than it would
otherwise have done. In other words the increased activity did not cause the
condition, it merely accelerated it. The sheriff was therefore entitled to award
damages as he did.
[23] In the result we
shall recall the interlocutor of the sheriff principal to the extent that it
sustained the defenders' cross-appeal and quoad ultra refuse the
appeal. The effect of that will be to restore the sheriff's interlocutor.