OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2009] CSOH 133
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CA126/09
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OPINION OF LORD HODGE
in the cause
BEAGHMOR PROPERTY LIMITED
Pursuers;
against
STATION PROPERTIES LIMITED
Defenders:
________________
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Act: Davie; Davidson Chalmers LLP
Alt: Barne; Biggart Baillie LLP
30 September 2009
[1] This is an application by the defenders under section 15K(2)
of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 as amended ("the 1987 Act") to recall an
inhibition on the dependence and also the warrant for diligence on the
dependence granted by an interlocutor dated 5 August 2009.
[2] The pursuers, Beaghmor Property Limited ("Beaghmor"), have sought
for some time to acquire for development a site at 6 Cockburn Street, 8
Advocates Close, 18-21 Market Street and the Tower Building, Advocates Close,
Edinburgh ("the site"). Beaghmor entered into a lock-out agreement with
Station Properties Limited ("Station"), which own the site. In that agreement
Station undertook that between 30 June and 31 July 2009 it would negotiate exclusively with Beaghmor for the
sale of the site. Beaghmor have commenced this action for damages for breach
of the lock-out agreement and have registered an inhibition on Station which is
limited to the site.
[3] Beaghmor claim damages of £4,500,000, which they aver are the
profits which they projected from their proposals to develop and sell on the
developed site and their advanced negotiations with an end user.
[4] Station admit breach of certain of their obligations under the
lock-out agreement but seek recall of the inhibition on the dependence and the
warrant for diligence. They submit that Beaghmor cannot satisfy the court on
each of the grounds listed in section 15K(9) of the 1987 Act, namely (a) that
they have a prima facie case to support their claim in damages, (b) that
there is a real and substantial risk that enforcement of any decree against
Station would be defeated or prejudiced by insolvency and (c) that it is
reasonable in the circumstances that the warrant and inhibition should continue
to have effect.
The factual background
[5] Beaghmor have negotiated to purchase the site on two occasions
before this summer. On the second occasion, in February 2009, Beaghmor
submitted a formal offer to purchase the site for £7.5 million. On each
occasion the negotiations broke down when another party offered to purchase the
site. But each time the sale to that other party did not proceed. Unsurprisingly,
when two directors of the parties agreed in June 2009 to resume negotiation of
a sale at the price of £7.5 million, Beaghmor wanted the security of a lock-out
agreement to prevent a repetition of what had occurred before.
[6] The material provisions of the lock-out agreement dated 29 and
30 June 2009 were as follows:
"3. Lock-out Obligations
3.1 Subject to the other terms and conditions of this deed during the Lock-out Period the Seller or any agent acting on their behalf .... shall not:-
3.1.1 actively market the Property for sale;
3.1.2 seek any offers for or seek any interest in the sale of the Property to or from any third party;
3.1.3 supply any information about or copy deeds or documents or other material relating to the Property or any occupiers of the same to any third party;
3.1.4 proceed with or accept any offer made by any third party in respect of the sale of the Property or the granting of an option or any other rights over same, or any other dealing in respect thereof;
3.2 During the Lock-out Period the Seller shall act in good faith and shall:-
3.2.1 notify all agents previously instructed in relation to the Property and any third parties who were aware that the Seller was willing to consider offers for the Property that it is under offer and instruct the agents not to reveal to any party details of the Transaction;
3.2.2 notify the Purchaser of any bona fide unsolicited offer made in respect of the Property by any third party;
3.2.3 use all reasonable endeavours following on the last date of execution of this Lock-Out Agreement to enter into the Transaction with the Purchaser and, to that end, procure that the Seller's Solicitors shall seek to negotiate the terms of a draft Agreement with the Purchaser's Solicitors;
3.2.4 implement the Transaction as soon as reasonably practicable;
3.3 The Purchaser and the Seller shall act in good faith with a view to agreeing the principal terms of a contract for the Transaction and entering into Missives to implement the Transaction and, to that end, they shall procure that the Purchaser's Solicitors and the Seller's Solicitors shall seek to negotiate the terms of the Missives to give effect thereto as soon as reasonably practicable;"
[7] Station in their defences admitted that they had broken clause
3.1 and clause 3.2.2 of the lock-out agreement. They entered into binding
missives with AMCO Developments Limited ("AMCO") on 5 August 2009 under
which AMCO agreed to purchase the site, excluding 8 Advocates Close. The
agreement comprised a detailed offer on behalf of AMCO dated 5 August 2009 to purchase that property for £8.5 million subject to
certain suspensive conditions and an unqualified acceptance of that offer on
the same date. The documents appended to the offer revealed that there had been
an earlier offer dated 9 July
2009, which had been prepared
after AMCO had obtained detailed information about the site.
[8] At the hearing on the motion for recall Mr Barne on
Station's behalf submitted that AMCO's offer had been unsolicited. He accepted
that Station had broken their contract by not revealing the offer contrary to
their obligation in clause 3.2.2. In the course of the discussion he also
submitted that Station's admission of the breach of clause 3.1 should be
confined to clause 3.1.4, namely the proceeding with AMCO's offer during the
lock-out period. Miss Davie for Beaghmor did not accept that AMCO's offer
was unsolicited. There was therefore a dispute about an important factual
circumstance which could not be resolved at the hearing.
The parties' submissions
[9] Mr Barne submitted that Beaghmor did not have a prima
facie case for claiming substantial sums in damages such as to justify
diligence on the dependence for two reasons. First, he submitted that the
appropriate measure of damages for breaking a lock-out agreement is the wasted
transaction costs of the party who was not in breach. Secondly, he argued that
Beaghmor had not averred a relevant case of the loss of an opportunity which
would sound in damages, because there was no averment that they would have been
prepared to match the offer of £8.5 million if Station had, as it was bound,
disclosed AMCO's offer. Station denied Beaghmor's averment that the parties
had reached agreement on the substance of the missives. In support of his
assertion that the appropriate measure of damages was the wasted transaction
costs he referred to Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, Lord Ackner
at p.139, Pitt v P.H.H. Asset Management Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 327,
Sir Thomas Bingham MR at p.334, Moroney v Isofam Investments SA [1997] EGCS 178 and Tye v House and Jennings (1998) 76 P & CR 188,
Evans Lombe J at p.190. Scots law did not exclude such a claim: Fielding v
Newell 1987 SLT 530 and Dawson International plc v
Coats Paton plc 1993 SLT 80. He also submitted by reference to Transfield
Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc [2009] 1 AC 61 that liability
in damages for the loss of Beaghmor's hoped-for contract was not the sort of
risk which Station assumed when they entered into the lock-out agreement. On
the correct approach to the recall of diligence on the dependence he referred
to the Inner House decision in Gillespie v Toondale Ltd 2006 SC
304 and Lord Pentland's opinion in MRK 1 Ltd v Sakur
and Bachir [2008] CSOH 176.
[10] Mr Barne's other submissions were (i) that there was no
substantial risk of Station's insolvency having regard to a statement of assets
and liabilities dated 26 August 2009 and (ii) it was not reasonable to
maintain the inhibition. In relation to the former, he submitted that on a
proper valuation Beaghmor's claim was probably in the region of £25,000 which
Station had sufficient resources to meet. In relation to the latter submission
he advanced six arguments. First, the inhibition could have a disastrous
effect on Station, which was a property company, and in particular could
undermine the valuable deal with AMCO which Station's bankers, Clydesdale Bank
plc, wished to see proceed. Secondly, a lock-out agreement did not justify the
remedy of an inhibition which operated as an interdict. Thirdly, if the deal
with AMCO were to fall, third parties, including AMCO, would be adversely
affected. An inhibition confined to the other property which Station owned
would be more appropriate. Fourthly, Beaghmor's claim was unrealistic as they
were seeking the full profit which they hoped to make on their deal and that
profit depended upon contingencies which might or might not come about.
Fifthly, Beaghmor would not obtain any profit until 2011 at the earliest yet
they were claiming the full value now. Finally, it appeared that Beaghmor were
a dormant company which would not be able to pay damages if in the end they
were held liable for wrongful diligence.
[11] Miss Davie submitted that Beaghmor's substantial claim for
damages was justified as at a meeting on 7 July 2009, involving the senior
personnel in each of the parties, their legal advisers and also three
representatives of Clydesdale Bank plc, agreement had been reached on the principal
terms of the sale of the site. Thereafter, all that remained was for the
parties' solicitors to formalise the contractual documentation. This submission
was supported by the actings of Station's solicitors who on 8 July 2009 sent Beaghmor's solicitors a copy of Beaghmor's
earlier offer of 10 February
2009 with revisals to reflect
the matters which the parties had discussed and agreed on the previous day.
The solicitors acknowledged that they did not have their clients' authority to
set out the terms but they also sent a copy of the document to Station. Miss Davie
accepted that a bare agreement to negotiate in good faith was not binding; her
point was that the parties had got beyond that stage and had agreed all of the
essential terms of the contract for the sale of the site. Thereafter the second
part of clause 3.3 applied: Station should have instructed their solicitors to
complete the missives. Instead they deliberately delayed instructing their
solicitors before seeking to pull out of the lock-out agreement in mid-July.
[12] She did not accept that AMCO's offer was unsolicited and
inferred from the existence of the detailed offer on 9 July 2009, Station's behaviour thereafter and their general
admission of a breach of clause 3.1 that Station had encouraged AMCO to bid in
breach of the lock-out agreement. She submitted that if AMCO had not been
allowed on the scene it was more likely than not that the deal between Beaghmor
and Station would have been formalised. She referred to Petromec Inc. v
Petroleo Brasiliero SA [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep 121, BBC Worldwide Ltd v
Bee Load Ltd [2007] EWHC 134 (Comm), Dandara Holdings Ltd v Co-operative
Retail Services Ltd [2004] EWHC 1476 (Ch) and Allied Maples Group Ltd v
Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602.
[13] In relation to the quantification of loss, she reminded the
court that the basic rule for contractual damages in Scots law was that they
were to place the wronged party as nearly as possible in the same position as
he would have been in if the contract had been performed: McBryde, "The Law of
Contract in Scotland" (3rd ed.) at paras 22-91 and 22-96. The
award of wasted transaction costs appeared to be an exception to that rule but
it was not an exclusive measure of the damages due for breach of a lock-out
agreement.
[14] On the risk of the decree being defeated by Station's
insolvency, Miss Davie referred to Station's unpaid debts and the
presentation of a winding up petition earlier in 2009. She quoted from an
email from Station's solicitors in May 2009 in which they informed the
company's architects, who were pursuing a substantial debt, that a director of
Station had stated that the best course for Station might be "a bank-led
administration". Station owed the bank over £7.6 million. A desk-top valuation
of the site by DTZ dated 6 September
2009 stated that its current
open market value was £3.5 million. Station were, she submitted, practically
and absolutely insolvent.
[15] Finally, the maintenance of the inhibition was not
unreasonable. It was restricted to the site and the pursuers had no desire to
fetter Station's business unnecessarily. While the missives with AMCO were
caught by the inhibition and thus third parties were affected by it, the
defenders knew of their breach of the lock-out agreement when they entered into
those missives. Beaghmor were no longer a dormant company but were trading.
In any event it was unlikely that a claim for wrongful diligence would arise
under the statutory regime for the recall of inhibitions.
Discussion
[16] It is for the creditor, Beaghmor, to satisfy the court that it
should not recall the warrant and the inhibition: section 15K(10) of the 1987
Act. I am so satisfied at this stage of the proceedings. But I would be
prepared to reconsider matters in the light of further disclosure about what
occurred at the meeting on 7 July 2009 and also the circumstances in which
AMCO came to make their offer on about 9 July 2009. I explain my
reasoning below.
(i) The prima facie case
[17] In order to meet the statutory requirement of a prima facie case,
the pursuer must demonstrate that he has a good arguable case. That is a
substantial hurdle, which is more than a colourable case. The Inner House in Gillespie
v Toondale Ltd have applied to the statutory regime this test of
which Lord Drummond Young spoke in Barry D Trentham Ltd v Lawfield
Investments Ltd 2002 SC 401 at para 19 in the context of the pre-existing
common law.
[18] That Beaghmor have a good arguable case of breach of contract
is not in issue. Station admit breach of the lock-out agreement and liability
in damages therefor. The questions therefore are (i) of what breaches have
Beaghmor made out an arguable case and (ii) what damages might flow from those
breaches?
[19] Beaghmor conceded that an agreement to negotiate in good faith was
not an enforceable contract: Walford v Miles, Lord Ackner at
pp.138-139. They also accepted that the essence of a lock-out agreement was
that it was a negative undertaking and not an agreement to sell: Pitt v
P.H.H. Asset Management Ltd, Sir Thomas Bingham MR at p.334. As Lord
Ackner stated in Walford v Miles at p.139G, "what A has achieved
is an exclusive opportunity, for a fixed period, to try to come to terms with
B."
[20] Where A's only obligation in a lock-out agreement is that of
giving B an exclusive opportunity to reach a deal with him, breach by A of that
obligation may not give rise to a substantial claim in damages. If A had
performed his contractual duty and given B the exclusivity to which he was
entitled, no deal might have resulted. Such an exclusivity agreement is
designed to protect purchasers from incurring substantial expense in
negotiating complex deals which is wasted if the seller chooses to sell to
someone else. Thus in England it has been held that B can recover his
wasted transaction expenses if A deals with another during the period of
exclusivity: Tye v House and Jennings. While that may not put the
party observing the contract in the position he would have been in if it had
been performed, it can be seen as compensating for the denial of the protection
for which he had contracted.
[21] There is, however, no rule that the only measure of damages for
the breach of a lock-out agreement is the wasted costs incurred in the aborted
transaction. The court must look at the particular contract and the breaches
which are alleged. In this case Beaghmor do not assert that they would have
been prepared to match AMCO's offer. Thus they do not found on any breach of
clause 3.2.2 of the lock-out agreement. They found on the admitted breach of
clause 3.1. They assert that Station, having agreed all the essential terms of
the contract with them on 7 July, received AMCO's offer, which they had
solicited in breach of clause 3.1, and then deliberately and in bad faith
failed to perform their obligation under clause 3.3 to procure that their
solicitors put the deal agreed at the meeting on 7 July into a formal
contract. But for the solicited offer from AMCO, Beaghmor's deal with Station
would have been formalised.
[22] At this stage in the action, when parties and the court have
not yet seen all of the relevant documentation, I have to judge whether
Beaghmor have a prima facie case on the pleadings, the documents in
process and counsel's submissions. While I consider that it is likely that the
opening words of clause 3.3 are too uncertain to be enforced, it does not
follow that none of that clause may be enforced. Where the parties intended
the lock-out agreement to be a legally binding contract, the court should
strive to give effect to their agreement: Petromec Inc, Longmore LJ at
paras 115-121; BBC Worldwide Ltd, Toulson LJ at paras 48-51. I have
also discussed this issue in more detail in a recent opinion: R & D
Construction Ltd v Hallam Land Management Ltd [2009] CSOH 128 (at
paras 33-55) and adopt the same approach in this case. I accept that if, as
Miss Davie submitted, the parties had reached agreement on the essential
terms of their deal, the unenforceability of an obligation to try to do so
would not prevent the court giving effect to the second half of the clause. I
consider that Beaghmor have averred sufficient to have a good arguable case
that Station broke their obligation to procure the finalisation of the deal and
that they solicited the offer from AMCO.
[23] I do not accept the submission based on the decision of the
House of Lords in Transfield Shipping Inc. that it is evident that the
parties to the lock-out agreement could not have intended to expose Station to
such a large claim in damages. If, as I have opined, the second part of clause
3.3 may be enforceable once the essentials of the contract had been agreed, it
must have been in the contemplation of the parties that a deliberate failure to
procure that the sellers' solicitors negotiate the missives with the purchasers'
solicitors could cause Beaghmor to lose the benefit of the purchase.
[24] Accordingly, it appears on the information provided to the
court that Beaghmor have pleaded a claim in damages for the loss of a real or
substantial chance to conclude the purchase and the opportunity to develop the
site. Such a claim has the potential to be of much greater value than merely
the wasted transaction costs. It may be that evidence will show that at the
meeting on 7 July 2009 the parties did not agree the essential terms of the
sale; it may turn out that the AMCO offer was unsolicited and, if so, it may be
argued that its receipt allowed Station not to proceed with any deal reached on
7 July 2009. If an unsolicited offer suspended any obligation on Station
under clause 3.3 to finalise a deal, a breach of other provisions of the
contract may not have deprived Beaghmor of its chance to conclude the
agreement. There may be no causal link as in Dandara Holdings Ltd. For
now, however, I approach the other statutory questions on the basis that
Beaghmor have a good arguable claim of substantial value against Station.
(ii) A real and substantial risk that a decree could not be enforced
[25] This statutory test requires the court not only to look at a
defender's present financial position but also to predict, so far as one can,
future events at the time when the pursuers might obtain a decree for payment
of damages: Barry D Trentham Ltd, Lord Drummond Young at para 8 and MRK 1 Ltd, Lord Pentland at paras 25 -26.
[26] Station's statutory accounts for the year ending 30 April 2008 are of limited relevance as property values have
generally declined since then as a result of the major financial crisis which
arose later that year. Station appear to have had some financial difficulties
earlier this year: see paragraph [14] above. But they have submitted a
statement of affairs dated 26 August
2009. This purports to show
that they have net assets of £3.8 million. Their assets include a hotel at
9-13 Market Street, Edinburgh, which Station have let out on a long lease, and
retail premises at 48 George IV Bridge, Edinburgh, which have been
independently valued at £2.7 million and £250,000 respectively. Other
heritable properties are valued at an aggregate of £535,000. But the
calculation of net assets depends fundamentally upon the valuation of the site
at £8.5 million on the strength of AMCO's conditional offer, whose suspensive
conditions may or may not be purified. I do not feel able to rely on that
valuation before AMCO's offer becomes unconditional. Beaghmor have lodged an
independent valuation of the site which values it with the current planning
permission for development at £3.5 million, but their own actions suggest that
there is the potential to obtain considerably greater value from the site. It
appears that Station have a commercial future if they continue to be supported
by their bankers, Clydesdale Bank plc. As Station's trade creditors are stated
at only £350,000, there is a prospect of the company's financial position
improving markedly if the sale to AMCO proceeds. But if it were not to
proceed, there may be, as Station's solicitors have earlier stated, a prospect
of the company being put into administration.
(iii) The reasonableness of the warrant and the inhibition remaining in effect
[27] In some cases the prospect of insolvency may be such that it
militates against the grant of warrant for diligence on the dependence because
it is clear that the diligence cannot protect the enforcement of a decree in
future. This may arise particularly in relation to the diligence of inhibition
which is merely a prohibitory diligence and does not attach the land. At
common law it ranked after debts which have already been secured and gave no
preference in relation to prior unsecured debts. On insolvency it secured more
than a pari passu ranking at the expense only of posterior creditors:
see Bell's Canons of Ranking in "Commentaries"
(McLaren's ed.) Vol II, p.413 and Baird and Brown v Stirrat's Trustee
(1872) 10 M 414. An inhibition registered after 22 April 2009, when section 154 of the Bankruptcy and Diligence Etc
(Scotland) Act 2007 came into force, does not confer
any preference in ranking. Thus in many cases the imminent prospect of the
debtor's insolvency may make it unreasonable to grant warrant for such
diligence or maintain it in effect. In this case, however, there is a prospect
of an advantageous sale of the site at a sum which significantly exceeds
Station's current liabilities. There appears therefore to be something to
secure.
[28] There is, nonetheless, a danger of killing the goose that might
lay the golden egg. The missives with AMCO are caught by the inhibition. An
inhibition is available to secure a claim and not to undermine a rival's bid.
Were the AMCO deal to fall, Station would lose out and would have fewer funds
to meet Beaghmor's claim. Clydesdale Bank plc have a standard security or
standard securities over the site as well as a floating charge over Station's
property and undertaking. Station owes them about £7.6 million but the net
free proceeds of the site are likely to be considerably greater than Station's
debt if the AMCO deal proceeds. It appears that there should be an opportunity
for Station and their bankers to provide alternative security for Beaghmor's
claim from the free proceeds of the sale of the site after deduction of the
sums due to the bank. That might be supplemented by an inhibition or security
over another heritable property. Until such an arrangement is made, or it is
demonstrated that Beaghmor's claim based on breaches of clauses 3.1 and 3.3 of
the lock-out agreement is not a good arguable case, I consider that it is
reasonable that the inhibition in relation to the site and the warrant continue
to have effect.
Conclusion
[29] As Beaghmor have discharged the onus of satisfying the court as
to the matters in section 15K(9) of the 1987 Act, I refuse Station's
application for recall in hoc statu.