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Scottish Court of Session Decisions
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DL v The Parole Board For Scotland & Ors [2008] ScotCS CSOH_168 (09 December 2008)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2008/CSOH_168.html
Cite as:
[2008] CSOH 168,
[2008] ScotCS CSOH_168
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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2008] CSOH 168
|
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OPINION OF LORD MALCOLM
in the petition of
D L
Petitioner;
against
THE PAROLE BOARD
FOR SCOTLAND
AND OTHERS
Respondent
for
JUDICIAL REVIEW
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ________________
|
For petitioner: Reilly; Drummond Miller LLP
For 1st respondents: Cullen QC; Dunlop; Anderson Strathern
LLP
For 2nd respondents: Lake; Scottish
Government Legal Directorate
9 December 2008
[1] On
22 October 2008 I heard a
first hearing in this application for judicial review on behalf of D L
presently a prisoner in HM Prison Saughton, Edinburgh. That day I refused the application,
delivering an ex tempore judgement in
the terms set out below. The respondents
are the Parole Board for Scotland
and the Scottish Ministers. On 21 February 2003 the petitioner was
sentenced at the High Court to six years imprisonment in respect of two charges
of lewd, indecent and libidinous practices and behaviour towards a male and
female step-child of the petitioner. The
offences took place over a period of four and a half years during which the
victims were between the ages of four and eight. The sentence will expire in February 2009.With
effect from 21 February 2007
the petitioner was released on licence. On
27 March 2007 the Parole
Board recommended that the petitioner be recalled to custody. In due course his licence was revoked. On 5
June 2007 the Board, having considered the petitioner's
representations in relation to his recall to custody, decided not to order his
immediate release. On 29 April 2008 the Board reconsidered whether
the petitioner should be released. It
decided not to order his re-release. The
petitioner's case was again referred by the Scottish Ministers to the Board on 29 September 2008. A decision on this matter was pending at the
date of the first hearing.
[2] When
the petitioner was released on licence on 21 February 2007 that release was subject to certain
conditions. One of the conditions was:
"12. You shall have no contact or attempt to
contact either directly or indirectly
P, A, M, J and J A without prior approval of your supervising officer."
[3] The
petitioner is the natural father of J A the youngest child of Ms A, with whom
he had been co-habiting prior to his conviction. Ms A's children were placed on the Child
Protection Register because of concern as to the threat posed to them by the
petitioner. They were made the subject
of supervision orders by the Children's Panel.
[4] When
presenting the application on behalf of the petitioner Mr J Reilly explained
that when in custody the petitioner enjoyed prison visits from his son J. Those visits were stopped by the prison
authorities, so the petitioner raised proceedings in the Sheriff
Court to reinstate them. The respondents to that action were Ms A, as
J's mother, and the Scottish Ministers.
The Scottish Ministers did not enter appearance. On the day of his release, through his
solicitors the petitioner applied to the sheriff for an ad interim contact order with J.
The petitioner's supervising officer was not informed of this
application. It is clear from the
information given to the court at the hearing that if the supervising officer
had been informed, he would not have approved, but rather would have taken steps
to ensure that the sheriff was aware of the full background.
[5] In
due course these events formed the basis for the decisions by the Parole Board
and the Scottish Ministers to the effect that the petitioner should return to
and remain in custody. It is those
decisions which are the subject of challenge in this judicial review.
[6] While
the pleadings for the petitioner set out a number of alleged grounds for
review, including human rights issues, in his submissions to me Mr Reilly
presented the application solely on the basis that the Parole Board and the
Scottish Ministers were not entitled to reach those decisions because the
petitioner was seeking contact with J through the mechanism of a court
order. It was submitted that the use of
a legal process meant that condition 12 was not breached, thus decrees of
declarator and reduction as sought should be pronounced.
[7] In
his response Mr Cullen QC for the Parole Board stated that he would deal with
the petition on the short and narrow basis on which it had been presented in
oral submission. It was submitted that
it was clear that the petitioner had breached condition 12 of his licence. The decision letter of 5 June 2007 stated, amongst other things, that
it was
"clear that Mr L
has decided to persist with an application to the Sheriff
Court for a contact order in relation to J A. This is contrary to licence condition 12,
which states clearly that he must not attempt to have such contact. This has been done without prior knowledge or
approval of his supervising officer. He
has shown little regard for licence conditions and the nature and restrictions
of supervision, both of which are in place to protect the public. Taking into account the nature of the index
offence, the lack of any offence related work, Mr L's denial of personal
responsibility, his attitude to supervision, the circumstances of the breach of
licence, and the assessment that he poses a high risk of re-offending, the risk
that Mr L poses is unacceptable and cannot be managed in the community. As the Board had before it detailed
representations from Mr L and his solicitors, and there were no outstanding
matters of fact in dispute in relation to the recall, an oral hearing was not
required."
[8] Mr
Cullen recounted the full history of events by reference to the relevant
documentation. It is clear that a
decision was taken by the petitioner to try to see J without the knowledge, let
alone the approval of his supervising officer.
In my opinion the fact that an application for a court order was the
chosen method of achieving this is irrelevant, not least since there is no
suggestion that all interested parties were given intimation of the
application. On the contrary, and under
reference to one of the file notes of
the petitioner's Aberdeen solicitors, it would appear that the intention
was to obtain the order in a court process which was undefended, and then use
it as a vehicle to attack the condition itself, something which it was
suggested should be resolved at a hearing.
The conflict between any such order and condition 12 was implicitly
recognised in some of the correspondence and other documentation at the hand of
the petitioner's Aberdeen agents.
[9] Understandably
all of this caused considerable concern to the petitioner's supervising
officer, all as set out in his letter of 8
March 2007 to the Scottish Ministers. In my opinion not only was the Board entitled
to come to the decision which it did on the information before it, I would have
been surprised if it had reached any other conclusion. I am of the view that what happened was a
clear breach of the terms of condition 12 of the petitioner's licence. I can well understand the Board's concern as
to the petitioner acting in this way without involving his supervising officer,
and as to the potential implications for the safety of the children
concerned. The risk of history repeating
itself if the Board and the Scottish Ministers had not acted was obvious. It follows that I agree with the submission
made by Mr Lake for the Scottish Ministers that, whatever else, the decisions
taken were reasonable decisions. In my
view there is no merit in the petitioner's submission that his un-intimated
application to the sheriff on the day of his release for contact with J was not
in breach of condition 12 of his licence.
[10] The result is that I uphold the first respondents' fourth plea-in-law,
the second respondents' fourth plea-in-law, repel the petitioner's first to
third pleas-in-law and refuse the prayers of the petition.