OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2007] CSOH 99
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P3098/06
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OPINION OF LORD EMSLIE
in the Petition of
IAN J LATIMER,
Chief Constable, Northern Constabulary
Petitioner;
for
Judicial Review of
a decision of a Police Appeals Tribunal dated 8 September 2006
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Petitioner: Peoples, Q.C.; Ledingham Chalmers
Respondent: Woolman, Q.C., Grant-Hutchison; Balfour & Manson
13 June 2007
Introduction
[1] In
this petition for judicial review, the Chief Constable of the Northern
Constabulary seeks reduction of a disciplinary appeal decision by a Police
Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") dated 8 September 2006, coupled with a remit
for rehearing by a freshly constituted Tribunal. Only the respondent police officer, John
Smith ("Mr Smith"), has lodged Answers as an interested party, although
formal service of the petition was also effected on the Northern Joint Police
Board and on the Tribunal itself. It is
a matter of agreement, however, that Mr Smith is the proper contradictor in
this dispute, and that it can properly be considered and determined in the
absence of these other potential parties.
[2] Under
Regulation 6 of the Police (Conduct) (Scotland) Regulations 1996, a misconduct
hearing was first convened on 16 March 2006 to consider Mr Smith's
conviction at Dingwall Sheriff Court of a drink-driving offence committed on
7 July 2005. The decision of the chairman
of the hearing was to the effect that the circumstances of the offence were so
grave, and Mr Smith's actions so irresponsible, that the conviction "...(had) the
potential to seriously undermine the trust and public confidence in the
Service". The only appropriate penalty
was therefore a requirement for Mr Smith to resign from the Force as an
alternative to dismissal. On appeal to
the petitioner under Regulation 20 of the 1996 Regulations this decision
was upheld, and it was at this point that Mr Smith pursued a further
appeal to the Tribunal under section 30 of the Police (Scotland)
Act 1967. The Tribunal's conclusion,
after hearing argument, was that compulsory resignation was too harsh a penalty
in what they described as the special circumstances of the case, and that a monetary
fine should be imposed instead.
[3] According
to the petitioner the Tribunal had erred in law in deciding to substitute a
lesser penalty for Mr Smith's admitted misconduct, and in particular had failed
to state proper and adequate reasons for its decision. For his part, Mr Smith maintained that
the Tribunal had committed no error of law, and that the Court should therefore
refuse the prayer of the petition.
[4] Before
me, the parties were substantially in agreement as to the law on the nature and
scope of the Tribunal's statutory duty to give reasons for its decision under Rule
16(6)(b) of the Police Appeals Tribunals (Scotland)
Rules 1996. In the words of the Lord
President (Emslie) in Wordie Property Co
Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland
1984 S.L.T.345, at p.348,
"...all that
requires to be said is that in order to comply with the statutory duty imposed
upon him the Secretary of State must give proper and adequate reasons for his
decision which deal with the substantial questions in issue in an intelligible
way. The decision must, in short, leave
the informed reader and the court in no real and substantial doubt as to what
the reasons for it were and what were the material considerations which were
taken into account in reaching it".
This approach, which was
acknowledged to be of wide general application, was consistent with the views
expressed by the Inner House in the earlier case of Albyn Properties Ltd v Knox
1977 S.C.108, and had been cited with judicial approval on many occasions since
1984. It was thus ultimately a matter of
impression for this Court whether the Tribunal's stated reasons should be held
adequate, dealing with the substantial questions in issue in an intelligible
way, or whether the informed reader and the Court were left in real and
substantial doubt as to the basis on which the decision was reached. Beyond that, parties were agreed that
although the usual grounds for judicial review were available in the present
context, including inter alia any
failure on the part of the Tribunal to take account of relevant and material
considerations, such a failure could not necessarily be inferred from the mere
fact that the decision contained no express reference to individual pieces of
evidence.
[5] It
is convenient at this stage to summarise the salient factual evidence
pertaining to Mr Smith's offence, and also the history of the disciplinary
procedures which culminated in the Tribunal's decision. As regards the former, there was documentary
material available at all stages to inter
alia the following effect:-
(i) From
about 2000 onwards, Mr Smith had intermittent problems with alcohol abuse. These came to the notice of his superiors and
attracted public comment, thereby gradually calling into question his fitness
to serve within the small community at Kyle of Lochalsh where he was then
stationed.
(ii) In consequence Mr Smith was transferred
to Dingwall with effect from about April 2003.
When seen by occupational health professionals in both July 2002
and August 2003, he was reported as acknowledging that his job was at risk from
continued alcohol abuse, and that the Dingwall transfer was his last chance.
(iii) In mid-2005, with the assistance of his
superiors at Dingwall, arrangements were made for Mr Smith to receive
appropriate advice at Raigmore Hospital,
Inverness. An
initial appointment was made for 1.45pm
on 7 July 2005, and in
anticipation of that appointment Mr Smith was released early from his
nightshift. Some of the relevant records
and statements suggested a release time of 3.00am,
but according to the duty sergeant's contemporaneous notes, and also Mr Smith's
own reported statement when he arrived for the appointment at Raigmore, it was
not until about 4.00am that he went
off shift.
(iv) Before going to bed, Mr Smith on his own account
consumed a quantity of alcohol which he described on arrival at Raigmore as
'...about 3/4 of a bottle of wine'.
According to him, he took no more drink when he awoke. He then drove his car the 15/16 miles from
Dingwall to Inverness, waving to colleagues whom he
passed on the way, and arrived at Raigmore at around 2.10pm, some 25 minutes late for his appointment.
(v) According to the registered nurse who
then saw him in the Occupational Health Unit, Mr Smith was smelling of alcohol
together with some very strong antiseptic such as mouthwash. From the outset his manner and appearance
attracted attention. His eyes were
glazed and bloodshot, his complexion flushed and his responses vague, and he
seemed unable to answer questions quickly.
The nurse was so concerned that she immediately questioned his fitness
to drive, receiving responses along the lines (a) that he was fine and knew how
much he could drink and safely drive, and (ii) that he intended to drive home
after the appointment. After first
stating that his last drink had been 3 months previously, he then mentioned the
3/4 bottle of wine which he had consumed after coming off nightshift at 4.00am.
The nurse then informed Mr Smith that in her judgement he was not fit to
drive home, and asked him to hand over his car keys. Initially this request met with some
resistance, but eventually the keys were 'rather reluctantly' handed over after
the nurse threatened to inform Mr Smith's superiors.
(vi) According to another member of the
hospital staff from whom the nurse sought assistance, Mr Smith's eyes were 'a
bit bloodshot', and the whole room smelt strongly of alcohol, aftershave and
antiseptic. Mr Smith seemed quite
slow to respond to questions, as if he was not concentrating, and only handed over
his car keys after several requests.
(vii) At this stage the nurse telephoned Mr
Smith's superiors to advise them that in her opinion he would not be fit for
nightshift work that evening.
(viii) After talking of going home for a meal and
some tea, Mr Smith instead went to the Fluke Bar, Inverness,
after leaving the hospital. There he
consumed, in rapid succession, one half pint of Stella Artois
beer and five double whiskies. Having
thereafter been collected by his partner in her car, he fell asleep on the way
home, and was still asleep in the passenger seat when approached by colleagues
from the Road Traffic Department in connection with suspected
drink-driving. He failed a roadside
breath test, and later at Dingwall Police Office was found to have an alcohol
reading of 128mgs of alcohol in 100mls of breath. When asked to confirm who had driven the car
to Raigmore Hospital
earlier in the day, he replied 'It doesn't matter: ...me'.
(ix) Mr Smith was subsequently charged with a
contravention of section 5(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, and on
granting him bail pending trial the sheriff imposed a special condition that he
must not drive a motor vehicle. In due
course, following certain negotiations, Mr Smith on 13 October 2005 pled guilty to a reduced
offence involving an alcohol reading of 69mgs of alcohol in 100mls of breath
(very nearly double the legal limit for driving of 35).
[6] Turning
to the history of the disciplinary proceedings which were instituted against Mr
Smith, it was conceded from the outset that his conviction for a drink-driving
offence constituted misconduct within the scope of Regulation 4
(incorporating Schedule 1) of the Police (Conduct) (Scotland) Regulations
1996. Efforts were, however, made on Mr
Smith's behalf to advance mitigating circumstances sufficient to allow him to
retain his job and to justify one of the lesser penalty options set forth in
Regulation 18. In light of the evidence
and submissions tendered on 16 March
2006, the chairman of the misconduct hearing took account of the
nature and seriousness of the allegation, the background circumstances, the
effect on public confidence in the Police Service, and the effect of any
disposal on Mr Smith and his family.
He concluded inter alia as
follows:-
"Road safety is
a key element of our policing objectives in an area where there is widespread
community concern regarding the conduct of drivers on our roads. Your actions and your criminal conviction
have the potential to seriously undermine the trust and public confidence in
the Service. As an experienced police
officer with a particular interest in roads policing, you must have been aware
of the potential seriousness of driving whilst unfit to do so through alcohol
and you must be held to account.
Although you suffer from an alcohol-related illness, it is not an excuse
for your conduct.
The gravity of
the misconduct admitted is such that, even after considering your service
history and the mitigating circumstances, I consider a severe...disposal is
reasonable, appropriate and necessary.
The offence
admitted is of a grave nature and your actions were completely irresponsible".
[7] Mr
Smith then appealed to the petitioner who, after hearing submissions, affirmed
the decision of the misconduct hearing.
In so doing, he stated inter alia
(in paragraphs 1 and 2) that the conviction of a police officer of a criminal
offence was a matter of very serious concern, with Mr Smith's drink-driving
offence involving nearly double the prescribed level of alcohol per 100mls of
breath. In paragraph 3 the
petitioner considered the particular offence to be aggravated by the following
features:-
"The driving
offence took place around lunchtime in a built-up area, namely Dingwall. The offence came to light at about
14.10 hours having been reported by a member of the Occupational Health
Service at Raigmore Hospital,
Inverness, who described Mr Smith as smelling
strongly of a mixture of alcohol and mouthwash.
I noted additionally that he was described as being hesitant and vague
with bloodshot and glazed eyes and flushed complexion".
In paragraph 5, the petitioner
went on to record inter alia that,
despite being challenged about the amount of alcohol that he had taken and
giving conflicting accounts, Mr Smith stated that he intended to drive after
his consultation with the Occupational Health Service, that he was reluctant to
hand over his car keys; and that after
leaving Raigmore he apparently went to nearby licensed premises where, on a
balance of probabilities, he consumed 5 double whiskies and a half pint of
Stella lager despite being due on duty that evening at 2300 hours. Subject to certain favourable and/or
mitigating circumstances set out in paragraphs 8 and 10, paragraph 9
went on to note that Mr Smith's career had not been without incident. "Previous issues" were said to be set out in
the transcript of the misconduct hearing, with particular reference being made
to earlier misconduct hearings in November 2002 and January 2004. In paragraphs 11 to 16 inclusive, the
petitioner then went on to express the view that dismissal or a requirement to
resign was reasonably to be expected by all police officers convicted of
drink-driving offences. In the
petitioner's judgement there was nowadays an increased public intolerance towards
drink-driving offences, and this had led to the stepping-up of police efforts
to combat such offences. These included
the Northern Constabulary's well-publicised policy on drink-drivers and
participation in a campaign specifically focused in that connection during
2005.
[8] Against
that background, the petitioner considered that to allow an officer of the
Northern Constabulary to remain in service after having been convicted of
drink-driving could undermine, not only the Force's road safety campaign, but
also the work of other Scottish Police Forces and ACPOS. In addition, the petitioner concluded that
retention within the Force of convicted officers was liable to undermine the
respect and goodwill of the community which were crucial to the successful
policing of the Highlands and Islands,
to attract undesirable media attention, and to impact adversely on morale and
discipline within the Force itself.
While it is true to say that the petitioner addressed and commented on a
number of other factors in reaching his decision, the points itemised above
were the primary grounds on which that decision was based. Like the chairman of the misconduct hearing,
the petitioner took the view that Mr Smith's actions exposing himself to
the risk of conviction were culpable, and that there were no exceptional
circumstances to justify a lesser penalty than the one imposed.
[9] When
the matter came on appeal before the Tribunal the "salient facts" were said to
be largely uncontested, although Mr Smith's representative urged a degree of
caution regarding the precise detail of the Raigmore staff members' evidence
which, being only in documentary form, had never been effectively tested. Having heard submissions from both sides, the
Tribunal by a majority of 3:1 determined that, in the whole circumstances, the
penalty of resignation was excessive and that a fine (expressed in terms of
increments of pay over a 12-month period) should be substituted. The minority member essentially agreed with
the petitioner and with the chairman of the misconduct hearing, on the basis
that the public expected police officers to uphold the law, which Mr Smith
had not done; that Mr Smith should
have appreciated that alcohol would still be in his blood; and that it would not be generally understood
if Mr Smith did not lose his job, especially given the real concerns in the
area as to the dangers of driving when under the influence of alcohol.
[10] The reasoning of the majority of the Tribunal, as set out at
pages 8 and 9 of their written decision, was to inter alia the following effect:-
"...(All) members
of the Tribunal readily acknowledge that a conviction for drink-driving is a
serious offence. This is particularly so
for a police officer. However, in the
present case, the majority are of the view that there are a number of factors
which point to a disposal of lesser gravity than loss of employment. The offence happened when Mr Smith was
actively seeking assistance for his alcoholism.
He was a patient seeking treatment at the time of the events which led
to his conviction. He had taken alcohol
some hours previously before he retired to bed.
He stated through his representative that had he been aware that he was
unfit to drive, he would not have done so.
There is no good reason to doubt this.
A contrast can be made with cases which involve a police officer driving
in circumstances in which it is clear that it was reckless and culpable to do
so.
"In reviewing
the decisions of the chairman of the misconduct hearing and of the Chief
Constable, the majority of the Tribunal considers that insufficient weight was
attached to the background of the appellant's illness and his attempts to
obtain treatment for it. It can
reasonably be concluded that but for his malady the conviction would not have
happened. Further, and importantly, the
recent report from Mr Hassan includes long periods of abstinence in the past
year, and continuing expert support being provided to Mr Smith.
"The Tribunal
did not accept the view that the alcohol level was particularly high, having
regard to readings commonly encountered.
It is readily accepted that, as a generality, a drink-driving conviction
raises concerns as to morale, efficiency and professional perception within the
Force, and also as to public perception of the Force as a whole. However, the circumstances of each case must
be fully considered and taken into account.
The majority of the Tribunal is of the view that the particular
circumstances of this case would be considered to be mitigating factors both by
Mr Smith's colleagues and by the public as a whole. It would be wrong to reach conclusions on
individual cases by reference only to general concerns about drink-driving
convictions .... The determining factors are the full circumstances of each case,
not any presumption flowing from the conviction itself. In saying this, the majority of the Tribunal
does not intend to dilute the significance and seriousness of the offence
itself, but wishes to stress that this should not divert one from a careful
weighing of all the relevant factors when determining an appropriate outcome".
[11] The majority of the Tribunal then went on to question other
aspects of the petitioner's decision, notably his apparent reliance on Home
Office guidelines having no formal status in Scotland, and further stated inter alia as follows:-
"As to whether
Mr Smith intended to drive after his appointment at the hospital, the Tribunal
is prepared to accept that once his unfitness to drive was questioned, Mr Smith
did not intend to return to his vehicle.....As to whether the Courts consider
that loss of employment is a likely consequences of a drink-driving conviction,
no doubt this is true when a driving licence is a condition of that
employment. A driving licence is not a
condition of service in the Police Force.
"In summary, in
the view of the majority the circumstances here are special. The disposal appealed against was not
proportionate if regard is had to all of the circumstances, untrammelled by
application of the Home Office guidelines".
The parties' submissions
[12] In submitting that the
Tribunal had erred in law, and that their decision should be reduced, senior
counsel for the petitioner began by drawing attention to the particular facts
of the case and to the principal grounds on which the decisions of the
misconduct hearing and the petitioner had been based. Special emphasis was laid on Mr Smith's
previous employment history, on the factors which in combination might be
thought to aggravate the offence in question, and on the acknowledged importance
of maintaining public confidence in the Police Service as well as the
continuing morale and discipline of its members. Against that background, it was submitted
that the Tribunal's reasoning was inadequate as to (i) the basis on which Mr
Smith's personal culpability for his actions had apparently been negated or
diminished; and (ii) the basis on which
the circumstances of the case were regarded as sufficiently special to elide
the normal adverse impact of an officer's conviction both within the Force and
among members of the public in general.
[13] While certain potentially mitigating factors had been
mentioned, there was nothing to indicate the view (if any) which the Tribunal
had taken of the multiple aggravating factors which had carried weight with the
misconduct hearing and with the petitioner, and which had been repeated in
submissions. In particular, no mention
was made of Mr Smith's past employment history, nor of his stated
awareness that his job was at risk unless his alcohol problem could be
controlled. No mention was made of the
extent to which Mr Smith was reportedly smelling of alcohol on arrival at
Raigmore Hospital on the day in question, nor of his assertion that he knew how
much he could safely drink before driving, nor of his initial untruth about
past drinking, nor of his reluctance to give up his car keys when his fitness
to drive was challenged, nor of his subsequent consumption of alcohol at a high
rate shortly after leaving the hospital.
Did the Tribunal accept or reject the evidence on these matters in
particular? If they rejected it, on what
basis did they do so? If they accepted
it, what weight (if any) did they give it in relation to Mr Smith's
culpability? On what basis did they
conclude that, notwithstanding such evidence, Mr Smith's conduct could be
contrasted with conduct which was clearly reckless and culpable? In the latter context, what sort of conduct
did the Tribunal have in mind?
[14] On what basis, moreover, did the Tribunal conclude that there
was "no good reason to doubt" Mr Smith's assertion that, had he been aware
that he was unfit to drive, he would not have done so? On what basis were they "prepared to accept"
that once his unfitness to drive was questioned Mr Smith did not intend to
return to his vehicle? If they rejected
the evidence as to his stated intention to drive home, or as to his reluctance
to hand over his car keys to the nurse, it was incumbent on the Tribunal to
explain why. In short, there were
numerous factors in the evidence before the Tribunal which, if accepted, would have
tended to aggravate Mr Smith's offence, and to contradict what was claimed
to have been his state of mind at the material time. In the face of such evidence, it was not good
enough for the Tribunal merely to assert that they accepted Mr Smith's
claims, or that there was no good reason to doubt them, without clearly
explaining how such conclusions were reached.
Similarly, it was not good enough for the Tribunal, without explanation,
to imply that in some way the circumstances of Mr Smith's driving were
neither reckless nor culpable.
[15] Senior counsel for the petitioner also challenged the basis on
which the Tribunal had apparently concluded that Mr Smith's conviction
would, exceptionally, fail to have an adverse effect on "...morale, efficiency
and professional perception within the Force, and also (on) public perception
of the Force as a whole". Was the
Tribunal saying that there would be no such adverse consequences, or that such
consequences would arise but would be outweighed by other factors? If so, what were these other factors, and how
did they outweigh normal expectations?
On what basis did the Tribunal take the view "...that the particular
circumstances of this case would be considered to be mitigating factors both by
Mr Smith's colleagues and by the public as a whole"? Surely the long term nature of
Mr Smith's problems, the fact that he was seeking assistance in that
connection, or the fact that he had pled guilty to a breath-alcohol level of
double the permitted limit could not, of themselves, be thought to have that
effect. Once again, the decision of the
majority of the Tribunal left the informed reader and the court in real and
substantial doubt as to the basis on which it had been reached.
[16] In response, senior counsel for Mr Smith submitted that the
Tribunal took all material considerations into account, and that proper and
adequate reasons had been given. As was
observed by Lord Clyde in Stefan v General Medical Council 1999 1 W.L.R.1293,
at pp.1301 and 1304, the extent and substance of reasons must depend upon the
circumstances. So long as they told the
parties in broad terms why the decision was reached, they need not be elaborate
nor lengthy, and there could clearly be circumstances where a quite minimal
explanation would legitimately suffice.
Against that background, it was important to remember that this was
effectively a sentencing appeal before the Tribunal. The only real question was whether the
previous outcome of the disciplinary proceedings was too harsh, bearing in mind
that in the absence of tested oral evidence the key facts could only be
considered on a broad basis. No doubt written
evidence had been admitted without objection for the purposes of regulation
14(3) of the Police (Conduct) (Scotland) Regulations 1996, but in judging that
evidence the Tribunal was entitled to be guided by the parties' respective
submissions during the hearing before them.
[17] The starting point for the majority of the Tribunal was an
acceptance that a conviction for drink-driving was a serious offence,
particularly for a police officer.
However, they then went on to identify factors which in their view
favoured a less severe disposal in the particular circumstances of the
case. All of this was readily
intelligible to the informed reader. There
was here no conveyancing document to be minutely examined. The only question was whether, in broad terms,
the basis of the decision was adequately conveyed to the reader. For instance, Mr Smith's statements as
to his state of mind at the relevant time had been consistent from the outset,
and it would have been open to the presenting officer to challenge or disprove
them if he chose. It was not clear what
view the chairman of the misconduct hearing had taken on such matters because
his ruling contained contradictory statements.
The important thing was not to scrutinise the Tribunal's decision too
closely, but to judge it in the context of the submissions made and the absence
of oral evidence. In senior counsel's
submission, the Tribunal had been entitled to say that there was no good reason
to doubt Mr Smith's claimed state of mind, since this had never really
been in dispute before them.
[18] More generally, this court should be careful not to impose an
undue burden on decision-makers by setting too high a standard for the duty to
give reasons. It was not incumbent on
the Tribunal in this case to rehearse the detail of the Raigmore staff members'
statements or the extent to which these were either accepted or rejected. This was, after all, the final level of
appeal, and the court should only quash the decision if it could be said that
the Tribunal had manifestly gone wrong.
Sentencing appeals generally were conducted on a broad basis, and on ex parte statements without the need for
any proof in mitigation. The concern was
simply to achieve an appropriate disposal on the basis of the important factual
background.
[19] On the question of culpability, this was acknowledged by the
Tribunal from the outset, so it would be wrong to hold that they had somehow
reached the opposite conclusion. In the
passage at page 8 of their decision, the Tribunal had merely been evaluating
the level of culpability, and had contrasted other cases in which culpability
might have been clearer such as that of an officer driving straight after
"tumbling out of a nightclub". In all
the circumstances, it was neither necessary nor appropriate for the Tribunal to
go further as senior counsel for the petitioner had suggested.
[20] As regards the Tribunal's reasoning on the adverse impact of
police officers being convicted of criminal offences, it was again important
for this court to refrain from imposing too high a test. Not all of the factors relied on by the
petitioner had been clearly focused in the submissions before the Tribunal,
although it was acknowledged that many had been the subject of reliance in one
or both of the decisions appealed against.
No one had, however, relied at any stage on Mr Smith's apparent
acceptance that he was on his last chance after being transferred to
Dingwall. In the end, according to
senior counsel, it was largely a matter of impression whether the tests in Wordie and Stefan were satisfied. In
his submission they were, with all material issues being addressed and
satisfactorily explained.
Discussion
[21] In approaching this matter I am conscious of the limited role
of the court in review proceedings of this kind. An application to the court's supervisory
jurisdiction is neither an appeal nor a re-hearing. The court cannot enter into any question as
to whether the Tribunal's conclusions on the evidence before them were right or
wrong, nor can it interfere with any decision except where the petitioner
demonstrates an established ground for
review such as, for instance, failure to give proper and adequate reasons in
contravention of a statutory duty to do so.
[22] Against that background, it seems to me that the competing
arguments here are fairly finally balanced.
Although the Tribunal's determination was relatively brief and succinct,
they were essentially dealing with a sentencing appeal where identification of the
main issues depended, in part, on the competing submissions before them and, in
part, on the terms of the decisions appealed against. A broad approach was quite legitimate in that
context. In addition the prima facie assumption must, I think, be
that all of the available evidence was considered and taken into account.
[23] In the end, however, notwithstanding the factors listed in the
preceding paragraph, I am unable to affirm the adequacy of the Tribunal's
stated reasons on key aspects of this case.
In particular, there is no explanation of the basis on which the majority
concluded that "...there (was) no good reason to doubt...." Mr Smith's
assertion that had he known he was unfit to drive, he would not have done
so. Nor is there any explanation of the basis on which the majority bore to accept
the submission that "...once his unfitness to drive was questioned, Mr Smith
did not intend to return to his vehicle".
In the face of the multiple strands of evidence narrated at
paragraph 5 above, from which very different inferences might have been
drawn (and were in fact drawn in the decisions under appeal), it was surely
incumbent on the Tribunal to make at least some reference to such matters and
to explain what (if anything) they made of them. Did the majority accept or reject the
relevant evidence? If they rejected it,
on what basis did they do so? If they accepted it, by what route did they then
proceed to reach inconsistent conclusions?
In my judgement these are important unanswered questions, bearing in
mind (i) that a fairly substantial body of evidence was involved,
(ii) that the relevant conclusions appear to have played a material part
in the Tribunal's overall decision, and (iii) that on a consideration of
the same evidence the misconduct hearing and the petitioner both reached a
different view.
[24] Similarly, I am persuaded that the Tribunal's reasoning can be
faulted on the issue of Mr Smith's culpability in general. On what grounds did the majority seek to
contrast the present case with "...cases which involve a police officer driving
in circumstances in which it is clear that it was reckless and culpable to do
so"? In drawing a distinction here, what
kind of circumstances did they have in mind as inferring clear recklessness and
culpability? If they considered that in
driving his car with a breath-alcohol level of nearly twice the legal limit
Mr Smith was not culpable or reckless, or at least clearly so, by what
route or reasoning did they reach that conclusion? Since this again involved a significant
departure from the approach which commended itself to the misconduct hearing
and to the petitioner, I consider that it called for more than mere assertion
in the face of a body of evidence capable of supporting an inference that Mr
Smith drove his car, and intended to drive it again, when he must have known or
suspected that his fitness to drive was impaired. Even assuming, in the
Tribunal's favour, that they did not simply leave such evidence out of account,
I am unable to accept that they stated proper and adequate reasons for the
conclusion which they reached.
[25] Furthermore, I am unable to discern the basis on which the
Tribunal concluded that "...the particular circumstances of this case would be
considered to be mitigating factors both by Mr Smith's colleagues and by the
public as a whole", or that these circumstances were sufficiently special to elide
normal concerns as to morale, efficiency and discipline within the Force or as
to the attitude of the public. Even
discounting the difficulties to which I have already adverted regarding Mr
Smith's state of mind and culpability, it is not easy to see how the positive
factors relied on by the Tribunal were seen as taking this case into a special
or exceptional category. Why was Mr
Smith's intermittent treatment for alcoholism regarded as more than a neutral
factor? What was the perceived significance
of Mr Smith having retired to bed for some hours between drinking and
driving? And what was thought to be the
mitigatory value of driving with a breath-alcohol level of very nearly twice
the permitted limit, bearing in mind the public safety implications of such conduct?
[26] In the result, I conclude that the Tribunal's reasoning fails
to satisfy the requirements set out in Wordie
and other cases, and leaves the informed reader and the court in real and
substantial doubt as to the basis on which key conclusions were reached. In the preceding paragraphs I have dealt
individually with the three main criticisms which were levelled at the
Tribunal's decision by senior counsel for the petitioner, but in the end it seems
to me that the real sources of difficulty are the two associated issues of
Mr Smith's state of mind and his culpability in general. The Tribunal's judgement as to the likely
impact of Mr Smith's conviction both within and outwith the Force would not, I
think, necessarily have been open to successful challenge on its own. However, since I regard that issue as
inextricably linked with the other two, it is in my view challengeable along
similar lines.
[27] In reaching these conclusions I am not, of course, expressing
any view as to whether the Tribunal's decision on the appropriate penalty was
right or wrong, justified or unjustified.
For all I know, the Tribunal may well have been entitled to conclude
that the whole circumstances of the case warranted a penalty less severe than
the enforced termination of Mr Smith's employment. The problem, in my view, is simply that the
stated reasons leave too many critical questions unanswered.
Disposal
[28] For the foregoing reasons I
shall sustain the petitioner's second plea-in-law, repel the third plea-in-law
for the respondent Mr Smith, grant decree of reduction of the decision of the
Tribunal dated 8 September 2006, and remit Mr Smith's appeal for
rehearing before a freshly constituted Tribunal.