Opinion of Lord Macphail
In the petition of
Hyaltech
Limited, Petitioners
for
Judicial
Review of a decision of the Medicine and Health Products Regulatory Agency
15 May 2007 Summary
This application for judicial
review concerns a decision of the Medical and Health Products Regulatory Agency
("MHRA"). Hyaltech Limited ("the
company") manufactures a product called VisThesia, which they consider to be a
medical device. The MHRA, however,
determined that it was a medicinal product and required the company to stop
selling and supplying it. A Review Panel
appointed by the MHRA concurred that VisThesia was a medicinal product.
Lord Macphail decided that the
reasons given by the Review Panel were sufficient for their purpose and that
the MHRA had not made any error of law in their interpretation of the relevant
regulations. The petition was therefore
refused.
Hyaltech Limited manufacture in Scotland a product named "VisThesia" which is
designed to facilitate intraocular surgery to remove a cataract and implant a
prosthetic lens. The product includes a
solution called "VisThesia Topical".
The sale and distribution of medical products and medical devices for
human use are governed in the United Kingdom by regulations which implement European
Community Directives. Manufacturers must
obtain the grant of a marketing authorisation from the UK Licensing Authority,
the Secretary of State for Health, who acts through the MHRA.
The company considered that VisThesia Topical was a medical
device. The MHRA, however, provisionally
determined that it was a medicinal product.
A Review Panel appointed by the MHRA in accordance with the relevant
regulations considered representations from the company and from the MHRA and advised
the MHRA that it was a medicinal product.
The MHRA then made a final determination that it was a medicinal product
and they required the company to stop selling and supplying it. The company applied to the Court of Session
for judicial review of that determination, and the MHRA conceded that the
determination should be reduced because it had not been supported by proper
reasons. Thereafter the MHRA, without
obtaining further advice from the Review Panel, issued a second final
determination to the same effect as the first, but on this occasion they gave
reasons.
The company then applied to the Court of Session for judicial review of
the second final determination. They
maintained that if they were to be prohibited from selling and supplying
VisThesia from the UK, they would only be able to sell and supply
it in other member States of the European Union in which VisThesia has been
classified by the national licensing authorities as a medical device. They argued, first, that the Review Panel had
failed to provide the MHRA with proper and adequate reasons for their
advice. Secondly, they argued that in
reaching their second final determination the MHRA had made errors of law, had
taken into account irrelevant considerations and had failed to take account of
relevant considerations.
Summary of Lord Macphail's Opinion
in relation to the MHRA's decision:
ท
Lord
Macphail held, first, that although the reasons given by the Review Panel had
been briefly expressed, they had been sufficient for the purposes of the MHRA,
and the company had been able to understand them.
ท
Secondly,
his Lordship held that the MHRA had not made any error of law in the
interpretation of the relevant regulations.
He found that they had misunderstood passages in the US patent for the product now called VisThesia,
and a sentence in a letter from a medical expert. He concluded, however, that the company had
failed to demonstrate that the MHRA had erred in any other respect, and that
these errors had not vitiated their determination. Lord Macphail therefore refused the petition.
NOTE
This summary is provided to assist in
understanding the Court's decision. It
does not form part of the reasons for that decision. The full report of the Court is the only
authoritative document.
The
full opinion will be available on the Scottish Courts website from 12.00 noon today at this location:
Media Contact Elizabeth Cutting
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Information Officer
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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2007] CSOH 84
|
P818/06
|
OPINION OF LORD MACPHAIL
in the Petition of
HYALTECH LTD
Petitioners;
for
Judicial Review of
a Final Determination of the Secretary of State for Health as the UK
Licensing Authority established by section 6 of the Medicines Act 1968,
acting by The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
Respondents:
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ________________
|
Petitioners: Cormack, Solicitor Advocate; McGrigors
Respondent: Brodie;
Office of the Solicitor to the Advocate General
15 May 2007
Introduction
[1] The
petitioners manufacture in Scotland
a product named "VisThesia" which is designed to facilitate intraocular surgery
for the removal of a cataract and the implantation of a prosthetic lens. The product includes a solution called
"VisThesia Topical" which is intended to be applied to the surface of the eye. It contains a viscoelastic product, sodium
hyaluronate, and an anaesthetic agent, lidocaine hydrochloride ("lidocaine").
[2] The
sale and distribution of medicinal products and medical devices for human use
are governed in the United Kingdom
by regulations which implement European Community Directives. Manufacturers require to obtain the grant of
a marketing authorisation from the European Commission or the UK Licensing
Authority. The UK Licensing Authority is
the Secretary of State for Health who acts through an executive agency of the Department
of Health known as The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
("the MHRA"). Where a question arises as
to whether a particular product should be classified as a medicinal product or
a medicinal device, the MHRA may serve on the manufacturer a "provisional
determination notice" informing him that they are minded to determine that the
product is "a relevant medicinal product".
The manufacturer may make oral representations to a Review Panel at a
hearing at which the MHRA may also make oral representations. The Review Panel then give advice to the MHRA
who, having considered the advice, determine whether or not the product is a
relevant medicinal product.
[3] In
the present case the MHRA served on the petitioners a provisional determination
notice informing them that they were minded to determine that VisThesia Topical
was a relevant medicinal product. The
petitioners contended that it was a medical device. The matter proceeded to a Review Panel who,
after hearing oral representations from the petitioners and the MHRA, advised
the MHRA that VisThesia Topical was not a medical device but a relevant
medicinal product. The MHRA thereafter
served on the petitioners a notice ("the first final determination") that they
had determined on behalf of the licensing authority that VisThesia was a
relevant medicinal product and that it required the petitioners to cease the
sale and supply of VisThesia with immediate effect. They did not state any reasons for their
determination. The petitioners applied
to this Court for judicial review of that determination. It was conceded that the determination should
be reduced. Thereafter the MHRA issued a
further notice ("the second final determination") which advised the petitioners
that they had made a determination and requirement in the same terms as the
first. Unlike the first, the second
final determination was accompanied by a statement of reasons.
[4] The
petitioners now apply for judicial review of the second final determination. The respondent is the Secretary of State for
Health acting by the MHRA. Shortly
stated, the petitioners rely on two grounds.
The first is that the Review Panel failed to provide the MHRA with
proper and adequate reasons for their advice.
The second is that alternatively and in any event the second final
determination should be reduced because it is ultra vires in respect that the MHRA made material errors of law,
took irrelevant matters into account and failed to take relevant matters into
account. The petitioners accordingly
seek, first, declarator that the respondent made the decision to make the second
final determination without having proper advice from the Review Panel, in an
unfair manner and in a manner which was contrary to the petitioners' legitimate
expectations. They also seek declarator
that the second final determination is ultra
vires, reduction of that determination, and suspension of the notice given
in the notice of final determination.
[5] A
common theme in both grounds is the interpretation of the expression "medical
device" in the relevant Regulations. It
is there defined as including devices which, among other things, incorporate as
an integral part a substance which, if used separately, would be a medicinal
product and "which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that
of the device." The principal issue
between the parties in relation to interpretation is whether the lidocaine, the
anaesthetic agent in the solution, is liable to act upon the body "with action
ancillary to" that of the VisThesia Topical.
If it is liable so to act, as the petitioners maintain, VisThesia
Topical should be classified as a medical device,. If it is not so liable, as the MHRA maintain,
VisThesia should be classified as a relevant medicinal product. The practical significance of the matter for
the petitioners is that they claim that if they are to be prohibited from
selling and supplying VisThesia from the UK,
they will only be able to do so in other Member States of the European Union in
which VisThesia has been classified by the national licensing authorities as a
medical device.
The regulatory framework
[6] The
marketing of medicinal products and the marketing of medical devices are
regulated by two separate regimes, each derived from a Community Directive. That for medicinal products is regulated by
the Medicines for Human Use (Marketing Authorisations etc) Regulations 1994
(SI 1994, No. 3144), as amended
("the 1994 Regulations") which implements inter alia Directive 2001/83/EC ("the Medicinal Products
Directive"), and that for medical devices by the Medical Devices Regulations 2002
(SI 2002, No. 618) ("the 2002 Regulations") which implements inter alia Directive 93/42/EEC
("the Medical Devices Directive").
[7] "Medicinal
product" and "medical device" are defined as follows. "Medicinal product" is defined by article 1
of Directive 2001/83/EC, as amended, as:
"Any substance
or combination of substances presented as having properties for treating or
preventing disease in human beings;
Any substance or
combination of substances which may be used in or administered to human beings
either with a view to restoring, correcting or modifying physiological
functions by exerting a pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action, or
to making a medical diagnosis."
It should be noted for the sake of
completeness that from 31 October
2005 that definition replaced an earlier definition in the
following terms, to which reference is made in the provisional determination
notice (No. 6/5 of process):
"Any substance or
combination of substances presented for treating or preventing disease in human
beings.
Any substance or
combination of substances which may be administered to human beings with a view
to making a medical diagnosis or to restoring, correcting or modifying
physiological functions in human beings is likewise considered a medicinal
product."
[8] "Medical
device" is defined in the following way in regulation 2(1) of the 2002 Regulations:
"'medical
device' means an instrument, apparatus, appliance, material or other article,
whether used alone or in combination, together with any software necessary for
its proper application, which -
(a) is intended by the
manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of -
(i) diagnosis, prevention,
monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease,
(ii) diagnosis, monitoring,
treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or handicap;
(iii) investigation,
replacement or modification of the anatomy or a physiological process, or
(iv) control of conception;
and
(b) does not achieve its
principal intended action in or on the human body by pharmacological,
immunological or metabolic means, even if it is assisted in its function by
such means,
and includes
devices intended to administer a medicinal product or which incorporate as an
integral part a substance which, if used separately, would be a medicinal
product and which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that
of the device."
[9] That
definition in regulation 2(1) is derived from the following provisions of
articles 1.2(a) and 1.4 of the Medical Devices Directive:
"2. For the purposes of this
Directive, the following definitions shall apply:
(a) 'medical device' means
any instrument, apparatus, appliance, material or other article, whether used
alone or in combination, including the software necessary for its proper
application intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the
purpose of:
- diagnosis,
prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease,
- diagnosis,
monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or
handicap,
- investigation,
replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological process,
- control of
conception,
and which does
not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by
pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, but which may be assisted in
its function by such means;
[. .
. ]
4. Where a device
incorporates, as an integral part, a substance which, if used separately, may
be considered to be a medicinal product within the meaning of Article 1 of
Directive 65/65/EC and which is liable to act upon the body with action
ancillary to that of the device, that device must be assessed and authorized in
accordance with this Directive."
[10] Regulation 2(1) also provides a definition of "intended
purpose" which, so far as material, states:
"'intended
purpose' means -
(a) in relation to an active
implantable medical device [not relevant]
[. . . ]
(b) in relation to any other
medical device, the use to which the device is intended according to the data
supplied by the manufacturer on the labelling, the instructions for use and/or
the promotional materials."
[11] I now refer to the relevant provisions of the 1994 Regulations. Regulation 3(1) provides that no
relevant medicinal product is to be placed on the market or distributed by way
of wholesale dealing unless a marketing authorisation in respect of the product
has been granted in accordance with the relevant Community provisions by the
licensing authority or the European Commission, and is for the time being in
force in accordance with those provisions.
"The licensing authority" is the Secretary of State for Health
(Medicines Act 1968, sections 1, 6, as amended). As already explained, the Secretary of State
acts through the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency ("the
MHRA"), an executive agency of the Department of Health.
[12] A question may arise as to whether a particular article submitted
to the MHRA for a marketing authorisation should be classified as a "medicinal
product". In particular, there may be a
question whether it should be classified as a "medicinal product" or as a
"medical device". Such articles are
known as "borderline products". A
procedure for determining whether a borderline product is a medicinal product
is provided by regulation 3A. Shortly
stated, the procedure is that the MHRA serve on the manufacturer a "provisional
determination notice" informing him that they are minded to determine that the
product is "a relevant medicinal product".
The manufacturer may make oral representations to a Review Panel at a
hearing at which the MHRA may also make oral representations. The Review Panel then give advice to the MHRA
who, having considered the advice, determine whether or not the product is a
relevant medicinal product.
[13] The following are the provisions of regulation 3A which
are material in the present case.
"(1) Where the licensing
authority are of the opinion that a product without a marketing authorization [. .
. ] is a relevant medicinal
product, they may, by a notice in writing (referred to in this regulation as a
'provisional determination notice') served on any person who has placed or who
in the opinion of the authority may place the product on the market -
(a) inform him that they are
minded to determine that the product is a relevant medicinal product (referred
to in this regulation as 'the provisional determination') and of the reasons
why they are so minded; and
(b) advise him that if he
disagrees with the provisional determination, he may request that the licensing
authority review their provisional determination, provided that within four
weeks of the date on which the provisional determination notice was served on
him (referred to in this regulation as
'the date of the provisional determination') he makes that request, and
[. .
. ]
(ii) within four weeks of the
date of the provisional determination, he informs the licensing authority in
writing that he wishes to make oral representations to a review panel,
appointed by the licensing authority, explaining why he considers that the
product is not a relevant medicinal product.
(2) Where the licensing
authority have been informed, pursuant to paragraph (1)(b)(ii), that a
person wishes to make oral representations to a review panel, they shall, after
consultation with that person, set a date for the oral hearing (at which the
licensing authority may also make oral representations to the panel) and [. .
. ] that date shall be the date
fixed for the oral hearing.
[. . . ]
(5) If a person on whom a provisional
determination notice was served -
[. .
. ]
(b) has made oral
representations to a review panel at an oral hearing arranged pursuant to paragraph (2),
[. .
. ] the licensing authority shall,
after further consideration of the matter and in particular after having
considered the advice of the review panel arising out of -
(i) the oral representations
made and any other evidence submitted to the panel at the hearing by that
person;
(ii) any oral representations
made and any other evidence submitted to the panel at the hearing by the
licensing authority, and
(iii) any other evidence considered by the
review panel,
determine
whether or not the product is a relevant medicinal product,
and shall inform
that person in writing of their determination and their reasons for it, and if
the licensing authority make a determination which is contrary to the advice of
the review panel, they shall also give their reasons for disagreeing with the
advice of the review panel.
(6) In respect of any product
which the licensing authority determine, in accordance with paragraph [. .
. ] (5), to be a relevant
medicinal product, the licensing authority may, by a notice in writing served
on any person who has placed or who in the opinion of the licensing authority
may place the product on the market, require that he shall -
(a) stop marketing the
product from a date specified in the notice; or
(b) not place the product on
the market,
unless or until
a marketing authorization [. . . ] is
granted in respect of that product."
[14] In addition to the material provisions of the various Regulations it
is necessary to notice the terms of a guidance document produced by the
European Commission relating to the application of, among other Directives, the
Medical Devices Directive. This document
(No. 6/2 of process) is headed, "MEDICAL DEVICES: Guidance document", is
identified as "MEDDEV 2. 1/3 rev
2 July 2001", and is referred to hereafter as "MEDDEV". The Foreword is in these terms:
"The present
Guidelines are part of a set of Guidelines relating to questions of application
of EC-Directives on medical devices. They
are legally not binding. The Guidelines
have been carefully drafted through a process of intensive consultation of the
various interested parties (Competent Authorities, Commission services,
industries and other interested parties in both the medical devices and the
medicinal products sectors) during which intermediate drafts were circulated
and comments were taken up in the document.
Therefore this document reflects positions taken in particular by the
aforementioned interested parties.
Due to the participation of the aforementioned interested parties and of
experts from Competent Authorities, it
is anticipated that these guidelines will be followed within the Member States
and, therefore, ensure uniform application of relevant Directive provisions."
[15] MEDDEV is in four sections.
The first, Section A, is headed, "Demarcation between medical
devices directives and medicinal products directives". The introductory paragraph notes that in
the Medical Devices Directive several provisions to establish the
demarcation between both regimes have been laid down. It continues:
"It was
recognised that the subject needs to be further explained and illustrated by
practical guidance and examples. The
present document has no legal force. It
has nevertheless been elaborated by an expert group including experts from
Member States' competent authorities for both medical devices and medicinal
products, the European Commission, as well as industry trade associations. It is therefore intended that the document
will provide useful guidance which should assist common positions to be taken
throughout the European Union."
Section A goes on to state
general principles, give examples of medical devices and medicinal products,
and discuss medical devices incorporating a medicinal substance with ancillary
action. I shall refer to the contents of
MEDDEV in more detail later in this Opinion.
[16] It should also be noted that article 9 of the Medical
Devices Directive provides a system of classification of medical devices
according to risk, and that before a device in the higher classes is entitled
to bear the CE mark an independent certification organisation (a "Notified
Body") must certify that it meets certain specified requirements. It is common ground between the parties that
a Notified Body in the Netherlands
named KEMA accepted that Ophthaleaze, subsequently renamed VisThesia, fell
within the Medical Devices Directive and that KEMA certified that it met
these requirements. The petitioners aver
that they have been able to sell VisThesia throughout the European Union with
the CE marking and the identification number of KEMA as the relevant Notified
Body. It is also accepted by both
parties, however, that the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Optident Ltd v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] UKHL 32,
[2001] 3 CMLR 1 is that it is not the law that if a CE mark is
obtained in one Member State it must be respected in another Member State
unless it can be set aside: the application of the CE mark in one Member State
does not exclude the competence of the authorities or courts of another Member
State (Lord Slynn of Hadley at paragraph 29).
Procedure
[17] In the present case, the procedure laid down by
regulation 3A of the 1994 Regulations was initially followed. The MHRA served on the petitioners a
provisional determination notice dated 17 May 2004 (No. 6/5 of
process) informing the petitioners that they were minded to determine that
VisThesia was a relevant medicinal product and stating the reasons why they
were so minded. The petitioners, through
their solicitors, informed the MHRA that they wished to make oral
representations to a review panel. A
hearing took place before the review panel ("the Review Panel") on 25 November 2004 at which both
the petitioners and the MHRA were represented.
The Review Panel heard parties' oral representations. They also had before them written submissions
from the petitioners' solicitors (Nos. 6/16, 6/18 and 6/21 of
process) and a skeleton argument from counsel for the MHRA (No. 6/19 of
process). In a document dated 16
and 21 December 2004
the Review Panel advised that VisThesia was a relevant medicinal product and
gave reasons for its advice (No. 6/4 of process). The MHRA determined, or purported to
determine, that VisThesia was a relevant medicinal product, and so informed the
petitioners in a letter dated 21 December
2004 in which they also required the petitioners to cease the sale
and supply of VisThesia with immediate effect (No. 6/6 of process). They did not, however, state any reasons for
their determination. That letter is
referred to above as "the first final determination".
[18] The petitioners then applied to this Court for judicial review
of the first final determination, the respondent being the Secretary of State
for Health. In that petition ("the first
petition", No. 6/7 of process) the petitioners' first plea-in-law was in
these terms:
"(1) The respondent's decision to make the
final determination being unsupported by proper reasons in terms of
regulation 3A(5) of the 1994 Regulations, decree of declarator and
reduction should be pronounced."
The petition was disposed of on 14 July 2005 by the Court's
pronouncing an interlocutor (No. 6/8 of process) interponing authority to
a joint minute (No. 6/9 of process), sustaining the petitioners' first
plea-in-law and reducing the first final determination.
[19] Thereafter the MHRA appear to have taken no action in the
matter until 31 March 2006,
when they sent the petitioners a letter ("the second final determination", No. 6/3
of process) which referred to the same advice from the Review Panel, informed
the petitioners that the MHRA had determined that VisThesia was a relevant
medicinal product, and required them to cease the sale and supply of it with
immediate effect. In this letter the
MHRA gave their reasons for their determination.
[20] In the present petition the respondent is the Secretary of
State for Health acting by the MHRA. The
petitioners seek the following orders in relation to the second final
determination:
"3.1 Declarator that the respondent made the
decision to make the final determination without having proper advice from the
Review Panel in terms of the 1994 Regulations, in an unfair manner and in
a manner which was contrary to the petitioners' legitimate expectations;
3.2 Declarator that the final determination
is ultra vires;
3.3 Reduction of the final determination;
3.4 Suspension of the purported
notice under regulation 3A(6) of the 1994 Regulations given in
the notice of final determination requiring that the petitioners cease the sale
and supply of the topical components in the products VisThesia and VisThesia
Light with immediate effect and interim suspension;
3.5 A finding of expenses against the
respondent."
At the first hearing the solicitor
advocate for the petitioners explained that interim
suspension was not sought because an undertaking had been given.
[21] The petition makes it clear that the petitioners rely on two
grounds for review of the second final determination. The first relates to the advice of the Review
Panel, and the second is that the second final determination is ultra vires in respect that the MHRA
made material errors of law, took irrelevant matters into account and failed to
take relevant matters into account.
[22] Before considering the grounds for review I shall describe the
product VisThesia, outline the initial dispute between the petitioners and the
MHRA, and summarise the procedure before the Review Panel. I shall then consider, first, the advice of
the Review Panel, and secondly, the terms of the second final determination, in
the light of the grounds for review.
VisThesia
[23] The following description of VisThesia is derived from the
petitioners' averments which are admitted by the respondent.
[24] VisThesia and VisThesia Light (hereafter collectively referred
to as "VisThesia"), are products designed to facilitate intraocular surgery to
remove cataracts and implant a prosthetic lens.
Such surgery involves the eyelids being held open by a metal surgical
instrument known as a speculum. An
incision is then made in the cornea, the diseased lens is removed and replaced
by the prosthetic lens, and the wound is closed by suturing. The eyelids are held open by the speculum for
the duration of the procedure, which is typically about 20 minutes.
[25] VisThesia is in the form of a kit or pack assembled by the
petitioners at their factory in Edinburgh. VisThesia is principally made up of two
viscoelastic solutions: first, a solution contained in two ampoules for topical
application to the eye ("VisThesia Topical"); and, second, a solution designed
for intracameral administration ("VisThesia Intracameral"). The pack includes a sterile cannula, or
syringe, to facilitate the injection of VisThesia Intracameral. VisThesia Topical is a sterile clear viscous
solution of 0.3% sodium hyaluronate and 2% lidocaine hydrochloride. The latter ("lidocaine") is a local
anaesthetic. VisThesia Intracameral is a
sterile clear viscoelastic solution which consists of 1.5% sodium
hyaluronate and 1% lidocaine.
[26] The information for use ("IFU") leaflets lodged in court
(No. 6/17 of process, appendix 3), which have been included in packs
of VisThesia, differ in certain respects, as will appear, but they have the
following in common, which may suffice to indicate very broadly how the product
is used. They agree in describing
VisThesia as "Viscoelastic substances to facilitate intraocular surgery". They instruct that the contents of one
ampoule of VisThesia Topical should be applied to the surface of the eye before
surgery. They advise that each ampoule
of VisThesia Topical and each syringe of VisThesia Intracameral includes
lidocaine which is free to diffuse from the viscous solution. They explain that VisThesia Topical hydrates
and lubricates the surface of the eye. VisThesia
Intracameral is infused through the cannula into the anterior chamber during
surgical intervention to remove cataract and implant a prosthetic lens. The intracameral viscoelastic creates and
maintains a deep chamber and the space in which to work inside the eye, thus
minimising the risk of mechanical damage to any of the ocular structures
involved.
The initial dispute
[27] The MHRA in their provisional determination dated 17 May 2004 (No. 6/5 of
process) accepted that the VisThesia Intracameral and the cannula in each pack
were medical devices. They considered,
however, that VisThesia Topical was a medicinal product. Their reasoning may be paraphrased as follows. Lidocaine is a substance which, if used
separately, would be a medicinal product (this is not disputed). In the opinion of the MHRA the lidocaine in
VisThesia Topical is not "liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to"
that of the VisThesia Topical. Because
the definition of "medical device" in regulation 2(1)(a) of the 2002 Regulations includes
a device "which incorporate[s] as an integral part a substance which, if used
separately, would be a medicinal product and which is liable to act upon the
body with action ancillary to that of the device", it does not include a device
incorporating such a substance whose action is more than "ancillary". Accordingly VisThesia Topical is not a
device, but a medicinal product. It is a
substance or combination of substances "which may be administered to human
beings with a view to [. . . ]
modifying physical function" and accordingly satisfies the definition of
"medicinal product" in Article 1 of Directive 2001/83/EC. The MHRA said in their provisional
determination:
"Whilst the
product has two separate functions, lubrication and anaesthesia, these are two
separate and independent actions. As
anaesthesia is essential prior to surgery the Agency does not agree that the
action of the lidocaine is ancillary."
The Review Panel
[28] The petitioners then set in motion the procedure under
regulation 3A of the 1994 Regulations by informing the MHRA that
they wished to make oral representations to a Review Panel and explain why they
considered that the product was not a relevant medicinal product. An oral hearing was arranged for 25 November 2004. The MHRA decided to be represented and to
make oral representations to the Panel. Both
the petitioners and the MHRA submitted to the Panel beforehand a substantial
amount of material including written representations, authorities and other
documents. The written submissions by
the petitioners' solicitors are Nos. 6/16,
6/18 and 6/21 of process, and the skeleton argument of counsel for the
MHRA is No. 6/19 of process.
[29] The petition gives a detailed account of the written
submissions and the arguments advanced at the hearing before the Review Panel. The petitioners submitted that the MHRA had
relied on irrelevant information and that the focus should be on the
manufacturers' current claims as to a product's principal intended purpose [sic].
They said that the principal intended purpose of VisThesia Topical was
hydration, lubrication, protection and keeping the eye clear, and that that was
supported by current scientific data and literature and by the evidence of
skilled witnesses. Both parties made
submissions as to the meaning of "ancillary", the petitioners arguing that it
meant only "subordinate" while the MHRA submitted that it meant either
"insignificant" or "not separate and independent". The petitioners also maintained that there
was an onus on the MHRA to demonstrate that the product was not a medical device. In addition, there was some discussion of a US
patent filed by Dr Julius Nielsen, who gave evidence.
[30] The Review Panel thereafter issued a document (No. 6/4 of
process) which was signed by the chairman and the secretary on 16 and 21 December 2004 respectively. The following are its material terms:
"Hyaltech Ltd.
Visthesia &
Visthesia Light
FINDINGS
The Panel considered the oral and
written representations of the MHRA (Borderline Section) and Hyaltech Ltd. In light of the fact that there was no
dispute in relation to whether Visthesia and Visthesia Light bore any medicinal
claims, the Panel did not consider whether the first limb of the definition of
'medicinal product' ('Any substance or combination of substances presented for
treating or preventing disease in human beings or animals') as per Article 1
of Directive 2001/83/EC was
satisfied. The Panel, therefore, only
had to consider whether the second limb of the definition of 'medicinal
product' ('Any substance or combination of substances which may be administered
to human beings or animals with a view to making a medical diagnosis or to
restoring, correcting or modifying physiological function in human beings or in
animals is likewise considered a medicinal product') was satisfied. The Panel found that Visthesia and Visthesia
Light fell within the second limb of the definition of a medicinal product.
ADVICE
The Panel advised that Visthesia and
Visthesia Light are relevant medicinal products and subject to the provisions
of The Medicines for Human Use (Marketing Authorisations Etc.)
Regulations 1994 (S.I. 1994/3144) as amended by The Medicines for
Human Use (Marketing Authorisations Etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2000
(S.I. 2000/292).
REASONS FOR ADVICE
The products Visthesia and Visthesia
Light are presented as kits comprising an intracameral, a viscoelastic cannula
and two topical ampoules containing sodium hyaluronate (3mg/ml) and
lidocaine hydrochloride (20mg/ml). The
topical ampoules are the components under review.
The definition of medical device in
Regulation 2(1) of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 includes
devices incorporating a medicinal product 'which is liable to act upon the body
with action ancillary to that of the device'.
By definition, therefore, a product cannot be classified as a device if
the medicinal component is more than merely ancillary.
It is well documented that lidocaine
is an established medicinal substance with a local anaesthetic action i.e. its effects will modify physiological
functions in human beings. Anaesthesia
is an essential part of surgery and lidocaine is commonly used by surgeons at
the start of a cataract operation. Lidocaine
has no effect on the action of the hyaluronate, whereas the hyaluronate has a
synergistic effect on the lidocaine.
After having considered all the
information available, including the witness statements and evidence, the
patent, the claims of the manufacturer (both original and current), other
literature and the presentations made by both parties, the Panel held that the
anaesthetic element in the products Visthesia and Visthesia Light is not an
ancillary medicinal product, but has a separate and substantial action of its
own. The lidocaine is not liable to act
on the body with action ancillary to that of the device itself. Accordingly, neither Visthesia nor Visthesia
Light can be considered as a medical device for the purposes of the Medical
Devices Regulations 2002.
The Panel, therefore, considered
that Visthesia and Visthesia Light fall within the second limb of the
definition of a medicinal product as stated in Article 1 of Directive 2001/83/EEC."
First ground for review: the advice of the Review Panel
[31] The petitioners' first plea-in-law is in these terms:
"1. The respondent having made the decision
to make said final determination without having proper advice from the Review
Panel et separatim in an unfair
manner et separatim in a manner which
was contrary to the petitioner's legitimate expectations, decree of declarator
and reduction should be pronounced as craved."
[32] The advice of the Review Panel was of importance because the
MHRA considered it before making their second final determination, as they were
bound to do by regulation 3A(5)(b) of the 1994 Regulations. The petitioners complain that the Review
Panel failed to give proper and adequate reasons for its advice. They aver that the giving of advice by the
Review Panel is critical to the fair achievement of the proper purpose of the
process, which is independent scrutiny of the position provisionally taken by
the MHRA in light of evidence and submissions from the MHRA and from the person
on whom the provisional determination notice has been served. It is, say the petitioners, a necessary
implication from the terms of regulation 3A that the Review Panel's advice
will contain proper and adequate reasons for their recommendation and that they
will consider the issues raised before them in such a manner as to allow such
reasons to be given. They point to the
"Guidance on requesting a review of a Provisional Determination issued by the
Borderline Section of the Medicines Control Agency [the predecessor of the
MHRA]" (No. 6/24 of process) which states at paragraph 6.1, "The
Panel's advice will be put in writing giving full reasons [. .
. ]" The petitioners say that they had a legitimate
expectation that that guidance would be complied with.
[33] The petitioners go on to aver that the advice leaves the
informed reader in real and substantial doubt as to what the reasons for it
were and what were the material considerations taken into account in reaching
it. In particular, the advice does not
explain why the Review Panel rejected the petitioners' arguments as to the
interpretation and application of the Medical Devices Directive, the 2002 Regulations
and MEDDEV. They did not give any
reasons for the definition of "ancillary medical product" which they chose to
adopt. They did not explain why they had
taken into account claims by the manufacturer which had been superseded. They did not deal with the issue of onus, or
indicate what they had taken from the evidence.
They made only two findings on matters of dispute: that anaesthesia is
an essential part of surgery; and that hyaluronate has a synergistic effect on
the lidocaine, a finding which was contrary to the evidence.
[34] In his oral submissions at the first hearing of the petition,
the solicitor advocate for the petitioners took me through many of the
materials that had been before the Review Panel. He pointed out that the respondent had
admitted in answer 20 on page 30 of the record that the Review Panel
must provide the licensing authority with reasons for its advice. He argued that unreasoned advice was not
liable to be of assistance to the licensing authority. The chairman of the Panel had to be legally
qualified (No. 6/24 of process, paragraph 2.2) and it was his duty to
ensure full consideration and a fair hearing, and to have regard to legal
precedent and to the evidence and submissions.
The licensing authority could not satisfy itself that these duties had
been implemented in the absence of a statement of full reasons. When the licensing authority disagreed with
the Review Panel it had a duty to give reasons (regulation 3A(5)), and it
could not do so if the advice itself was not adequately reasoned. The purpose of the requirement for advice was
to affect the decision-making process, and a failure to give adequate advice
invalidated the ultimate decision. Reference
was made to Chief Constable, Lothian and
Borders Police v Lothian and Borders
Police Board [2005] CSOH 32, 2005 SLT 315 and Somerville v Scottish Ministers [2006] CSIH 52, 2007 SLT 96.
[35] The respondent's position on averment was that the advice and
reasons satisfied the requirements of regulation 3A. They were not binding on the licensing
authority. The issue before the Review
Panel had come to be whether the lidocaine was "liable to act upon the body
with action ancillary to that of the device." The Panel had correctly
approached it as a question of fact to be determined on the available evidence. It was not necessary for the Panel to
rehearse the parties' submissions as to construction. The Panel had construed "ancillary" correctly. The manufacturers' intended purpose was not
determinative of the issue. Their
superseded and current claims were both relevant. The question of onus did not arise.
[36] At the first hearing of the petition counsel for the respondent
submitted that in any given case the need to give reasons and the reasons which
would be adequate were determined by the context and circumstances of the case. The reasons must enable a reader informed as
to the issues to understand in broad terms why the matter had been decided as
it had been. Any inadequacy of reasoning
should have led to genuine and material prejudice on the part of the aggrieved
party. Counsel cited J & A Kirkpatrick v Lord Advocate 1967 SC 165
at 174-176; Paterson v Secretary of State for Scotland 1971
SC 1 at 5, 9-10; London &
Clydeside Properties Ltd v Aberdeen
District Council 1983 SC 145 at 151-153; South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33,
[2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraphs 35, 36; and Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Police, supra. Any deficiencies at the Review Panel stage
might be cured by the final decision by the MHRA. The Panel were only required to provide
advice. The question was, What did
fairness require? The petitioners and
the MHRA were a most informed audience. The
decision-maker was not the Panel, but the MHRA.
The petitioners had not been prejudiced by the advice of the Panel. As a result of the successful petition for
judicial review of the first final determination, the MHRA had been required to
reconsider the whole issue and consider all the evidence and submissions before
reaching the second final determination.
In any event the Panel had identified the question at issue, had adopted
a correct construction of "ancillary", had identified the nature and properties
of lidocaine, and had had sufficient evidence before them to entitle them to
make their findings as to the importance of anaesthesia and as to the role of
the lidocaine being more than ancillary.
[37] In my opinion, in order to assess the adequacy of the reasons
provided by the Review Panel for its advice, it is necessary to answer the question
whether their statement of their reasons caused any prejudice to the
petitioners. In order to address that
question it is necessary to appreciate the nature of the function of the Review
Panel. That appears from
regulation 3A of the 1994 Regulations and the practice of the Review
Panel. The duty of the Review Panel is
not to make a decision which has binding force, but to tender advice to the
MHRA after considering written or oral representations made by a person on whom
a provisional determination notice has been served and by the MHRA themselves,
should they wish to make representations.
That advice having been tendered, the MHRA, after further consideration
of the matter, and in particular after having considered the advice of the
Review Panel arising out of those representations and any other evidence
considered by the Review Panel, determine whether or not the product is a
relevant medicinal product (regulation 3A(2), (5)). While there is no statutory requirement that
the Review Panel should give reasons, or that their advice should be copied to
the party aggrieved by the MHRA's provisional determination, in practice
reasons are given, a copy of the advice is sent to the aggrieved party with the
final determination, and both the advice and the final determination are
published.
[38] This is an unusual procedure.
Although the Panel are described as "The Independent Review Panel" in
the Guidance (No. 6/24 of process) and in the document containing their
advice (No. 6/4 of process), the word "Independent" appears to have no
statutory warrant. It is not perhaps a
wholly appropriate description of a panel appointed by the very body whose
representations it may have to weigh against those of a person aggrieved by
that body's decision, and to whom the panel must report with advice as to
whether that body's views are right or wrong.
Counsel were not aware of any similar process elsewhere in the field of
administrative law. The closest analogue
that was suggested is that of a reporter in planning procedure whose report is
not determinative but advisory. The
analogue is only very approximate, because in planning procedure the Minister
to whom the report is addressed is not acquainted with all the details of the
live issues and with the evidence and submissions at the planning inquiry, and
for that reason, among others, it is necessary for the reporter to compile a
report which must contain appropriate findings in fact together with sufficient
material to enable the Minister to reach a fully informed decision. In the procedure under regulation 3A in
the present case, however, the decision-makers, the MHRA, not only had already
investigated the subject and made a provisional determination but also were
already fully informed as to the issues raised, the evidence led and the
submissions made before the Review Panel, because the MHRA themselves had been
in attendance as active, contending parties at the hearing.
[39] In that situation, what did procedural fairness require in the
way of reasons from the Review Panel? It
is not difficult to understand that the petitioners might have been
disappointed by the brevity of the reasons given. Nor is it difficult to imagine that the
petitioners might have appreciated a more elaborate document which included an
acknowledgement of the importance of the case to them and the industriousness
of their legal advisers in their conduct of it.
But these are not the issues. The
question is whether the Review Panel's reasons for their advice were such that
they led to a result which was unfair to the petitioners.
[40] With some hesitation I have reached the view that that cannot
be affirmed. The Review Panel's document
begins by correctly identifying the question they had to consider: whether
VisThesia satisfied the second limb of the earlier definition of "medicinal
product" in Article 1 of Directive 2001/83/EC. They also stated, correctly, that the topical
ampoules were the components under review.
They next turned to the definition of "medical device" in
regulation 2(1) of the 2002 Regulations and accurately directed
themselves that a product could not be classified as a device if the medical
component was more than merely ancillary.
[41] They then had to arrive at a definition of "ancillary", find
the material facts relative to the ampoules under review, and apply the
definition to these facts. They
expressed the view that a medicinal product incorporated in a device was not
ancillary if it had "a separate and
substantial action of its own". They
found in fact that lidocaine was an established medicinal substance with a
local anaesthetic action. Echoing the
definition of "medicinal product", they observed that its effects would modify
physiological functions in human beings.
They also found that anaesthesia was an essential part of surgery and
that lidocaine was commonly used by surgeons at the start of a cataract
operation. They took into account "all
the information available, including the witness statements and evidence, the
patent, the claims of the manufacturer (both original and current), other
literature and the presentations made by both parties." Having done all that, they concluded that the
anaesthetic element in the products was not an ancillary medical product, but
had a separate and substantial action of its own: it was not liable to act on
the body with action ancillary to that of the device itself. Accordingly VisThesia was not a medical
device but fell within the second limb of the definition of a medicinal
product.
[42] In my opinion, although that advice was briefly expressed, it
was all the advice that the MHRA needed.
In addition, the petitioners were able to understand it, albeit they did
not agree with it. Both the MHRA and the
petitioners knew what materials had been before the Panel and what submissions
had been made to them. If I may
anticipate conclusions which I shall express more fully later in this Opinion,
it also appears to me that the advice was advice which the Panel was entitled
to give. As I shall explain later, I
consider that the definition of "ancillary" cannot be faulted. The findings about anaesthesia were supported
by material in the statements of three of the witnesses, Mr Singh, Mr Mackintosh
and Dr Nielsen. In particular, the
finding that anaesthesia is an essential part of cataract surgery cannot be
gainsaid. The finding that lidocaine has
no effect on the action of the action of the hyaluronate was not controversial. The question whether the hyaluronate had a
synergistic effect on the lidocaine was a matter of dispute, but the finding
that it had such an effect was supported by material before the Panel which
they were entitled to accept. Dr Nielsen
said (No. 6/16 of process, appendix, paragraph 22) that the "use of a
viscous meniscus on top of the eye may establish a compartment from where the
anaesthetic is gradually released to where it is needed and as long as it is
needed. This provides for overall less
use of anaesthetic with less anaesthetic side effects put on the cornea." The
Panel were entitled, in my view, to look at the patent and at both the original
and the current claims of the manufacturer.
There was no question of onus of proof.
It must have been clear to the petitioners that the Panel had rejected
their submissions on that matter and on the meaning of "ancillary", as well as
their submissions that the manufacturer's earlier claims and the evidence about
the patent were irrelevant. It was
unnecessary for the Panel to set out their reasons for the rejection of those
submissions because the informed readers of the advice, the petitioners and the
MHRA, had heard the arguments for and against them at the hearing.
[43] While the Review Panel have not set out their advice and the
reasons for it with the degree of elaboration that might be expected of a professional
judge, that is not, in my view, what is required of them. Some indication of what is required may be
gleaned from the speech of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood in South Bucks D C at paragraphs 35
and 36, where his Lordship is attempting "some broad summary of the
authorities governing the proper approach to a reasons challenge in the
planning context." It must be the case
that the standards required of reasons in that context cannot be higher than
those required in the present context. His
Lordship said at paragraph 36:
"36 The
reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why
the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the
'principal important controversial issues', disclosing how any issue of law or
fact was resolved. Reasons can be
briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the
nature of the issues falling for decision.
The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether
the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant
policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational
decision on relevant grounds. But such
adverse inferences will not readily be drawn.
The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to
every material consideration. [. .
. ] Decision letters must be read
in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties
well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the
party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially
prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision."
[44] I shall now assume that, contrary to my opinion, the advice of
the Panel was not adequately reasoned, and I shall consider whether the
petitioners have genuinely been substantially prejudiced thereby. The short answer is that the petitioners do
not make sufficient averments on that matter.
They say, first, that the MHRA should have arranged for the matter to be
reheard by a differently constituted Review Panel, and that in proceeding
without having adequately reasoned advice the MHRA has caused the UK Licensing
Authority to act ultra vires. In any event, by so proceeding, "the MHRA has
caused the process to be conducted in a manner which is unfair to the
petitioner, contrary to its own Guidance and in violation of the petitioner's
legitimate expectation that such Guidance would be complied with. The outcome of the process under
regulation 3A could have been different had the Review Panel considered
the issues and provided advice in an appropriate way." In argument, the
petitioners' solicitor advocate submitted that a failure to give adequate
advice in terms of reasons invalidated
the ultimate decision made, and reference was made to Somerville v Scottish Ministers and to Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Police. In reliance on Lord Reed's dicta at paragraph 64
of his opinion in the latter case relative to a statutory duty to give reasons,
it was argued that this was a situation
in which adequate reasons had to be provided at the required time, and
in which a failure in compliance could not subsequently be "cured"; and that where
the purpose of the duty to give reasons
was to influence the decision-making process, it might be that that duty could
not be fulfilled after a failure in compliance had occurred, since the failure
might so taint the legitimacy of the decision-making process that the decision
should be re-taken.
[45] These averments and submissions appear to assume that the MHRA
reached their second final determination simply by adopting the advice of the
Review Panel, and that they thus neglected the statutory duty imposed upon them
by regulation 3A(5)(b) to undertake further consideration of the matter. The petitioners do not, however, make any
explicit averment to that effect. On the
contrary, it seems clear from the terms of the second final determination that
the MHRA examined the whole matter afresh and reached their determination on
the basis of much more elaborate reasoning than that contained in the Review
Panel's advice. It is not remarkable
that they should have done so, because their first final determination had been
reduced on the ground that it had been "unsupported by proper reasons". In any event the reasons provided in support
of the second final determination, which I shall examine later, are so
comprehensive and articulate that it is not possible to affirm that any assumed
inadequacy in the Review Panel's reasoning tainted the legitimacy of the
decision-making process. It is obvious
that the MHRA were not content merely to rely on the reasons provided by the
Review Panel, but pursued their own reasoning in order to arrive at the second
final determination. As Lord Reed
observes at paragraph 42 of his opinion,
"the
consequences of a failure to comply with a statutory duty to give reasons
depend, like those of other failures to comply with procedural requirements
imposed by statute, upon the terms of the relevant provision and upon the
context."
In the present case it is accepted
that the Review Panel had an obligation, albeit not a statutory duty, to give
reasons. On the assumption that they
failed to do so, the consequences were not, in my view, prejudicial to the
petitioners. The MHRA were fully aware
of the petitioners' evidence and arguments, and took them into account in
reaching their own view as to what their second final determination should be. Viewed in that context, the presumed
inadequacy of the Panel's reasons cannot be said to have vitiated the
determination. To say that the outcome
could have been different if the Panel had acted otherwise must be no more than
speculation.
[46] I do not consider that the concept of legitimate expectation is
of assistance to the petitioners. They
aver that they had a legitimate expectation that the Review Panel would give
"full reasons", as stated in paragraph 6.1 of the Guidance (No. 6/24
of process). What will be sufficient
reasons is, however, a matter of circumstance (Somerville, paragraph 152). Further, the petitioners would have to show
that they had relied on that representation in the Guidance to their detriment
(Shetland Islands Council, Petitioner [2007]
CSOH 05 at paragraphs 156, 157).
I have already expressed the view that the petitioners have failed to
demonstrate any prejudice or detriment by reason of the assumed inadequacy of
the Panel's reasons.
[47] I shall accordingly repel the petitioners' first plea-in-law.
Second ground for review: the second final determination
[48] The petitioners' second plea-in-law states:
"2. The respondent having acted ultra vires in deciding to make said
final determination, decree of declarator and reduction should be pronounced as
craved."
The petitioners, having stated on
averment their criticisms of the reasoning of the Review Panel go on to say,
"Alternatively, in any event," if the second final determination does not fall
to be reduced on that basis, "it should be reduced as it was based upon
material errors of law going to the root of the questions for determination and
is accordingly ultra vires." It is
said, first, that the MHRA made material errors of law. Secondly, they took into account irrelevant
considerations. Thirdly, they failed to
take account of relevant and material
considerations which ought to have been taken into account. I shall consider each of these criticisms in
turn.
The
definition of "medical device"
[49] The first matter on which the petitioners found as a material
error of law on the part of the MHRA is their interpretation of the definition of
"medical device" in the 2002 Regulations.
It will be convenient to repeat the material terms of the definitions of
"medical device" and "intended purpose" in regulation 2(1) of the 2002 Regulations
and to highlight the words and phrases discussed in argument:
"'medical
device' means an [. . . ] article [. .
. ] which -
(a) is intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of -
(i) diagnosis, prevention,
monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease,
(ii) diagnosis, monitoring,
treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or handicap;
(iii) investigation,
replacement or modification of the anatomy or a physiological process, or
(iv) control of conception; and
(b) does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the
human body by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, even if it is
assisted in its function by such means,
and includes
devices intended to administer a medicinal product or which incorporate as an
integral part a substance which, if used separately, would be a medicinal
product and which is liable to act upon
the body with action ancillary to that of the device."
Regulation 2(1) also provides
the following definition of "intended purpose", read short:
"'intended
purpose' means -
[. .
. ]
(b) in relation to any other
medical device [that is, one other than 'an active implantable medical device]
the use to which the device is intended according to the data supplied by the
manufacturer on the labelling, the instructions for use and/or the promotional
materials."
[50] It will also be useful to quote from MEDDEV, the guidance
document produced by the European Commission (No. 6/2 of process) which
has already been mentioned above. In the
discussion of general principles in Section A, the document observes (on
page 2) that as a general rule a relevant product is regulated either by
the Medical Devices Directive ("MDD") or by the Medicinal Products Directive ("MPD"). It then advises (on page 3):
"In order to
decide which regime applies, the following criteria should be examined:
Step 1 The intended
purpose of the product taking into account the way the product is presented
(this is likely to establish if either the MDD or the MPD apply, rather than
distinguish between the two regimes),
Step 2 The method by
which the principal intended action is achieved.
The latter
criterion, based on the 'principal intended action' is crucial in the
definition of a medical device. Typically
the medical device function is fulfilled by physical means (including
mechanical action, physical barrier, replacement of or support to organs or
body functions, . . .). The
action of a medicinal product is generally achieved by pharmacological,
immunological means or by metabolism.
The principal
intended action of a product may be deduced from:
-
the manufacturer's labelling and claims,
-
scientific data regarding mechanism of action.
Although the manufacturer's
claims are important, it is not possible to place the product in one or other
category in contradiction with current scientific data. Manufactures may be required to justify
scientifically their rationale for classification of borderline products."
[51] Section A.5 deals with "Medical devices incorporating a
medicinal substance with ancillary action", and states:
"It follows from
the definition of a medical device that devices may incorporate substances as
an integral part which, if used separately, may be considered to be a medicinal
product. This is specifically addressed
in article 1(4) MDD which makes it clear that such products are devices, provided
that the action of the medicinal substance is ancillary to that of the device,
as reflected in the product claim and as supported by the scientific data
provided by the manufacturer of the devices."
The underlining is in the original.
[52] In the second final determination the MHRA interpreted
regulation 2(1) in this way:
"In making this
determination it is necessary to consider the meaning of 'intended purpose',
'principal intended action' and 'ancillary'.
The definition in Directive 93/42/EC ('the Directive') and the
Medical Devices Regulations [the 2002 Regulations] is supplemented by
Guidance issued by the European Commission: the Medical Devices Guidance
Document, or MEDDEV. The Guidance is
authoritative but not legally binding. The
MHRA accepts the relevance of these matters, although it notes that they are
not exhaustive of the material which may be considered; nor are they set out in
either the Directive or the Medical Devices Regulations.
Under the
Directive:
Intended
purpose relates to the question of whether the product has, overall one of
the four purposes set out in categories I to IV [(i) to (iv)]
above. This is determined by having
regard to the data supplied by the manufacturer in the labelling, instructions
for use and promotional materials. Insofar
as the Guidance makes reference to manufacturers' claims, where the product remains
unchanged, this is not limited to current
claims. The issue of manufacturer's
intent is determinative only at the
initial stage of deciding whether a product has, overall, one of the four
purposes which would suffice to make it a device (e.g. the purpose of
investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological
process).
The principal
intended action of the product is to be determined objectively. Although the Guidance (p3) states that
the principal intended action may be deduced from manufacturer's claims and
scientific data, it notes that it is not possible to categorise a produce in
contradiction with current scientific data and that manufacturers may be required to justify
scientifically their classification rationale.
The question of whether or not such action is achieved by
pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means can only be addressed by
scientific evidence.
Taking into account the examples
given in the Guidance, MHRA is of the view that:
Ancillary
action, in relation to the principal intended action, is an action which is
insignificant or of little importance; or an action which is subsidiary or
auxiliary, or which supplements or provides support, to the principal intended
action.
Because the definition of medical
device includes devices incorporating a medicinal product 'which is liable to
act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device' it does not
include devices incorporating medicinal products whose action is more than
'ancillary'. Such devices do not come
within the scope of the Medical Devices Regulations and are to be
regulated as medicines. The question of
whether a medicinal component of a device has an ancillary action is to be
determined according to whether it is 'liable' to have ancillary action, not
whether it is intended by the manufacturer to have an ancillary action. If an action is more than ancillary, this
does not necessarily mean that it must be a principal intended action.
The Guidance states that the issue
of whether the action of a medicinal component is ancillary is to be decided in
the light of 'the product claim' and 'the scientific data provided by the
manufacturer of the devices' (para A.5).
It is important to note that manufacturers' claims cannot prevail over
scientific data (para A.2)."
[53] On averment the petitioners claim that the MHRA erred in taking
the view that the question whether a medicinal component of a device has an
ancillary action was to be determined according to whether it was liable to
have an ancillary action, not according
to whether it was intended by the manufacturer to have an ancillary action. That question, say the petitioners, should be
determined by the manufacturer's principal intended purpose [sic], viewed objectively from the product
claims of the manufacturer, provided that that is not inconsistent with the
scientific data. The MHRA had failed to
ask themselves the right question, which was whether VisThesia Topical achieved
its principal intended purpose by the action of the device or by the action of
the medicinal substance. Further, the
correct meaning of "ancillary" in this context was "subordinate". The MHRA's interpretation was not consistent
with the Guidance provided by MEDDEV.
[54] In argument the petitioners' solicitor advocate noted that it
was agreed that the intended purpose of VisThesia Topical fell within the terms
of regulation 2(1)(a)(iii), "investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or
a physiological process". The reference
to "principal intended action" in regulation 2(1)(b) indicated that a
product classed as a device could have more than one intended action. The words from "and includes" to the end were
there for the avoidance of doubt, to make it clear that a device which
incorporated an integral medicinal substance fell within the definition of
"medical device" provided it met the test of "principal intended action", and
these words should not have to meet a more stringent test than the preceding
general words. "Ancillary" should be
interpreted as meaning "subordinate", which was one of the primary meanings
assigned to it by The Oxford English
Dictionary. The equivalent word in
the French text of the Directive was "accessoire". The MHRA had erred by leaving the intention
of the manufacturer out of account. That
was inconsistent with the MEDDEV Guidance.
A medical device might not achieve its principal intended action by
pharmacological means or one of the other means excluded by regulation 2(1)(b),
but it might be assisted in its function by such means. The test was whether the principal intended
action was achieved by the device means or the pharmacological means; and that
test was to be applied with reference to the manufacturer's labelling and
claims and the scientific data regarding mechanism of action, in accordance
with the MEDDEV Guidance. It was
necessary to undertake a comparative analysis between two different actions in
the context of the overall intended purpose of the product. An outcome might be that the two actions were
of equal significance, but the assessment was still one of relative
significance. The MEDDEV Guidance should
be consistently applied, in conformity with the fundamental principle of
consistency in administrative decision-making: R v Secretary of State for the
Home Department, ex p Urmaz [1996] COD 479. The MHRA's errors in interpretation had led
them not to address the matter in the proper way by ascertaining the principal
intended action having regard to the product claims and the scientific data.
[55] The respondent's approach to the issue of construction in her
pleadings was as follows. In determining
whether a product was a "medical device" it was necessary to consider, first,
its "intended purpose" and whether it was for any of the purposes in regulation 2(1)(a). Its intended purpose was to be determined, as
required by regulation 2(1)(a), by reference to "the data supplied by the
manufacturer on the labelling, the instructions for use and/or the promotional
materials." The intended purpose was to be identified subjectively, by
reference to the manufacturer's intentions as to purpose. Secondly, it was necessary to consider
regulation 2(1)(b) and determine the "principal intended action" of the
product in or on the human body and whether that was achieved by
pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means. That was to be assessed objectively, having
regard to the manufacturer's representations and to scientific data as to how
the device did in fact act on the human body.
The manufacturer's claims could not prevail over the scientific evidence. The question whether a substance was "liable
to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device" necessitated
a determination of what the action of the device was and how the substance was
liable to act upon the body. No
provision was made here for the intention of the manufacturer: the latter was a
question of fact to be determined by scientific evidence, and the
manufacturer's intention could have no relevance. "Ancillary" in this context meant
"insignificant" or "of little importance" or an action which was "subsidiary"
or "auxiliary" to the principal intended
action. That approach conformed with
MEDDEV.
[56] The submissions of the respondent's counsel elaborated on these
averments. It was necessary, first, to
consider what was the intended purpose of the product, on the basis of the
manufacturer's materials, in order to see whether it was one of the four
purposes listed in regulation 2(1)(a).
It was then necessary to identify the principal intended action of the
product by considering the scientific question, capable of objective
determination, of how it acted in or on the human body, and also what the
manufacturer intended its principal action to be. If the product achieved its principal
intended action by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, it would
not be a medical device; but if its principal intended action was assisted by
such means, it might still qualify as a medical device. If it was intended to administer a medicinal
product or if it incorporated as an integral part a substance which, if used
separately, would be a medicinal product, it was necessary to consider whether
that product or substance "was liable to act upon the body with action
ancillary to that of the device." Here, there was no role for the intention of
the manufacturer: one was looking simply at how the product or substance was
liable, that is, apt, to act on the human body.
[57] Counsel referred to various dictionary and judicial definitions
of "ancillary" and "accessoire" including those in The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Sarsfield v Dixons Group plc [1998]
STC 938 at paragraph 16, Collins
v Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions European Court of Justice, 23 March 2004, at paragraph 26,
and Skalka v Sozialversicherunganstalt der gewerblichen Wirtschaft European
Court of Justice, 29 April 2004, at paragraph 10. These definitions pointed to a spectrum of
meanings. An ancillary effect could be
one which was insignificant or of little importance, or materially inferior in
importance, in particular as compared to other components of the product. Or it could be one which was not separate and
independent but which had a causal link to another more important effect,
serving as a means to an end. Or
"ancillary" could mean "lesser". In the
context of the Directive and the Guidance, it connoted "being of relatively
less importance". What was ancillary
then came to be a matter of judgment. Reference
was made to R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p
South Yorkshire Transport Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 23 at 29A-E.
[58] Thus, said counsel, where the action of the medicinal product
was more than of relatively little importance, or more than insignificant or
minor, with or without a causal connection, as compared to the physical or
mechanical action, in the context of the overall function of the article in
relation to the purpose in regulation 2(1)(a), the article would not be a
medical device. Determining whether the
medicinal product was ancillary in that sense was a matter of fact, involving a
judgment properly exercised on consideration of the relevant evidence. That had consequences for any challenge made
to a finding as to what was "ancillary": Edwards
v Bairstow [1956] AC 14; R v Monopolies
and Mergers Commission, ex p South Yorkshire Transport Ltd, supra, at 32F-33A.
[59] In my opinion it is clear that in order to make their
determination it was necessary for the MHRA to interpret the definition of
"medical device" in regulation 2(1) of the 2002 Regulations and, in
particular, to reach a view as to the meanings of the expressions "intended
purpose", "principal intended action" and "ancillary".
[60] As to "intended purpose", the intended purpose of the product
under consideration is defined by regulation 2(1) as "the use to which the
device is intended according to the data supplied by the manufacturer on the
labelling, the instructions for use and/or the promotional materials." The
question here, accordingly, is whether those data indicate that the product is
to be used for one of the four purposes listed from (i) to (iv) in
part (a) of the definition of "medical device". It is common ground that VisThesia Topical is
intended to be used for a purpose falling within (iii): "investigation, replacement or modification of
the anatomy or a physiological process".
This means of arriving at the intended purpose of the product is
consistent with the MEDDEV Guidelines in section A.2, already quoted, which
advises that in order to decide whether the MDD or the MPD regime applies, two
criteria should be examined, the first of which is "The intended purpose of the
product taking into account the way the product is presented." At this stage, accordingly, a subjective test
is to be applied: the product's "intended purpose" is to be identified only by
reference to the manufacturer's intentions as these may be discerned from the
way he presents it and the data he supplies.
Here, therefore, the manufacturer's intentions are conclusive of the
issue of what is the intended purpose of the product. As will shortly appear, I am of opinion that
it is only at this stage of the construction of the definition of "medical
device" that the manufacturer's intentions are conclusive. I therefore consider that the MHRA's interpretation
of "intended purpose" was correct: they said,
"The issue of
manufacturer's intent is determinative only at the initial stage of deciding
whether a product has, overall, one of the four purposes which would suffice to
make it a device."
I shall deal later with their
observation that in so far as the Guidance makes reference to manufacturers'
claims, "where the product remains unchanged, this is not limited to current claims."
[61] The MHRA next had to consider what is meant by the "principal
intended action" of the product in or on the human body. The second criterion provided by the MEDDEV Guidance is "the method by which the
principal intended action is achieved." It may be convenient to repeat what the
Guidance then goes on to say:
"The latter
criterion, based on the 'principal intended action' is crucial in the
definition of a medical device. Typically
the medical device function is fulfilled by physical means (including
mechanical action, physical barrier, replacement of or support to organs or
body functions, . . .). The
action of a medicinal product is generally achieved by pharmacological,
immunological means or by metabolism.
The principal
intended action of a product may be deduced from:
-
the manufacturer's labelling and claims,
-
scientific data regarding mechanism of action.
Although the
manufacturer's claims are important, it is not possible to place the product in
one or other category in contradiction with current scientific data. Manufactures may be required to justify
scientifically their rationale for classification of borderline products."
[62] In my opinion that passage from the Guidance makes it very
clear that the manufacturer's claims are not determinative of the
identification of the principal intended action of the product. It is obvious that his labelling and claims
must be considered and must be regarded as important. But if they contradict current scientific
data, it is the data which determine the issue.
That must be so, because otherwise the manufacturer would be the arbiter
of the category into which his product was to be placed, even if his
categorisation flew in the face of the scientific data. The scientific data must be conclusive,
because one of the objectives of the regime provided by the Directives is the
protection of public health. The Medical
Devices Directive states, among other things:
"Whereas medical
devices should provide patients, users and third parties with a high level of protection and attain the
performance levels attributed to them by the manufacturer; whereas, therefore,
the maintenance or improvement of the level of protection attained in the
Member States is one of the essential objectives of this Directive; [. .
. ]"
Similarly, Recital 2 to the
Medicinal Products Directive states:
"The essential
aim of any rules governing the production, distribution and use of medicinal
products must be to safeguard public health."
Accordingly the manufacturer's
claims are not simply to be accepted, but are to be tested, and cannot prevail
against scientific data. I am therefore
of opinion that the MHRA's understanding of the expression "principal intended
action" in the paragraph of the determination beginning "The principal
intended action" is entirely correct.
[63] Next, the MHRA had to consider the words "which is liable to
act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device." The MEDDEV Guidance in section A.5,
already quoted, refers to article 1.4 of the Medical Devices Directive which,
according to the Guidance, "makes it clear" that articles which incorporate as
an integral part substances which, if used separately, may be considered to be
a medicinal product "are devices, provided that the action of the medicinal
substance is ancillary to that of the device, as reflected in the product
claim and as supported by the scientific data provided by the manufacturer of
the devices." With all respect to the authors of the Guidance, I must observe
that I find that a rather curious statement.
The words "as reflected in the product claim and as supported by the
scientific data provided by the manufacturer of the devices" do not appear, and
are nowhere implied, in article 1.4.
Nor can any similar words be said to appear or to be implied in the
2002 Regulations. Further, they
seem to mean that the question whether the action of the medicinal substance is
ancillary to that of the device is to be determined only by reference to the
claims made and the scientific data provided by the manufacturer. That, however, would be inconsistent with the
stance of the Guidance in relation to the determination of the principal
intended action of the product under consideration, where it is made clear that
the manufacturer's claims cannot determine into which category the product is
to be placed. It does not seem possible
to accept that at the stage of deciding whether a substance is liable to act
upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device the MHRA should be
obliged to defer to the manufacturer's claims and to scientific data selected
and presented by him. That would be an
irrational way of arriving at a conclusion on the matter. How a substance is liable to act upon the
body must be a question of fact, to be determined by such scientific evidence
as the MHRA may reasonably decide to accept after appropriate critical scrutiny. It is important to notice that the MEDDEV
document describes itself, correctly, as "legally not binding" and having "no
legal force". The MHRA at page 2 of
their determination describe it as "authoritative but not legally binding",
which to a lawyer may appear to be an oxymoron.
The true position may be that the Guidance carries weight in so far as
it deals with matters within the expertise of its authors, but nothing in its
contents is binding on a tribunal or a court of law. However valuable and persuasive it may be in
relation to medical matters, it would surely be incorrect for a court or
tribunal to follow the Guidance where it bore to supplement the terms of a Directive
by adding words which did not there appear and could not be implied, especially
where it thereby seemed to recommend an irrational means of deciding an issue
of importance.
[64] It follows that in my opinion the MHRA were correct in saying
in their determination that the question whether a medicinal component of a
device has an ancillary action "is to be determined according to whether it is
'liable' to have an ancillary action, not whether it is intended by the
manufacturer to have an ancillary action."
Their approach to the MEDDEV Guidelines was, in my opinion, sound: they
noted what was said in paragraph A.5, but added, correctly, "It is
important to note that manufacturers' claims cannot prevail over scientific
data (para A.2)."
[65] The next issue is the MHRA's interpretation of the word
"ancillary" in its context in regulation 2(1). The MHRA said in their determination:
"Taking into
account the examples given in the Guidance, MHRA is of the view that:
Ancillary
action, in relation to the principal intended action, is an action which is
insignificant or of little importance; or an action which is subsidiary or
auxiliary, or which supplements or provides support, to the principal intended
action."
The petitioners argued that
ancillary meant "subordinate", while the respondent argued that it meant "insignificant"
or "of little importance", or an action which was "subsidiary" or "auxiliary"
to the principal intended action.
[66] The word "ancillary" is not defined in the Directive or in
the Regulations. It is clear from the
definitions cited in argument that it encompasses a range of meanings. It may suffice to refer to The Oxford English Dictionary. It provides three meanings of the adjective
"ancillary". Ignoring the "rare and
affected" second meaning, these are: "1. Subservient, subordinate,
ministering (to). 3. Designating activities and
services that provide essential support to the functioning of a central service
or industry; also, of staff employed in these supporting roles. Now used esp.
of non-medical staff and services in hospitals." Those meanings appear to fall into two groups. In the first, "ancillary" means subordinate,
or of inferior importance. Thus in Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions European Court of Justice,
23 March 2004, at paragraph 26, the Court referred to "activities on
such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary." Here, all that is meant by "ancillary" is that
that which is ancillary is of lesser importance than the object with which it
is said to be related. In the second group,
"ancillary" means that that which is ancillary is linked to the other object
because it is of use to it (or is subservient to it) or provides it with
something (or ministers to it) or furthers its purposes by providing it with
essential support. Here, the ancillary
matter is auxiliary to the other object: there is a causal link between the
existence of the ancillary matter and the purpose of, or the effect produced
by, the other object. Thus, in Sarsfield v Dixons Group plc [1998] STC 938 at paragraph 18 a warehouse was said to be used for a
purpose ancillary to the purposes of retail shops because its use served no
other purpose than furthering the purposes of those retail shops. And in Skalka
v Sozialversicherunganstalt der
gewerblichen Wirtschaft European Court of Justice, 29 April 2004, at paragraph 10,
a compensatory supplement to a retirement pension which could only be paid to a
person receiving a pension under the statutory pension insurance scheme was "a
benefit ancillary to that pension": it
furthered the beneficial purpose of the latter pension.
[67] In R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p
South Yorkshire Transport Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 23 at 29C-D
Lord Mustill said:
"The courts have
repeatedly warned against the dangers of taking an inherently imprecise word,
and by redefining it thrusting on it a spurious degree of precision."
In the present case, suffice it to
say that in my opinion the MHRA directed themselves correctly as to the
meanings of "ancillary". They took
account of both groups of meanings when they said that "ancillary" action, in
relation to the principal intended action, "is an action which is insignificant
or of little importance [the first group]; or an action which is subsidiary or
auxiliary, or which supplements or provides support, to the principal intended
action [the second group]." If the analysis of the meanings of "ancillary"
which has been attempted above is correct, the MHRA's interpretation of it
cannot be held to be an error in law.
[68] The MHRA went on to apply these meanings of "ancillary" to the
facts before them. They noted,
correctly, that the product would fall outside the definition of "medical
device" if the action of the anaesthetic component was more than ancillary. They continued:
"It is therefore
for the Agency to determine whether the action of the lidocaine in the topical
component is ancillary to the purpose of the topical component as a whole. Whether or not such action is ancillary is a
question of fact."
That appears to me to be
unassailable. They went on to express
the following view:
"In the present
case, MHRA is of the view that the lidocaine component is liable to have an
effect on the body which is more than ancillary because:
1) The evidence suggests that the
anaesthetic function of VisThesia Topical is of greater, or at least equal,
importance relative to the wetting function served by the sodium hyaluronate.
2) Even if that is not the case, it is the
Agency's view that the anaesthetic function of VisThesia Topical is at least a
significant, independent function of the product and cannot properly be
regarded as ancillary."
Accordingly, the product did not
satisfy either group of definitions of "ancillary". First, its anaesthetic action was not
insignificant or of little importance: thus, it did not satisfy the first group. Secondly, it was not auxiliary to the wetting
function of the solution because the anaesthetic function was independent of
the wetting function and did not serve to make the wetting function more
effective: thus, it did not satisfy the second group.
[69] Whether in reaching these conclusions the MHRA took into
account irrelevant considerations or left out of account relevant
considerations are separate issues for consideration later. Here, I find that they did not misdirect
themselves in law in their interpretation of the definition of "medical device"
in the 2002 Regulations.
Relevant
material
[70] The petitioners' next point under the heading of "material
errors of law" is that the MHRA did not accept their submissions with regard to
the material which was relevant. The
petitioners had submitted that on a proper construction of the legislation and
the Guidance it was only the current claims of the manufacturer which were
relevant, as a matter of law, to "the ascertainment of principal intended
purpose [sic]". The petitioners aver that, contrary to that
submission, the MHRA had regard to and founded upon a US
patent, the petitioners' Information for Use (IFU) leaflet dated April 2002, a
document referred to as "the CIBA Vision press release" and the changes to the
IFU leaflet.
[71] I note that the petitioners in their pleadings (in
statement 23(a) at the top of page 35 of the record) and in their
submissions used the expression "principal intended purpose" to which I have
drawn attention above. That expression
appears in the MEDDEV Guidance, paragraph A.2, together with the
expressions "principal purpose" (paragraph A.2) and "primary intended
purpose" (paragraph A.4). None of
those expressions, however, is employed in the Directive or in the
Regulations, and I regret that I have found them confusing and unhelpful. Accordingly I entertain a doubt as to whether
the petitioners' submissions relative to "principal intended purpose" are
soundly focused. I shall, however,
examine their proposition on the assumption that they contend that only the
manufacturer's current claims are relevant, as a matter of law, to the
ascertainment of the "intended purpose" and the "principal intended action" of
the product under consideration. I have
already expressed the view that it is only at the stage of the ascertainment of
its "intended purpose" that the manufacturer's intentions are conclusive; and
that in the ascertainment of its "principal intended action" the manufacturer's
claims are to be considered but cannot prevail over the scientific data. I would add that the manufacturer's claims
and the scientific data cannot be, in my view, the only materials the licensing
authority is entitled to consider. The
MEDDEV Guidance cannot reasonably be interpreted as exhaustive and as fettering
the discretion of the licensing authority to examine any material which may be
relevant to their determination of a matter concerning the vitally important
object of the protection of public
health.
[72] I now consider each of the matters referred to by the
petitioners.
[73] United States
Patent No. US
6,627,620 B1 ("the US
patent", No. 6/17 of process, appendix 8), dated 30 September 2003, relates to a "composition
set and kit for use in intraocular surgery".
The inventor is Dr Per Julius Neilsen. The abstract is in these terms:
"A new
composition set and a kit for use by intraocular operations, preferably
cataract operations. The composition set
comprises a first and a second viscoelastic agent, e.g. [read 'i.e.'] sodium
hyaluronate, containing an anaesthetic, e.g. [read 'i.e.'] lidocaine
hydrochloride. Hereby a simplified
operation and anaesthesia is achieved while at the same time the risk of
complications and discomfort on the patient are reduced."
The petitioners aver that they
"materially developed" VisThesia "specifically as a device from an original
concept of Dr Per Julius Nielsen" (statement 7). In a statement provided to the Review Panel (No. 6/16
of process) Dr Nielsen said, "VisThesia is effectively my invention."
There is no indication that there has been any material change to the product
since the publication of the US
patent.
[74] In their final determination the MHRA noted, correctly, that
the US patent
was "focused mainly on claims for its anaesthetic properties." They quoted various passages from the patent
and concluded, "This indicates that anaesthesia is either the principal
intended action or one of two principal intended actions."
[75] The petitioners submitted that the patent was irrelevant
because it was neither evidence of the claims of the manufacturer nor
scientific data. I have already
considered and rejected that submission.
While the MEDDEV Guidance refers to the manufacturer's claims and to
scientific data, the Guidance cannot properly be invoked to prevent a licensing
authority from considering any other evidence which is likely to be of
assistance. It seems clear that the
licensing authority are entitled to consider that the contents of the patent of
the product under consideration are likely to be of significance: they can
scarcely be ignored on the ground that they are irrelevant. The fact that the inventor was not the agent
of the petitioners is immaterial.
[76] The petitioners further submitted that in any event the MHRA
had unreasonably misconstrued the patent.
The passages quoted in their determination referred not to VisThesia
Topical but to VisThesia Intracameral. This criticism appears to be sound. The passage in the determination which deals
with the US
patent must accordingly be left out of account.
[77] The next matter which the petitioners say the MHRA should not
have considered is the Information for Use (IFU) leaflet dated April 2002
(No.6/17 of process, appendix 3). The
petitioners contend that it was only their current claims for the product which
were relevant, as a matter of law, to the ascertainment of "principal intended
purpose". I shall again assume that what
is meant is "principal intended action".
I have already indicated my view that the MHRA were entitled to consider
materials other than the manufacturer's claims and scientific data.
[78] The IFU leaflet dated April 2002 may fairly be said to
give as much prominence to the anaesthetic function of VisThesia Topical as it
does to its hydrating and lubricating function.
Later, however, the leaflet was significantly amended, although the
product remained the same. The
April 2002 leaflet contained the following words, which did not appear in
a later leaflet dated July 2003:
"The anaesthetic
ingredient of both VisThesia topical and VisThesia intracameral is lidocaine
which stabilises the neuronal membrane and prevents the initiation and
conduction of nerve impulses thereby effecting local anaesthetic action."
The April 2002 IFU leaflet also
contained the following passage. The
words omitted from the July 2003 leaflet are printed in italics:
"VisThesia
topical hydrates and lubricates the surface of the eye in preparation for
intraocular surgery, with analgesia.
Application 5 minutes before intraocular surgery enables hydration of the
surface tissue and diffusion of the
analgesic through the viscous solution to be absorbed directly into the cornea.
A
second application immediately before surgery supplements the initial
application to provide hydration, lubrication and analgesia of the cornea for
the early stages of the surgical procedure.
The
viscous solution brings the anaesthetic into intimate contact with the corneal
epithelium through which it is absorbed. Anaesthesia occurs rapidly usually
within 5 minutes. The duration of effect is normally 20 to 30 minutes."
The July 2003 leaflet contains
the following words, which do not appear in the April 2002 leaflet:
"[Application
before intraocular surgery] ensures that the cornea stays clear and hydrated
throughout the surgery and is not compromised.
The lubricating properties ensure that a clean small incision can be
made with minimal damage.
A second, supplementary, application
is used only if needed.
Lidocaine is incorporated in the
topical viscoelastic as an ancillary anaesthetic agent. It should be included in the ophthalmic
surgeon's routine anaesthetic regimen."
[79] The deletion of the references to analgesia and anaesthesia,
and the assertion that the lidocaine was only an ancillary anaesthetic agent
are, prima facie at least, rather strange, because the product had not been
altered in any respect. The MHRA
commented in their determination, under the heading "Manufacturer's
information":
"There was [in
the April 2002 leaflet] no suggestion in the dosage regime that additional
anaesthesia from another product would be needed during the procedure, implying
that the manufacturer's intention was that the product provided all of the
anaesthesia necessary during surgery."
Under the heading "Changes to the
Information for Use leaflet" they said:
"During our
investigation, the Information for Use leaflet was significantly amended in 07/2003
in order to place less emphasis on the role of the anaesthetic claims relating
to lidocaine. However, the product
formulation has not altered in any way and the action of the lidocaine in the
topical ampoules remains to provide anaesthesia for cataract surgery. The change in the manufacturer's claim does
not reflect any change in the scientific evidence of the anaesthetic effect of
lidocaine at the concentration contained in the product or as to how the
product is used."
[80] The petitioners submitted that the original IFU was ambiguous,
but it did not indicate that the later IFU was false. The original IFU did not clearly assert that
the product provided all of the anaesthesia necessary during surgery, and in
particular it did not assert that it supplied all the topical anaesthesia which
might be regarded as necessary. To claim
otherwise had no evidential basis and in any event was unreasonable. The respondent, on the other hand, submitted
that the contents of the earlier leaflet and the changes made were relevant to
both "intended purpose" and "principal intended action". I agree with the submission for the
respondent. Since the emphasis on the
product's anaesthetic function in the IFU had changed but the product itself
had not changed, the MHRA were entitled to consider the statements in the
original IFU. It appears to me that the
MHRA were entitled to read the original IFU as they did, to make the comments
they did, and to take these comments into account when reaching their
determination.
[81] As to the fact that changes were made to the IFU leaflet, the
petitioners said that the MHRA had failed to address the critical question
whether the later IFU was inconsistent with the actual mode of action as
demonstrated by the scientific data. The
petitioners argued that at best for the MHRA, the changes in the IFU simply
raised a question about the current claims, but the MHRA had failed to go on to
deal with that matter. I do not consider
that that is a fair reading of the MHRA's comments. It seems to me to be obvious that the MHRA
called in question the accuracy of the later version of the leaflet and took
the view that the leaflet had been altered to play down the role of the
lidocaine. They expressly stated that
the amendment had been made in order to place less emphasis on the role of the
anaesthetic claims relating to lidocaine, and that the change in the claim did
not reflect any change in the scientific evidence about the lidocaine. In my opinion they were well entitled to
express those views.
[82] The petitioners similarly argued that the MHRA had not been
entitled to have regard to and found upon a press release which was referred to
as "the CIBA Vision press release". This
document is dated 9 May 2002
and is within No. 6/17 of process. Like
the original IFU leaflet, it emphasises both the anaesthetic function and the
wetting function of the product, and does not suggest that the former is
ancillary to the latter. It includes the
following statements:
"CIBA Vision
will begin offering an entirely new produce for cataract surgery called
VisThesia - a combination [of] viscoelastic and aesthetic to be used for
the new procedure of 'viscoanesthesia'. By
combining viscoelastic and anaesthesia, VisThesia may help surgeons shorten the
time needed for cataract surgery and help increase patient comfort.
VisThesia is packaged with both
topical and intracameral components with separate percentages of sodium
hyaluronate and lidocaine hydrochloride.
Surgeons have the advantage of no longer needing to choose between a
topical or an intracameral anaesthetic. In
addition, they can save time by eliminating separate injections of viscoelastic
and anaesthetic. Procedures previously
requiring two injections now require only one.
Patients also benefit from these
same advantages. VisThesia is designed
to help patients by reducing time in surgery and by avoiding separate
injections of anaesthetic and viscoelastic."
[83] In their determination the MHRA quoted from the first paragraph. The petitioners said that what was stated in
the press release applied both to VisThesia Intracameral and to VisThesia
Topical. The material point, however, is
that the press release refers to both components, states that each contains
lidocaine, and lays stress on the claim that the product is a combination of
viscoelastic and anaesthetic: there is no indication that the anaesthetic plays
an ancillary role in either component. Those
representations, like those in the original IFU leaflet, were matters which in
my view the MHRA were entitled to take into account when determining the
"intended purpose" and "principal intended action" of the product.
Onus
[84] The final matter raised by the petitioners under the heading of
"material errors of law" is that there was an onus on the MHRA "to demonstrate
that a CE marked product like VisThesia assessed under the Medical Devices Directive is
not a medical device and that doubt, if any, should be resolved in favour of
the petitioner[s]." The petitioners
complain that in their determination the MHRA apparently did not accept their
submissions with regard to onus. No
authority was cited in support of these submissions, and I am unable to see how
any question of onus could have arisen. Reference
was made at the first hearing to the views of the French, German and Dutch
licensing authorities on the categorisation of VisThesia. The MHRA say in their pleadings that these
views were a relevant consideration for them in arriving at a final
determination, but they were not binding upon the MHRA as the competent
authority within the United Kingdom.
[85] I have already noted above that Optident Ltd v Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry [2001] UKHL 32, [2001] 3 CMLR 1, makes it
clear that it is not the law that if a CE mark is obtained in one Member State
it must be respected in another Member State unless it can be set aside. It was said in argument that the MHRA had not
referred in its determination to the views of these other authorities. There was no exploration before me, however,
of the materials these authorities had considered, or of the reasoning which
led them to their various views, in order to demonstrate the extent to which
their views might have carried weight. Accordingly
I do not consider further the alleged lack of consideration of the views of the
other authorities.
Irrelevant
considerations
[86] The petitioners aver in statement 24 of the petition that in
any event the decision of the MHRA is ultra
vires because the MHRA have taken into account irrelevant considerations. I have already dealt above with the matters
raised in statement 24: the first IFU leaflet and the changes to it, the CIBA
Vision press release and the US
patent.
Relevant
considerations
[87] The petitioners go on to aver in statement 25 that in any
event the decision of the MHRA is ultra
vires because the MHRA failed to take account of relevant and material considerations which they ought to have taken
into account. First, it is said that the
MHRA apparently failed to take into account the MEDDEV Guidance and "the
unchallenged position of the petitioner[s] that the current information for use
leaflet and the marketing material is consistent with classification as a
device." I have already stated my views
on the Guidance and on the extent to which the manufacturer's claims are
determinative.
[88] It is said, next, that the MHRA excluded relevant material from
consideration by deciding that other publications submitted by the petitioners
on the role of hyaluronate related to dry eye syndrome, not cataract surgery,
and were not relevant. There is a
sentence to that effect at the foot of page 4 of the determination. It is possible that the MHRA took too strict
a view in so far as the publications were intended to demonstrate the value of
sodium hyaluronate, but that is immaterial as the MHRA accepted that sodium
hyaluronate had the properties claimed for it (No. 6/17 of process,
appendix D, page 22). Counsel
for the respondent confirmed at the first hearing that the importance of the
hydrating and lubricating action of sodium hyaluronate was not in dispute.
[89] The petitioners also say that the MHRA did not deal correctly
with expert evidence on the subject of the precise function of the topical
sodium hyaluronate. That, say the
petitioners, was a topic on which the expert witnesses disagreed, and the
determination "without explanation" preferred the evidence of Dr Singh and
left out of account the evidence of Dr Nielsen. In the determination the matter is dealt with
in this way:
"The experts
disagreed over the function of the topical sodium hyaluronate. Mr Singh noted that it had an important
role as a wetting agent, but was not needed for lubrication because the eye
does not blink during surgery. Mr Mackintosh
described its function both in terms of wetting and lubrication. Whether or not sodium hyaluronate is a more
novel or interesting compound than lidocaine, as suggested by Mr Mackintosh,
is not relevant to this determination. The
legal test is whether the action is ancillary.
Mr Mackintosh does not suggest that the topical anaesthetic in
VisThesia is unimportant.
Expert evidence shows that the
product is intended to facilitate surgery in two ways, by providing anaesthesia
and acting as a wetting agent. Both
experts agree that wetting and anaesthesia are essential for surgery. The fact that two substances with two
different objectives are used in combination does not, of itself, reduce either
objective to an ancillary role."
[90] I am unable to see that any dispute between experts as to the
precise function of the topical sodium hyaluronate is of material importance. As I have indicated above, the MHRA accepted
that sodium hyaluronate had the properties claimed for it. The two experts were agreed that it was a
wetting agent. The issue was, not the
nature of its precise function, but whether the action of the lidocaine was
ancillary to it.
[91] The petitioners' next complaint is that in their determination
the MHRA failed to take into account the evidence of Dr Nielsen and Mr Mackintosh
with regard to the limited role of the topical anaesthetic. The petitioners' averments relative to these
witnesses in statement 19(d) run as follows. Dr Nielsen explained to the Review Panel
that in his view the role of topical anaesthesia at the beginning of surgery
was limited to dealing with a minor chance of pain on the surgical incision
being made. Mr Mackintosh said that
the main role of the lidocaine in the VisThesia Topical was to make the
injection of the VisThesia Intracameral into the eye more comfortable. There was uncontradicted evidence from both
experts that surgical practice in relation to the anaesthetic in VisThesia
varied from surgeon to surgeon with many surgeons using additional anaesthesia
including anaesthesia used topically and by injection. That was consistent with the advice in the
later IFU leaflet that the lidocaine in VisThesia should be included in the
ophthalmic surgeon's routine anaesthetic regimen. In statement 25 the petitioners add that
in the final determination the MHRA quoted a sentence from Mr Mackintosh's
report and had misunderstood his evidence.
On a proper construction of his evidence he was there referring to using
VisThesia Topical during the operation for the reasons he had described
relating to the function of the sodium hyaluronate.
[92] What the MHRA said was this:
"From the expert
evidence, it can be deduced that:
Topical
anaesthetic is routinely used in cataract surgery in the UK. Both Mr Singh and Mr Mackintosh
agree that it is necessary for usual surgical practice. It is not in dispute that VisThesia provides
topical anaesthesia. Some surgeons also
provide anaesthesia by injection; some do not.
There is therefore no dispute that topical anaesthesia plays an
essential role.
Even where anaesthesia is given by
injection subsequent to topical anaesthesia, topical anaesthesia clearly plays
an important role in anaesthetizing the eye.
The opinion of Mr Mackintosh indicates that an injection would not
normally be given without prior local anaesthesia. Although Mr Mackintosh states that he
would add additional topical anaesthetic, he notes that VisThesia can fulfil
that function:
'A fault in the
descriptive use of this product in Hyaltech's literature is that it emphasises
using it preoperatively, but does not stress that it should be used during the
operation . . .'"
[93] The first statement attributed to Dr Nielsen in the
petitioners' averments is not, in my opinion, helpful to the petitioners. Even if the topical anaesthesia was not
necessary throughout the procedure, it is plain from the statement that it was
necessary at the beginning. It is also
clear from Dr Nielsen's written statement appended to 6/16 of process
that anaesthesia is part of the procedure, and there is no suggestion there
that the lidocaine in VisThesia Topical plays a part which is "ancillary" to
the action of the product in either of the senses discussed above. In particular, he says at paragraph 22
of his statement that "use of a viscous meniscus on top of the eye [i.e. the sodium hyaluronate] may
establish a compartment from where the anaesthetic is gradually released to
where it is needed and as long as it is needed."
[94] As to the petitioners' other averments, the MHRA expressly
accepted that surgical practice in relation to the anaesthetic in VisThesia
varied from surgeon to surgeon, with some surgeons providing additional
anaesthesia. That, however, does not
alter the fact that, as the MHRA found, topical anaesthesia plays an essential
role.
[95] Mr Mackintosh was concerned to rebut a view expressed by Mr Singh,
a consultant ophthalmic surgeon who had supplied a report to the MHRA dated 3 September
2003 Mr Singh had there observed that the sodium hyaluronate in the
VisThesia only acted as a carrier for the lidocaine and had no action on its
own account. In a letter to the
petitioners' agents dated 25 August 2004 (No. 6/16 of process, appendix)
Mr Mackintosh disagreed with that view and said that the sodium
hyaluronate applied to the cornea before and during surgery helped to improve
corneal clarity, and that the interesting, novel component of the ampoules was
the sodium hyaluronate and not the anaesthetic.
Mr Mackintosh went on to say that the majority of surgeons in the United
Kingdom would not carry out cataract surgery
purely using topical local anaesthetic, but would generally use a local
anaesthetic block carried out by injections to achieve anaesthesia. It is clear that the MHRA understood and
accepted that. Mr Mackintosh also
said that he had supplemented the use of VisThesia with some pure topical
anaesthesia; and the MHRA also noted that.
The next sentence in his letter is the one quoted in the determination. I am satisfied that the MHRA misunderstood it. It seems clear that what Mr Mackintosh
meant was that the product should be used during the operation because of the
utility of the sodium hyaluronate in
improving corneal clarity. That error,
however, does not in my opinion vitiate the determination. The MHRA correctly drew from what Mr Mackintosh
had to say that he did not suggest that the lidocaine in VisThesia Topical was
unimportant. They were entitled,
accordingly, to infer from his evidence that the action of the lidocaine was
not ancillary to that of the VisThesia Topical.
[96] It should be added that after the date of Mr Mackintosh's
letter, Mr Singh submitted a further report dated 5 October 2004 (No. 6/17 of process,
appendix 7) in which he took account of the submissions and productions
which the petitioners had presented for the hearing before the Review Panel. He there accepted that the viscoelastic had a
wetting property and that wetting of the cornea was an essential part of the
procedure. He continued:
"I accept all
the properties of Viscoelastic as claimed by the company. My contention is that the addition of
lidocaine is done with the sole purpose of its local anaesthetic effect hence
it is a medicine.
Two substances in combination where
each on its own has a different primary action cannot be portrayed as one
having a primary action and the other a secondary role. In this case the primary action of
Viscoelastic is wetting and of lidocaine is as a topical anaesthetic.
[.
. . ]
Viscoelastic is primarily a wetting
agent and lidocaine is primarily a local anaesthetic agent. The combination of these two does not reduce
either of them to an ancillary role."
Mr Singh went on to say that Dr Nielsen
did not claim that lidocaine had any role in the wetting of the cornea and
maintaining its clarity during cataract surgery. He pointed to an article by Dr Nielsen
in the May 2003 issue of Eurotimes in which he had said, "VisThesia
provides a good introduction to topical anaesthesia and brings comfort to both
patient and surgeon." Dr Nielsen
detailed in the article 160 cataract operations performed using only
VisThesia as a local anaesthetic agent.
[97] I consider that there was, accordingly, sufficient material
before the MHRA to entitle them to express the following views, which I have
noted above and repeat for convenience:
"The experts [Mr Singh
and Mr Mackintosh] disagreed over the function of the topical sodium
hyaluronate. Mr Singh noted that it
had an important role as a wetting agent, but was not needed for lubrication
because the eyelid does not blink during surgery. Mr Mackintosh described its function
both in terms of wetting and lubrication.
Whether or not sodium hyaluronate is a more novel or interesting compound than lidocaine,
as suggested by Mr Mackintosh, is not relevant to this determination. The legal test is whether the action is
ancillary. Mr Mackintosh does not
suggest that the topical anaesthetic in VisThesia is unimportant.
Expert evidence shows that the
product is intended to facilitate surgery in two ways, by providing anaesthesia
and acting as a wetting agent. Both
experts agree that wetting and anaesthesia are essential for surgery. The fact that two substances with two
different objectives are used in combination does not, of itself, reduce either
objective to an ancillary role."
Decision
wholly unreasonable
[98] Finally, the petitioners aver that esto the MHRA took into account the relevant matters which the
petitioners say they failed to take into account, their decision was wholly
unreasonable. They aver that no
reasonable licensing authority properly directed in law, following the terms of
the Guidance and having regard to the relevant material and only to such
material would have reached a conclusion other than that VisThesia and in
particular VisThesia Topical is correctly classified as a medical device
incorporating an ancillary medicinal substance and that the existing CE
marketing as a device could not be said to be wrong. They point out that the MHRA had already
classified VisThesia Intracameral as a device incorporating an ancillary
medicinal substance.
[99] It was not demonstrated at the first hearing that the
classification of VisThesia Intracameral had any bearing on the classification
of VisThesia Topical. I believe I have
considered in this Opinion all the other matters mentioned. I have expressed the view that the MHRA
misunderstood the passages they quoted from the US
patent and the sentence they quoted from Mr Mackintosh's letter. Those appear to me to be minor errors which
do not vitiate their determination. I
shall accordingly repel the petitioners' second plea-in-law. Their third plea-in-law, seeking suspension
of the notice of final determination, was founded only on the argument that the
final determination was invalid. Their
fourth plea-in-law was a general plea to the relevancy of the respondent's
answers.
Result
[100] Although the respondent has stated a general plea to relevancy,
her counsel moved me to sustain only her second plea-in-law, which states, "The
final determination demonstrating no error of law, the petition should be
refused." I shall sustain the second
plea-in-law for the respondent, repel the pleas-in-law for the petitioners, and
refuse the petition.