OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION [2006] CSOH 009 |
|
A155/03 |
OPINION (No 2) OF R F MACDONALD QC (Sitting as a Temporary Judge) in the application
to the Court of Session under section 238 of the Town and Country
Planning ( by ASHLEY BELL Applicant against First Respondent and GEORGE WIMPEY UK LIMITED Second Respondent and CARVILL ( Third Respondent ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ________________ |
Applicant: Sir
Crispin Agnew of
Second and Third Respondents: A L Stewart; Aitken Nairn
[1] My
opinion on the merits of this application was issued on
[2] On
"In an early case (Edinburgh
& Glasgow Railway Co v Arthur
1858 20D 677), it was held that where several defenders have the same ground of
defence, but have not combined in a joint defence, the unsuccessful pursuer
will only be found liable in the expense of a single defence and of a
consultation between the defenders at the beginning of the litigation. This rule was somewhat modified in a later
case (Stott v Fender & Crombie 1878 16 SLR 5), where in somewhat similar
circumstances the court held that two successful defenders were only entitled
to one account of expenses, with a modified sum added as watching expenses for
the second defender. This latter method
of dealing with the expenses of separate defenders was again modified (Anderson v McCracken Bros 1900 2F 780), and it was laid down as a general
rule, and the practice now is, that where a pursuer convenes more than one
defender and fails in his action, with a liability for expenses, each defender
is entitle to his expenses down to the closing of the record; but if it appears from the closed record that
the interest of the defenders is identical, the pursuer is only liable in full
expenses for a single defence, with watching fees for the other defenders."
In the last case mentioned in the above passage,
"In this case the defenders have been successful. The question now to be decided is whether the
two sets of defenders are to be allowed their full expenses as for a separate
appearance for each of them. The
practice is, I think, well established that in such a case as this the
unsuccessful party is not to be called upon to pay two sets of expenses, and
that he should only be made liable in one, he being also liable to a watching
fee to the second party. In the
discussion this was admitted to be the practice. Of course if the two defenders choose they
may appear separately at proof and debate.
But the question whether they can be allowed to do so, so as to double
the expenses which their opponent may be called on to pay on non-success, is a
different matter, and the practice is against it. I am in favour of granting a finding of
expenses in this case in accordance with the practice as applicable to the
expenses incurred since the closing of the record."
At pages 793-4 Lord Trayner stated as follows:
"I understand the rule and practice of the Court in giving expenses
against an unsuccessful pursuer who has convened more than one defender to be
this - each defender is entitled to lodge separate defences under the
assistance and advice of his own agent and counsel. When the record has been closed, and it
appears that the defenders have not any different interest, and that as regards
both the same question is raised, then the Court regards it as the reasonable
course that the defenders should combine, and by arrangement be represented by
the same agent and counsel. If they do
not do so the pursuer is only found liable to the defenders in the expenses as
for one appearance. Full expenses are
allowed as for one defender, and only a watching fee is allowed as for the
other, the Court regarding it in the circumstances as unnecessary that there
should be separate agents and counsel to represent what is practically one
interest, and refusing to lay the burden of such unnecessary expense upon the
pursuer. The correctness of this view of
the practice of the Court was admitted by all the counsel at the bar. I do not enter upon the question whether the
practice is a good practice. It is
enough for the present case to say that it is the practice, and that one
Division of the Court should not at its own hand alter a recognised and
established practice."
[4] Sir
Crispin went on to submit that the principal party who had to respond to the
present application was the planning authority, the first respondent. The second and third respondents had obtained
outline planning permission in the course of the present application and, as
developers, had an interest in the present application. All respondents had made exactly the same
points and it was unnecessary for the second and third respondents to be
represented separately from the first respondent. The question of costs in a planning appeal to
the court where there was multiple representation was considered by the House
of Lords in Bolton Metropolitan District
Council v Secretary of State for the
Environment and Others [1995] 1 WLR 1176.
At page 1178F Lord Lloyd of Berwick stated:
"What then is the proper approach?
As in all questions to do with costs, the fundamental rule is that there
are no rules. Costs are always in the
discretion of the court, and a practice, however widespread and longstanding,
must never be allowed to harden into a rule."
Nevertheless, his
Lordship stated earlier at page 1178B:
"The House will be astute to ensure that unnecessary costs are not
incurred. Where there is multiple representation, the losing party will not normally be
required to pay more than one set of costs, unless the recovery of further
costs is justified in the circumstances of the particular case."
His Lordship also set out four propositions at
page 1178F-1179A, the second of which stated as follows:
"The developer will not normally be entitled to his costs unless he can
show that there was likely to be a separate issue on which he was entitled to
be heard, that is to say an issue not covered by counsel for the Secretary of
State; or unless he has an interest
which requires separate representation.
The mere fact that he is the developer will not of
itself justify a second set of costs in every case."
Sir Crispin submitted that nothing had been said by
counsel for the second and third respondents in the present application that
had not been said in the answers or at the hearing on behalf of the planning
authority.
[5] In a
brief reply on behalf of the second and third respondents Mr Stewart
referred to the terms of the record and of my opinion. He referred in particular to
paragraph 27 of my opinion, which, he pointed out, dealt with matters not
mentioned by counsel for the first respondent.
The second and third respondents had done more than merely "polish up"
the submission for the first respondent.
The
[6] Having
considered the competing submissions, I reached the view that the applicant
should not be liable in expenses to the second and third respondents after they
had lodged their answers. I therefore
awarded the second and third respondents their expenses only up to and
including the date on which their answers had been lodged. It seemed to me that in the present form of
process the lodging of answers fell to be regarded as the equivalent of the
closing of the record in an ordinary action.
The one issue which fell to be determined in the application was the
validity of Policy T7 adopted in the local plan by the first respondent as
planning authority. It was accordingly
for the first respondent as planning authority to respond to the challenge to
the validity of that policy. The second
and third respondents as potential developers had, of course, an interest to
see that the policy was defended, but, once answers were lodged, it was evident
that the planning authority was intent upon defending its policy. I think that in the present application it
would have been inappropriate for all three respondents to have had conjoined
representation as that would have involved the association of the planning
authority and two potential developers.
The second and third respondents were entitled to be separately
represented and to appear at the hearing of the application, but it did not in
my view follow that the unsuccessful applicant had to pay their expenses. In reaching my decision I sought to follow
and apply in the context of the present application the principles set out in
the passage from MacLaren on Expenses and the cases cited by
Sir Crispin. Although the
circumstances of the appeal to the House of Lords in the