OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2006] CSOH 76
|
A1317/03
|
OPINION OF LORD EMSLIE
in the cause
ATWAL ENTERPRISES
LTD
Pursuers;
against
DONAL TONER, t/a
DONAL TONER ASSOCIATES
Defender:
________________
|
Pursuers: Moynihan QC; Drummond Miller WS
Defender: Springham; Simpson & Marwick WS
12 May 2006
Introduction
[1] In
the course of 1995, after intermittent preparatory activity dating back to 1990,
work commenced on the construction and installation of a 5-a-side football
complex in Glenrothes. The complex was
to consist of a pavilion and bar attached to six all-weather artificial
pitches, a facility for which there was thought to be substantial demand in the
area. The main contractors engaged for
this project were Europa Construction (UK) Ltd ("Europa"). The nominated specialist sub-contractors for
the artificial pitches were En Tout Cas Ltd ("ETC"), a company with worldwide
expertise and reputation in that field.
The defender was the architect for the project following the dissolution
of his former firm, the Toner Kerr Partnership, which had been involved at an
earlier stage. In this action it is now
accepted that the pursuers, a company incorporated in December 1993, were at
all material times the client to whom the defender's professional services were
rendered and on whose instructions the project was undertaken. The director of the pursuers most closely
involved with the project was Mr Baljinder Atwal ("Mr Atwal"), who
personally conducted all negotiations both before and after December 1993.
[2] Within
a matter of weeks after the final completion of the project in early 1996, Mr
Atwal reported to the defender that there were problems with water lying on the
surface of pitches 1 and 2 situated nearest to the pavilion. Thereafter, as the use of the complex
increased, similar surface water problems were found to affect all six
pitches. In particular, instead of
remaining substantially unaffected by light rain, and draining within a short
time after the cessation of heavy rain, the pitches were affected by surface
ponding of water which would appear on virtually any rainfall and would last
for a considerable period after the rain stopped. In consequence, the pitches were regularly
dangerous and unplayable in wet weather; their use diminished significantly on
account of limited availability and deteriorating condition; their capital
value was adversely affected; and in this action (following the liquidation of
Europa and ETC in 1996 and 2000 respectively) the pursuers seek to recover
damages from the defender in respect of their resultant loss and damage.
[3] At
the proof which has now taken place before me over a total of 23 days in
June/July 2005 and February/March 2006, the parties were in dispute on three
principal issues. These were (i) the
cause or causes of the surface water problems affecting the artificial pitches;
(ii) the nature and extent of any recoverable losses sustained by the pursuers
in that connection; and (iii) the extent (if any) to which such losses were
attributable to professional negligence on the part of the defender or of those
for whom he is in law responsible.
[4] According
to the pursuers, the surface water problems were caused by excess fine material
in the foundation and dynamic layers constituting the sub-base of the pitch
construction, thereby making them relatively impervious to water and retarding
normal drainage. Broadly speaking, the
foundation layer was intended to comprise a relatively coarse, stable and
free-draining mix of crushed stone several inches in depth. The dynamic layer was a much shallower
deposition of finer material designed to cover or "blind" the uneven top
surface of the foundation layer, and thus to provide a smooth and level support
for the synthetic pitch "carpet" above.
The pursuers' position, in summary, was that the excess fines rendered
both of these sub-base layers disconform to the contract specification; that this ought to have been obvious to an ordinarily
competent and careful architect both during and immediately after the
construction phase, when contract monies could have been withheld and the
responsible contractors could have been required to rectify the problem; that instead the defender's employee Stephen
Gordon certified all work for payment and issued a certificate of practical
completion, thereafter doing little to help the pursuers find a way out of
their difficulties; that the pursuers
are consequently faced with substantial rectification costs allied to a loss of
profits over many years; that no
architect of ordinary competence exercising reasonable care and skill should
have been guilty of the failures now alleged against the defender; and that, having been professionally
negligent, the defender should be held liable to the pursuers in damages.
[5] In
sharp contrast, the defender maintained that the acknowledged surface water
problems were caused by a combination of (i) the pursuers' choice of a low-cost
specification for the works (in particular omitting a geotextile membrane
between the sub-base layers and the clay soil beneath, and further omitting a
perimeter cut-off drain to prevent water ingress from the slightly higher
ground surrounding the pitches on three sides);
(ii) progressive contamination of the sub-base layers by migration of
water-borne clay from the subjacent and surrounding ground; (iii) disconnection and blockage of the main
drainage system at various times; and to
some extent (iv) the pursuers' failure to maintain the pitches. The defender further contends that both
design and construction of the pitches were the responsibility of the
specialist sub-contractors ETC; that his
own duties as architect during the construction phase were limited, extending
to little more than a brief fortnightly site inspection; that at the material time he had no reason, as
architect, to suspect that the works were defective as alleged by the pursuers,
any early appearance of surface water being consistent with the fact that the
pitch drainage system was not connected into the main sewer until December
1995; and that in the circumstances he
was not guilty of professional negligence and accordingly under no liability in
damages to the pursuers. In any event,
according to the defender, the intended lifespan of the pitches was no greater
than 7-8 years even if properly installed and maintained, and for that
reason among others the pursuers' claim was excessive.
[6] In
the paragraphs which follow I propose to deal in turn with each of the
principal issues in contention between the parties.
Cause or causes of the surface water problems affecting the pitches
General
[7] As
regards the physical conditions which caused surface water to lie on the
pitches after rain, there was a fair measure of agreement among the various
experts who had, over the years, been engaged to carry out inspections and
conduct investigations. As early as
March 1997 Weeks Technical Services, engaged by ETC, concluded that the dynamic
layer (which they called "whin dust") was of low permeability, and appeared to
be acting as a sealing layer over the sub-base by filling the surface
voids. On 15 January 1998, Charles Lawrence (Scotland)
Ltd reported to the pursuers inter alia
as follows:-
"...
the basic problem with the surface is that the dynamic
base has sealed and is impervious to water.
... The reason for this is that the clay content in the top regulating
layer under the geotextile membrane is high and is forming a barrier to the passage
of water into the Type 1 base. ... From
inspection, we would also have reservations on the quality of the Type 1
material which also seems to be contaminated and resistant to the passage of
water."
In February 1998, in dry
conditions, the pursuers' architectural expert Gordon Gibb inspected the
exposed top of the sub-base after lifting a corner of the "carpet" or
artificial pitch surface. He found that
this was damp, taking on the appearance of wet concrete, and furthermore that
it had the consistency of fine sand with no aggregate visible. The material appeared waterlogged and did not
look as if it had the characteristics of a good draining medium. In a letter to the pursuers dated
9 September 1998 (no.6/65 of process), ETC's operations director Mr Sheard
drew attention to what he described as "discrepancies in the planarity" of the
subjacent clay surface, and continued:-
"The
depth of the sub-base also varies and is contaminated with clay and fines which
decrease its porosity. The fine grade
dynamic layer is also dense and is not as porous as we would prefer. ... The
combined effect of the different situations described above is to produce a
slow draining playing surface".
[8] Later
investigation has brought out the same general conclusion. As illustrated by particle size distribution
tests carried out by the pursuers' civil engineering expert Eric O'Donnell in
2000, and by the defender's pitch expert Graeme Tipp in 2005, the fundamental
problem was an excessive proportion of fine materials in the dynamic layer, and
to a lesser extent in the foundation layer, resulting in these layers being
less porous and water-permeable than the artificial pitch surface above. In terms of volume, the samples tested by Mr
Tipp comprised a majority of fine material passing the 0.6 mm. sieve. The sub-base layers were not, in short,
free-draining, and the presence of water on the pitch surfaces after rain was
thus inevitable.
[9] At
the proof, the validity of these general conclusions was accepted by all of the
technical witnesses who were led on both sides, namely Messrs Kidd (formerly of
ETC and Charles Lawrence), O'Donnell and Gibb for the pursuers, and Messrs Tipp
and Pirie (a consultant to the Hurd Rolland architectural partnership) for the
defender. However, the parties remained
severely at odds as to when and how the problem of excess fines arose. According to the pursuers, the explanation
was simple and straightforward: the
materials used by the specialist sub-contractors ETC in constructing the
pitches were disconform to contract. In
particular, the material delivered to site for use as the dynamic layer had far
too low a stone content, and correspondingly far too high a percentage of
fines. In these respects it did not meet
the confidential internal specification for ETC's own proprietary "Dri Pla" mix
to which the sub-contract referred, but more importantly it did not conform to
the fundamental requirement that the constructed sub-base layers should permit
free drainage of all water percolating through the artificial pitch
surface. To a lesser extent, the same
criticism could be levelled at the composition of the foundation layer which
might erroneously have been Type I material rather than the coarser
Type IX specified. Accordingly, as
soon as increased rainfall was experienced in the late autumn of 1995, while
construction was still in progress, surface water began to pond on the rolled
and compacted dynamic layer and thereafter on the artificial sanded carpet when
that was laid. Subsequently, the problem
became more widespread and more acute as the pitches came into regular use,
with the most noticeable ponding occurring on the heaviest-compacted central
areas between goalmouths. However, the
underlying cause remained the initial disconformity of the materials as
laid.
[10] According to the defender, on the other hand, it was highly
unlikely that renowned specialists like ETC should, without noticing, have
taken delivery of dynamic layer materials which were obviously disconform to
their own proprietary mix, and then proceeded to spread and compact the wrong
materials across the whole area of the construction. It was equally unlikely that ETC's
subcontractors should have laid a defective foundation layer. There was, moreover, no reason to think that
the materials as initially laid were anything other than free-draining. As recent investigations showed, the problem
was one of progressive contamination with fines subsequent to installation, the
primary sources of such contamination being (i) clay-laden water running over
and through the pitch construction from the elevated surrounding area after
rain; and (ii) water-borne clay particles migrating upwards into the foundation
and dynamic layers during periods when the main outfall drainage of the site was
inoperative and the pitches became waterlogged.
The pitches had been constructed in a shallow excavation through natural
clay strata, and such contamination was inevitable in the absence of a
geotextile membrane or a perimeter cut-off drain. Moreover, throughout the construction phase,
the outfall drainage system remained unconnected to the main sewer north of the
site, causing contaminated water to rise through the sub-base layers and reduce
their initial drainage capacity.
Significantly, in June 2005, the pitch construction became flooded following
blockage of the main outfall drainage system to the north east of the
site. There was thus a convincing
explanation, not only for the high proportion of fines discovered in the
foundation and dynamic layers, but also for the appearance of water on the
surface of the pitches while they were still under construction.
[11] A notable feature of the proof was that neither party had
apparently carried out any tests or investigations which might conclusively identify
the source or sources of the unwanted fine materials. For their part, the pursuers led no evidence
(from former ETC personnel or otherwise) to identify the quarry or quarries
from which the sub-base materials were obtained, nor to prove by scientific
analysis that the offending materials came from there, nor indeed to show that
such fines could not have come from the surrounding or subjacent clay formation
as the defender suggested. Similarly,
while the defender led evidence of simple microscopic and visual analysis
tending to show the identical appearance of fines separated from the foundation
and dynamic layers respectively, no investigations had been carried out on his
behalf to confirm that these materials were either
identical to fines comprised within the surrounding or subjacent formation, or alternatively different from such
fines as could have been delivered to site from any relevant quarry or quarries
in 1995. In consequence, I am left to
determine this first crucial issue as a matter of probability, by reference to
the substantial volume of factual and opinion evidence which is now before
me.
[12] On that basis, I have reached the conclusion that the pursuers'
contentions are to be preferred, and that in all probability the underlying cause
of the surface water problem was the over-fine composition of the materials
which ETC and their subcontractors received on site and then incorporated into
the pitch construction. However,
resolution of this issue has not been an easy task, given the significant
contradictions within the evidence and the range of considerations which might
appear to favour the defender. For
example, I agree with counsel for the defender that, at first sight, it seems
unlikely that renowned and experienced specialists like ETC should have failed
to notice when dynamic layer material of the wrong specification was delivered
to site and then spread and compacted across the whole area of the
pitches. David Kidd, ETC's former regional
manager who gave evidence for the pursuers at the proof, apparently had no
difficulty in identifying the alleged disconformity when he and a colleague
(then employed by Charles Lawrence) inspected the pitches in January 1998, and
further claimed to recognise the same disconformity in the video footage of site
works in October 1995. In particular, with
reference to the video footage of two recently-delivered mounds of what should
have been ETC's proprietary Dri Pla mix, he asserted that they comprised far
too little stone, and correspondingly too much fine material or "dust", as
illustrated by the sharp delineation of a footprint in the surface of one of
the mounds close to its base. If the
supposed disconformity was so easily recognised by Mr Kidd, how could the
ETC representatives on site have failed to recognise it over an extended period
in 1995?
[13] There are, however, many reasons why I am unable to regard this
apparent improbability as determinative, and why, in my opinion, disconformity
of the sub-base materials to contract is indeed the most likely cause of the
surface water problems which have blighted the development. These reasons are discussed in paragraphs [14]
to [36] below.
Mr Kidd's
evidence
[14] To begin with, I am
satisfied that I should accept Mr Kidd's evidence to the effect that in 1995 "
a fairly major problem" arose on site by reason of his former company inter alia using material other than Dri
Pla for the dynamic layer of the pitch construction. He was, I consider, particularly
well-qualified to say what did or did not constitute Dri Pla. He had worked for ETC for some 14 years up to
1995, leaving them very shortly after the pitch works at Glenrothes began. He was a civil engineer by training, and
clearly had a great deal of experience in the construction of artificial
pitches. In that context the
composition, appearance and performance of the proprietary Dri Pla mix must
have been very familiar to him. As a
civil engineer, moreover, he could be expected to have a sound working
knowledge of the drainage potential of different soils and constructional
materials. In January 1998, along with
another experienced civil engineer, he examined the pitch construction with
some care, digging 12 trial pits and taking appropriate samples in the
process. Although brief, the resulting
joint report no. 6/37 of process was in clear and unequivocal terms. As regards the video footage taken in 1995,
the principal significance of Mr Kidd's evidence was that in his view the
appearance and behaviour of the materials shown were no different from what he
observed just over two years later, and it is noteworthy that Mr O'Donnell
cited roller marks on the video as tending to support his parallel conclusion
that the dynamic layer was too fine and close-textured.
[15] In this context, I accept Mr Tipp's warnings that the
composition of different parts of a mound of material may be expected to vary,
and that (as in the case of wet sand on a beach) the presence of a clear
footprint would not necessarily demonstrate a lack of permeability. I also accept the need for caution in
interpreting short lengths of video footage taken by a layman. Mr Kidd, however, had the real advantage of
examining and testing the sub-base layers of the pitch construction in January
1998, and I see no reason to doubt his evidence on the narrow question whether
the video footage obviously differed from what he had seen before. Both in 1998 and 1995, he said, it was clear
that the stone content of the dynamic layer (by which he meant whinstone chips
having a particle size of 6 mm and upwards) fell very far short of the required
level of 75-80%. Given the extent of his
experience, Mr Kidd's evidence on this point strikes me as impressive and
reliable, and I do not understand it to be suggested that what he said on oath
was deliberately false. Moreover, his
stated particle size for the stone content was entirely consistent with
Mr O'Donnell's measurement of the depth of the dynamic layer on site at
25-35 mm.
[16] By comparison with the ETC personnel who remained on site after
his own departure in about August 1995, it seems to me that Mr Kidd's training
and experience rendered him less likely to make a mistake as to the essential
characteristics of the dynamic layer material used on site. Much of that material was delivered and
spread in the early autumn of 1995, before significant rains fell, and
according to the defender's architectural expert Mr Pirie it would at that time
have felt gritty and granular to anyone handling it. Significantly, that was the general impression
gained by Stephen Gordon, the project architect, in early October 1995 when handling
material from a different pile of what the ETC site representative, Paul
Waddington, told him was Dri Pla.
Moreover, Mr Tipp in the witness box repeatedly stressed that it was
only after carrying out particle size distribution tests that he was able to
draw conclusions as to the true nature of the problem. In my opinion, considerations such as these
make it easier to imagine how ETC's site personnel could have received, spread
and compacted the delivered material in relatively dry conditions without
appreciating that there was something seriously wrong. So long as subsequent loads were broadly
consistent with the first load delivered, it may be that no-one was alerted to a
possible problem as the works progressed.
[17] Furthermore, no other witness was in a position to contradict
Mr Kidd's assertion that, in a Scottish context, Dri Pla typically comprised at
least 75% whinstone of a particle size of 6-10 mm, together with 20-25% of what
he described as "dust". Counsel for the
defender sought to interpret Mr Kidd's reference to "dust" as restricted to
fine particles below 0.6 mm in size, but I do not consider that to be a fair
reading of his evidence. Had Dri Pla
comprised such a high level of very fine particles it would never have been
free-draining, and it was perhaps for this reason that Mr Tipp, in his
evidence-in-chief, queried whether Mr Kidd could actually have meant
that. In any event, again echoing
Mr Tipp, it seems unlikely that Dri Pla would not have been the
free-draining mix which its name suggests.
Much more likely, in my view, is that Mr Kidd was using the term "dust"
in a looser sense, to denote all of the graded
fraction of Dri Pla having a particle size smaller than 6 mm. As he explained in cross-examination, the
right grading was an important feature of any dynamic layer. All in all, as Messrs Tipp and Pirie fairly
accepted, Mr Kidd ought to have
been in a position to judge whether the material he saw and inspected was or
was not Dri Pla. In all the
circumstances, I do not consider that there is any reason to doubt the evidence
which Mr Kidd gave on that subject.
Pattern
of ponding in 1995 and 1996
[18] Significantly, it was accepted by the experts on both sides
that initial disconformity of one or both of the sub-base layers to
specification was at least a possible explanation consistent with the
appearance of surface water on the pitches after rain. In my opinion this explanation was, on a
consideration of the whole evidence, not merely possible but probable. In particular, as it seems to me, it is the
only suggested explanation which convincingly accounts for the early onset of
scattered surface water ponding in October 1995. Such ponding appears on the video footage
from 3 October 1995
onwards, initially on the foundation layer alone but becoming particularly
marked on the exposed dynamic layer of certain pitches as at 17 and 31 October 1995. The striking feature here is that the distribution of the ponding was apparently irregular and random
across different pitches, especially pitch 2, and did not at any
stage give the appearance of flooding of the whole pitch construction or even
of a substantial part of it. Mr O'Donnell's
evidence was particularly positive in this connection. His considered view was that if (as
maintained by the defender) the sole cause of the surface ponding seen at that
stage was the main drainage outflow being unconnected, the pattern and
appearance of such ponding would have been distinctly different. It would, he said, have involved rising water
levels affecting the lowest point on the pitches, and spreading and developing
from there. In this he was supported by
Mr Gibb, who envisaged rising water spreading laterally like the tide coming
in. Neither man was prepared to accept
that any lack of connected drainage could have produced the scattered ponding which
actually occurred in areas well away from the lowest point of the pitch
construction.
[19] In various respects Mr O'Donnell's written report no. 6/51 of
process was an unimpressive document. Despite
his protestations, it was not clear whether no.6/51 or no. 7/9 of process was
the final version; both
were wrongly dated; there were
unexplained changes of wording between the two documents, coupled with apparent
contradictions regarding the depth of the dynamic layer as found and a mistake
as to the specification of the foundation layer; and both contained a surprising error in
suggesting that no lateral drains had been laid beneath the pitches. Be that as it may, Mr O'Donnell came across
as an impressive witness in court, and I am not prepared to discount the
substance of his evidence on crucial matters on the strength of apparent
carelessness in the preparation of his written advice.
[20] Importantly, the pattern of ponding of which Mr Atwal
complained in March 1996 was broadly the same as that which appeared on the
video footage taken while construction was in progress. In December 1995, however, the outfall drainage
had finally been connected into the main sewer, at which point it may
reasonably be assumed that the whole drainage system was tested and confirmed
to be functional. No evidence was led of
any malfunction of the newly-connected drainage system in the intervening
period, and it therefore seems highly unlikely that downstream drainage
problems could have been the cause of the observed ponding in March 1996. If that is so, then it is just as unlikely
that downstream drainage problems were responsible for the very similar ponding
which appeared in and after October 1995.
Permeability
[21] From the outset, all permeability tests have confirmed the
inability of the pitch construction to drain properly from the top down. The figures are remarkable, being several
orders of magnitude lower than they ought to be, and in my view this again
tends to show that there was something intrinsically wrong with the pitch
construction itself, rather than some supervening problem with downstream
drainage. Furthermore, external
contamination could hardly explain such low permeability in the early years of
the development. The earliest
calculation of permeability appears in the brief report by Weeks Technical
Services in March 1997, and subsequent test results were broadly consistent
with that.
ETC's
conduct
[22] It is also significant that
when the pursuers' complaints persisted, ETC ultimately responded by
instructing the Weeks report in March 1997.
At no stage did they seek to raise downstream drainage problems or external
contamination as a possible explanation, and indeed the terminology of
Mr Sheard's letter no.6/65 of process was inconsistent with any such
suggestion. Following the Weeks report ETC
went on to carry out various remedial works at their own expense. By that stage, they were under no contractual
obligation to do so, all work having been paid for and the defects liability
period having expired. It seems to me
that ETC's conduct in this regard constitutes powerful evidence that they
recognised and accepted that the sub‑base layers, and in particular the
supposed "Dri Pla", did not conform to specification. Admittedly, the limited works which they
undertook involved the laying of more stone and lateral drains under
pitch 1, and correspondingly did not involve the wholesale removal and
replacement of either of the sub-base layers, but it has to be remembered that
this was only an initial attempt in the hope that conditions would
improve. For a while, it seems,
conditions on that pitch did improve, but I do not think that this weakens the
pursuers' position. For one thing, the
laying of extra drains and clean stone in and below the foundation layer could
hardly have failed to improve matters to some extent, and in addition the skimming
and temporary de-compaction of the dynamic layer (with the possible addition of
some less fine material) must also have had some beneficial effect. The fact that, over time, the old problem
with pitch 1 began to reappear tends, in my opinion, to support the view
that the primary cause of the problem was the composition of the sub-base layers. Mr Atwal's initial complaint concerned the
pitches which were most often used when the complex opened for business, with
ponding being concentrated in the most heavily-compacted areas along the centre
section of the pitches between the goalmouths.
Similar problems spread to other pitches as they came into heavier use, and
it therefore seems likely that compaction was a factor which further reduced
the drainage capacity of the sub-base layers.
On that analysis, gradual re-compaction following ETC's remedial works
would appear to provide a plausible explanation for the reappearance of the
problem on pitch 1.
Interim
conclusion
[23] On the evidence to which I have referred so far, I am unimpressed
with the defender's contention that the ponding of water seen on certain
pitches in the course of construction in 1995 should be attributed to the fact
that the downstream drainage had not yet been connected into the main sewer
north of the site. Had this been the
sole issue for determination, I would have had no difficulty in upholding the
pursuers' contention that the probable cause of the appearance of surface water
at that stage was disconformity of the sub-base layers to the contract specification.
External
contamination theory - general
[24] However, the defender has led powerful evidence, from Messrs
Tipp and Pirie in particular, tending to indicate that the true cause of the
long-term problems affecting the pitches has been progressive contamination of
the sub-base layers with clay from the subjacent formation and surrounding
area. Mr Tipp was the leading proponent
of this theory. According to him, the
problem started at a very early stage, and indeed as soon as construction began
without the protection of (i) a geotextile membrane to separate the sub-base from
the excavated clay surface beneath, and (ii) a perimeter cut-off drain to
prevent the ingress of clay-laden water from the surrounding ground. Thereafter, conditions deteriorated gradually
to the point at which, in very wet conditions in 2005, both the dynamic and
foundation layers were found to be identically contaminated with fine, orange-coloured
clay, and at the same time clay-laden water was observed running on to the
pitches and through the sub-base layers at their north eastern corner. Mr Tipp's theory was presented in a confident
and plausible manner, relying on scientific testing as well as on observed
facts and circumstances. It therefore
deserves to be considered with care.
[25] The defender's preparations for the proof, including
investigation of the cause of the problems of which the pursuers complained, appear
to have been of the late variety. According
to Mr Gordon on Day 14, the defender did not instruct any expert
investigation when litigation between the parties first commenced in the Sheriff
Court in 1997.
Although the summons in the present action was served in 2001, the
defender again sought no expert assistance until Messrs Tipp and Pirie
were approached in about May 2005, a matter of weeks before the proof began. A joint site inspection took place on 2 June 2005, and it is on
the strength of what was observed, sampled and tested on that occasion that the
defender's principal case has been developed.
In consequence, the defender's pleadings say less than they might have
done about what turned out to be his primary answer to the pursuers' claim;
even in March 2006, Mr Tipp's views were plainly still evolving as he gave
evidence in the witness box; and in consequence some key elements of his final position
were not fully put to the pursuers' witnesses in cross-examination. I do not attach any blame to Mr Tipp for this
state of affairs. The short timescale
was not of his making, and I am not persuaded that (as was at one stage
suggested on behalf of the pursuers) I should discount his evidence merely
because, in material respects, it departed from the terms of the written report
which he prepared in some haste only days prior to the proof.
[26] On the other hand, I cannot simply ignore the difficult
situation in which Mr Tipp found himself.
In my view, I am bound to take appropriate account of the fact that his
report was hurriedly prepared on the strength of a single site visit and
associated investigations; that its conclusions were necessarily reached
without the benefit of long-term involvement and mature reflection; and that his
evidence shifted quite markedly as his position was tested and challenged in court. In the same context, I must also recognise
that Mr Tipp was, by qualification, a polymer chemist rather than a civil
engineer or soils scientist, although he clearly had extensive practical experience
relative to the design and installation of artificial pitches.
Site
visit of 2 June 2005
[27] The joint site visit on 2
June 2005 took place after a night of heavy rainfall. It was still raining heavily when the visit
took place, and there was evident widespread flooding of the pitch surfaces,
with only one corner actually free of standing water. In these circumstances the outfall drainage
was checked and found to be wholly or substantially blocked at a point
downstream of the manhole to the north-east of the development. When this blockage was successfully cleared
by means of specialist rodding and pressure jetting, a substantial outflow of
water from the pitch construction was observed to last for several hours. The surface flooding gradually diminished
until eventually (in Mr Tipp's words) the pitches "became playable", whereas according to Mr Pirie the amount of water on the
pitches merely "dropped considerably" and became "visibly less". As his photographs nos. 23 and 24 showed, and
as Mr Atwal emphasized, there were still scattered areas of ponding left
some four hours after the drainage was unblocked. The observed effect of clearing the drains
would seem to have been largely responsible for the defender's suggestion (already
discussed) that the presence of surface water in and after October 1995 should
be attributed to lack of connection of the downstream drainage at that time. Significantly, however, the problem
experienced from October 1995 onwards did not involve wholesale flooding of the
kind which occurred in 2005. On the
contrary, it resembled the situation left behind once the 2005 flooding
subsided. As against that, the
relatively rapid disappearance of the floodwater did tend to confirm, in
general terms, that none of the various layers of the pitch construction was
entirely impervious to water, and that, in substantial measure, water could and
did permeate through to the drainage system.
[28] When the north-eastern corner of the synthetic pitch surface
was folded back, exposing the top of the dynamic layer, the latter was found to
have an exceedingly low level of permeability - only 25 mm/hr, when the
absolute minimum should have been several hundred. Although the synthetic carpet was itself
heavily contaminated, its permeability was measured at 45 mm/hr, and after
cleaning that figure rose to 2,500 mm/hr.
Thereafter, a single trial pit was dug so that the composition of the
sub-base layers could be ascertained by laboratory analysis. Within a relatively short time, however, the
pit was seen to fill slowly from the sides with water which appeared to be
discoloured by clay in suspension.
Similar discoloured water was also seen flowing in under the vertical
kick-boards which formed the eastern boundary of the pitches.
[29] In the laboratory, both sub-base layers were found to contain a
high proportion of very fine material.
Some 50 per cent of the dynamic layer and 30 per cent of the foundation
layer passed the 0.6 mm sieve, and only 5 per cent of the dynamic layer had a
particle size in excess of 5 mm. At the
sampling point, the depth of the dynamic layer was measured in situ at 30-35 mm. On microscopic examination, the particles
greater in size than 0.6 mm were found to be predominantly rounded, black in
colour with flecks of mica, and consistent with the appearance of crushed
granite. Although this seemed to
undermine Mr Kidd's evidence that whinstone was used for Dri Pla in Scotland,
the parties were in agreement that the difference between whinstone and granite
was not material for the purposes of this action.
[30] There was thus no doubt that, as at June 2005, neither of the
sub-base layers met the original contract specification. This replicated Mr O'Donnell's findings
in 2000, but according to Messrs Tipp and Pirie the real question was whether
that had also been the position in 1995, when the sub-base was first laid, or
whether the observed flooding and its release, and the observed active
contamination by discoloured water in the north-eastern corner of the
development, might provide alternative explanations. In their view, the amount of pitch debris
found in the outfall drainage helped to confirm the existence of a long-term
problem.
Mr Tipp's
conclusion
[31] The conclusion reached (primarily by Mr Tipp, but supported in
general by Mr Pirie) was that contamination from outwith the pitch construction
was indeed the most likely explanation for the long-term problem affecting the
pitches. The active contamination
process which was observed in extremely wet conditions in June 2005 could not
be ignored. According to Mr Tipp, it was
the obvious explanation for everything that had happened in the intervening
years, especially in view of the fact that comparison with the particle size
distribution tests carried out under Mr O'Donnell's direction in 2000 showed
the degree of contamination to be progressively worsening with time. As against that, however, at pages 12 and 20
of his written report, Mr Tipp conceded that it was not possible to state
whether, or to what extent, the sub-base layers were contaminated from the
outset, and in his evidence on Day 18 of the proof Mr Pirie concurred with that
view.
[32] At paragraphs 6.8 and 6.10 of Mr Tipp's report no. 7/5 of
process, the contamination was envisaged as occurring "... from the top
downwards", by clay washed on to the pitch surface from the surrounding higher
ground during heavy rain. In addition,
at page 11, Mr Tipp described "... the possibility" of upward contamination of
the stone sub-base by clay, impairing its drainage capability. By the end of his evidence in court, however,
Mr Tipp had substantially retreated from his emphasis on contamination
occurring from above, postulating instead (a) contamination of the
sub-base layers occurring laterally beneath the pitch surface, and (b)
contamination occurring from below in the form of a "soup" of suspended clay
particles within the sub-base layers during periods when the outfall drainage
was not operational. The former
mechanism was, it was said, illustrated (and its validity confirmed) by the
observed seepage into the trial pit dug on 2 June 2005, and the latter was
consistent with the significant flooding observed before the downstream
drainage was unblocked.
[33] In advancing these views, Mr Tipp attached considerable
importance to the fact that, of all the expert witnesses who gave evidence at
the proof, only he and Mr Pirie had the advantage of seeing the pitches in
seriously wet conditions. They were thus
better placed than anyone else to judge how the pitches were in fact affected
by heavy rainfall, and had indeed seen the contamination process at work for
themselves. Moreover, their experience
with the blocked drain, and with the effect of its being cleared, gave them
great insight into the likely cause of standing water on the pitch
surfaces. By comparison, the contrary
views expressed by others were not soundly based. Mr Kidd's evidence as to the composition of
Dri Pla should be rejected, as should all the other evidence which suggested
that the surface water problems were due to initial disconformity of the
sub-base layers to the contract specification.
In general, Mr Tipp sought to criticise the basis on which that other
evidence was given, even in areas where conclusions were consistent with his
own.
[34] In fairness, however, as regards his own principal assessment, Mr Tipp
conceded in the witness box that in making it he was handicapped by the
nine-year gap in time; that his scenario of clay contamination from below was
"... speculative, you might say"; that it was difficult (and undesirable) to
extrapolate from one single set of test results; that for some reason no flow
of discoloured water was evident until half an hour after the trial pit was dug; and that since the video from 1996/7 showed
such water running down the eastern boundary of the pitches, it was unlikely
that this could have caused problems on any of the pitches further west. In addition, as previously mentioned, Mr Tipp
conceded that he had done no tests to prove that the particles which he found
in the sub-base layers were identical to clay in the surrounding ground, or
indeed to particles in the discoloured water which he saw.
Discussion
[35] Having given this matter anxious consideration, I am not
persuaded that the defender's theory of external contamination is, in the end,
any more than speculative, or that the evidence of Messrs Tipp and Pirie as to
the likely source of the excess fines in the sub-base layers should be
preferred to that of Messrs Kidd, O'Donnell and Gibb. For the reasons already given, I regard the
latter evidence as generally impressive and reliable, and consider that in all
probability the main cause of the pursuers' problems has from the outset been
disconformity of the sub-base layers to the contract specification. The principal grounds on which I have come to
reject the defenders' theory of external contamination may be briefly summarised as
follows:
(i) Mr Tipp's conclusions
are based on extrapolation from a single trial pit dug on 2 June 2005 in the north-east corner of the
development. As he accepted, this was
not an ideal situation. Questions must
inevitably arise as to whether the state of the sub-base at that point was
typical of the remainder, or whether the observed water flow conditions were
merely localised phenomena. I note that
even after most of the surface water had drained away on 2 June 2005, Mr Tipp did not take the
opportunity of digging further trial pits, nor did he return on any subsequent date
to check whether his observations and conclusions could be maintained in drier
conditions or at different parts of the pitch construction.
(ii) Mr Tipp was unable to
explain the delayed appearance of discoloured water in the north-east corner of
the development some thirty minutes after the trial pit was dug. At one stage it was suggested to him that
this might have had something to do with the high-pressure jetting that was
going on nearby, but in the end the matter remained unresolved.
(iii) As mentioned in
paragraph [34] above, discoloured water at approximately the same location
was evident on the video footage taken between March 1996 and March 1997. Since that water was visibly flowing towards
the south-east corner of the pitches, in accordance with the drainage gradient,
it is hard to see how it could possibly have contaminated pitches further west. To do that, it would have had to flow in the
opposite direction from all other surface and sub-surface water.
(iv) If
Mr Tipp's theory were correct, one would have expected to see evidence of
discoloured water affecting the north and west sides of the pitches, where the surrounding
ground was also elevated to some extent.
However, there was no apparent sign of that on the video, nor was there
evidence to suggest any particular contamination of the sub-base in these
areas.
(v) To some degree, Mr Tipp
sought support for his theory from the appearance of a progressive increase in
the level of fines in the sub-base layers.
I do not find that evidence compelling.
It was based on a comparison of particle size distribution tests conducted
five years apart and on samples taken from different locations. The two trial pit analyses from 2000 yielded
different results, at least with respect to the content of larger-sized stone, suggesting
that different batches of material used on site might vary to some degree. It is not surprising that a further single
pit dug near the edge of the construction should have yielded a different
result again. In addition, as
Mr O'Donnell explained on Day 7 of the proof, all of the samples
were small, and percentage results could easily be distorted by the presence or
absence of a stone or two from the foundation layer.
(vi) While
the synthetic carpet was clearly in a filthy and degraded condition by 2005,
there was no evidence that it was materially contaminated by orange-coloured
clay. Indeed Mr O'Donnell positively
confirmed that the carpet and its sandfill were not contaminated with clay when he inspected them in 2000. Along with factors (iii) and (iv) above, I
believe that this was a major reason why Mr Tipp found it necessary to depart
from the confident assertion in his written report regarding contamination "...
from the top downwards", and retreated to a position in which the principal
contamination was seen as occurring from the sides and from below.
(vii) Leaving aside the fact
that this new position was not directly put to the pursuer's witnesses, I am
not convinced that it can properly account for the historical development of
the problems on site. These problems
began almost as soon as the dynamic layer was laid on certain pitches in 1995,
and it seems highly unlikely that sufficient lateral contamination could have
occurred over the very short timescale involved. Moreover, given that the adjacent car park
showed no sign of ponding, the evidence before me was conflicting, and
ultimately inconclusive, as to whether there could have been sufficient
rainfall prior to October 1995 to fill the reservoir capacity of the
sub-base layers and cause water to lie on the pitch surfaces. In any event, even acknowledging that the
downstream drainage remained unconnected until December 1995, it is hard to see
how a gradual build-up of static water within the pitch construction could have
created Mr Tipp's clay "soup" in the first place, far less raised it to the
level of the dynamic layer and artificial surface of the various affected
pitches seen on the video. By March
1997, when Weeks Technical Services examined the dynamic layer, its top surface
plainly gave immediate cause for concern, and the same applied as at January
and February 1998 when that top surface was seen and condemned by Messrs Kidd
and Gibb respectively.
(viii) Even more significantly,
when Mr O'Donnell carried out his initial investigations in 2000, he found a distinct
interface between the sub-base layers and the subjacent clay formation, with no
material sign of cross-contamination between them. The percentage of Mr O'Donnell's
subjacent clay sample which had a particle size smaller than 0.06 mm was
approximately five times greater than the equivalent percentage within either
of the sub-base layers. More importantly,
the sub-base samples which he took and tested were not contaminated with a high percentage of fine orange clay. According to him, any possible upward
migration of clay was precluded by the well-graded foundation layer which
presented no voids into which clay could penetrate. In any event, had such contamination from
below occurred, it seems improbable that the layer to be worst affected should
have been, not the foundation layer with which the clay formation was in direct
contact, but the dynamic layer above which would not be reached unless, on
occasion, any water trapped in the sub-base reservoir exceeded the depth of the
foundation layer - between 120 and140 mm, according to the trial pit logs
reproduced in Mr O'Donnell's report.
(ix) The pattern of scattered
ponding across different pitch surfaces is, I think, very difficult to
reconcile with the theory of widespread external contamination. Much more likely, in my view, is that the
observed pattern principally reflects (a) some measure of variability within
the disconform sub-base materials, and (b) the effect of compaction, first by
construction activity and then by sports usage, rendering discrete areas
relatively less permeable than the remainder.
The problem was never one of total impermeability, but only of slow
drainage in places, and it is in my view of some significance that when the outfall
blockage was cleared in June 2005 the pitches actually drained fairly well over
a period of some four hours, leaving only scattered areas where ponding
persisted.
(x) Mr Atwal's evidence
was that when the problems with surface water first arose, ETC told him to
check the state of the drains and he did so.
According to him, one of the first steps taken by ETC themselves
was to rod the drains. Mr Kidd gave
unchallenged evidence of having checked the manhole in the south-east corner of
the site in January 1998, finding it dry with only a trickle of water running
through. Both of the Atwal brothers
described sweeping surface water into the same manhole from time to time, as a
last resort. Furthermore, Mr O'Donnell appeared
to find no material problem with the drains in 2000. If all of that evidence is correct, and I
have no reason to hold otherwise, then it follows that the main drainage system
could not have been non-operational over the whole period from 1995 to 2005,
and the situation which Messrs Tipp and Pirie discovered in June 2005 could
have no direct bearing on the state of the pitches more than nine years
earlier.
(xi) It is clear that the
serious flooding which Messrs Tipp and Pirie saw in June 2005, which
according to Mr Tipp was 150 mm deep in places and covered the whole
area of the pitches other than the north-east corner, was largely attributable
to a downstream blockage in the drainage system. There can in my view be no other explanation
for the fact that the flooding substantially disappeared, over a period of
hours, when that blockage was cleared, although the extent of the blockage was
called into question by Mr Pirie's photograph no. 11 showing water
flowing into the top of a manhole before clearance works began. Significantly, however, as Mr Pirie
conceded and Mr Atwal emphatically confirmed, some surface water still
remained in scattered patches after the main flooding subsided. In all the circumstances I am unable to
regard the 2005 blockage as providing a plausible explanation for the scattered ponding of water on different
pitch surfaces at any date.
(xii) In addition, while
accepting that the blockage of June 2005, whether total or partial, must have existed
for some time, I cannot regard the amount of pitch debris in a single manhole
as a reliable indicator of how long that might have been. Since much of the debris came from the
surface of the synthetic carpet, and could not possibly have filtered through
the sub-base layers to reach the drains, it follows that it must have entered
the drainage system through the top of a manhole. That would, I think, be consistent with the
evidence of the Atwal brothers to the effect that they sometimes swept away
water from the pitch surfaces by that route.
Conclusion
on cause
[36] For all of these reasons I am satisfied, on the balance of
probabilities, that the pursuers are correct in attributing their surface water
problems to a material disconformity of the sub-base layers, especially the
dynamic layer, to the contract specification.
As it seems to me, this conclusion is positively supported by the
factual and opinion evidence which was led on the pursuers' behalf, and is
further fortified by the ultimate absence of any credible alternative
explanation. However, contrary to the
submission made by counsel for the defender in reliance on Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds
1985 1 WLR 948, this is not a situation in which rejecting the defender's contentions
has somehow led me to accept an extremely improbable case put forward by the
pursuers. Clearly, an intrinsically
improbable case will not be salvaged by the mere fact that something even more
improbable is rejected, but as explained earlier in this opinion I consider
that the pursuers have led more than enough credible and reliable evidence to
establish the probable cause of the problems of which they complain. In my view there are too many factors
pointing positively in that direction to allow me to hold otherwise,
and the defender's failure to set up a plausible alternative merely lends force
to that conclusion. Reverting to the
position of the specialist sub-contractors ETC, on which counsel for the
defender placed great emphasis in her submissions, I do not consider that a
major error on their part in laying the wrong materials can per se be regarded as so improbable that
it must be discounted altogether. All
human beings are fallible, and experience shows that even reputable contractors
do, from time to time, get things wrong.
With hindsight, it may be difficult to understand how such an error
could have been made in this case, but I am satisfied, on the balance of
probabilities, that the sub-base layers were indeed constructed with the wrong
materials, and that (without necessarily ruling out the possibility of
cross-contamination, or even of some degree of external contamination, over the
years) this was the primary cause of the pursuers' problems from 1995
onwards.
The defender's legal liability
General
[37] The next question to be
determined is whether, in the absence of the contractors and sub-contractors
against whom the pursuers' claim might preferentially have been directed, the
defender has been shown to have been in breach of his contractual obligations
as the pursuers' architect and thus liable to them in damages. There is now no dispute between the parties
(i) that the defender undertook to provide architectural services to the
pursuers in connection with the project;
(ii) that these services related, not only to the pavilion which
the defender designed, but also to the artificial pitches in respect of which
the defender had no design input and Mr Atwal engaged ETC as specialist
sub-contractors; (iii) that
although the contract between the parties did not formally incorporate the RIBA
Standard Form of Agreement for the Appointment of an Architect (the 1992
edition of which formed no.6/11 of process), the defender's duties of
inspection quoad both pavilion and
pitches would broadly have coincided with those set out in paragraphs K-L
01 to 08 of that document; and (iv) that
the defender's performance now falls to be measured against the standard of an
architect of ordinary competence exercising reasonable care and skill. As regards (iii) above, paragraphs 04,
05 and 08 were of particular relevance, imposing general obligations on an
architect to inspect materials delivered to site, to inspect the progress and
quality of the works at intervals, and where appropriate to instruct sampling
and testing of materials and workmanship.
[38] As against that, it is important to recognise that - in the
absence of express contractual provision - no architect owes his client a duty
to guarantee the success of a project, nor to supervise every aspect of the
work as it is performed by contractors, nor even to inspect the progress of the
works on anything other than a periodic basis.
Here the defender's duties related primarily to the pavilion which he
had designed, and in which a wide array of technical matters required
attention; his entitlement to fees arose
primarily in connection with the pavilion works; his letter to Mr Atwal dated
31 August 1992 (appendix 3 of no.7/7 of process) referred only to
"...an element of site inspection during the course of the contract"; and in practice (through his employee
Mr Gordon) he inspected the works, including the pitches, at approximately
fortnightly intervals which, in the main, coincided with formal recorded site
meetings. It is also relevant to note
that where, as here, specialist sub-contractors are involved, technical matters
concerning the sub-contract works or installations may well be outwith the
knowledge and expertise of the ordinary architect. The case against the defender must therefore turn
on what would or would not reasonably be expected, in that limited context, of an architect of ordinary competence
exercising reasonable care and skill.
[39] It is well settled that liability for professional negligence
can only arise where, on the evidence, no ordinarily competent and careful
member of the relevant profession could have been guilty of the particular
failure alleged against the defender:- cf. Hunter
v Hanley 1955 SC 200; Bolam
v Friern Hospital Management Committee
1957 1 WLR 582. Applying that test, it
is not for the court to choose between conflicting practices where both are
supported by a responsible body of opinion within the profession
concerned. However, this does not mean
that the mere existence of expert evidence favouring the defence will in all
cases be sufficient to defeat a pursuer's claim. In Michael
Hyde & Associates Ltd v J D
Williams & Co Ltd 2001 PNLR 8, Ward LJ gave examples (at paragraph
25) of situations in which expert evidence favourable to a defender would not
necessarily have that effect. These were
(i) where the professional opinion relied on was not capable of
withstanding logical analysis;
(ii) where the evidence in question fell short of reflecting a
responsible body of opinion within the relevant profession; and (iii) where the act or omission
alleged against the defender did not require the exercise of any special
skill. In the same case Sedley LJ
reached the same conclusion on a rather broader basis, and at paragraph 46
made the following observation:-
"But
in general it can be said that the Bolam
test is typically appropriate where the neglect is said to lie in a conscious
choice of available courses made by a trained professional, and that it is
typically inappropriate where it is in an oversight that the neglect is said to
lie."
For present purposes, it is perhaps
sufficient for me to indicate general agreement with the approach of the Court
of Appeal in Michael Hyde, without
necessarily accepting that that decision exhaustively identified the
circumstances in which a finding of professional negligence might be made
notwithstanding the existence of expert evidence supportive of the defender.
[40] Against that background, counsel for the pursuers invited me to
hold that, on the evidence, Mr Gordon was indeed guilty of professional
negligence at and after the time when the ponding of water first appeared on
pitch surfaces. In this regard he
founded heavily on certain concessions made by Mr Gordon himself, allied
in particular to Mr Gibb's forthright criticism of Mr Gordon's
conduct. The defender's position, on the
other hand, was that professional negligence on Mr Gordon's part had not
been proved, and on the strength of Mr Pirie's evidence in particular
counsel for the defender asked me to hold that Mr Gordon was blameless and
should be exonerated altogether.
[41] An unusual complicating feature here was that Mr Gibb's
expert opinion evidence was given before Mr Gordon himself went into the
witness box, with the result that Mr Gibb had to proceed on the basis of
certain assumptions as to what Mr Gordon actually saw or knew in late
1995. This difficulty was compounded by
the fact that one of the crucial parts of Mr Gordon's defence, namely certain
advice on unconnected drainage which he claimed to have received from Europa's
site representative Mr Travers in the latter part of October 1995, was not
focused on Record, nor did it appear in any lodged report, nor was it even put
to Mr Gibb in cross-examination.
The other side of the coin is that Mr Pirie's expert opinion
evidence was given after that of Mr Gordon, and he was thus placed in the
position of having to react, at fairly short notice, to the latter's
concessions in the witness box which may or may not have been anticipated. In addition, Mr Pirie was allowed to be
present in court throughout the evidence of both Mr Gordon and
Mr Tipp, with the result that he was perhaps at some risk of his evidence
being affected, consciously or unconsciously, by what he had heard.
The
critical issue
[42] As the proof proceeded, the
critical issue between the parties on this aspect of the case became fairly
narrowly defined. Although
Mr Gordon, somewhat surprisingly, had no knowledge of the nature and
composition of ETC's proprietary Dri Pla mix which was specified for the
dynamic layer, and had never seen the bill of quantities in which the intended
foundation layer was identified as "Type 1X sub-base lightly compacted",
he was on his own admission aware from the start that both of the sub-base
layers had to be free-draining if the pitches were to perform
satisfactorily. In his
evidence-in-chief, he was inclined to skirt round this a little, maintaining
that he had no knowledge of the weather conditions in which the pitches were
supposed to be playable. However, under
cross-examination, he conceded knowledge that the pitches were intended to be
free-draining and available for use, day and night, in virtually all
weathers. Mr Gordon was also aware,
again on his own admission, that by mid-October 1995 surface
water could be seen ponding on various pitches where Dri Pla had been
laid. Further, he realised that this was
a matter of potential significance, causing him concern as to whether the
sub-base fulfilled the free-draining requirements of the contract. In that state of affairs, however, his only
response was to invite Mr Travers, Europa's contracts manager, to comment
in the course of a walk round the site.
When the latter advised him that the downstream drainage was yet to be
connected, Mr Gordon simply assumed that this accounted for the appearance
of surface water and took no further action.
He did not ask ETC, the pitch specialists, for their observations on the
state of their partially-completed works, nor did he do anything to check Mr Travers'
advice by looking at the actual state of the drains or of the pitch
construction. The key question for
determination in these proceedings is thus relatively straightforward and
non-technical, namely whether a competent and careful architect, having become
aware of surface ponding and realised its potential significance, should have
done more than Mr Gordon did to ensure the proper protection of the
pursuers' interests. Apart from his
brief conversation with Mr Travers, Mr Gordon essentially did nothing
at all. Was this truly acceptable for an
architect of ordinary competence, exercising reasonable care and skill, or was
it not?
Mr Gordon's
position
[43] In order to answer that
question, it is necessary to consider in a little more detail what
Mr Gordon actually saw and knew in the latter part of 1995. As regards water lying on the pitch surfaces,
his position was that on one occasion only, most probably 17 October, he saw
some ponding on top of the dynamic layer on one or two pitches. Only small, randomly distributed puddles or
pools were involved;
they were not deep; and
the ponding was very similar, although perhaps not so extensive, as that which
appeared on the video footage of pitch 1 on 17 October. According to Mr Gordon, the ponding
which he saw was certainly on pitch 1 and, he thought, also on
pitch 2, with pitch 4 being mentioned at one point as a further
possibility. In the witness box, he
initially tended to favour 31 October as the date when he saw the ponding,
following some ten days of heavy rain.
However, in cross-examination, he accepted that his observation must
relate to 17 October because, as the video showed, the synthetic carpet had
already been laid on pitch 1 by the date of the later site meeting.
[44] Mr Gordon then conceded that, having seen water lying on
the Dri Pla on one or more pitches, he realised that this was a matter of
concern because the fundamental requirement for the pitch construction was that
it should be free-draining. At some
point on the day of the next site meeting on 31 October, at which
Paul Waddington of ETC was not present, Mr Gordon mentioned his
concern to Mr Travers, who told him (i) that the main drains were complete
but had not been connected to the sewer in the road; (ii) that Europa were awaiting completion of
a silt trap and connection which were the responsibility of ETC; and (iii) that in the absence of an outfall
the drainage pipes would backfill 100 per cent, with the result that the last
ten days of water would still be there.
The latter reference was, I take it, to the adverse weather conditions
which had been experienced in the ten days immediately preceding
31 October, and which were recorded at paragraph 4.04 of the minute
of the site meeting held on that date.
Strangely, however, although the continued ponding of surface water was plainly
visible on the video footage of 31 October, and must have been there to be
seen at the time when the conversation with Mr Travers took place,
Mr Gordon continued to maintain that it was only on the one occasion that
he actually saw it, and that the ponding which he saw was not as serious as the
video suggested. It is also strange that
Mr Gordon's concern was never raised or recorded at any site meeting, and
that no reference to unconnected drainage appeared until six weeks later
in paragraph 3.10 of the minute of the site meeting held on
11 December 1995 (where it appeared as a matter raised by the contractor).
From October 1995 onwards, moreover,
Mr Gordon continued to issue interim
certificates without any deduction in respect of any defect in the works.
Discussion
[45] In the foregoing circumstances,
I have serious doubts as to the credibility and reliability of Mr Gordon's
stated recollection of (a) the extent and distribution of the surface water
which he saw on the pitches in October 1995;
(b) the date or dates on which such observations were made; and (c) the date and circumstances in which
the matter was allegedly raised with Mr Travers. The video footage presents a fairly
consistent picture on 17 and 31 October, and if surface ponding had been a
cause for concern on the earlier date, it seems inevitable that Mr Gordon
must again have been very conscious of its presence a fortnight later. Moreover, his account of a conversation with
Mr Travers on 31 October was not supported from any source; it is hard to
believe that such an important conversation regarding both drainage and pitches
would not have been recorded in any site minute; no reference to it appeared in the defender's
pleadings; Mr Tipp does not seem to
have known about it; paragraph 5.16
of Mr Pirie's report is inconsistent with it; and it was never put to any of the pursuers'
witnesses in cross-examination. I
acknowledge that these matters were only faintly raised, if at all, with
Mr Gordon in cross-examination, and it is also true that his evidence
concerned events which occurred nearly 10 years ago. However, given the highly unsatisfactory
circumstances in which the claimed conversation was first raised, the
unexplained discrepancies in the available evidence, and the absence of support
from Mr Travers or from any other source, I am not willing to accept
Mr Gordon's unvouched and unsupported testimony on a matter which has
become crucial to his defence to the allegations against him. I have the clear impression that in the
witness box he was concerned, not only to minimise the extent of the surface
water problem of which he was aware, but also to maximise the steps which he
took in that regard and the speed with which he took them. He also sought to volunteer implausible
excuses for the inaction alleged against him.
At one point, for example, he attempted to maintain that, since
their Mr Waddington did not happen to be present on site on 31 October 1995, he had no
opportunity to raise his concerns with ETC.
At another, notwithstanding his claimed reliance on Mr Travers'
advice, he maintained that there was no possible way in which the true state of
the drainage system could have been ascertained at that time.
[46] Having said all that, I propose for the moment to follow the
approach taken by counsel for the pursuers and, in testing the legal issue, to
take Mr Gordon's evidence pro veritate. On that approach, as previously indicated,
counsel founded heavily on Mr Gordon's concessions as already recorded,
and in particular on the following passage which appears at the end of
Mr Gordon's cross-examination on Day 14 of the proof:-
"Q. In the course of most probably the site inspection
on 17 October, you discovered and saw ponding of water on certainly one and
perhaps two pitches?
A. Yes
Q. Ponding of
water, as an architect exercising ordinary competence and ordinary care, you
would have realised was of potential significance because the pitches were
intended to be free draining?
A. Correct.
Q. But that on
seeing that ponding you simply spoke to the person with whom you were at the
time, namely the site manager of the main contractor Europa Construction?
A. Yes.
Q. Though he
was a civil engineer as you have said in chief in fact Europa Construction had
no involvement in respect of the pitches?
***
A. They were
not taking under any of the work but they did have a responsibility with
regards to and looking after managing the nominated subcontractor.
Q. And so far
as Europa Construction then is concerned, they had no expertise in respect of
the installation of artificial football pitches?
A. Not that I
am aware of.
Q. That based
upon your conversation with Mr Travers, you made an assumption that the problem
was attributable to backing up of drains?
A. Yes.
Q. In fact, an
architect of ordinary competence exercising reasonable care, knowing the
potential significance of water standing on what should otherwise be a free
draining surface would have gone further and would have carried out some form
of investigation. Do you accept that or
not?
A. Eh, no.
Q. That an
architect exercising that legal duty of care would at the very least have asked
the specialist subcontractor En Tout Cas to comment?
A. Yes.
Q. And you did
not do so?
A. No, because
the problem as I saw it was something that Europa Construction were responsible for.
Q. But that is
assuming your deduction that the problem was the drains to be correct.
A. Yes.
Q. What I am
suggesting to you is that an architect of ordinary competence exercising
reasonable care on a matter of importance like this the performance of a free
draining structure, would not have rested on an assumption. He would in fact have asked the specialist
subcontractor at the very least to confirm that his assumption was correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But you did
not do so?
A. No.
***
Q. Perhaps I
will just leave it at this, that by failing to carry
out in fact any investigation in relation to the acceptability of the
assumption that you made that the source of this problem was the drains, you
fell below the standard that in law is required of an architect exercising
reasonable skill and care. Do you accept
that?
A. Eh no.
Q. Why don't
you accept that, if you accept that an architect exercising reasonable skill
and care would at the very least inquire of the subcontractor specialist what
the problem was?
A. The
specialist subcontractor I don't think was there at that particular time, and
we were strongly of the opinion it was because the drains were not connected.
Q. Sorry, who
was strongly of the opinion?
A. Myself and
Jim Travers of Europa Construction.
***
Q. But surely
an architect exercising reasonable skill and care who
sees something that is potentially a very significant problem doesn't get
deflected by the fact that the man who may have the answer is to his side or at
the end of a phone?
A. Yes. Correct.
Q. This is why
I want to press you: if you accept that an architect exercising
reasonable skill and care would have followed up this concern with the
specialist, i.e. En Tout Cas, does that not have the result that you accept
that by having failed to do so in this case you fell below the standard being
expected of an architect of ordinary competence exercising skill and care?
A. With
inspections perhaps, yes."
[47] Although in re-examination Mr Gordon went back to
minimising the significance of what he had seen, asserting that he did not
think it a serious problem at the time, I consider that even the partially-retracted
admissions which he made in cross-examination go a very long way towards
entitling me to make a finding of professional negligence in this case. If the choice lay between doing something or
doing nothing to check the validity of Mr Travers' alleged comments, then
on Mr Gordon's own admission he took the latter course. Despite his claimed reliance on the expertise
of ETC in the field of artificial pitch construction, he took no steps to check
with them the proper composition and characteristics of the sub-base materials
as specified. More importantly, he did
not ask them to justify the performance of the pitches at that stage, nor even
to comment on the observed ponding which they themselves must also have
seen. In parallel, he did nothing to
investigate the state of the drainage, with particular reference to the extent
to which the sub-base reservoir was in fact filled
with static water, nor did he carry out even the simplest examination of the
top surface of the dynamic layer to see if that yielded any answer to the
problem. Under the contract, of course,
he had the power to instruct sampling or testing of any part of the constructed
sub-base, but even a simple permeability test would in all probability have
been sufficient to divert attention away from the drainage and in the direction
of the materials themselves. In my
opinion, on an issue so fundamental to the fitness of the pitches for their
intended purpose, and bearing in mind also Mr Gordon's alleged discovery
that important drainage connection work had not been carried out, it is simply
not credible that he should have been entitled to take none of these steps
while at the same time continuing to certify all aspects of the contract works
for payment. Even on his own account, he
inexplicably did nothing at all for a fortnight before allegedly raising his
concern regarding surface water with Mr Travers.
[48] In considering the expert evidence led from Messrs Gibb and
Pirie on this aspect of the case, I note in passing that each side's witness
was criticised as having been affected by "momentum" flowing from a personal
belief as to what further investigations in 1995 would have disclosed. Mr Gibb, it was said, believed that the sub-base
materials were intrinsically defective, and was thus critical of Mr Gordon for
leaving matters unexplored. Mr Pirie, on
the other hand, was said to be a convert to Mr Tipp's theories and
conclusions, and accordingly comfortable with Mr Gordon having failed to
take the steps which the pursuers desiderated.
Over and above that, counsel for the defender challenged the reliability
of Mr Gibb's evidence as having been based on erroneous assumptions as to
what Mr Gordon actually saw and knew in October 1995. For his part, counsel for the pursuers
contended that Mr Pirie's approach to the duties of a competent and careful
architect was altogether too lenient, and should be discounted for that
reason.
[49] It is quite possible that the evidence of the two experts was
influenced, in different directions, by the "momentum" which counsel
identified. However, I do not think that
it would be appropriate to discount the evidence of either man on that ground
alone. So far as Mr Gibb's evidence
is concerned, he did not have the opportunity of hearing the concessions which
Mr Gordon subsequently made in the witness box, nor did he hear
Mr Gordon's claims to have seen rather less than the video footage
showed. In my view Mr Gibb was
justified in assuming that Mr Gordon would have seen broadly what the
videos disclosed, but in any event he was entitled to take the view that any competent
and careful architect would have appreciated that the presence of any lying water on the top of the
dynamic layer was a matter of real concern.
In this, he correctly anticipated the really important concession which
Mr Gordon made. What mattered was
that, in places, the pitch surfaces were plainly not free-draining, and in that
regard precise locations and dates were not of critical significance. Accordingly, I do not consider that
Mr Gibb's evidence was weakened by the assumptions on which it proceeded. In his view, any architect should have
queried the presence and cause of water lying on the pitch surfaces, and in
particular should have demanded an explanation from ETC as the responsible
sub-contractors. Because it was never
put to him, Mr Gibb also had no opportunity to comment on Mr Gordon's
claim to have relied on a conversation with Mr Travers of Europa regarding
unconnected drainage. However, at the
beginning of Day 11 of the proof, he did comment on the passage in
Mr Pirie's report which suggested that Mr Gordon, of his own accord,
had formed the belief that unconnected drainage was to blame. Mr Gibb reacted to that suggestion with
incredulity, pointing out that no relevant entry appeared in any site minute, and
that in place of any expression of concern the minutes from October 1995
onwards showed only satisfaction with the progress of the works. At this time, while substantial contract
monies remained outstanding, the architect had a real hold over the
contractors, and to a lesser extent he continued to have a hold over them
during the defects liability period. It
was therefore wholly unacceptable for Mr Gordon to have taken no effective
steps to protect the pursuers' interests.
Had the matter been raised with ETC when it should have been, the
probability was that the true cause would have been identified and that ETC
would have remedied the situation.
[50] In my opinion Mr Gibb's evidence was restrained and
persuasive, and reflected a common sense view of the situation. It was also broadly consistent with the
concessions subsequently made by Mr Gordon in the witness box. Mr Gibb was an experienced and
well-respected architect, and in the circumstances I am satisfied that I should
accept the conclusions which he put forward, and the reasoning on which they
were based.
[51] By contrast, while acknowledging that Mr Pirie was also an
experienced and well-respected architect, I am unable to accept the views which
he expressed in this case. He was, of
course, in a difficult position from the outset, given the various concessions
which Mr Gordon made in the witness box, but it does not seem to me that
his evidence came anywhere near neutralising these concessions or persuading me
that they should not have been made.
According to Mr Pirie, a competent and careful architect would have
had to rely on ETC's knowledge of the sub-base materials and how they should
perform, yet he saw nothing wrong with Mr Gordon's failure to consult ETC
when an apparently significant problem arose.
He did not seek to criticise the absence of any mention of the problem
in contemporaneous site minutes, nor did he query the significant delay before
any record of the unconnected drainage appeared. He did not criticise Mr Gordon for doing
nothing between 17 and 31 October
1995, or for continuing to issue unqualified interim certificates, or for expressing himself as satisfied with
progress in the site minutes, or ultimately for
granting a certificate of practical completion without seeking to verify the
true cause of a continuing problem. His
position was simply that having mentioned his concerns to Mr Travers, and
having received an apparently logical reply, an architect such as
Mr Gordon was entitled, without more, to assume the correctness of that
reply. In my opinion, when faced with
the uphill struggle of trying to overcome the concessions which Mr Gordon
made in the witness box, Mr Pirie proposed far too lenient a standard for
the competent and careful architect. In
this, he was at variance with Mr Gordon himself, and with Mr Gibb,
and in my view also with common sense having regard to the video evidence and
the picture presented by the site minutes between October and December
1995. In all the circumstances I am
unable to regard Mr Pirie's evidence as a reliable guide to what might, in
late 1995, have been expected of an architect of ordinary competence exercising
reasonable care and skill, and bearing in mind the non-technical nature of the
omission alleged against Mr Gordon it seems to me that that evidence can
be discounted on all of the grounds discussed at paragraph [39] above. It may be that, if Mr Pirie had not been
inclined to believe that the surface water problems in late 1995 were
attributable to unconnected drainage, the whole tenor of his evidence would
have been different. But as matters
stand I have come to the view that, on the critical issue, the evidence of
Mr Gibb, taken together with Mr Gordon's concessions, is to be
preferred to that of Mr Pirie.
Conclusion
on liability
[52] For all of these reasons, it
seems to me that the pursuers have successfully established their case of
professional negligence against Mr Gordon and, through him, against the
defender. Had it been necessary for me
to do so, I would have held (i) that Mr Gordon could not have failed to
see the extent of surface ponding shown in the video footage of both 17 and
31 October 1995, (ii) that he did not in fact raise any concern with
Mr Travers on 31 October as he claimed, and (iii) that the matter of
unconnected drainage did not arise until the contractors mentioned it at the
site meeting of 11 December 1995.
In that situation, which would be consistent with the surrounding facts
and circumstances, including Mr Gordon's other actings over the relevant period, he unaccountably did nothing to ascertain the cause
of a visible problem which he knew to be of potentially fundamental
importance. It is, however, unnecessary
for me to go that far, because I am satisfied that, even on his own account
taken at face value, Mr Gordon fell below the standard to be expected of
an architect of ordinary competence exercising reasonable care and skill. His claimed conversation with Mr Travers
was significantly delayed;
it was not subsequently followed up to any degree; and in the whole circumstances I am unable to
accept that this could realistically constitute a sufficient discharge of the
defender's legal responsibilities towards the pursuers.
Causation
[53] As I see it, the issue here
is simply whether, if Mr Gordon had appropriately pursued his concerns
regarding surface water in October 1995, the pursuers' continuing problems and
consequent losses would probably have been avoided. According to Mr Gibb, the answer was
clear. Had Mr Gordon raised the
matter with ETC, asking them to justify the state of the partially-completed
pitches, ETC would in all probability have investigated the matter and reached
the same conclusion as was reached by Weeks Technical Services, Charles Lawrence
(Scotland) Limited, and Messrs Kidd, Gibb and Sheard in 1997 and 1998. It was then probable that they would have
rectified the situation at their own expense.
They were renowned contractors with a reputation to maintain, and in late
1995 they would also have been under commercial pressure to comply while significant
payments remained outstanding under their sub-contract. Over and above that, the rectification cost
in 1995 was relatively small, being equivalent to only a fraction of the
outstanding contractual payments.
However, Mr Gibb went further and contended that, irrespective of
ETC's response, a competent and careful architect would have (i) checked
the state of the drainage, and (ii) ordered the sampling and testing of
pitch materials, with a view to satisfying himself of the true position. Admittedly sampling and testing would have
had some cost implications for the pursuers, but on a matter of potentially
fundamental importance an architect should nevertheless have proceeded to
exercise the contractual powers vested in him.
[54] Mr Pirie, on the other hand, sought to cast doubt on what
would have happened, perhaps again from the standpoint of one who believed that
the unconnected drainage was the real cause of the trouble. According to him, it was very difficult to
judge how ETC would have reacted in this entirely hypothetical situation. Moreover, given the pursuers' past insistence
on cutting costs at every turn on this project, it was unlikely that they would
have agreed to meet the cost of sampling and testing the pitch materials.
[55] In the latter context counsel for the defenders further argued
that, since the full extent of Mr Gibb's evidence had not been put to
Mr Gordon in cross-examination - the only suggestion to Mr Gordon
being that it would have been prudent for him to ask ETC about the surface
water on the pitches - the matter of sampling and testing, and its likely
outcome, could not properly be taken into account.
[56] In my opinion, the pursuers' contentions are to be preferred on
this issue. In practical terms the
choice is between, on the one hand, ETC reacting in broadly the same way as
they did later on, when they were under no contractual obligation or financial
pressure to do so, and, on the other, the development of some sort of stalemate
in which the true cause of the problem would have remained unresolved, and/or
the contractors (including ETC) would have resisted demands for remedial action
notwithstanding the subsistence of the contracts and the threat of outstanding
payments being withheld. As it seems to
me, the former alternative may legitimately be inferred from the whole
surrounding facts and circumstances, and is by far the more likely consequence
of appropriate action being taken by Mr Gordon.
I am not prepared to accept that the problem with the pitch materials would
have remained unidentified if the matter had been appropriately pursued, and I
also think it highly unlikely that, irrespective of the contractual situation,
a company like ETC would have declined to undertake remedial works. In reaching this conclusion, I am content to
proceed on the basis that Mr Gordon's duty was, at the very least, to
approach ETC and ask them to justify the state of the pitches. On the balance of probabilities, it seems to
me that that would have been sufficient to secure a favourable outcome from the
pursuers' point of view. Had it been
necessary, however, I would also have held that in the event of any lack of
co-operation on ETC's part, a competent and careful architect should have
insisted on (a) checking the drainage and (b) sampling and testing the pitch
materials in the exercise of his contractual powers. Either way, in my opinion,
the end result would have been the same, and the pitches would have been
rectified at no cost to the pursuers.
[57] In the event, of course, Mr Gordon never raised the matter
with ETC (or formally with the main contractors Europa) in 1995; without deduction, he certified all work for
payment and issued a certificate of practical completion; the defects liability period was allowed to
elapse without appropriate action being taken;
no warranty was obtained from ETC to allow the pursuers to institute a
contractual claim against them; and of
course Europa and then ETC subsequently went into liquidation. It is, in my view, highly unlikely that such
a lamentable sequence of events would have occurred if Mr Gordon had not
been professionally negligent. I
therefore decline to make any such finding, and hold instead that the pursuers'
case on causation has been proved.
Damages
General
[58] In presenting his
submissions at the end of the proof, counsel for the pursuers referred me to
the three alternative calculations which were put forward by Mr Howard
Ounsley in his updated report no.6/63 of process. As a matter of law, it was well settled that the
measure of a pursuer's loss might be ascertained by reference to several
different approaches, none of which need necessarily be determinative:- cf. Haberstitch v
McCormick & Nicholson 1976 SC 1,
esp. per Lord President Emslie at pp.9-10.
As Lord President Clyde put it (quoting Lord Stair) in Duke of Portland v Wood's Trustees 1926 SC 640, at p.652, "It is rather in the
arbitrament of the Judge to ponder all circumstances". It was also well settled that while
contractual damages might prima facie
fall to be assessed as at the date when a cause of action accrued, there was no
bar to a later assessment where that was necessary to achieve restitutio in integrum, and in particular where a pursuer's impecuniosity had precluded
the carrying out of rectification works at an early stage when costs were lower:- cf. Bevan
Investments v Blackhall Struthers
1977 11 BLR 78; Dodd Properties (Kent) Limited v Canterbury City Council 1980 1 WLR 433.
[59] Against that background, Mr Ounsley's three alternative
calculations were as follows:
(i)
|
Loss of profits sustained by the
pursuers over the 8 years from 1996-2003 inclusive:
|
£585,000
|
(ii)
|
Diminution in the current market
value of the development as a going concern:
|
£355,000
|
(iii)
|
Current cost of rectifying the pitch
defects:
|
£221,000
|
In theory, more than one of these
heads of loss might be appropriate in the circumstances of a given case, but at
the end of the proof counsel for the pursuers invited me to grant decree in his
clients' favour for £585,000, which failing £355,000, which failing £221,000,
in that order. The primary claim for
loss of profits alone appeared to depend largely on the concession that, if the
pitches had been free of defects, then out of their operating profits the
pursuers would have had to meet all capital costs such as the (now urgent) cost
of renewing the pitches at the expiry of their natural life. On this basis it was suggested that if an
award for loss of profits were to be made, no additional claim for
rectification costs, or for diminution in value, would be appropriate.
Loss
of profits
[60] As succinctly explained by
Mr Ounsley in his updated report, the pursuers had plainly lost
substantial profits by comparison with even a conservative view of the
commercial potential of such a development.
Mr Ounsley was a very experienced valuer with particular expertise
in the field of artificially-surfaced sports facilities, and had no difficulty
in calculating (by standard means) the potential annual profits which he
thought the Glenrothes facility was reasonably capable of generating between
1996 and 2003. When compared with the
pursuers' actual profits in the same years, this brought out a cumulative
shortfall equivalent to the principal sum sued for, namely £585,000.
[61] Counsel for the defender was severely critical of this aspect
of Mr Ounsley's report, maintaining that no proper evidence had been led
to justify any award for loss of profits in this case. On one side of Mr Ounsley's calculation
were figures which involved no assessment of the pursuers' ability to manage
and run a facility of this kind, and thus bore no relation to reality. In addition, these figures unduly favoured
the pursuers in connection with booking levels, days of operation and the
like. The other side of the comparison
involved figures derived from the pursuers' annual accounts, but the accounts
themselves did not disclose how far (if at all) the progress and profitability
of the enterprise had been adversely affected by the surface water
problem. Vague general evidence on these
matters had been given by the Atwal brothers, but astonishingly none of the pursuers'
business records had been produced for the assistance of the court. There was thus no vouching to show the number
and source of bookings from year to year, the extent and timing of
cancellations due to pitch problems, or the apparent effect of such
cancellations on the pursuers' trading.
The court was being asked to award a substantial arithmetical shortfall
on the assumption that it reflected the adverse consequences of pitch
defects. However, the validity of that
assumption was not proved, and the arithmetical shortfall might just as easily
reflect the pursuers' inexperience and lack of appropriate management
skills. Since the true position could not
now be ascertained, and the court could only guess at the level of an
appropriate award, it would be inappropriate for any loss of profits to be awarded
at all.
[62] By way of reply to these criticisms, counsel for the pursuers
commended Mr Ounsley's qualifications and the clarity of his report, and
submitted that on all relevant matters of detail the evidence of the Atwal
brothers was sufficient and should be accepted.
Mr Ounsley's calculation had avoided the need to explore the
details of actual bookings and cancellations, and had instead proceeded on a
reasonable comparison between the pursuers' troubled years, on the one hand,
and the true potential of the development, on the other.
Diminution
in market value
[63] Turning to diminution in market
value, Mr Ounsley's calculation started with the figure which a purchaser
might reasonably be expected to pay for the facility, as a going concern, in
the event of its being in perfect condition.
In accordance with normal practice, this calculation started with a
notional profit figure reflecting the apparent potential of the development in
2003 (the last year for which accounts were available), and went on to apply a
multiplier before bringing out a total of £785,000. As against that, the market value of the
subjects with defects was assessed by taking the same figure of £785,000, and
deducting from it (a) the rectification cost of £221,000, and (b) further
sums to represent re-launch costs and diminished business over the first two years. This brought out a total of £430,000, and the
difference between the values with and without defects was accordingly
£355,000. In Mr Ounsley's view, it
was not realistic to attempt any more sophisticated calculation on the basis of
the pursuers' actual profitability, or lack of it, at any relevant date.
Cost
of rectification
[64] The figure of £221,000 for
current rectification costs was spoken to by Mr O'Donnell in his evidence
on Day 6 of the proof, and in the end neither party took issue with the
accuracy of this figure.
Discussion
and conclusion on damages
[65] In assessing the true nature
and extent of the pursuers' losses in this case, I begin by noticing the very
limited scope of the evidence tending to show how far their business has been
adversely affected by the recurring problem of surface water on the pitches. According to Mr Atwal, records of all
bookings and cancellations were in existence, but for some reason these were
not produced in court. Had they been
available for scrutiny, they might have confirmed the sort of trading pattern
of which the Atwal brothers gave general evidence. They might have shown which pitches were
worst affected, and with what frequency.
They might have illustrated the booking patterns as between organised
leagues and "bounce" games, and perhaps demonstrated why the ratio between
these categories fluctuated from about 1:1 to around 3:1 in the pursuers'
annual accounts. They might also have
confirmed the existence of a link between the loss of particular customers and
the cancellation of fixtures due to pitch problems. Alternatively, however, the missing records
might have confirmed none of these things, and might have raised other possible
explanations for the pursuers' gradually increasing turnover from 1996 to 2001,
and/or for the marked decline which has occurred since then. How far was that decline due to
Mr Atwal, the driving force behind this development, losing interest and concentrating
on his restaurant business from around 2000?
How far did it coincide with the emergence of greater local competition,
including the major Powerleague complex in Dunfermline,
in the period subsequent to Mr Ounsley's initial report in 2000? How far could it have been attributable to
lack of maintenance of the pitches and drainage, and to episodes of increased
flooding on that account? In the absence
of the pursuers' business records, questions like these remain substantially
unanswered, and it is therefore difficult for the court to make any confident
estimate of the proportion of the claimed shortfall in profits which is truly
attributable to the defective state of the pitches.
[66] Further complications arose from the evidence of the Atwal
brothers. For example, according to
Mr Amarjit Atwal on Day 8 of the proof, it was not all that long ago
that the pursuers realised that the business was not doing well. Notwithstanding the loss of some customers
whose bookings were affected by rain, the business was "running fairly well"
and "going quite happily" until a gradual decline set in at a date which he
could not pinpoint. At its peak, the
business supported a total of 15 eight-team "divisions" or leagues over a
6-day week, although the number of leagues had now dropped to 5. These leagues would run without a break
during a 3-4 month season, before becoming quieter over the holiday
period. Even in 2005, when the pitches
were in a bad state of disrepair, the pursuers were still left with their "most
loyal teams" until, while the proof was in progress, their insurers forced the
closure of the facility on safety grounds.
[67] Mr Atwal's evidence was less forthcoming on some of these
issues. According to him, the business
operated 6 days a week for 52 weeks of the year. At one time leagues had been an "almost
daily" feature, but this was now reduced to a 3-day week. Although the pursuers' initial business
projections had never come close to being realised, Mr Atwal purported to
agree with Mr Ounsley's potential turnover of £300,000 per annum, and felt
that his profits figure of £585,000 was "achievable". Mr Atwal also agreed that Mr Ounsley's
selected hourly pitch charge of £30 was conservative, even though this would be
higher than the charges levied by many competitors, including the Fife
Institute just across the road. He
further purported to agree that £60,000 would be a reasonable level of bar
takings "...if there were more customers", despite the fact that the highest
figure for bar takings in the pursuers' accounts since 1996 was only £21,537,
with the level most often achieved being around £15,000/£16,000.
[68] As regards the percentage of days affected by rain,
Mr Atwal's estimate (as quoted by Mr Ounsley) was 10-20%, a
surprisingly wide range if, as he disclosed in court, the relevant records were
in existence. However, when asked about
this on Day 4 of the proof, he went rather further and expressed the
belief that the percentage of affected days was "20-25%... 30%", thereby ending
up with a range of figures in which the uppermost was three times greater than
the lowest. Significantly, however, even
if Mr Atwal's upper level of 30% were to be added back to the actual
profit figures in the pursuers' accounts, these would still come nowhere near
Mr Ounsley's projected potential profitability for the development. This suggests either that Mr Ounsley's
figures are not realistic, or that by no means all of the
apparent shortfall is attributable to problems with the pitches.
[69] A further difficulty, in my view, is that the assumption of an
unbroken 52‑week trading year for the facility seems unrealistic. It makes no allowance for regular winter
weather, for example snow and ice, or persistent heavy rain, which would tend
to render the pitches unplayable.
Equally, it makes no allowance for public holidays such as Christmas and
New Year, for customers' annual holidays, or for intervals between
leagues. The time required for annual
maintenance and redecoration of the facility would also appear to have been
ignored.
[70] In all the circumstances, I find myself unable to accept either that Mr Ounsley's projected
potential profit figures for the period 1996-2003 are reasonably stated, or that the whole of the shortfall
between these figures and the actual profit taken from the pursuers' annual
accounts can, in the absence of the pursuers' business records, properly be
attributed to the defective state of the pitches. The main criticisms which can in my view be
levelled against Mr Ounsley's projections are (i) that they assume a
52-hour week; (ii)
that they include extensive Saturday operation, contrary to the pursuers'
long-term practice; and (iii) that they
allow estimated bar takings at a level far in excess of what the pursuers ever
actually managed to achieve. In these
respects I do not consider that Mr Ounsley ended up comparing like with
like. Arguably, his assumed hourly
rental figure of £30 was also on the high side, but I am inclined to give him
the benefit of the doubt on that score. If
(a) the annual utilisation of the pitches were to be reduced to a more
realistic figure of (say) 48 weeks, and at the same time (b) Saturday
trading were to be excluded, and (c) estimated bar takings were to be stated
at a level equivalent to the highest ratio which the pursuers' actual bar
takings bore to pitch income in their annual accounts (approximately 22%), I
calculate that Mr Ounsley's "EBDITA" potential profit for 2003 would
thereby come down from £138,500 to only £95,225 (i.e. £30 x 121.5 hours x 48 weeks x 122% x 50%, less £11,500); that his projected net profit for the years
1996-2003 would, on the basis of the 2003 figure continuing to represent
19.514% of the total, amount to £487,000 rather than £709,000; and that the overall loss of profits would thus
be reduced from £585,000 to around £363,000.
[71] Over and above that, however, I consider that a substantial
discount would be appropriate to reflect the real uncertainty as to the true
effect of the pitch problems on the pursuers' actual trading figures. On the evidence, I am prepared to accept that
the major part of the shortfall should be attributed to the direct and indirect
effects of the pitch defects, including the inevitable erosion of the pursuers'
morale and commitment to the business, and on that basis it seems to me that a
discount of (say) one-third would adequately cover the evidential uncertainty
to which I have referred. On this
approach, the loss of profits calculation would bring out a figure of £242,000.
[72] As previously noted, diminution in capital value is put forward
as an alternative measure of the pursuers' loss. This approach concentrates on what a
purchaser might realistically offer for the facility in its present state, and in
that context particular features of the pursuers' past trading pattern would no
longer be directly relevant. Accordingly,
in my view, modifications (a) and (c) as set out in paragraph [70]
above should continue to apply to the profit potential figures which underpin
the calculation, but not modification (b) on account of the fact that an
intending third party purchaser might well envisage operating 7 days per
week in line with Mr Ounsley's advice.
On that basis, the capital value of the facility without defects, less
purchasers' costs at 5.5%, would on my calculations ([£30 x 153 hours x 48 weeks x 122% x 50%, less £11,500] x 6 x 94.5%)
come to £696,000. As regards the value
with defects, this would be £696,000 less
(i) rectification costs of £221,000 and (ii) a re-launch allowance of 17%,
bringing out a figure of £357,000 and thus an overall diminution of £339,000 in
the value of the property on account of the defects.
[73] Although I have up to this point considered each of
Mr Ounsley's principal calculations separately, it does not seem to me
that either of them would by itself represent adequate compensation to the
pursuers in the circumstances of this case.
As the pursuers concede, a discounted award in name of loss of profits
must be taken as covering the cost of such pitch replacement as would have been
necessary even if no surface water problem had existed, and it is agreed in
this action that that cost would be £160,000.
But since it is also agreed that the cost of rectifying the defective
pitches is rather greater, amounting to £221,000, the excess of £61,000 is a
cost which the pursuers would not have had to meet but for the professional
negligence of the defender, and I can see no reason why the pursuers should be
expected to meet that excess cost out of their own pocket. In short, I consider that the true measure of
the pursuers' loss comprises two elements, namely (i) the discounted loss
of profits to which I have already referred, amounting to £242,000, and
(ii) the current cost of rectifying the defects, under deduction of the
£160,000 replacement cost which the pursuers would have required to meet in any
event. These two elements together
amount to £303,000, and in my opinion substantial
justice would be achieved by an award of damages at that level.
[74] Counsel for the defender suggested that any award relative to
the cost of rectification should be discounted on account of the pursuers'
delay in bringing this action to a conclusion.
However, I do not consider that any deduction from the figure of £61,000
would be appropriate in present circumstances.
Apart from the fact that I am not inclined to blame either party for
such delays as have occurred in this case, it seems to me that the relevant
excess would probably have remained at a comparable level even if the
two primary costs had been assessed at some earlier date. Moreover, in the context of Mr Ounsley's
calculation of diminished market value, it is clear that only current costs
would be considered by a notional third party purchaser, with the result that no
discount would be justified there either.
Failing such a discount, I understood counsel for the defender to accept
that present-day figures could legitimately be considered in view of the
pursuers' impecuniosity to date.
[75] On Mr Ounsley's alternative approach, the diminution in
the capital value of the facility equates to (i) the current rectification
cost of £221,000, taken together with (ii) fairly substantial re-launch
costs and allowances. On the basis set
out in paragraph [72] above, these elements amount, in aggregate, to
£339,000. On a superficial view, this
figure is not far removed from the sum of £303,000 to which I refer in
paragraph [73], and may thus be thought to provide a cross-check on the
validity of the latter. However, I am
not persuaded that the two can properly be compared in this way, nor even that
Mr Ounsley's calculation of diminished capital value provides a true
measure of the pursuers' loss. For one
thing, the current rectification cost of £221,000 would surely have to be
off-set, at some point in the calculation, by the replacement cost of £160,000
which the pursuers would have had to meet anyway. And for another, it seems to me that, in
present circumstances, the pursuers would almost certainly have incurred
re-launch costs and diminished initial trading returns even if they had merely
been replacing the pitches at the end of their natural life. In addition, it is clear that an award in
name of diminished capital value alone would reflect only part of the pursuers'
loss, leaving them entirely uncompensated for such loss of profits as they have
sustained to date. These considerations
merely serve to confirm and reinforce my conclusion that the true measure of
the pursuers' loss, and the proper measure of an award of damages, must
comprise the aggregate of (i) their discounted loss of profits to date,
and (ii) the £61,000 excess cost of putting the pitches into proper
repair.
[76] Accordingly, in my view, the pursuers' entitlement to damages
in this case may fairly be assessed at the sum of £303,000. As I understand it, no interest will be
payable on that figure to date because the "EBDITA" profits utilised by
Mr Ounsley in his calculations took no account of depreciation, interest,
tax or amortisation. In his submissions
at the end of the proof, counsel for the pursuers accepted that this would be
the correct approach, and in acknowledging this counsel for the defender did
not press her contention that the loss of profit calculations should be re-done
so as to incorporate the omitted items. Neither
party sought to address me on the potential impact of taxation on any award in
name of loss of profits.
Decision
[77] For
all of the foregoing reasons, I now sustain the pursuers' first plea-in-law,
repel the first three pleas-in-law for the defender, and find the pursuers
entitled to damages in the sum of £303,000.
Notwithstanding the position regarding interest to date, as recorded in
paragraph [76] above, interest at 8% per year will, in the ordinary way,
be payable on the above sum from the date of decree until payment.