OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2006] CSOH 68
|
PD388/05
|
OPINION OF LORD
TURNBULL
in the cause
PETER ALASTAIR
STRUTHERS‑WRIGHT
Pursuer;
against
NEVIS RANGE
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY PLC
Defenders:
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ________________
|
Pursuer:
Hardman; Russel & Aitken
Defenders: Ross; McClure Naismith
4 May 2006
Introduction
[1] The pursuer in this action is Peter
Alastair Struthers-Wright. The defenders
are the Nevis Range Development Company PLC, a company incorporated under the
Companies Acts and whose registered office is at Edinburgh Quay,
133 Fountain Bridge, Edinburgh. The defenders provide skiing services at
Aonach Mor near Fort
William.
[2] The
pursuer seeks an award of damages against the defenders in light of injuries
suffered by him whilst skiing at Aonach Mor on Wednesday
20 March 2002. The case called
before me for proof on Tuesday 7 March 2006. Mr Hardman appeared as Counsel for the
pursuer and Mr Ross appeared as Counsel for the defenders. I heard evidence on that and the following two
days. Submissions were presented on
Friday 10 March.
[3] At the
commencement of the proof, I was given information about a development in the
assessment of the pursuer's injuries which had only just come to the attention
of his Counsel. In light of this, Mr
Hardman invited me in terms of Rule of Court 36.1(b) to order that the
proof on liability be separated from proof on quantum and to restrict the
current issue at proof to liability. Mr
Ross consented to this motion. In these
circumstances, I granted the motion made.
[4] Mr
Hardman led the evidence of the pursuer and his wife, Gale Struthers‑Wright. Mr Ross led evidence from Ms Marian Austin,
the defenders' Managing Director, Tony Cardwell, the defenders' Ski Patrol
Manager, David Sutherland, a Snow Boarding Instructor employed by the
defenders, Paul Roe, a further member of the Ski Patrol, and Bruce Crawford,
the Chief Executive of Snowsport Scotland.
The Nevis Range Facility
[5] The
defenders provide skiing and snow boarding services at what they call the Nevis Range, at Aonach Mor near Fort William. The services include tuition, hire of
equipment, a range of different ski lifts and tows and the presence of a Ski
Patrol to provide advice and medical assistance.
[6] The
main ski area is situated on the north west slope of Aonach Mor and is
referred to as The Goose. Access is
provided to this area from the car park below by what is called a mountain gondola. Customers who wish to use the facilities
purchase tickets from a kiosk in the car park area. From the top station of the gondola customers
can access a range of ski runs, tows and chairlifts within The Goose area.
[7] A
second ski area, known as The Back Corries, is located on the north east slope
of the mountain. Access to the Back
Corries is obtained from the summit plateau of Aonach Mor. Skiers (or snow boarders) may reach the
summit plateau by taking a combination of ski tows or lifts within The Goose
area to the tow called the Summit Button Tow.
Using this tow the skier accesses the plateau itself. The Summit Button Tow was referred to in
evidence as "The Summit Tow". The top of
the Summit Tow is at a height of some 4,000 feet.
[8] From
the top of the Summit Tow there are ski runs which are broadly parallel with
the tow. One could ski up and down these
using the Summit Tow. In addition, there
are runs, heading from the top of the Summit Tow, which would take a skier back
into The Goose area.
[9] The
defenders commenced operations at Aonach Mor in 1989 with facilities in The
Goose area. About two or three years
later they added the facilities in the Back Corries.
[10] All of the ski runs within both The Goose and the Back Corries
are given names and their locations and routes are represented on literature
provided by the defenders. The ski runs
are also graded in ascending order of difficulty from green to blue to red and
to black. In 2002, the runs within the
Back Corries were all graded as either red or black runs. The defenders' production number 7/57 of
process was accepted by the parties as being the version of their leaflet
describing their facilities which was in use in 2002. It contained a representation of the ski
areas with the various runs marked and named.
Next to the representation of the ski areas there is text headed up:
"A Friendly Welcome To The Nevis Range!" There are three paragraphs of text below this
heading. The second paragraph is in the
following terms:
"Opening up the Back Corries with the Braveheart Chair has
expanded the skiable area considerably, providing intermediate and experienced
skiers and boarders with an off-piste expanse, unrivalled in Scotland! Entry points are
marked on the map, you are advised to consult Ski Patrol to verify snow
conditions and avalanche risks, look out for the piste signage or call into the
ski patrol hut at the top of the Summit lift."
At the edge of the ski map on this leaflet is a text
box within which the grading of the runs is explained. Green is described as easy, blue
intermediate, red difficult and black very difficult.
The Summit
[11] The
eastern edge of the summit plateau is bordered by a ridge. If one exited the summit tow and walked
directly ahead one would be walking to the east. Within quite a short distance one would come
to a steep cliff edge beyond which was an area used by climbers. Beyond the top of the Summit Tow the
defenders had erected a fence to try and discourage people from heading off in
that direction. Following the cliff edge
or ridge in a northerly direction, one would come to a point known as Climbers
Coll. From this point on, the ridge
curves round to form a basin with the area below known as The Back Corries.
[12] From
the Climbers Coll onwards, the ridge provides access for skiers into the Back
Corries. There are a number of runs
within the Back Corries, some of which are accessed from this part of the ridge. This part of the ridge, as it runs around the
summit edge, is known as the Lemming Ridge.
Once into the Back Corries, skiers can use the facility of a chairlift
called the Braveheart Chair to allow them to ski up and down a portion of the
slope and can make their way back by other runs to The Goose area.
[13] From
the area of the Lemming Ridge, there are a number of marked and recognised ski
runs into the Back Corries. The first of
these commences at a point just to the north of Climbers Coll and is called
Chancer. The next run commences about
two hundred metres further on around the curve of the ridge and is called
Back Track. When snow is lying on
the summit plateau the shape and precise location of the edge can change. As snow builds up and is blown across the
plateau by wind, the snow at the edge can create an overhang known as a cornice. The entry point from the ridge to each of the
Chancer and Back Track runs is marked by a pole bearing a sign with the name of
the run. These poles are simply placed
into the snow and can be moved as and when necessary. The snow at the entry point is cut away so
that at that point there is no overhang and the skier can move straight onto
the face of the slope. The entry at the
Chancer run is steeper than that at the Back Track run. In 2002, the Chancer run was graded as a
black run whereas the Back Track run was graded red.
The
Chancer Run
[14] The
Chancer run is sign posted from the top of the Summit Tow. The route to the run is marked by a line of
poles permanently sunk into the rock. The
line of poles runs broadly parallel to the cliff edge in the area used by
climbers. The purpose of these poles is
to act as both a route and a sort of boundary line. As one made one's way down this route to the
Chancer run, the cliff would be off to one's right. Taking this route, the start of the Chancer
run was about five hundred yards from the top of the Summit Tow. The line of poles was depicted on production
number 7/56 of process, a copy ordnance survey map.
The Back Track Run
[15] The
Back Track run is also sign posted from the top of the Summit Tow. The recognised route is firstly along what is
called the Switch run. The Switch run is
one of the runs that goes from the top of the Summit Tow back to the main, or
Goose, ski area. Taking this run, the
Lemming Ridge would be some distance off to the skier's right hand side.
[16] The
left hand edge of the Switch run is bordered by a snow fence. The snow fence runs in a direction which is
broadly parallel with the Lemming Ridge until a point roughly level with the
entrance to the Back Track run where the fence turns off to the left in the
direction of the Goose area. On the way
down the Switch run there are two further snow fences roughly parallel with
each other which run across the plateau at an angle of about forty five degrees
towards the Lemming Ridge. Their purpose
is to create a channel or route across to the entrance to the Back Track run.
At the end of the line of the two fences, there is a
permanent tower about four or five metres high. It is used as an anchor point for snow grooming
machines. The tower is located about
twenty metres from the entrance to the Back Track run.
Information Signs
[17] Information
about weather conditions is available to skiers in various ways at various
points around the defenders' facility. On
20
March 2002
certain signs were located around the area of the summit. There was a white board with marker pen
writing on it at the exit from the Summit Tow.
On the morning of 20 March 2002 it said:
"Back
open, caution poor visibility, avalanche debris, cornices".
In the area of the cliff edge used by climbers, the
defenders had placed warning signs at intervals running from a point roughly in
line with the top of the Summit Tow to about Climbers Coll. These signs comprised yellow boards attached
to poles. On each board there was a
black triangular sign depicting a person falling headfirst down a mountainside. Below the sign there appeared the word
"DANGER!", also in black. An example of
such a sign appeared in photograph 3 within production number 7/52 of process. These signs were located roughly in a line to
the right of the line of the poles marking the route to the Chancer run. On the last of the line of poles, about
ten metres from the entrance to the Chancer run, there was one of the
yellow danger signs. At the entrance to
the run itself there was a further pole with a sign bearing the name of the run. This last pole was merely placed into the
snow and accordingly moveable as necessary.
[18] There
was a sign for the start of the Switch run indicating that it led to other
runs, including the Back Track run. At
each of the two fences forming the route across to the Back Track run there
were signs indicating that the route to the Back Track run was to the
right and that the route to The Goose area was to the left. On the tower at the end of the fences there
was a further danger sign of the sort located along the climbers cliff. At the entrance to the Back Track run, there
was a pole placed into the snow bearing the name of the run.
Ski
Patrol
[19] The
defenders provided a Ski Patrol facility at the Nevis Range. On 20 March 2002 there were four members of
the Ski Patrol on duty. They were based
at a hut near to the top exit of the Summit Tow. It was the duty of the Ski Patrol to check
the skiing areas each day before the facility was opened to the public. In the Back Corries, the Ski Patrol would
ensure that the slopes were free from any obvious dangers. At the entrances to the runs they would clear
away any danger and ensure that the cornice was broken back to firm snow. It was their duty to assess whether
conditions were suitable for the runs to be open. The white board at the top of the Summit Run
was filled out by members of the Ski Patrol.
The Pursuer's Accident
[20] Mr
Struthers-Wright was 39 years old by the date of the proof. He had been married for 18 years. He had substantial experience of skiing,
having started at the age of five. He
was a proficient recreational skier and although he did ski black runs, he
preferred to ski red or blue runs.
[21] He gave
evidence that on 20 March 2002 he arrived at the Nevis Range facility at about 9.30am with the intention of
skiing in the Back Corries area, if it was open. This was what he usually did as the snow was
good in that area. He had substantial
experience of skiing at Aonach Mor. Within the previous two or three months
he had skied there two or three times and he had skied in the Back Corries on
the Wednesday of the previous week.
[22] Having
taken the gondola from the car park to the start of the main skiing area, the
pursuer took what was called the Quad Chairlift and skied from the top of it to
a point further across the slope where he accessed a ski tow called the Goose
T-Bar. From the top of this tow, he
accessed the Summit Tow which took him to the summit plateau. All of these facilities were represented on production
number 7/64 of process, which was a large-scale representation of the Ski Runs
and facilities provided by the defenders.
Mr Struthers-Wright arrived at the summit plateau at about 10.45 am at which time he described
the weather as being reasonable with bits of sunshine and bits of cloud. It was overcast but the visibility was good. His plan had been to go across the summit
area to the start of the Back Track run and then make his way down this run
into the Back Corries. Once there he
intended to ski up and down the area of the Braveheart Chairlift.
[23] The
pursuer had skied down the Back Track run numerous times before and, as one
would expect, it was clear that he was familiar with the summit area. He was familiar with the signs at the top of
the Summit Tow and with the snow fence forming the boundary of the Switch run. He was familiar with the directional signs on
the fences down the Switch run indicating the left and right routes for
respectively the main area and the Back Track run. He described this as the "decision point"
where you had to make up your mind which way you would go.
[24] The
pursuer explained that he left the area of the Summit Tow heading for the Back
Track run. He was moving slowly down a
gentle slope in a skating action pushing himself with his ski poles. He was proceeding at about walking pace. He explained he was following tracks in the
snow left by previous skiers who, he said, "had obviously gone to the Back
Corries". After having gone no more than
about fifty to sixty yards, and within two to three minutes of leaving the
Summit Tow, the weather changed and cloud descended. The pursuer said that he could still see a
distance of about fifty to sixty yards, although it was difficult to tell
because there was no context to look against.
By this, I understood him to mean that it was difficult to distinguish
the cloud from the snow.
[25] Despite
the change in the weather conditions, the pursuer continued on his way. He explained his decision in two ways. Firstly, he said that as he was already
heading down hill towards the Back Corries, to turn around would mean him
having to go uphill. Secondly, as he
explained it, he decided "to continue to follow the tracks heading to the sign". By this he meant the signs at the fences
already described at which one would go left to the main area or right to the
Back Track run. The pursuer continued by
explaining that he did not find the signs and within a couple of minutes or so
of the cloud coming down he felt himself fall and then sliding down the snow.
[26] It
transpired that the pursuer had fallen through, or over, the cornice at a point
about twenty feet to the north of the entrance to the Chancer run. He suffered significant injures in the fall,
including a four-part proximal fracture to the left humerus and a three-part
proximal fracture to the right humerus.
[27] He was
rescued and evacuated by members of the Ski Patrol. His skis had come off on impact with the
slope and the point from which he had fallen was identified by where they were
later found. The skis were lying about
ten feet apart, one above the other, at a point about twenty feet to the right
of the entrance to the Chancer Run as one looked up at it from below. Accordingly, it was deduced that he had
fallen from the edge at a point just past the entrance to the Chancer Run as
the ridge continues round towards the entrance to the Back Track Run.
[28] Mr
Struthers-Wright said that he had a clear recollection up to the point of
falling but had no recollection of the fall itself or of the impact with the
slope. At no stage did he describe
himself as suddenly realising he was at the edge, or of losing control of his skis
on the snow. When asked by Mr Hardman
why it was that he fell off the edge if he could see fifty yards ahead of
himself he said:
"Had there been continuous markers I would have continued to
follow those. I was following the tracks. My assumption was that they had been heading
to the main area. They must have turned
round and headed for Chancer. That is
all I can think of".
The
pursuer's criticism in evidence was that there should have been some kind of
line of markers between the Summit Tow and the entrance to the Back Track run. Additionally, there ought to have been
warning signs along the ridge so that someone in his position would not be able
to get to the edge without appreciating where they were.
[29] In both
evidence in chief and cross-examination, the pursuer was referred to the
contents of production number 7/54 of process.
This was a document headed Scottish Ski Patrol Injury Report Form. This type of document was filled out by the
Ski Patrol to record the circumstances and detail of any accidents which
occurred. In the section of the form
headed "History/Examination/Treatment", the following appears in hand writing:
"SKIING ALONG RIDGE, FELL
INTO BACK CORRIE OFF CORNICE, BACKS OF SKIS HITTING FIRST THEN TUMBLED FORWARD.
15MG CYCLIMORPH @12.45,
ENTONOX".
The pursuer denied giving this account to any member
of the Ski Patrol. He said that he told
the Ski Patrol he had been aiming for Back Track and went over the cornice.
[30] Although
having no recollection of the actual fall or the impact, in a letter written by
him in February 2003, the pursuer claimed that he fell a height of some thirty
feet vertically before hitting the slope below the edge and then tumbling a further
distance down the slope - production number 7/61 of process. The same assertion appears in the Record. The pursuer claimed on a number of occasions
in evidence that he had been given this information by the Ski Patrol. The same account of the fall appears in other
documents, for example, production number 6/1 of process, a medical report
prepared for the pursuer by Mr Gordon McLeod, a Consultant
Orthopaedic Surgeon.
[31] In
re-examination, and for the first time, the pursuer mentioned that as he made
his way across the plateau, he had in fact seen a black sign on a pole saying
"Chancer". He said that he was about ten
feet away from this sign when he saw it and that it was only about five to ten
feet after seeing this sign that he fell.
He recognised in this passage of his evidence that it must have been the
sign showing the entrance to the Chancer Run which he was describing. His explanation for not reacting to this sign
was that he thought it must have been a direction sign for someone who wanted
to go up the hill and ski down this run.
[32] The
pursuer led no further evidence concerning the circumstances of his accident. Although his wife gave evidence, her
testimony was restricted to repeating an account given to her by the pursuer a
few days later. In this conversation he
said that he could not understand how he came to be so close to either the
Chancer run or the edge of the plateau.
The Defenders' Evidence
The Pursuer's Rescue
[33] The
evidence led for the defenders disclosed that David Sutherland had heard the
pursuer shouting for help whilst he was riding up the Braveheart Chairlift. Having passed a message on, he climbed up the
slope and located Mr Struthers-Wright. In
due course, he was joined by two members of the Ski Patrol, Mr Cardwell and
Mr Roe. The pursuer was transferred
to the medical centre at the top of the gondola in the Goose area and
thereafter by ambulance to hospital.
[34] Although
neither members of the Ski Patrol could remember what account the pursuer had
given to them, each explained that the information in the Ski Patrol Injury
Report (production number 7/54) would have come from Mr Struthers-Wright. All those who attended upon him denied saying
to Mr Struthers-Wright that he had fallen a distance of twenty to thirty feet.
Warning Signs
[35] The
defenders' Managing Director Ms Austin, Mr Cardwell and Mr Roe, all gave
evidence to the effect that they had on a number of occasions given thought to
the question of whether any form of warning sign should be placed around the
area of the Lemming Ridge. Their
evidence was all broadly to the same effect.
In the first place, they sought to draw a distinction between the cliff
area used by climbers and the area of the Lemming Ridge. Warning signs were placed along the former
area, as it was impossible to ski there, whereas skiers entered the Back
Corries from points all along the Lemming Ridge. Subject to ability, it was entirely
appropriate to do so. In the view of
these witnesses, it would be inappropriate to use the danger signs along the
Lemming Ridge as this would suggest that the area was not for skiing. By the same token there would be a risk that
the effect of the signs at the climbers' cliff would then be diluted. Poles, such as formed the route to the Chancer
run, created a risk of drawing skiers to them and a risk of skiers using them
to ski in and out of. Poles tended to
indicate a route rather than a hazard. Warning
signs of some other sort had limitations.
Snow and ice covered them making them unreadable. The wind at the summit could be very strong
and signs which were not permanently sunk into the surface rock could easily
blow away. This might constitute a
danger to other skiers. The use of
permanent signs sunk into the rock raised conservation and environmental issues. As the location of the edge varied according
to snow conditions, signs might have to be located in different places on
different days. If skiers came to expect
there to be signs advising them that they were nearing the edge, an added
danger would be present should one or more of the signs blow away or not be
visible. Finally, there was a question
of consistency. If risks of this sort
were to be warned of, then that would have to be done throughout the facility.
[36] Fencing
or netting along the ridge had also been ruled out as impractical, in that it
would be unlikely to withstand the weather, and inappropriate in that they
would not want to fence off an area which skiers used. Fencing would create a further hazard in that
snow tended to accumulate on the lee side of the fence. This might have the effect of adding to the
build-up of cornices at the edge.
[37] Finally
these witnesses confirmed that apart from Mr Struthers-Wright, no-one else had
ever claimed to have inadvertently skied off the edge of the plateau.
Pursuer's Submissions
[38] This
action was brought in terms of the procedure set out in Chapter 43 of the Rules
of Court. The case pled on Record by the
pursuer, in Statement 4 of condescendence, contained four grounds of fault made
against the defenders. They were as
follows:
1.
Had the defenders closed the Summit area and Back Corries due
to the possibility of deteriorating visibility at the Summit area, the pursuer would not
have gone there, and the accident would not have occurred.
2.
Had the defenders put marker poles or some other indicators at
the edge of the cliff, the pursuer would not have fallen through/over the
cornice and the accident would not have occurred.
3.
Had the defenders clearly marked the route from the top of
the Summit Tow to the entrance to the Back Track run, the pursuer would not
have fallen through/over the edge of the unmarked cornice edge and the accident
would not have occurred.
4.
Had the Piste Map of the Ski Area provided by the defenders
depicted a more accurate representation of the summit area and the relative
positions of the runs/routes, the pursuer would not have fallen through/over
the unmarked cornice edge and the accident would not have occurred.
The first sentence in Statement 6
of condescendence set out that: "This claim is based on common law." At the commencement of submissions for the
pursuer, Mr Hardman moved to amend Statement 6 so as to read: "This claim
is based on breach of the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland)
Act 1960". No objection was taken to
this proposal. I allowed the amendment
and the submissions were presented in this context. Submissions on the pursuer's behalf were
restricted to the second ground of fault outlined above.
[39] Mr Hardman referred me to Section 2(1) of
the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland)
Act 1960 which is in the following terms:
"Extent
of occupier's duty to show care
2(1) The care which an occupier of premises is
required, by reason of his occupation or control of the premises to show
towards a person entering thereon in respect of dangers which are due to the
state of the premises or to anything done or omitted to be done on them and for
which the occupier is in law responsible shall, except in so far as he is
entitled to and does extend, restrict, modify or exclude by agreement his
obligations towards that person, be such care as in all the circumstances of
the case is reasonable to see that that person will not suffer injury or damage
by reason of any such danger".
His
submission was that there were two issues for consideration in this case:
1. What
was the danger in this case?
2.
Did the defenders show such
care as in all the circumstances of the case was reasonable to see that the
pursuer would not suffer injury or damage by reason of such danger?
In
seeking to identify what the "danger" was in this case Mr Hardman submitted
that it was not the fact of there being a steep drop, for which the defenders
could not in law be responsible. The
danger, he said, was the failure of the pursuer in poor visibility to
appreciate that he was at or approaching the edge. This danger was caused by an omission on the
part of the defenders, namely their failure to put signs in place along the
ridge warning the pursuer that he was close to the edge.
[40] Mr Hardman asked me to accept the
pursuer's evidence that the accident happened as described by him. In particular, that he was making his way by
a normal route to the Back Track run, at slightly faster than walking pace,
when cloud descended to the extent that he could not differentiate the ridge
from the cloud.
[41] In addressing the question of whether the
defenders displayed such care as was reasonable to see that the pursuer did not
suffer injury or damage by reason of the danger he identified, Mr Hardman
submitted that certain factors were relevant:
1. The pursuer was a paying guest of the defenders when this
accident occurred. He said that the
defenders sought to encourage skiers to go into this area and accordingly
submitted that a higher standard of care was incumbent on the defenders in
relation to the pursuer than would be the case with people to whom no
encouragement was offered.
2.
The risk of an unwary
individual falling over the edge was known to the defenders.
3.
The risk of injury to someone
taken unaware was a risk of serious injury.
4.
The evidence demonstrated that
it was feasible to place warning signs along the ridge.
5.
The pursuer was making his way
to a skiing area at the time rather than skiing down a run.
Mr
Hardman referred to the evidence of the defenders risk assessment form which
demonstrated that they had given consideration to the risk posed. He submitted that on the evidence the
defenders had not given proper consideration to the need for warning signs and
the way in which they could be utilised.
He reminded me that the entrance signs for the Chancer and Back Track
runs were moveable and placed into the snow at appropriate points. He submitted that it would have been equally
feasible for the defenders to have placed warning signs daily between the area
of the Chancer run and the area of the Back Track run. Accordingly, he submitted that the question
of what constituted taking reasonable care was a question of fact to be decided
in the particular circumstances of any given case. In the present case, he submitted that the
defenders could be seen to have failed in their duty.
Defenders' Submissions
[42] Mr Ross for the defenders referred me to
the terms of Sections 1 and 2 of the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland)
Act 1960. He accepted that the defenders
were to be seen as the occupiers of the land for the purposes of the act. He accepted that there was no question of the
defenders having restricted, modified or excluded any of their obligations. He referred me to paragraph 32.14 of The Law
of Scotland by Gloag and Henderson and to the following reported decisions:
1. Stevenson
v The Corporation of The City of Glasgow
1908 SC 1034
2. Graham
v East of Scotland Water Authority
2002 SCLR 340
3. Tomlinson
v Congleton Borough Council & Another
2004 1A.C 46
[43] Mr Ross commenced with an analysis of the
evidence. He said in this regard that
the pursuer's evidence lacked both credibility and reliability. He attacked the pursuer's evidence on
visibility. The pursuer had said that he
could not see the edge. He pointed out
that the evidence from all of the other witnesses who skied was that visibility
of fifty metres or so ought to be sufficient to permit safe skiing. He referred to the evidence of David
Sutherland, Paul Roe and Tony Cardwell. Taken
together, these witnesses had made their way across the summit plateau to the
edge both before and after the pursuer's accident. None of them had encountered any difficulty. All had been able to see the edge without
difficulty and two had skied around the ridge without difficulty.
[44] He submitted that I should accept the
evidence of the Ski Patrollers as to the way in which the Injury Report production
number 7/54 would have been compiled. He
submitted I should be satisfied that the pursuer was the source of the
information within that report. Accordingly,
he asked me to find that it constituted a contemporaneous account which
contradicted the evidence given in Court by the pursuer.
[45] Mr Ross invited me to disbelieve the
evidence given by the pursuer and to hold that the accident was caused by his
own fault. In this context, he referred
to the pursuer's evidence. He suggested
that the pursuer was familiar not only with the plateau but also with the safe
route down the Switch run to the Back Track run. He referred to the pursuer's account of
following tracks left by other unknown skiers.
On this account, the pursuer made an unwarranted assumption as to where
these tracks were heading. He also
referred to the pursuer's evidence of seeing the sign for the entrance to the
Chancer run and his failure to react to this.
All of this, he said, combined to present a picture of a skier who was
not paying sufficient attention to where he was going and of failing to take
proper care for his own safety.
[46] Alternatively, Mr Ross invited me to
conclude that the pursuer's evidence did not provide a sufficiently credible or
reliable account of what occurred to enable a proper assessment of whether the
defenders had discharged their duty to take such care as in all the
circumstances was reasonable. On this
basis, he invited me to hold that the pursuer had failed in the onus of
establishing what had happened and why, and to find against the pursuer.
[47] Upon the premise that the evidence did
disclose a reliable account of what occurred, Mr Ross submitted that the
question to be addressed was, did the accident occur as a consequence of a
danger which was due to the state of the premises or to anything done or
omitted to be done on them and for which the occupier is in law responsible. In this regard he referred to Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council & Another and to Lord Hoffman's
comments at paragraph 27 where he said:
"Mr Tomlinson was a person of full capacity who
voluntarily and without any pressure or inducement engaged in an activity which
had inherent risk. The risk was that he
might not execute his dive properly and so sustain injury. Likewise, a person who goes mountaineering
incurs the risk that he might stumble or misjudge where to put his weight. In neither case can the risk be attributed to
the state of the premises. Otherwise any
premises can be said to be dangerous to someone who chooses to use them for
some dangerous activity. In the present
case, Mr Tomlinson knew the lake well and even if he had not, the judge's
finding was that it contained no dangers which one would not have expected. So the only risk arose out of what he chose
to do and not out of the state of the premises".
In
the same vein, he referred to the comments of Lord Hutton at paragraph 59 where
he said:
"Stevenson
v Glasgow Corporation and Hastie v Edinburgh Magistrates (which were not concerned with trespassers)
were decided almost a century ago and the judgements are couched in old
fashioned language, but I consider that they express a principle which is still
valid today, namely, that it is contrary to common sense, and therefore not
sound law, to expect an occupier to provide protection against an obvious
danger on his land arising from a natural feature such as a lake or a cliff and
to impose a duty on him to do so".
Accordingly,
Mr Ross submitted that if Mr Struthers-Wright had fallen or skied off the
ridge, this was not something which could be said to have happened due to the
state of the premises. Accordingly, the
defenders should be assoilzied. He said
that the submission for the pursuer that the danger arose out of an omission to
place warning signs was a circular argument of the sort presented in Tomlinson and addressed by Lord Hoffman
at paragraph 28 where he said:
"Mr Braithwaite was inclined to accept the
difficulty of establishing that the risk was due to the state of the premises. He therefore contended that it was due to
"things done or omitted to be done on the premises ..."
"In my opinion "things done or omitted to be
done" means activities or the lack of precautions which cause risk, like
allowing speedboats among the swimmers. It
is a mere circularity to say that a failure to stop people getting into the
water was an omission which gave rise to a duty to take steps to stop people
from getting into the water".
[48] Mr Ross went on to submit that in any
event it could be seen that the defenders had taken what constituted reasonable
care to see that a skier would not suffer injury in the circumstances under
consideration. In this regard he
submitted that a number of matters were relevant, for example:
1.
That skiers were undertaking an
activity with an inherent level of risk and had a duty to exercise appropriate
care for their own safety.
2.
The runs accessed from the
summit edge were for experienced skiers only.
3.
It was obvious from all the
defenders literature that there was a steep slope in this area.
4.
The pursuer was in any event
familiar with the area.
5.
Safe routes to both the Chancer
run and the Back Track run were marked.
6.
The white board at the top of
the Summit Tow gave advice about conditions.
7.
No other accidents of this sort
had ever been reported.
He
submitted that the evidence disclosed that the signs suggested by the pursuer
would be ineffective, unduly burdensome and would be capable of introducing
further risk should skiers come to expect them.
In this context, he submitted that a balance had to be struck. Many people came to ski this area because of
its features. It was a wilderness area. Accordingly, he said, even if injury is
foreseeable, it may still in all the circumstances be reasonable to do nothing
about it. Upon this basis, also, he
submitted that I should assoilzie the defenders.
Discussion
Factual Matters
[49] The pursuer in this case was clearly an
experienced skier. He knew the Nevis Range
facilities well having skied there many times.
In particular, he knew the summit area and the Back Corries well. He had crossed the summit to access the Back
Track run numerous times. He had a good
understanding of the location of all of the runs in and around the summit area. He was well aware of the presence of the Lemming
Ridge and its location in relation to the Summit Tow and the other runs. Only the week before he had skied in that
very area. On that occasion, he had
taken some rather spectacular photographs which were lodged as productions
numbered 6/6, 6/7 and 6/8 of process. These
were taken at the edge of the ridge just up from the entrance to the Back Track
run and showed the view looking up and round the basin back to the area of the
Chancer run. In two of these photographs,
figures, probably snow boarders, could be seen on the edge and coming down the
slope in the area near to the Chancer run.
It was clear that the slope was very steep in that area. The pursuer stated in evidence that he had
never skied down the Chancer run and had never been at the part of the summit
where the entrance to the Chancer run is located.
[50] I accepted the pursuer's evidence that he
was intending to ski down the Back Track run and that the weather
conditions deteriorated soon after his arrival at the summit. It is clear from the evidence of David
Sutherland, who found his skis, that the pursuer fell over or through the
cornice near to the entrance to the Chancer run. The pursuer himself saw the entrance sign for
this run immediately before his fall. The
circumstances in which he got to that part of the summit were the subject of
competing submissions.
[51] Although on Record it is averred at
Statement 4(h) that "Visibility was reduced to considerably less than fifty
yards", the pursuer's own account did not mirror this. As set out above, his evidence was that he
could see about fifty to sixty yards.
In these conditions, it was his evidence that he could not distinguish
between the snow and the cloud. There
was other evidence available as to what effect this level of visibility would
have on a skier. Ms Austin, who was 49,
and currently the defenders' Managing Director, had been involved in teaching
skiing for over twenty years. She had
taught in New Zealand,
Switzerland,
France
and other Scottish resorts. Mr Cardwell,
who was 62, had been the defenders' Ski Patrol Manager for sixteen years and
had been skiing since his twenties. The
evidence of both of these witnesses was that in visibility of that range, one
ought to be able to ski quite reasonably, although it might not be very
pleasant. Mr Cardwell himself had no
difficulty in making his way around when he went to assist the pursuer. Mr Roe, who was 48, had been a Ski Patroller
at the Nevis
Range
for ten years and had been skiing for twenty-seven years. His evidence was that as he made his way over
from the Ski Patrol hut in the direction of the Chancer run, the
visibility was about fifty metres. He
had no difficulty whatsoever in making his way across, seeing the edge or making
his way around the edge.
[52] I found the evidence of these witnesses on
this issue to be consistent and compelling.
Their experience was obviously extensive. No effort was made in cross‑examination
to suggest that they were incorrect or unreliable in this matter. Accordingly, I was persuaded that in
visibility of the kind described by the pursuer, he ought to have been able to
see sufficiently well to make his way safely across the summit.
[53] Since the pursuer did not intend skiing
down the Chancer run yet ended up falling over the edge near to it, I had to
consider how he came to find himself at that part of the summit. In the pursuer's evidence he explained a
number of times that on leaving the area of the Summit Tow he followed some
tracks in the snow left by earlier skiers.
He assumed that these tracks were heading in the direction of the
Back Track run. He deduced that
they must in fact have turned and headed for the Chancer run.
[54] On the pursuer's behalf, Mr Hardman sought
to submit that the pursuer believed that following other tracks was quite a
normal way to traverse the summit and that the pursuer did not consider that
there was a particular route to the Back Track run. It was clear from the evidence that an
individual skier could make his way in any direction he or she chose. Equally, many skiers and snow boarders chose
to ski straight off the ridge at points in between the marked runs. In doing so they might well determine their
own route from the Summit Tow to their chosen point of access. However, I did not accept Mr Hardman's
submission on this matter. The
recognised route to the Back Track run was clearly marked as being along the
Switch run to the twin fences described earlier, and then along the channel so
created, passing the tower, and to the ridge at this point. The pursuer was clearly well aware of this. In evidence in chief, he described the
location of the relevant direction signs and referred to the sign at the fence
as the "decision point sign". In cross-examination
he described his normal route to the Back Track run as taking him along the
side of the fence at the Switch run. In
describing his route across the summit on the day of the accident at one point
he said that he thought the tracks he was following were heading for the signs
at the fences but that he did not find them.
[55] I was satisfied that the pursuer was well
aware of what was the recognised and signed route from the Summit Tow to the
Back Track run. This route would have
kept a skier well away from the plateau edge until the very entrance to the
run. What was clear, accordingly, was
that the pursuer chose not to follow what he knew to be the designated, and his
normal route.
[56] His evidence was that instead of following
what he knew to be the designated route, marked by features with which he was
familiar, the pursuer chose to follow some tracks in the snow about which he
made an assumption. Although the
visibility was poor, he claimed that he continued to proceed in this fashion
rather than go back to the Summit Tow. His
explanation for this was that he would have to go uphill to do so. Despite this, at other points in his
testimony, he was at pains to explain that in making his way across the summit
he was not skiing as properly understood.
Instead, he was moving in a skating action propelled by his ski poles
along a gentle slope.
[57] I did not find the pursuer's evidence as
to how he came to be at the plateau edge to be credible. In the first place, there seemed to me to be
no reason why he could not have returned to the safety of the Summit Tow area
if visibility was concerning him. Secondly,
I did not accept that an experienced skier who was familiar with the geography
of the summit, who was familiar not only with the various routes provided but
with the features along such routes, would decide to follow the tracks of
unknown skiers upon the assumption that they had gone to the same location as
was his own intention. A skier in the
pursuer's position would not need to be guided by tracks. He would know the way to go. Thirdly, I did not accept that a skier with
the experience and knowledge set out above would continue to follow such tracks
despite not seeing any of the expected features of the anticipated route. Fourthly, I did not accept that an
experienced skier with knowledge of the Aonach More summit would simply continue
to follow unknown tracks if he or she had concerns about the level of available
visibility.
[58] The pursuer's evidence about seeing the
entrance sign for the Chancer run further undermined his credibility. On his account, he ought to have been nowhere
near this part of the summit. If he
thought that he was heading for the entrance to the Back Track run, this sign
ought to have alerted him. On his
account, he had never been to this part of the plateau before. His explanation for taking no action on
seeing this sign was that he thought this must have been a direction sign for
someone who wanted to go up the hill and ski down this run. The pursuer's demeanour was uncomfortable at
this stage of his evidence. This
explanation appeared to me to make no sense.
There was no evidence that anyone could or would approach the Chancer
run in an uphill direction. It was
impossible from the other evidence as to the geography of the area to
understand how skiers would do this.
[59] For these reasons, I rejected the evidence
given by the pursuer as to how he came to be in the region of the Chancer run. Having rejected his own explanation I was
still left with the evidence that he had in fact made his way from the Summit Tow
to the area of the Chancer run. Standing
the pursuer's familiarity with the area, the logical inference to draw was that
he did so by choice.
[60] This inference was reinforced in my
judgement by the contents of production number 7/54 of process, the Ski Patrol
Injury Report. This report was in the
handwriting of a member of the Ski Patrol called Deesa Evans. By the time of the proof she had returned to
her native New Zealand. Both Mr Cardwell and Mr Roe gave evidence to
the effect that in terms of their procedures, the information in this document
would be taken from the injured party. Mr
Roe explained that the form was completed by Ms Evans in the medical centre at
the top station of the gondola, although he was not present at the time. Mr Struthers-Wright of course denied that he
had given this account.
[61] I gave careful consideration as to the
weight which I should give to this production.
The absence of its author was a factor which made it difficult to
conclude that it accurately reflected an account given by the pursuer. However, the combination of a number of
factors persuaded me that it did:
1.
The evidence of the Ski Patrol
procedures. The form concludes with the
printed words "Description of Incident (Casualty's Words)". In handwriting, the words "as above" appear. Although there is also a space for casualty's
signature, the pursuer's injuries were such as to prevent this.
2.
The amplification of this
evidence by Mr Roe who explained that no‑one else saw what happened and
the only first hand account could come from the pursuer.
3.
The other content of the form. The top of the form records the pursuer's
name and age. It records his address as
"Shiel Col Cottage, Findogask, Madderty".
It gives his telephone number. At
the bottom of the report, a variety of information is recorded as to the
pursuer's skiing ability and experience, including the fact that he has not
previously sustained a snow sport injury.
All of this information must have come directly from the pursuer. No contrary suggestion was made. Accordingly, this is consistent with the
application of the Ski Patrol procedures.
[62] The account which appears in this document
is:
"SKIING ALONG RIDGE, FELL INTO
BACK CORRIE OFF CORNICE".
If
account is taken of this explanation, it is consistent with an intention to ski
round from the Chancer run to the Back Track run. As it happens, this route would have taken
the pursuer along the very part of the summit shown in the photographs which he
took the week before.
[63] The location of the pursuer's fall is also
consistent with this explanation. He did
fall off the ridge at a point which would be just past the entrance to the
Chancer run if heading in the direction of the Back Track run.
[64] It follows, on this analysis, that the
pursuer would have been aware of the fact that he was at the edge. The explanation for his fall may be that he
lapsed in concentration in an area with which he was unfamiliar or that the
cornice gave way under him. There may be
other explanations. However, none
proceed upon the premise that he was disoriented and did not appreciate how
near he was to the edge.
[65] Accordingly, and for the reasons set out
above, in my opinion, the pursuer has failed to establish the underlying
factual basis for the case presented. Accordingly,
I would assoilzie the defenders.
Legal Issues
[66] The
Occupiers' Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 provides as
follows:
"Extent
of occupier's duty to show care
2(1) The care which an occupier of premises is
required, by reason of his occupation or control of the
premises to show towards a person entering thereon in respect of dangers which
are due to the state of the premises or to anything done or omitted to be done
on them and for which the occupier is in law responsible shall, except in so
far as he is entitled to and does extend, restrict, modify or exclude by
agreement his obligations towards that person, be such care as in all the
circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that that person will not suffer
injury or damage by reason of any such danger".
It is, however, clear that the duty imposed upon
an occupier does not extend to providing protection against obvious and natural
features of the landscape. As Lord Kinnear
said in Stevenson v Corporation of Glasgow 1908 SC. 1034 @
1042:
"... a person going upon
property, even by invitation, express or implied, is expected to use reasonable
care for his own safety. He is to look
out for all the ordinary risks that are necessarily incident to the kind of
property that he is going upon, but, on the other hand, it is held that he is
not to be exposed to any unusual danger known to the proprietor, and not known
to people who may come upon premises with which they are not familiar. If that be the law, it seems to me clear
enough that it imposes no duty upon the owners of public parks to fence every
stream of water or every pond which may happen to be found in a public garden".
In Dumbreck
v Addie & Sons' Collieries 1928 SC,
Lord President Clyde, drawing on Stevenson,
put it this way:
"It is important in this connection to observe the
distinction which has long been recognised between (1) sources of danger
arising from physical features of the ground, whether natural or artificial -
such as a precipice or an excavation, natural water of an artificial pond; and
(2) sources of danger arising from mechanical and similar contrivances - such
as the haulage system in the present case.
The former are presumed from their own character to constitute obvious
and usual dangers against which people, be they adults or children, must
protect themselves."
[67] Both of these cases were founded upon by Lord Emslie in the
case of Graham v East
of Scotland Water Authority 2002 SCLR 340,
when holding that there was no duty imposed upon an occupier of land to fence
the edge of a reservoir. In explaining
this opinion his Lordship said:
"In my opinion, the danger alleged here by the pursuer falls
within the intended scope of the authorities concerning obvious dangers on
land, against which no duty to fence is incumbent on an occupier."
[68] That
the older cases still provide an authoritative statement of the law is clear
from the speeches of their Lordships in the case of Tomlinson v Congleton Borough
Council & Another 2004 1AC 46, which examined the extent of any
duty imposed upon occupiers of land by virtue of either the Occupiers'
Liability Act 1957 or the Occupiers' Liability Act 1984. The passage at paragraph 59 in the speech of
Lord Hutton referred to by Mr Ross is a perfect example. The same point is made by Lord Hoffman at
paragraph 45 where he says:
"I think it will be
extremely rare for an occupier of land to be under a duty to prevent people
from taking risks which are inherent in the activities they freely choose to
undertake upon the land. If people want
to climb mountains, go hang gliding or swim or dive in ponds or lakes, that is
their affair. Of course the landowner
may for his own reasons wish to prohibit such activities. He may think that they are a danger or
inconvenience to himself or others. Or
he may take a paternalistic view and prefer people not to undertake risky
activities on his land. He is entitled
to impose such conditions, as the Council did by prohibiting swimming. But the law does not require him to do so."
The absence of any duty upon an occupier to provide
protection against obvious and natural features of the landscape clearly means
that there is no duty to fence off such features as streams or cliff edges. Mr Hardman did not seek to suggest
otherwise. By the same logic, there can
be no duty in law to provide warning signs or notices drawing attention to the
danger of such features.
[69] On behalf of the pursuer, Mr Hardman
sought to categorise the danger as something other than the natural feature of
the landscape. The danger, he said, was
the failure of the pursuer in poor visibility to appreciate that he was at or
approaching the edge. This was something
which the defenders ought to have anticipated.
This danger was caused by an omission on the part of the defenders,
namely their failure to put signs in place along the ridge warning the pursuer
that he was close to the edge.
[70] In my opinion, Mr Ross was right to
describe this as a circular argument. The
danger which arose from making one's way along the summit plateau was that one
might fall off the edge. This danger
existed whatever the weather conditions, although it might be a greater danger
in some conditions. Signs would be
warning of the danger of falling over the cliff. The presence of such a danger would be
obvious to all who made use of that area for any purpose, be it skiing,
hillwalking or mountaineering. The
statute makes reference to, firstly, "dangers which are due to the state of the
premises" and, secondly, to "dangers which are due to anything done or omitted
to be done on them". If the first of
these does not impose a duty to provide protection against natural features
then it would be illogical to suggest that failure to place warning signs about
such a natural feature could constitute a danger arising out of something done
or omitted to be done on the same premises.
[71] Accordingly, regardless of my findings as
to the factual basis of the case, I was satisfied that there was no legal
duty imposed upon the defenders of the sort advanced on behalf of the pursuer. For this reason also I would assoilzie the
defenders.
Reasonable Care
[72] In the
event that the defenders did owe a duty of care to the pursuer arising out of
his use of the skiing facilities in the region of the Lemming Ridge, it would
be a duty to take such care as in all the circumstances of the case was
reasonable to see that he did not suffer injury or damage by reason of that
danger.
[73] The defenders'
witnesses agreed with Counsel for the pursuer that it would be feasible to
place signs of some sort along the ridge.
However, I agree with the submissions made by Mr Ross that the
assessment of any such duty would require a balance to be struck. It was correct, as he said, to acknowledge
that this was an area used only by experienced skiers. It was also correct to acknowledge that all
of the defenders' literature and advice made it clear that there was a steep
slope in the area of the Lemming Ridge. A
safe route to the Back Track run was provided.
The white board at the exit from the Summit Tow provided information
about the conditions on the summit and edge.
There were a number of issues as to the effectiveness of warning signs
placed in the snow. In particular, if
skiers came to expect them, then an added danger would be introduced should
such a sign be hidden by snow or blown away.
In this context it was correct to weigh this danger against the fact
that there had never before or since been an accident of the type complained
about by the pursuer. It was also
correct, in my view, to bear in mind the natural beauty and attractiveness of
the wilderness site.
[74] Had I
been required to decide whether the steps taken by the defenders to ensure
safety in the region of the summit plateau met the test of such care as in all
the circumstances of the case was reasonable to see that a skier did not suffer
injury or damage, I would have been satisfied that they did.
[75] In
particular, in my view, to place warning signs at regular intervals along the
summit ridge would have a significant impact upon the natural beauty and
character of the landscape. To have
taken this step would have constituted a disproportionate response to the risk
said to exist.
[76] It
follows that upon this basis I would also have assoilzied the defenders.
Decision
[77] For the reasons set out above, I will
assoilzie the defenders from the conclusions of the Summons. Parties wished me to put the case out By
Order upon reaching my decision in order that further procedure could be
addressed.