OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2006] CSOH NUMBER
|
A3557/01
|
OPINION OF LORD
BRODIE
in the cause
VIOLET HELEN
JOSEPHINE FALLONE
Pursuer;
against
LANARKSHIRE ACUTE
HOSPITALS NHS TRUST
Defenders:
ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ________________
|
Pursuer:
Sutherland, Advocate;
Drummond Miller, W.S.
Defenders: Ferguson, Q.C.,
Mitchell, Advocate; R
F Macdonald, Solicitor
28 March 2006
Introduction
[1] This
action for damages for personal injury came before me on Procedure Roll for
discussion of the defenders' preliminary pleas.
Miss Sutherland appeared for the pursuer and Mr Ferguson QC
and Mr Mitchell appeared for the defenders.
Mr Ferguson's motion was to reserve the defenders' first
plea-in-law, which was a general plea to the relevancy and specification; to uphold the
defenders' second plea-in-law, which was that there being special cause as to
why the case was unsuitable for jury trial, issues should not be allowed; and to allow proof before answer on the whole
of the parties' pleadings. Miss Sutherland's motion was to allow
issues.
Pleadings
[2] It
is convenient to quote the pursuer's pleading at some length.
[3] Article 2
of condescendence sets out a history of events between October 1997 and 16 June 1998, leading up to the
pursuer undergoing surgery in relation to breast cancer. It is in the following terms:
"In or about
late October 1997 the pursuer noticed a hard lump on her right breast, just
below the nipple. The pursuer was
conscious of a change in shape and appearance of the nipple. The pursuer was aware of the importance of
breast examination and normally checked her breasts for lumps. The pursuer was concerned that she could have
breast cancer. She consulted her General
Practitioner, Dr C J Mackintosh, Hunter Health Centre, East Kilbride.
He referred the pursuer to Mr Thomson, Consultant Surgeon at the
Breast Clinic at Hairmyres Hospital East Kilbride. The pursuer attended the clinic on 24th November, 1997. The pursuer was seen by Mr Ali who was
at that time a Surgical Registrar. He
examined the pursuer and confirmed the presence of a well circumscribed lump
below the right areola which was tethered to the overlying skin. This is a classic presentation of breast
cancer. In such circumstances a
cancerous lump must be ruled out. Mr Ali
arranged a mammogram. This was reported
by Dr Rosemary Weir as showing no suspicion of malignancy. All Surgeons working in breast units are
aware that mammogram is only one of three investigations required where a
patient presents with a breast lump. All
Surgeons working in breast units are aware that a negative mammogram does not
rule out malignancy. It is well known
that mammograms in pre-menopausal women will miss 30% of breast cancers. The report of the mammogram indicated that
ultrasound examination was advised. The
lump was said to be clinically palpable and to exhibit skin tethering, a
classic description of a cancerous lump.
No ultrasound examination was arranged by Mr Ali, despite this
instruction. No attempt was made by
Mr Ali to obtain a sample from the lump either by fine needle aspirate,
core or open biopsy. All ordinarily
competent Surgeons working in a Breast Unit are aware that where a woman
presents with a breast lump triple assessment is required before a malignant
lesion can be excluded. Triple
assessment includes clinical examination, mammography and cytology or a form of
biopsy. The pursuer was given an
appointment for review in 3 months.
The pursuer re-attended the clinic on 23rd February, 1998 and was seen by
Mr Ibrahim who was at that time an SHO in Surgery. He also noted a small lump at the outer
quadrant of the right breast at 7 o'clock,
and that the skin was tethered. He
arranged an ultrasound examination of the lump.
On 13th March,
1998 the pursuer underwent an ultrasound examination followed by a
fine needle aspirate. A fine needle
aspirate takes a small amount of the tissue from the area of the lump for
analysis. The sample was poor. The pathology report stated that the
appearances were atypical of breast pattern.
Following receipt of the cytology Mr Thomson wrote to the
pursuer. The pursuer was reviewed at the
clinic on 27th April,
1998 by Mr Morely SHO and arrangements were made for her to
undergo an ultrasound controlled biopsy on 15th May, 1998. On 10th June,
1998 the pursuer was admitted to Hospital for biopsy of her
breast. The procedure was performed by
Mr Thomson, who told the pursuer that there was little to worry
about. The specimen taken at biopsy was
analysed and the report on 16th June, 1998 confirmed that the
pursuer had breast cancer. Arrangements were made for the pursuer to attend for
further surgery which included wide local excision and axillary clearance. The breast cancer had been present since the
time of the pursuer's first presentation to Hospital in November 1997. As a consequence of the delay in diagnosis
the pursuer sustained the loss, injury and damage hereinafter condescended
upon."
[4] Article 3
of condescendence contains averments as to medical practice in 1997. It is in the following terms:
"In 1997 it was
normal and common medical practice to assess breast lumps by a triple
assessment procedure. Said assessment
included clinical examination, mammography, and cytology or a form of biopsy. Where clinical examination revealed, as it did
in the pursuer's case, a palpable breast mass with tethering to the overlying
skin, ordinarily competent medical practice necessitated further investigation.
Said investigation included both
mammography and an attempt to obtain a sample of the lump for both cytology or pathology. Failure to attempt to obtain cells for
cytology, or a core biopsy, or to recommend excision of the lump, would be a
course of action which no Doctor acting with ordinary care and skill would have
taken. When a Radiologist performing
mammography recommends further examination to the Surgical Team requesting the
original examination, ordinarily competent Medical Practitioners would act upon
such advice, particularly in the presence of a tethered breast lump. When atypical breast changes are demonstrated
upon fine needle aspirate, as occurred in the pursuer's case in March 1998, ordinarily
competent medical practice would necessitate further urgent investigation of
the abnormality, and not a further delay of three months before a definitive
biopsy was performed."
[5] Article 5
of condescendence contains the pursuer's averments of the damage she alleges is
consequential on the negligence for which the defenders are liable. It is in the following terms:
"As a result of
the delay in diagnosis of her breast cancer the pursuer sustained loss, injury
and damage. When the pursuer felt the
lump initially she was concerned that she did have breast cancer. She did not feel re-assured after her
attendance at Hospital and following examination by Mr Ali. She did not feel that he listened to her
concerns and felt he was dismissive. The
pursuer was aware that the lump was changing during the period between November
and June and also felt that it was increasing in size. She suffered pain in the area and frequently
woke from her sleep in distress. The
pursuer was convinced that she did have cancer and spent many hours lying in
the dark in her bedroom crying consumed by an overwhelming fear that she was
going to die. The pursuer was extremely
distressed when the diagnosis was eventually made. She broke down in tears certain that her
worst fears had now been confirmed. She
was immediately aware that there had been a delay in diagnosis and treatment of
the lump. The pursuer refused to believe
that she would not die. As a result of
the delay in diagnosis the pursuer has developed an Adjustment Disorder with
depressed mood. The pursuer continues to
suffer psychologically as a result of the delay in diagnosis. The pursuer has lost all confidence in
medical professionals. This will have
implications for any treatment she requires in the future. The pursuer has lost self confidence and
suffered a loss of self esteem as a result of the delay in diagnosis. The pursuer's marriage broke down as a result
of her psychological problems directly related to the delay in diagnosis of her
breast cancer. Prior to this the pursuer
had been happily married for 28 years.
A diagnosis should have been made within a week of the clinic visit on
24th November. Had the
diagnosis been made in November it is likely that the pursuer would have coped
with the diagnosis and undergone treatment without any continuing psychological
problems. The pursuer required to
undergo 18 weeks of chemotherapy commencing on 6th August, 1998. The sessions of chemotherapy were lengthy and
distressing for the pursuer. The pursuer
suffered nausea, tiredness and sore eyes which are side effects of the
chemotherapy treatment. Had the
diagnosis been made in November it is likely that the pursuer would not have
required chemotherapy. As a result of
the chemotherapy the pursuer lost her hair.
This caused her great distress.
In the circumstances the sum sued for is a reasonable estimate of the
loss, injury and damage suffered by the pursuer."
Submissions of parties
Submissions for the defenders
[6] Mr Ferguson,
on behalf of the defenders, explained that, after some preliminary remarks, his
submissions would fall into three chapters:
consideration of the terms of the Closed Record; a submission in support
of the contention that the pursuer's pleadings were of doubtful relevancy and
specification; and
a submission in support of the contention that, in any event, the claim
presented difficulties in the assessment of damages which made it unsuitable
for a trial by jury.
[7] In
his preliminary remarks, Mr Ferguson drew my attention to the terms of
sections 9 and 11 of the Court of Session Act 1988. The present action was one of a class that is
enumerated in section 11 of the Act.
Subject to section 9(b) of the Act, an enumerated cause shall be
tried by jury. The qualification to that
provision which is introduced by section 9(b) is that the Lord Ordinary
may allow a proof in such an action if special cause is shown. The question was essentially a matter for the
discretion of the court, the object being to select as between the alternative
methods of enquiry, which type of tribunal would best secure justice as between
the parties to the action: Graham v Associated Electrical Industries Limited 1968 S.L.T. 81 at 82.
[8] Mr Ferguson
then took me through the Closed Record.
He summarised the case as one of negligent delay in diagnosing breast
cancer, the only fault alleged being that of Mr Ali, the Surgical
Registrar who had seen the pursuer on 24 November
1997. The fault attributed
to Mr Ali was his failures to have carried out the third investigation required
for a triple assessment of the suspected breast cancer and to arrange for an
ultrasound scan. The pursuer's averments
attributed the whole of the delay between the end of November 1997 and 16 June 1998 as being due to the
fault of Mr Ali. That, submitted
Mr Ferguson, could not be so, given the pursuer's further averments which
disclosed that she re-attended the breast clinic on 23 February 1998 when
she was seen by Mr Ibrahim after whose examination there took place all
the investigations desiderated by the pursuer, and in consequence of which a
diagnosis of breast cancer was made on 16 June 1998. No criticism is made of what was done by
Mr Ibrahim or by anyone else, on or subsequent to 23 February 1998. It is not averred that anything should have
been done more urgently. The subsequent
history is simply presented as narrative.
[9] Moving
to the second chapter of his submissions, Mr Ferguson said that it was
trite that a properly drawn record that properly focused the issues was necessary
if issues were to be allowed. Jury trial
was only an appropriate mode of enquiry if the pursuer's pleadings were clearly
relevant and specific on all material points:
O'Malley v Multiflex (UK) Inc. 1997 S.L.T. 362 at
363; Boyle v Glasgow Corporation 1949 S.C. 254 at 261-262; and Moore v Stephen 1954 S.C. 331 at 334. There was no such thing as a "trial before
answer": Moore supra at 334. If a pursuer's averments were of doubtful
relevancy, then that was special cause rendering a case unsuitable for jury
trial: Boyle supra at 263; Irvine v Balmoral
Hotel Edinburgh Ltd 1999 Rep L.R. 41 at 43 and para.8-08. Mr Ferguson identified three respects in
which he submitted that the pursuer's pleadings in relation to the issue of
fault were of doubtful relevancy. First,
notwithstanding that the averments of fault in article 4 of condescendence
appeared to be directed solely against Mr Ali, there were averments at
pages 13C to D and at 14C of the Record which might be relied on to make a case
against others. At page 13C, after
mention of "the Surgical Team" there are references to "ordinarily competent
medical practitioners" and "ordinarily competent medical practice" without
explanation as to just whose medical practice was being referred to. At page 14 C, the pursuer averred that her
loss "was caused, or at least materially contributed to by the fault and
negligence of the medical staff employed at the said Hospital." If it was only Mr Ali who was being blamed,
why this reference to "the medical staff employed at the said Hospital" and why
the averment, at page 13C to D:
"When atypical
breast changes are demonstrated upon fine needle aspirate, as occurred in the
pursuer's case in March 1998, ordinarily competent medical practice would
necessitate further urgent investigation of the abnormality, and not a further
delay of three months before a definitive biopsy was performed."
Secondly, Mr Ferguson
complained of a reference at page 13A to "further investigation" without there
being any specification of what that investigation should have involved. He did not accept that it necessarily
referred to ultrasound examination, as mentioned at page 6E, given the
reference at page 13B to "excision of the lump". Given this reference at page 13B, the
defenders were entitled to know what it was that Mr Ali was expected to
have done which he did not in fact do.
If it was the instruction of ultrasound examination (which it was
averred at page 6E was advised by the radiologist in the report of the
mammogram carried out in November 1997) then the pursuer should say so. If it was something else then the pursuer
should say so. That the pleadings were
open to both interpretations meant that there would be problems as to the
admissibility of evidence. Thirdly,
Mr Ferguson complained about the averment at page 13B that no doctor
acting with ordinary care and skill would have failed to attempt to obtain
cells for cytology, or a core biopsy, "or to recommend excision of the lump"
given that it was no part of the case of fault against Mr Ali (as set out
in article 4 of condescendence) that he had not recommended excision of the
lump. Mr Ferguson took the word
"both" where it occurred before "cytology or pathology" at page 13A to be a
typographical error but interpretation of the pursuer's pleadings was not made
any easier, he said, by the reference to "cytology or pathology" and then "core
biopsy". Up until this point
Mr Ferguson had focused on the pursuer's averments of fault. He turned to her averments of loss. In his submission, these too were of doubtful
relevancy. Again, he had three
criticisms to make. First, the whole of what was said to have been a delay was
laid at Mr Ali's door whereas no criticism was made of what had happened
after 23 February 1998 when the pursuer was seen by Mr Ibrahim (other
than the reference to "further delay" at page 13D which was not taken forward
to any averment of breach of duty). Indeed, it would appear that Mr Ibrahim
did in February 1998 exactly what it is that the pursuer avers Mr Ali
should have done in November 1997. Why
then was Mr Ali blamed for the outcome of events subsequent to February 1998? What was set out in the pursuer's pleadings is
what in fact happened to the pursuer.
What was lacking was any explanation as to why any different series of
events would have occurred had Mr Ali done in November 1997 what
Mr Ibrahim did in February 1998. It
was averred, at page 16E, that a diagnosis should have been made within a week
of the clinic visit on 24 November
1997. There is, however, a
failure to explain why that should have been so. Mr Ferguson's second criticism was of the
averment at page 16D: "The pursuer has
lost all confidence in medical professionals.
This will have implications for any treatment she requires in the future." This, said Mr Ferguson, was entirely
inspecific. There was no indication of
what treatment was meant. Was it
intended to be a reference to the pursuer's treatment in respect of her
adjustment disorder? The defenders were
left entirely in the dark. They were
entitled to have at least a broad indication of what the pursuer maintained was
her loss. They had not been provided
with that. Thirdly and finally, under
this chapter, Mr Ferguson drew attention to the pursuer's averment at page
17B that had the initial diagnosis been made in November 1997 it is likely that
the pursuer would not have required chemotherapy. Again, there was no explanation as to why the
pursuer maintained that this was so.
[10] In the third chapter of his submissions, Mr Ferguson
contended that in addition to the doubtful relevancy of the case, it presented
difficulties in the assessment of damages.
There was difficulty in fact, difficulty in law and difficult in
relation to specification. Taken
together that amounted to special cause not to allow jury trial. Mr Ferguson accepted that the difficulty
or complexity of the facts did not, per
se, justify refusing a jury trial.
He did not, for example, argue that simply because this was a case of
alleged medical negligence it could not properly be tried by jury. However, there were particular complications
here. The jury would be asked to
distinguish the psychological sequelae flowing from delay in diagnosis by
reason of the fault of Mr Ali, from those flowing from the fact of the
diagnosis itself. This was complicated
by the pursuer blaming Mr Ali for all of the alleged delay between
November 1997 and June 1998. There was a
real problem as to how the elements of the pursuer's case fitted together. Mr Ferguson therefore invited me to
sustain his second plea-in-law, to refuse issues and to allow proof before
answer.
Submissions for the pursuer
[11] Miss Sutherland began by emphasising
that it was for the defenders to show special cause not to allow jury
trial. Such special cause had to be
specific to the particular case: Walker
v Pitlochry Motor Co 1930 SC 565
at 575. It had to be a real ground of
substance, not a mere hypothetical difficulty conjured up by the ingenuity of
counsel, something capable of articulate formulation and not a mere
generality: Graham v Paterson & Sons 1938
SC 119 at 127. The pleadings had to be
taken as a whole. It was not a proper
approach to manufacture hypothetical difficulties by looking at passages of the
pleadings in isolation. The question was
whether the judge would be able to give an adequate and effective direction
which could be readily understood by the jury:
O'Malley supra at 363J. It was relevant to consider whether the
pleadings gave fair notice, but the fact that complex and complicated medical
evidence might be required did not necessarily make a case unsuitable for jury
trial: Irvine v Balmoral
Hotel Edinburgh Ltd supra at 43 para.8-20;
Thomson v McAleer 1996 Rep L.R. 128 at 129
para.35-07. She recognised, however,
that limited assistance was to be gained from looking at other cases. In exercising what she accepted was a discretion, the court had to consider the particular case
before it. This case was very simple and
straightforward. The pursuer had gone to
Mr Ali with a view to the investigation of her condition. Mr Ali had failed to do what he should
have done. There had, as a result, been
a delay in diagnosis. No case was made
against Mr Ibrahim or any other practitioner. What was averred in Article 2 of
condescendence is what had actually occurred.
Mr Ali could have cut short that process by making a prompt
diagnosis. It could not be assumed that
the events which actually followed the negligent failure to diagnose would have
necessarily followed a diagnosis made in November 1997. Miss Sutherland referred to the decision of
the House of Lords in Chester v
Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134. Miss Sutherland
conceded that the averment at page 13B:
"to recommend excision of the lump" should not have been included in the
pleadings. Quite simply, the pursuer's
case was based on Mr Ali's negligent failure to order a biopsy for the
purpose of cytology with the result that he failed to obtain the tissue sample
from which a diagnosis would have been made.
He had a choice as to precisely what method he adopted but he had to
take a sample. The pursuer's case was
that he did not do so with the result that a diagnosis, which should have been
made in November 1997, was not made until June 1998. The question was whether the case was suitable
for jury trial. That essentially
involved consideration of whether fair notice had been given and whether an
adequate and effective direction could be given to the jury.
[12] In relation to the criticism levelled at the averment that the
pursuer had lost all confidence in the medical profession, Miss Sutherland
submitted that this was a case where a jury had a particular contribution to
make. The averment raised
what was very much a jury question. The
question was no more difficult than the sort of question that criminal juries
were regularly asked to determine. As
far as the averments in relation to chemotherapy were concerned, it was clearly
averred by the pursuer that had the diagnosis been made in November 1997 then
she would not have needed chemotherapy.
It was for the pursuer to prove that averment. She was offering to do so. In concluding Miss Sutherland returned to what
she had said at the beginning of her submissions: it was not for the pursuer to
satisfy the court that the cause was suitable for the jury, it was for the
defenders to show that there was special cause not to allow jury trial. In Miss Sutherland's submission the
defenders had failed to do this. She
moved for issues.
Discussion and decision
[14] Parties' counsel were at one
on a number of matters. If an action is
one of the enumerated causes, as this one is, a pursuer is entitled to jury
trial. It is for a defender wishing
another mode of inquiry to establish why the alternative should be adopted. In contemporary parlance, jury trial is the
default position. Determination of
whether there is special cause to withhold a cause from jury trial is a matter
for the discretion of the Lord Ordinary. What that means in this context was explained
by Lord Clyde in Walker v
Pitlochry Motor Co supra at 575:
"Whether this or
that special feature - or some combination of special features - amounts to
special cause is a question to be determined, not by reference to any legal
principle or category, but as a matter of sound discretion, and the discretion
rests mainly, and in the first instance, with the Lord Ordinary...".
Moving closer to the specifics of
this particular action, parties were also agreed that just because it involves
an allegation of medical negligence that, of itself, does not make a cause
unsuitable for jury trial. Miss Sutherland reminded me that the tests for medical
negligence that are most frequently referred to in Scotland and England
respectively were enunciated in Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200, in an opinion given
in relation to a motion for a new trial, and in Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, in the course of a charge to the
jury. Similarly that a case would
require the leading and understanding of technical or complicated evidence did
not, of itself, make that case unsuitable for jury trial. Juries in criminal trials are frequently
required to consider quite complex medical evidence and do so successfully.
[15] Needless to say, counsel did not agree on everything. I think that Mr Ferguson was correct in
identifying a difference in approach as between himself,
on the one hand, and Miss Sutherland, on the other, and that that was focused
by the weight given by Miss Sutherland to the consideration of whether an
adequate and effective direction could be given to and applied by the jury. This, she said on more than one occasion was
"the test" as to whether a case was suitable for jury trial. Not so, submitted Mr Ferguson. First there had to be clear, relevant and
specific pleadings. Then one might
consider whether an adequate and effective direction could be given. Without necessarily adopting the precise way
in which Mr Ferguson formulated the matter, I consider there to be force in his
submission. The passage from which
Miss Sutherland took her reference to this test is found in the opinion of
Lord Gill in O'Malley supra at 363J. Three paragraphs earlier in his opinion Lord
Gill had said this, at 363G:
"The recent
revival of interest in jury trial makes it necessary for pleaders to keep in
mind that jury trial is an appropriate mode of inquiry only if the pursuer's
pleadings are clearly relevant and specific."
Lord Gill then expressed the view
that the averments which had come under particular attack in that case
(relating to a claim for wage loss and for a loss of employability) were of
doubtful relevancy. He then said that absence
of clarity as to the relationship between the two claims provided a further
reason for these averments being of doubtful relevancy. Then, at 363J, he said this:
"A useful test
in these cases is to consider whether on the pursuer's pleadings an adequate
and effective direction could be given to, and applied by, the jury on the
contentious question. Counsel for the
pursuer had difficulty in suggesting a form of direction which would explain to
a jury, on the basis of the pursuer's pleadings, how they should calculate the
two heads of claim and how they should discriminate between the two."
With all respect to Miss Sutherland
my impression was that she was offering an adequate and effective direction
test as the touchstone as to whether jury trial was appropriate as the mode of
inquiry without taking into account the context where the reference to a test
is found in Lord Gill's opinion or taking into account how such a test might be
applied. Lord Gill was looking at
particular averments: "on the pursuer's pleadings" bearing on a particular
issue: "on the contentious question". In
his opinion the averments were of doubtful relevancy (in other words they might
or might be relevant depending upon precisely what was revealed by the evidence
led in support). That could be tested by
posing the question as to whether "on the pursuer's pleadings" an adequate and
effective direction could be given "on the contentious question", which, in the
particular case, was how the two heads of damages were to be calculated and how
they were related one to the other. I
would accept that doubtful relevancy is likely to give rise to difficulty in
giving a direction and that therefore difficulty in giving direction may well
be an indicator of doubtful relevancy. For
that reason I am not inclined entirely to divorce the question as to whether
the pleadings are sufficiently relevant and the question as to whether there
would be difficulty in giving directions, which seemed to be the approach
suggested by Mr Ferguson. However, one
can only ask the question whether on the pursuer's pleadings an adequate and
effective direction could be given to, and applied by, the jury on the
contentious question, if one has identified, with a degree of precision, a
contentious question. In other words,
one must be able to focus on a particular issue or topic in the light of the
way the pursuer's case is pled. I did
not understand Miss Sutherland to focus on any particular topic in the light of
the pleadings. Rather, she encouraged me
to look at the case as a whole. It was,
she said, a very simple straightforward case. As I understood her, it was because Miss
Sutherland characterised the whole case as simple and straightforward that she
invited me to answer the question as to whether an adequate and effective
direction could be given to the jury in the affirmative. In other words, it appeared to me that Miss
Sutherland's repeated references to the adequate and effective direction test
were really no more than reassertions of her characterisation of the case as
being one that was simple and straightforward. She was not, in any way that I was able to
follow, pointing me as to how I should apply this test when considering the
averments that were under particular scrutiny with a view to determining the
issue in her favour. I shall return to
Miss Sutherland's characterisation of the case as a simple and straightforward
one later in this opinion.
[16] Miss Sutherland did not seek to dispute the proposition, stated
in Lord Gill's opinion in O'Malley,
that jury trial is an appropriate mode of inquiry only if the pursuer's
pleadings are clearly relevant and specific. The rationale is explained by Lord
Justice-Clerk Thomson in the two cases cited by Lord Gill in O'Malley supra at 363H. In Boyle supra at 261 Lord Justice-Clerk
Thomson said this:
"A properly
drawn record is essential in a jury trial, and the points at issue ought to be
clearly focused. One wants to avoid
wrangling as to the admissibility of evidence. That is undesirable in itself
and sometimes operates prejudicially against the party taking objection. ... It
seems to me that it is in the interests of all parties that the relevant and
substantial points should be stated and clearly stated in the record, and that
the facts relied upon, the grounds of action and the pleas-in-law should be
adequately presented ...The function of a record is to convey what the case is
about and to make the legal issues clear, and it is really intolerable that it
should be left to the court, with the assistance of counsel, to try to
extricate from the averments what the points in the case are."
In Moore supra at 334 he put the matter this
way:
"The subsumption on which a
jury trial proceeds is that all questions of relevancy have been disposed of
and that the trial is to proceed on the basis of the record, which is looked on
as conclusive of relevancy. This is
shown by a number of considerations. No
judge could exclude evidence from the jury's consideration if the party leading
it could show that he had sufficient record for it. So, too, the courts, when invited to send a
case to proof rather than to jury trial, are frequently affected by the
consideration of the doubtful relevancy of the record, and the courts have
frequently emphasised the desirability of records in case going to juries being
clearly stated so as to focus for the jury the points in controversy. ...It is
only on a relevant record that the proper respective functions of judge and
jury can satisfactorily be operated."
[17] Is this then a record that clearly focuses
the points in issue and clearly states the facts which, if proved, will entitle
the pursuer to the remedy that she seeks?
I am not satisfied that it is.
[18] I was not impressed by all of Mr
Ferguson's criticisms. I shall have
something more to say about the averments at page 13C to D in relation to
events in March 1998, but it appears reasonably clear that the pursuer is
seeking to make a case against Mr Ali in respect of what he failed to do in
November 1997 and not against anyone else. Miss Sutherland expressly disclaimed any other
case and I consider Mr Ferguson's anxiety on this score to be unjustified.
Miss Sutherland conceded that the words
"to recommend excision of the lump" which are found at page 13B should not be
there. She did not, however, seek leave
to amend by deleting the words. While it
is not for the court to revise a party's pleadings, had these words been all
that stood between the pursuer and a jury trial I would have brought the case
out by order with a view to giving the pursuer the opportunity to amend by
deleting these words. Connected to the
criticism of the inclusion of the words at page 13B was Mr Ferguson's
submission that the expression "further urgent investigation" at page 13A was
of doubtful relevancy by reason of lack of specification. It might, he suggested, include excision of
the lump. It might include ultra-sound
investigation. Insofar as there was a basis for this criticism I would consider
that it would be addressed by deletion of the words at page 13B but I was not
persuaded that this criticism was soundly based. It appeared to me that, on a fair reading, the
pursuer is doing no more than setting out how the triple assessment procedure
should be applied: when certain findings are apparent on clinical examination
then further investigation is required. The pursuer specifies what she means by
further investigation in the following sentence: "Said investigation included both mammography
and an attempt to obtain a sample of the lump for ... cytology or pathology." While I agree with Mr Ferguson that it is
not entirely clear what is meant when the pursuer uses the words "biopsy",
"cytology" and "pathology", these are or may be terms of art requiring
explanation by suitably qualified witnesses. That the layman who has not had the benefit of
such evidence does not understand what is intended by these words is no more
reason to refuse a jury trial than it would be to refuse a proof. In fairness to Mr Ferguson he did not suggest
otherwise.
[19] I found Mr Ferguson's criticisms of the
relevancy of the pursuer's averments of the causation of damage to be more
formidable. At this point it is
convenient to take an overview of the action. That involves consideration of Miss
Sutherland's characterisation of the action as simple and straightforward. The pursuer avers that Mr Ali was
negligent in failing to see that two further procedures were carried out in
November 1997 when the pursuer attended for investigation of the hard lump she
had noticed in October of that year : biopsy, because it was part of the triple
assessment; and ultra-sound scan, because it had been advised by the
radiologist. By reason of these failures
it is averred that Mr Ali caused or at least contributed to the whole of the
pursuer's loss consequent upon what the pursuer asserts was a delay in
diagnosis as between the last week in November 1997 and 16 June 1998. The pursuer avers, at page 8B, that her breast
cancer had been present in November 1997. She avers, at page 14D, that had Mr Ali both
arranged an ultra-sound and obtained a sample for biopsy the diagnosis would
have been made in November 1997. She
does not aver what would have been apparent in November 1997 to a reasonably
competent investigator had these two investigations in fact been carried out. Now I shall have to return to that part of the
averment that concerns the date on which the diagnosis would have been made but
no criticism was made by Mr Ferguson of the averment that a diagnosis of breast
cancer would have been made (and, indeed, made earlier than it in fact was): understandably so, because the pursuer has
averments that when the procedures that she avers should have been carried out
were carried out a diagnosis of breast cancer was made. Proof that a diagnosis was made at a later
date as a result of specified investigative procedures being carried out at
least permits the inference that it would have been made at an earlier date if
the same procedures had been carried out earlier where, as in the present case,
an important sign (the lump) was present at that earlier date. Thus far, I would accept that the action can
be regarded as simple and straightforward. However, there are further complications.
[20] What Mr Ferguson did criticise was the
averment that, in the event that Mr Ali had done what any ordinarily competent
registrar would have done, a diagnosis would have been made in November 1997,
as opposed to, say, some four months later. I give the instance of some four months later
because it appears from the pursuer's averments that the pursuer having been
seen by Mr Ibrahim on 23 February 1998
and Mr Ibrahim having arranged that the investigative procedures desiderated by
the pursuer be carried out, it was only on 16 June 1998 that the diagnosis was made. The way Mr Ferguson put it was to ask why all
the delay was being put at Mr Ali's door when no criticism was being made of
what had in fact happened after 23
February 1998. Miss
Sutherland's response was that it could not and should not be assumed that what
happened in February 1998 would have happened in November 1997. She mentioned the decision of the House of
Lords in Chester v
Afshar supra as possibly
supportive of her position but it was not the subject of detailed discussion.
[21] Chester
v Afshar was a case of a surgeon failing
to obtain informed consent. A random
risk that the claimant should have been warned about by the defendant
eventuated albeit that the surgery was carried out without negligence. As the judge had not found that the claimant would
never have undergone the surgery had she been given an appropriate warning,
applying conventional principles she could not satisfy the test of causation. The majority of the House of Lords was,
however, prepared to make what Lord Steyn described as a narrow and modest
departure from conventional principles with a view to the vindication of the
claimant's right of autonomy and dignity (supra
at 936D). Without more detailed argument
I am unable see to see how this applies to the present case. A more obviously applicable authority is Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. In that case there was an issue as to whether
the plaintiff had proved that the admittedly negligent failure of a senior
paediatric registrar, Dr Horn, to attend a child in respiratory difficulty had
caused the damage caused by reason of his respiratory collapse. For the damage to have been prevented it would
have been necessary that the child be intubated prior to the final catastrophic
episode. The evidence of Dr Horn was
that had she attended, she would not have intubated. Evidence was led as to whether not instituting
prophylactic intubation in the circumstances would have been in accordance with
a responsible body of professional opinion. The trial judge held that it would have been
in accordance with such a body of opinion and therefore not negligent not to
intubate. He accordingly held that the
plaintiff had failed to prove that the child's damage was caused by Dr Horn's
fault in not attending when requested to do so. Bolitho
is usually cited for the discussion by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in the only
reasoned speech, of the necessity of assessing medical negligence by reference
to a responsible body of medical opinion. However, in a portion of his speech headed The Bolam test and causation, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson also considered the question of what a plaintiff need do in
order to establish that a negligent omission caused the relevant damage. At
240B to G he said this:
"Where,
as in the present case, a breach of a duty of care is proved or admitted, the
burden still lies on the plaintiff to prove that such breach caused the injury
suffered: Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613; Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074. In all cases the primary question is one of
fact: did the wrongful act cause the
injury? But in cases where the breach of
duty consists of an omission to do an act which ought to be done (e.g. the
failure by a doctor to attend) that factual inquiry is, by definition, in the
realms of hypothesis. The question is
what would have happened if an event which by definition did not occur had
occurred. ...Therefore in the present case, the first relevant question is 'what
would Dr. Horn or Dr. Rodger have done if they had attended?' As to Dr. Horn, the judge accepted her
evidence that she would not have intubated. By inference, although not expressly, the
judge must have accepted that Dr. Rodger also would not have intubated: as a senior house officer she would not have
intubated without the approval of her senior registrar, Dr. Horn...
However
in the present case the answer to the question 'what would have happened?' is
not determinative of the issue of causation. At the trial the defendants accepted that if
the professional standard of care required any doctor who attended to intubate
Patrick, Patrick's claim must succeed.
Dr. Horn could not escape liability by proving that she would have
failed to take the course which any competent doctor would have adopted. A defendant cannot escape liability by saying
that the damage would have occurred in any event because he would have
committed some other breach of duty thereafter. I have no doubt that this concession was
rightly made by the defendants. But
there is some difficulty in analysing why it was correct. I adopt the analysis of Hobhouse L.J. in Joyce v Merton, Sutton and Wandsworth Health Authority [1996] 7 Med. L.R.
1. In commenting on the decision of the
Court of Appeal in the present case, he said, at p. 20:
'Thus a plaintiff can discharge the burden
of proof on causation by satisfying the court either that the relevant person would in fact have taken the
requisite action (although she would not have been at fault if she had not) or that the proper discharge of the relevant
person's duty towards the plaintiff required that she take that action. The former alternative calls for no
explanation since it is simply the factual proof of the causative effect of the
original fault. The latter is slightly
more sophisticated: it involves the
factual situation that the original fault did not itself cause the injury but
that this was because there would have been some further fault on the part of
the defendants; the plaintiff proves his case by proving that his injuries
would have been avoided if proper care had continued to be taken. In the Bolitho
case the plaintiff had to prove that the continuing exercise of proper care
would have resulted in his being intubated.'
There
were, therefore, two questions for the judge to decide on causation: (1) What would Dr.
Horn have done, or authorised to be done, if she had attended Patrick? and (2) If she would not have intubated, would that have
been negligent? The Bolam test has no relevance to the first of those questions but is
central to the second."
[22] I agree with Miss Sutherland to the
extent that it does not necessarily follow that what actually ensued after Mr
Ibrahim arranged in February 1998 for the carrying out of ultrasound and biopsy
(and, in particular, the passage of time between the various steps which
eventually led to a diagnosis being made on 16 June 1998) would have ensued had
Mr Ali made similar arrangements in November 1997. The pursuer is entitled to assert, as she
does at page 14D of the record, that had Mr Ali arranged an ultrasound scan and
the obtaining of a sample of the lump for analysis, a diagnosis would have been
made in November 1997. However, she must
prove that averment. Looking at the
averments of primary fact in her pleadings it is by no means clear how she
proposes to do that. As Lord
Browne-Wilkinson identifies, we are in the realms of hypothesis: the question is what would have happened if
an event which by definition did not occur had occurred. Here the event (or events) that did not occur
was the arranging of an ultrasound scan and the obtaining of a sample of the
lump for analysis. The pursuer's case is
that had a scan been arranged and had a sample been taken in November 1997 the
results of the scan and analysis of the sample would have been such that a
diagnosis of breast cancer would have been made and made in November 1997. Now, adopting the analysis of Hobhouse LJ,
Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained that a party in the position of the pursuer in
the present case can discharge the burden of proof on causation by satisfying
the court either that the relevant
person would in fact have taken the requisite action (although she would not
have been at fault if she had not) or
that the proper discharge of the relevant person's duty towards the pursuer
required that he take that action. In
the present case it would appear from the pursuer's averments at page 7C to 8B
which narrate what actually happened after the pursuer saw Mr Ibrahim on 23
February 1998 that there was more than one "relevant person" who would have
been involved in scanning and analysis but it would appear from the bald
averment at page 14D that it is the first of the alternative means of
discharging the burden of proof on causation indicated by Hobhouse LJ that the
pursuer in the present case is opting for.
A difficulty pointed to by Mr Ferguson is that there is no averment
which attempts to explain why the relevant persons would have scanned and
analysed any more quickly in November 1997 than did the relevant persons in
February 1998 and thereafter. While
Miss Sutherland accepted that there was no allegation of negligence on the
part of anyone other than Mr Ali and accordingly that it was not being said
that those who treated the pursuer on and after 23 February 1998 were negligent,
it is true that there is in the pursuer's pleadings what I take to be criticism
of the performance of those responsible on and after 23 February 1998, at page
13C to D of the record. It is as if the
pleader was at least half-minded to opt for the second of the alternative means
of discharging the burden of proof on causation indicated by Hobhouse LJ. The averments do not, however, go the
distance of alleging negligence on or after 23 February
1998 and Miss
Sutherland did not suggest that they did.
Nor do I find averments to the effect that failure to diagnose breast
cancer in the pursuer's case within a week of Mr Ali arranging an ultrasound
scan and taking a sample in November 1997 (the events that did not occur) would
have been negligent. In the result, the
pursuer's case, at least insofar as it relates to four of the seven months'
alleged delay is perilled on proving that those responsible for scanning and
analysis in November 1997 would have come to a diagnosis of breast cancer very
much more quickly than those who were responsible in February 1998. This is in a context where the pursuer
provides quite detailed averments demonstrating how the process may take some
four months and no averments at all (other than the bare assertion) explaining
why it should take less than a week. I
agree with Mr Ferguson's submission that this part of the pursuer's case is of
doubtful relevancy.
[23]
Mr Ferguson submitted that the
averment: "The pursuer has lost all
confidence in medical professionals.
This will have implications for any treatment she requires in the
future.", which appears at page 16D of the record was
entirely inspecific. I agree. I have no idea what was intended by the
second sentence. To describe it as of
doubtful relevancy, which is as far as Mr Ferguson went, appeared to me
generous but no doubt Mr Ferguson had reasons for such apparent
generosity. To have submitted that it
was entirely irrelevant would have had the result of the averment not being admitted
to probation which would have meant that it would no longer have presented an
impediment to a jury trial. I did not
take it that it was Mr Ferguson's object to remove any such impediment
but, equally, there was no motion to amend by Miss Sutherland.
[24] At page 17B of the record it is averred that had the initial
diagnosis been made in November 1997 it is likely that the pursuer would not
have required chemotherapy. No
explanation is provided as to why the pursuer maintains that this is so. Mr Ferguson submitted that this averment
too is of doubtful relevancy. I
agree. We are again dealing with a
hypothesis: what would have happened if
an event which did not occur (a November 1997 diagnosis) had in fact
occurred. Clearly, among the
possibilities is that more radical treatment would not have been necessary
because the pursuer's condition would not have been so advanced. The averment criticised by Mr Ferguson
can be regarded as an invitation to the fact-finder to reach a particular
conclusion on the balance of probabilities, the conclusion being that had the
hypothetical event occurred chemotherapy would not have been necessary. Such a conclusion can only be reached on a
consideration of facts that are proved.
A statement of the averment by a witness, even an expert witness, would of
itself be of little value: Davie
v The Magistrates of Edinburgh 1953
SC 34 at 40. If facts are to be proved
they must be averred, at least in summary.
Looking to the pursuer's pleadings in the present case I have found
little in the way of averments of facts which, if proved, might permit the
conclusion that chemotherapy, which it is accepted was an appropriate treatment
in June 1998, would not have been necessary in November 1997. It is true, as Miss Sutherland pointed out,
that at pages 15E to 16A of the record it is averred that the pursuer was aware
that the lump was changing and increasing in size. That may point to a development of the breast
cancer over the period but it says nothing explicitly about why such
development might have this particular impact on options for treatment.
[25] In addition to his submission that the pursuer's averments were
of doubtful relevancy Mr Ferguson contended that the case was unsuitable
for jury trial because it presented difficulties in the assessment of damages.
[26] At page 16C the pursuer avers:
"As a result of the delay in diagnosis the pursuer has developed an
Adjustment Disorder with depressed mood" and, at page 16E: "Had the diagnosis been made in November it
is likely that the pursuer would have coped with the diagnosis and undergone
treatment without any continuing psychological problems." Difficult as the task of assessing damages
will be, looking at these averments in isolation, I would not have concluded
that they make the case unsuitable for jury trial. However I consider that the matter is
different when they are looked at in the context provided by the pursuer's other averments.
She avers that after examination by Mr Ali, she "did not feel
re-assured"; she "did not feel that he listened to her concerns and felt he was
dismissive." She goes on to aver that
she "was convinced that she did have cancer and spent many hours lying in the
dark in her bedroom crying consumed by an overwhelming fear that she was going
to die", and that she "was extremely distressed when the diagnosis was
eventually made. She broke down in tears
certain that her worst fears had now been confirmed." These averments at least raise the issue that
there were a number of factors bearing on the adverse psychological consequences
of the pursuer's experience from the time she became aware of the lump. These would appear to include her perception
that Mr Ali did not listen and that he was dismissive, her belief (which
proved to be correct) that she did have cancer, her fear that she would die and
her immediate reaction to being advised of the diagnosis. While the averment that the pursuer felt that
Mr Ali was not listening and was dismissive has a flavour of criticism about
it, it is not averred that he in fact did not listen or was in fact
dismissive. Importantly, it is not said
that he was negligent in the way he communicated with the pursuer. As is underlined by the use of the word
"coped" at page 17A, there is at the very least a suggestion in the pursuer's
averments that the fact of the diagnosis, confirming as it did the pursuer's
fears, had a part in producing the pursuer's psychological reaction. There may therefore be quite significant
difficulty in identifying what truly were the consequences of delay in
diagnosis as opposed to what were the consequences of other aspects of the
pursuer's experience. I agree with Mr
Ferguson that the matter is made more difficult by reason of the question as to
why it is that the pursuer maintains that Mr Ali's negligence caused the whole
of what she characterises as a delay.
[27] Agreeing with Miss Sutherland, I consider that the court should
not lightly assume that a case is simply too difficult for a jury. As she observed, in a criminal trial on
indictment the jury may be asked to determine quite complex matters,
without, of course, the benefit of
opening speeches. That said, the task of a jury in a civil case which is to do
justice as between the parties, assessing evidence on a balance of
probabilities, is not quite the same as the task of a jury in a criminal trial
which is to determine whether the Crown has proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt. If I am correct about my
assessment of the relevancy of the pursuer's pleadings then I cannot repel the
defender's plea to the relevancy and therefore I cannot allow issues. However, even if I am wrong about that, it
appears to me, for the reasons that I have set out, that the pursuer's
pleadings present sufficient in the way of difficulty in the assessment of
damages as to make the case unsuitable for trial by jury.
[28] I shall therefore uphold the defender's second plea-in-law,
reserve its first plea-in-law and order a proof before answer on all the
parties' averments. I shall reserve all questions of expenses.