Scottish Court of Session Decisions

Counsel for the petitioner submitted that this paragraph was evidence of speculation on the part of the adjudicator against the interest of the petitioner. There had been no evidence of the age at which someone became eligible to join the Pakistan Peoples Party or of the age at which one became eligible to be general secretary. Moreover, there was no evidence about the role and responsibility of the general secretary. In that regard counsel relied upon Alam v Secretary of State for the Home Department. It seemed to me that this criticism of the adjudicator's decision was unfounded. If the paragraph is read as a whole it is clear, as was submitted by counsel for the respondent, that the adjudicator found inconsistencies within the petitioner's evidence which caused the adjudicator to disbelieve the appellant. In particular, the appellant's initial evidence about the age at which he joined the Pakistan Peoples Party was shown to be erroneous. That alone would have entitled the adjudicator to doubt the appellant's credibility.

Counsel for the petitioner submitted that "it was common sense that someone would still be referred to as the general secretary of the party" even after he had left Pakistan. I do not agree. In any event, it seemed to me that counsel was attempting to place too much significance on this part of the adjudicator's decision. When read as a whole it is clear that the adjudicator was concerned about the apparent discrepancy between the actual date of the newspaper and the date given in the translation. The comment about the petitioner still being described as the general secretary of the party for Sahiwal city at least a year after the petitioner had left Pakistan should be read in context. The ultimate conclusion of the adjudicator was that he did not attach much weight to the newspaper article. It is clear from the beginning of this paragraph that the adjudicator considered that the newspaper article was of doubtful relevance. Thereafter, he expressed concern about the errors in translation and finally made the comment complained of. When read in context I do not consider that the comment illustrates that the adjudicator erred in law in failing to apply the correct standard of proof. Even if I had concluded otherwise, I do not consider that the alleged error would have conferred upon the petitioner a real prospect of a successful appeal because, as I observe below, any threats of violence to the petitioner did not emanate from the Pakistani authorities.

Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the medical report (6/6 of process) disclosed psychological features which the adjudicator failed to take into account. The relevant parts of the summary of the medical report are as follows:-

Although counsel referred to a passage in Syme & Jorro: "Asylum Law and Practice" to the effect that post traumatic stress syndrome can be important in assessing credibility, I note that the doctor did not diagnose the petitioner as suffering from such a condition. Indeed, having regard to the experience of the doctor in dealing with victims of torture I consider that it is significant that she did not make such a diagnosis. Moreover, as counsel for the respondent reminded me, in this case there had been no Home Office presenting officer and the adjudicator had to consider the medical report critically. In particular, he did not have to accept the final conclusion of the doctor that the petitioner had "significant medical evidence to support his claims that he had been tortured as described in his account". The adjudicator had to evaluate the information before him in a rational way. It appears to me that the summary of the medical examination amounts to no more than evidence of old injuries which could have a variety of causes, including ill treatment. The examination also disclosed a number of psychological symptoms which are commonly described in post traumatic stress syndrome but the doctor did not diagnose the petitioner as suffering from that condition. In the absence of such a diagnosis the reference to the possible effects of such condition on the assessment of credibility of the petitioner is in my view irrelevant. Moreover, even if it had been relevant I consider that it is significant that such a submission did not feature prior to the hearing before me. In particular it does not appear to have been any part of the petitioner's case that he was suffering from post traumatic stress syndrome and that as a result of that condition his ability to recall details was impaired. While I accept that the decision letter makes no reference to the psychological symptoms I do not consider that omission to be of any significance in the absence of a diagnosis of post traumatic stress syndrome. Nor do I consider that such an omission in the circumstances of this case amounts to an error of law on the part of the adjudicator. I am also of the view that the adjudicator was entitled to reach the conclusion that the opinion of the doctor that the petitioner had "significant medical evidence to support his claims that he has been tortured as described in his account" is an over statement and is not supported by the diagnosis. Accordingly I am not satisfied that this criticism of the adjudicator's decision is well founded.

I respectfully agree with these observations. In the present case the issue of bail is a material matter and the failure of the petitioner to mention it prior to his statement to the adjudicator is in my view a material discrepancy between that statement and his earlier answers to questions at his Home Office interview. Furthermore, the first reference which the petitioner made to there being outstanding charges against him was in his statement to the adjudicator. In my opinion that is a significant development from that adopted by him when he was interviewed by Home Office officials. At paragraphs 17 and 18 of the decision letter the adjudicator clearly attached significance to the omission of the petitioner to make reference to outstanding charges when he was interviewed. The subsequent reference in his statement to bail and to the outstanding charges were discounted by the adjudicator as being inconsistent with the original account given by the petitioner to Home Office officials when he was interviewed. The adjudicator was perfectly entitled to reach such a conclusion and I can see no justification for challenging the adjudicator's decision in that regard on the ground of unreasonableness.

In support of his submission counsel for the petitioner relied upon two questions and answers at the initial interview which were in the following terms:

I agree with counsel for the petitioner that, if read in isolation, these answers are ambiguous and capable of referring to the Pakistani authorities. However, the interview record should be read as whole to determine the source of the threats of violence. In that regard it seems to me that the following questions and answers are relevant to this issue:

When all of these answers are considered together it seems to me to be clear that any actual violence towards the petitioner's property and threats of violence to his person including the threat to kill him, emanated from members of the Sahaba party. It does not appear to me that the adjudicator erred in concluding that at the asylum interview the appellant was not expressing a fear of the Pakistani authorities. In these circumstances I do not consider that this criticism of the adjudicator's decision is well founded.