Karen Elizabeth Wetherhill Or Sheikh (Ap) v. Zahid Hussain Sheikh [2005] ScotCS CSOH_25 (10 February 2005)
OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION [2005] CSOH 25 | |
A3106/00
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OPINION OF LORD PHILIP in the cause KAREN ELIZABETH WETHERHILL OR SHEIKH (A.P.) Pursuer; against ZAHID HUSSAIN SHEIKH Defender:
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Pursuer: Hayhow, Advocate; Stuart & Stuart, W.S.
Defender: Party
10 February 2005
[1] In this action the pursuer seeks declarator that she was lawfully married to the defender by cohabitation between 8 November 1985 and 3 November 1998, and the habit and repute arising therefrom. [2] At the commencement of the diet of proof the defender appeared without representation and moved the Court to adjourn the proof. He explained that his solicitor had withdrawn from acting two weeks previously and that he did not have access to the file of papers relating to his case. A previous diet of proof had been discharged after his then solicitors had withdrawn because his legal aid application had been refused. Legal aid had subsequently been granted, but on his marriage to his present wife in May 2002, his financial circumstances required to be reassessed by the legal aid board. The implication was, as I understood it, that he was no longer legally aided. [3] In opposing the motion, Mr Hayhow for the pursuer set out the history of the case. The summons had been signetted on 15 November 2000 and served on 27 November 2000. Defences were lodged on 22 January 2001 and in February 2001 the case was sisted to enable the defender to apply for legal aid. In March 2001 the defender's application for legal aid was refused on the merits. The sist was recalled on 14 March 2001. In April 2001 the Keeper of the Rolls enquired by letter whether the defender intended to insist in his defence. The defender must have responded in the affirmative because a diet of proof was subsequently fixed for 6 November 2001. On 24 September 2001 the defender's solicitors withdrew from acting. The defender was again asked if he intended to insist in his defence and he instructed fresh solicitors. On 2 November 2001 a motion was enrolled on his behalf for discharge of the diet of 6 November 2001. According to Mr Hayhow's contemporaneous note, at the hearing on the motion the defender's counsel said that a further legal aid application had been made in September 2001. No intimation of that application had however been made to the pursuer's agents. The defender's new solicitors however felt they were unable to conduct the proof "for financial reasons", and in any event had been unable to prepare for the proof in the week since they had been instructed. There was a defence to the action and they intended to adjust the pleadings. The diet was then discharged. [4] Shortly thereafter the pursuer's agents received intimation of an application for legal aid. On 12 September 2002 legal aid was refused, but was subsequently granted on 19 November 2002 after a successful application for review. On 1 April 2003 a fresh diet of proof was fixed for 20 April 2004. The defender's solicitors proceeded to prepare for the proof. In late March 2004 the pursuer's agents were advised that the defender had consulted with counsel and that the proof would be proceeding. On 30 March 2004 the defender's new solicitors withdrew from acting. The defender then instructed a third firm of solicitors who enrolled a motion to discharge the proof. That motion was refused on 14 April 2004. The stated ground of refusal was that adequate time remained for the preparation of the case and, in any event, having regard to the time which had elapsed since the commencement of the action, the case should have been prepared by now. On 15 April 2004 the defender's third solicitors withdrew from acting. [5] In relation to the defender's access to the relevant file of papers, his second solicitors had intimated that they were willing to hand over the papers to anyone acting on his behalf. The pursuer's agents had very recently been informed by the Scottish Legal Aid Board that a legal aid certificate in favour of the defender remained in existence. The action was four years old and the defender had been solely responsible for the delays. It was his own fault that he was not represented. In any event, his witnesses were present in court. [6] In response the defender maintained that he had been told by his solicitor in April 2004 that legal aid had been "suspended". Otherwise he was not in a position to dispute the history set out by counsel for the pursuer. I was concerned that in support of his motion the defender had advanced an inaccurate and incomplete history of the case, and I concluded that it could be inferred from his conduct of the action to date that his objective was to delay indefinitely the resolution of the case to the prejudice of the pursuer. For the third time he had parted company with his solicitors shortly before a diet of proof and was seeking to have the diet discharged. The withdrawal of three separate sets of solicitors required some explanation. In two of the cases none was forthcoming. The pursuer had been ready to go to proof since 2001. She should not be required to wait any longer. The defender's witnesses were present. I accordingly refused the motion to adjourn and allowed the defender time to consider the file of papers held by his second solicitors. The proof then proceeded with the defender conducting his own case. [7] Before considering the evidence, I think it is helpful at the outset to set out the legal requirements for constitution of marriage of by cohabitation with habit and repute. The law is summarised by Professor Clive in Husband & Wife, 4th Edition, at paragraph 05.025:"Cohabitation and repute do not in themselves constitute a marriage. Outward actings do not make a marriage. Mere consent does not in itself constitute a marriage either. Marriage requires both a mental element (mutual consent to marry) and an outward or factual element (nowadays either a regular marriage ceremony or cohabitation with habit and repute). Both are necessary. Neither is sufficient. If the outward element is proved, the consent will be presumed to have been exchanged, but this presumption can be rebutted. The theory of the present law on marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute is therefore that if a man and a woman cohabit as husband and wife in Scotland for a sufficient time and are generally held and reputed to be husband and wife and are free to marry each other, they will be presumed to have tacitly consented to be married and, if this presumption is not rebutted, will be legally married."
"Of this kind of consent marriage by promise and subsequent copula is one example; and other example is the continued cohabitation of the parties as man and wife, with the repute, among all who know them, that such is their relation. It is important clearly to understand this principle, for there is here a risk of two opposite errors. On the one hand, it has sometimes been maintained that marriage is constituted by the cohabitation and repute, so that there could be no contradiction of it if the outward facts were certain; but it is clear that the outward facts operate merely as legal evidence of consent, which may be rebutted by counter-evidence, just as may be done in the case of mutual declaration. On the other hand, care must be taken not to consider cohabitation and repute merely as raising a presumption of marriage having been contracted by celebration or mutual declaration. They form in themselves a recognised and lawful mode of indicating consent. They raise a presumption of law that there has been consent, not, indeed, a praesumptio juris et de jure but a praesumptio juris, which, although it may be rebutted by proving that there was no consent at all, will not be rebutted by merely shewing that no consent had been expressly interchanged. If tacit consent is sufficient it is of no consequence that there is no express consent. The law infers mutual consent in the minds of the parties from their living so long together as man and wife, and allowing themselves to be reputed man and wife. It is not merely presumed that they were married in some other way. The law holds them to be married in this way, - that is, by means of the cohabitation and repute, which are a legitimate enunciation to themselves and others of their matrimonial consent, although never put in words."
"That repute need not be universal in order to permit of the inference being drawn that the parties consented to be man and wife, but it must be general, for cohabitation at bed and board may be that of man and wife, but it may also be that of keeper and mistress. Marriage is a grave matter, not lightly to be affirmed. The inference that cohabitation was that of man and wife will only be drawn if their behaviour has been such as to give rise to a repute which is substantially general and undivided that the parties were man and wife."