Koca v. Secretary Of State For The Home Department [2005] ScotCS CSIH_41 (27 May 2005)
FIRST DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
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Lord President Lord Macfadyen Lord Clarke
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[2005CSIH41] P759/02 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD CLARKE in the Petition of MEHMET KOCA (AP) Petitioner and Reclaimer; against SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Respondent: For Judicial Review of: (1) a Determination of an Immigration Appeal Adjudicator dated 7 February 2002 dismissing the petitioner's appeal against a Decision to Issue Removal Directions to an illegal immigrant; and (2) a Decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal dated 19 March 2002 refusing leave to appeal against the Adjudicator's Determination _______ |
Petitioner and Reclaimer: Bovey, Q.C., Blair; Drummond Miller, W.S.
Respondent: Lindsay; Solicitor for the Advocate General for Scotland
27 May 2005
Introduction
[1] This is a reclaiming motion from an interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary, dated 22 November 2002, whereby he refused the prayer of the reclaimer's petition for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal refusing the reclaimer leave to appeal against the Determination of an Adjudicator dated 7 February 2002, which refused the reclaimer's claim for asylum. [2] The full history of the reclaimer's application for asylum, and its refusal by the respondent, is set out in detail by the Lord Ordinary in his Opinion. In summary, the reclaimer is a national of Turkey. He is an Alevi Kurd, who was born in 1973. He left Turkey in or about February 2000 and arrived in the United Kingdom on 7 March 2000. He made a claim for asylum in terms of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 (the Geneva Convention). In the Statement of Evidence Form (SEF) which he submitted to the respondent, in support of his claim for asylum, and which was completed with the assistance of a solicitor, the reclaimer stated that he was of Turkish/Kurdish nationality and had left Turkey on 1 March 2000 by lorry, paying those who had arranged for his transportation out of Turkey 13,000 DM. He stated that he had changed lorries three or four times before arriving in the United Kingdom. He gave four reasons for fearing persecution in his country of nationality. These were:1. His ethnic origin
2. His religion
3. The political opinions he held
4. The fact that he had evaded military service.
He explained that he had been called up for military service in 1993 but he failed to attend his medical examination because he did not want to fight for the Turkish army and was against the use of violence and guns. Thereafter he used various false ID cards and false names. On 15 February 2000 he had participated in a protest against the detention of the Head of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). At the demonstration a friend of his had been arrested and, under torture, the friend gave the reclaimer's name to the military personnel who had been torturing him. Subsequently the reclaimer's home had been raided while he was absent from it. He decided he had to flee Turkey.
[3] The reclaimer was interviewed, on behalf of the respondent, on 14 March 2000. The record of that interview is set out at pages 261-267 of the Appendix. On 12 January 2001 the respondent refused the reclaimer's application for asylum in a letter, a copy of which forms pages 125-128 of the Appendix. In brief, the reasons given for refusal were as follows. In the first place the respondent considered that there was no evidence to demonstrate that being of Kurdish ethnic origin was in itself sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in Turkey. Secondly, the respondent considered that the reclaimer's claim to be an objector to the use of violence and, therefore, military service was implausible. Thirdly, the reclaimer did not originate from the five provinces in south east Turkey most severely affected by the conflict between the Turkish authorities and the PKK and there was no reason to think that he would be affected by the situation in those provinces upon his return. There was no reason why the reclaimer would have to reside in south east Turkey. Fourthly, the authorities in Turkey would have been entitled to make inquiries regarding the reclaimer's alleged support for the PKK as this was a terrorist organisation. The respondent was not persuaded that there was any compelling evidence to demonstrate that Alevi Muslims had a well-founded fear of persecution in Turkey on account of their religious beliefs. Lastly, the reclaimer had passed through a number of foreign countries where he could have claimed asylum. The fact that he did not do so, in the view of the respondent, "further reduces your credibility".The Hearing before the Adjudicator and her Determination
[4] The reclaimer's appeal against the respondent's refusal was heard by an Adjudicator at Glasgow on 11 December 2001. At the hearing of the appeal the respondent was not represented. The reclaimer was represented by a solicitor. The reclaimer and his wife gave oral evidence. There were also before the Adjudicator witness statements from both the reclaimer and his wife. Both parties had lodged bundles of documents. The Adjudicator also had before her a letter from the reclaimer's solicitor, which document was described as a chronology and skeletal argument for the appellant. Among the reclaimer's productions was a report, in the form of a letter, from David McDowall, dated 13 September 2001. This gentleman holds himself out as a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs with a particular interest in the Kurds. The report, with appendices, is reproduced as pages 1-84 of the Appendix. On page 2 of the letter Mr McDowall states:"Please provide the Court with a copy of Asylum Seekers from Turkey (hereinafter ASFT), to which I shall refer in this report".
It is a matter of agreement that that request was not complied with and the report (ASFT) in question was not before the Adjudicator.
[5] At the hearing before the Adjudicator the reclaimer's representative chose not to put questions, in the form of examination-in-chief, to the reclaimer but to rely on his witness statement and those of his wife. The Adjudicator herself put questions to the reclaimer. The questions and answers thereto are recorded at pages 275-282 of the Appendix. The reclaimer's representative then put certain questions to the reclaimer. When it came to the time for the reclaimer's representative to make submissions, the Adjudicator, as recorded at page 287 of the Appendix, said "Do you need to go through on (sic) all this as I have the skeleton argument and docs etc.". The reply to that question was "Do I need to address you on credibility?". The Adjudicator herself responded "Yes HOPO raised it" (HOPO is a reference to the official of the respondent's department). The reclaimer's representative went on to make some references to the witness's demeanour and certain aspects of the evidence. He also addressed questions of sufficiency of evidence. The Adjudicator put no further questions to the reclaimer's representative nor raised any further matter with him. The submission of the reclaimer's representative was concluded by him saying "I would ask you to uphold the appeal on suspected involvement on PKK and daily intense involvement of HADEP". HADEP is a reference to the People's Democracy Party which is a lawful political party in Turkey. The Adjudicator referred in her Determination to material before her that stated that the Turkish Government, however, apparently believes that many HADEP supporters have ties to the PKK or support their agenda. As will be seen the question as to whether, and to what extent, the reclaimer had an involvement with HADEP was an issue before the Adjudicator. It is clear, however, that a material part of the reclaimer's case was his alleged membership of HADEP and suspected support of the PKK. At paragraph 17 of the Adjudicator's Determination she said this:"Whilst I do not find that he supported the PKK as claimed in that he was not a member or in a position to provide them with support or that the authorities would have assumed he was in the PKK because he was a draft evader living in central Turkey of Alevi Kurd ethnicity, there remains the argument that the authorities would suspect him of being involved with the PKK once he had disappeared because of his earlier involvement with HADEP of which the authorities were apparently aware. I therefore turn to consideration of the evidence of the appellant's claim made by his representative in his submissions that he had a daily intense involvement with HADEP".
At paragraph 19 the Adjudicator concluded as follows:
"From the late 1990s the appellant claims to have been an active supporter of HADEP to the extent that it was submitted on his behalf that he had a daily intense involvement with the organisation. He said he attended meetings once a month or so, particularly in Yusuf Akca's house who was his cousin. He was the main organiser of HADEP in the area. After evading military service he continued to work at his father's farm but lived elsewhere, including with his cousins who were HADEP members. He spoke at HADEP meetings far from his home and this is how he met his wife in 1993".
The following passage in the Adjudicator's Determination was the subject of considerable discussion both before the Lord Ordinary and at the hearing of the reclaiming motion. It is appropriate to set it out in full.
"However, I note that in the SEF form which the appellant completed with the assistance of his representatives and in which he was asked, 'The name of any political organisations with which you have been involved either in the United Kingdom or abroad' the appellant does not mention HADEP or any other political organisation save to say that he 'sympathised' with PKK but was not a member. Again, in his interview the appellant said that he had not been a member of a political party but he sympathised with Kurdish parties such as PKK, HADEP and DEP before it was closed down (B10, Q13). This completely contradicts his statement which he made after his application had been refused by the respondent. In that statement he said he was a member of HADEP from the late 1990s onwards. He said he was tired in the interview. However, I assume he was not tired when he completed the SEF form with his solicitor. He must have known whether or not he had been a member of any political party and to say on two occasions prior to refusal of his application that he was not now nor had been a member of any political party either in the UK or when abroad, and then to change this to a claim of being an active member of HADEP subsequent to the refusal of his claim for asylum is seriously damaging to his credibility. The picture the appellant paints of himself after the appeal as a very active member of HADEP speaking at meetings, etc is very different to the first picture he presented of himself. It is a very different thing to be a sympathiser of the PKK and previous parties concerned with Kurdish interests than to being a political activist travelling the country, attending and speaking at meetings which is what the appellant had changed his claim to by the time he made his statement after refusal of his claim. I note in the Statement of additional grounds filed in March 2001 and referred to above, neither the appellant nor Hatice Toker in her separate statement refer to his active membership of HADEP. Both she and he concentrate in these statements rather on the danger of the appellant being returned as a failed asylum seeker of Kurdish Alevi origin who had refused to undertake military service".
The Adjudicator then went on to deal with the reclaimer's evidence regarding his attendance at an alleged demonstration on 15 February 2000 as a result of which he said he came to the attention of the authorities. She came to the conclusion that there was no demonstration on the date which he claimed, that is on 15 February 2000 which he had attended. At paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Determination the Adjudicator was to the following effect:
"I consider on this evidence that the claimed active membership of the appellant of HADEP was created to bolster his claim for asylum after the respondent's refusal.
The background material states that the government believes that many HADEP supporters had ties to the PKK or supported their agenda. HADEP offices were raided and HADEP officials such as mayors were detained although I note the areas mentioned are significantly further to the east or south of the country than Kayseri. However, I have found that the appellant was a supporter, not a member and did not hold a position with HADEP despite his later claims to be an active member and therefore he is not in danger of being suspected as a threat to the government on the grounds of any sympathy or support he has for HADEP".
"I note Mr McDowall states that nowhere is safe in Turkey if one is suspected of dissident views. The report to which he refers, 'Asylum Seekers from Turkey' was not enclosed in the bundle of papers. However, the appellant lives in the centre of Turkey as far as I can tell from the map, well away from the active PKK areas".
She also referred, at paragraph 21, to Mr McDowall's observations on the date or occasion of the alleged demonstration which the reclaimer said he was attending. The last reference to Mr McDowall's evidence is to be found at paragraph 27 when the Adjudicator was dealing with the argument that the reclaimer would face persecution as a returnee who had evaded military service. She stated:
"Mr McDowall argues that as an Alevi Kurd he would be subjected to ill feeling from within the armed forces although he was not able to quantify the risk or provide evidence within his report. He referred to evidence regarding Kurds in the military service but none was produced with the report. The CIPU report states that both Turkish and Kurdish Alevis may be subjected to some bureaucratic discrimination as are other ethnic and religious minority groups in Turkey. However, it is stated in that report that there is no evidence that Alevis are persecuted on account of their religious beliefs by the Turkish State. He would suffer some consequences on his return as being an evader of military service. It is possible that he would be obliged to serve a sentence of imprisonment before being sent to carry out his military service. No differentiation is made between evaders who remain in Turkey and those who migrate abroad. The appellant would suffer these consequences whether he had given himself up in Turkey or upon his return. The evidence does not support the contention that such consequences would amount to persecution although I note that there is not much evidence in this regard. On the evidence before me I do not find that the appellant would suffer persecution because he is an Alevi Kurd in military service or by the fact he was an evader of military service".
The Adjudicator's conclusion, at paragraph 30, was that the reclaimer's rights under the 1950 Convention would not be breached by returning him to Turkey and she therefore dismissed the appeal.
Application to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and its decision
[7] In his application to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal for leave to appeal against that decision, the reclaimer stated, inter alia, at paras. (3) and (4):"(3) The lynch pin of the adjudicator's repudiation of the appellant's account is her treatment at para.20 of her determination of the purported discrepancy between his evidence in SEF and at interview that he was a HADEP supporter/sympathiser and in his Witness Statement that he was a member who did not have a membership card. There are serious problems with the adjudicator's reliance on this point. By definition it was not raised in the RFRL since the Witness Statement by definition post-dated that. There was no HOPO at the hearing so the point was not put to the appellant in cross-examination. And although the adjudicator in her determination relies on the point, she did not herself put it to the appellant for explanation, notwithstanding that she questioned him on other matters to an extent perhaps inconsistent with due impartiality; furthermore the appellant's representative was at no time invited to comment on the point. It is submitted that the appellant's representative could be forgiven for failing to identify the point as an obvious discrepancy crying out for explanation during examination in chief.
(4) It is therefore submitted that the adjudicator has found against the appellant on a point which ought to have been put to him for explanation. That submission is made with particular force in the light of the views of the Tribunal in Mayisokele (13039) that care must be taken in making a determination turn on discrepancies of this kind. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal is craved to receive a Supplementary Witness Statement of the appellant which contains his explanation of the point".
A separate statement of the reclaimer dated 18 February 2002 (pages 214-215 of the Appendix) did seek to deal with the so called discrepancies. In refusing leave to appeal, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, inter alia, stated in its Determination (page 216-217 of the Appeal):
"The Adjudicator in a lengthy and carefully considered determination does not show an over eager inclination to base her decision on credibility. The grounds of appeal should not make veiled submissions of possible over-involvement by the Adjudicator without detail or supporting evidence. The reasons for the partial adverse credibility finding are compelling. There is no obligation on an Adjudicator to put to an Applicant every point on which she subsequently relies in reaching an adverse credibility finding. Had she done so there might have been some justification for the suggestion of over involvement".
The Petition for Judicial Review
[8] In his petition for judicial review, the reclaimer sought to attack the decision of the Adjudicator on a number of grounds. In Statement XXI of the petition his attack was based on the Adjudicator's failure to give the reclaimer an opportunity to provide an explanation for perceived discrepancies in his evidence. In Statement XXII the reclaimer attacked the Adjudicator's decision in relation to her treatment of the evidence regarding the reclaimer's involvement with HADEP. In the course of his averments in the petition, the reclaimer also complained about the Adjudicator's failure to obtain the report (ASFT) referred to in Mr McDowall's evidence. [9] In his decision, the Lord Ordinary, addressed the three specific issues which were apparently, in the event, raised before him. The first was the complaint about the way in which the Adjudicator had dealt with the apparent discrepancies in the evidence of the reclaimer regarding his HADEP involvement. The second related to the Adjudicator having, to some extent at least, dismissed the appeal due to lack of corroboration of the reclaimer's evidence. The third matter was the failure of the Adjudicator to seek out the report referred to in Mr McDowall's evidence and more generally the use made by the Adjudicator of material contained in Mr McDowall's evidence. The grounds of appeal lodged by the reclaimer against the Lord Ordinary's decision in refusing the prayer of the petition, in the first place, focused on the Lord Ordinary's handling of the Adjudicator's approach to the alleged discrepancies in the reclaimer's evidence regarding his HADEP involvement. In the second place, the grounds of appeal focused on the Lord Ordinary's consideration of the way in which the Adjudicator dealt with Mr McDowall's evidence and her failure to call for the ASFT report. [10] Before this Court, Mr Bovey, Q.C., for the reclaimer made submissions initially with reference to those grounds of appeal. In discussion with the Court, however, it began to emerge that his complaint on behalf of the reclaimer in relation to the Adjudicator's decision, was, in substantial part, at least, really one pointing to her failure to provide adequate or comprehensible reasons for her decision to refuse the appeal. This approach had not, it was conceded, clearly been focused either in the petition, or in the grounds of appeal. Senior counsel for the reclaimer sought leave both to amend the petition and to add new grounds of appeal to focus such an attack. This was opposed by counsel for the respondent as coming far too late in the circumstances. While recognising the force of the respondent's grounds of opposition, we considered that it was appropriate, in this case, to allow both the grounds of appeal and the petition to be amended to enable what appeared, perhaps, to be the true basis of the attack on the Determination of the Adjudicator to be focused. The additional grounds of appeal are No.21 of process and the Minute of Amendment of the petition is No.20 of process.Submissions on behalf of the reclaimer
[11] Senior counsel for the reclaimer's first main submission was that the Adjudicator had failed to give the reclaimer a fair hearing. This requirement had not been met in the present case because, at no stage, before her Determination was issued, did the Adjudicator raise the perceived contradiction in the reclaimer's evidence discussed at paragraph 20 of her Determination. That was not a peripheral matter. It was reasonably clear from what the Adjudicator said at para.23 of her Determination that had she found that the reclaimer had been an active member of HADEP then she would have held him to have been at risk of ill-treatment. Reference was made to various authorities, outwith the field of immigration law, where the Courts had held, in particular circumstances, that a decision-maker, such as judge or arbiter, should not leave a party to a dispute before it, not knowing the main aspects of the case he had to meet. We were referred in this respect to Lindsay v Giles (1844) 6D 771, Clarke v Watson 1982 S.L.T.450, Zermalt Holdings SA v Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd [1985] 2 EGLR 1136 and Costain Ltd v Strathclyde Builders Ltd 17 December 2003 (unreported). [12] In the present case, in order to ensure a fair hearing for the reclaimer, the Adjudicator, it was submitted, should have brought to the attention of the reclaimer's representative the discrepancies in the reclaimer's evidence which might materially affect her decision. She could have done so in a number of ways. In the first place she could, herself, have asked the reclaimer, in her questioning of him, about such discrepancies. Secondly, she could have invited the reclaimer's representative to put questions to the reclaimer about these matters. Thirdly, she could have brought her particular concerns to the attention of the reclaimer's representative when he came to make submissions. Lastly, she could have put the matter out for a further hearing if the concerns had only emerged while she was formulating her decision. The Lord Ordinary, in his treatment of this part of the case, had focused far too heavily on what might be appropriate in a contested ordinary civil litigation where both sides were represented. Somewhat different considerations applied, in the present case, having regard to the nature of the decision which the Adjudicator had to arrive at, the guidance that had been previously been given to Adjudicators as to how they should carry out their functions, and the fact that no contradictor appeared at the hearing. Reference was made to the case of Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All.E.R.449, particularly at page 457 as to the approach which should be adopted by Adjudicators in reaching their decisions in such cases. Senior counsel also drew the Court's attention to the "starred" decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal presided over by Collins, J., MNM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] INLR 576, in which guidelines were issued to Adjudicators as to how to conduct hearings where the Secretary of State is not represented. It was submitted that guidelines (IV) and (V) were of particular relevance for present purposes. They are in the following terms:"(iv) Where credibility is raised in the refusal letter, the special adjudicator should request that the appellant's representative address those matters in examination-in-chief or in submissions. The special adjudicator is then entitled to form his own view as to credibility irrespective of whether the matters are addressed.
(v) Where no matters of credibility are raised in the refusal letter but, from reading the papers, the special adjudicator considers that matters of credibility do arise, those matters should be pointed out to the appellant's representative and request should be made that the appellant's representative address these matters in examination-in-chief or in submissions".
Reference was also made to guidelines (vii) and (viii) which are in the following terms:
"(vii) Although it is not the function of the special adjudicator to raise a matter which may have been raised by the Secretary of State's representative in cross examination had he been present, a special adjudicator can, after having received the evidence or submissions in relation to matters which he has drawn to the appellant's attention, ask questions in order to clarify any matters.
(viii) Where the refusal letter does not raise matters which the special adjudicator considers relevant and important such as, for example, whether internal protection was open to the appellant or whether the existence of a civil war in the appellant's country precluded refugee status, he should raise these matters with the appellant's representative and invite submissions".
The Lord Ordinary, in his Opinion, it was submitted, had focused largely on guideline (iv). He had failed to take into account the overall effect of the guidelines which was that to ensure fairness, the Adjudicator, if something arose in the procedure, or from the material before him, which he considered might be damaging to the position of the applicant, such a matter should be brought to the attention of the applicant or his representative for comment. Such an approach had already been approved in the case of Rodrigues Mayisokele 23/02/1996, a note of which is provided in the Immigration Network Case Law Database. The note is in the following terms:
"In this case leave to appeal to the IAT from a decision of the adjudicator had been refused by the Tribunal but that refusal was later quashed by the High Court. In his judgment Ognall, J. had stated that it was not apparent from the determination that the adjudicator had afforded the appellant an opportunity of dealing with the perceived discrepancy in his evidence, and that the adjudicator was arguably wrong in founding his opinion on the credibility of the appellant on the discrepancies which the adjudicator saw between the two sets of information given at two different stages.
Decision: Referring to the above judgment of Ognall J. (with respectful approval) the Tribunal stressed that 'where an adjudicator relies on what appears to be a discrepancy in statements made by the appellant it is incumbent upon the adjudicator that the appellant be given an opportunity to deal with that matter. If the matter is not covered at the hearing and the adjudicator has not given any indication of his doubts the adjudicator should seriously consider whether the matter should be re-listed".
That approach was consistent with that which was adopted in other jurisdictions to such questions. For example, in the case of Campos-Sanchez v Immigration & Naturalisation Service, a decision of US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, INF.No.A-72-667-220, the judge, at first instance, had found the applicant to be credible but had refused his application for asylum on other grounds. The applicant appealed. The appeal body made an adverse finding on the appellant's credibility and on that basis refused the appeal. The Court of Appeals granted a petition for a review of that decision. In the course of its judgment, the Court said:
"The BIA must provide a petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to offer an explanation of any perceived inconsistencies that form the basis of a denial of asylum".
We were also referred to the case of Guo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1996] F.C.J. No.1185. In that case the applicant sought judicial review of a decision of an Immigration and Refugee Board refusing her refugee claim. She did so on the basis that she had not been given an opportunity to explain inconsistencies in her evidence which were noted by the Board in its decision. It was held that the Board had committed an error in law in not giving the appellant an opportunity to explain the inconsistencies in her testimony. The application was referred back to the Board for rehearing and redetermination by a differently constituted panel. In the note of the reasons given by the judge for his decision, it is stated:
"The relevant jurisprudence establishes that inconsistencies in the claimant's evidence from which a board may find a refugee claimant not credible must be put to the claimant and the claimant afforded an opportunity to explain the alleged inconsistencies. A review of this record indicates that this applicant was not confronted with the alleged inconsistencies in her evidence and given an opportunity to respond, as is required by the rules of natural justice".
"I am concerned that in your SEF you do not mention any involvement with HADEP and at interview you simply stated that you were a sympathiser and not a member. It is only in your witness statement, for the first time, that you claim to have been an active member of HADEP. What is your explanation for that?".
Such a question would have given the reclaimer or his representative at the hearing the opportunity to put his position in relation to that concern.
[14] Having informed the Court that he was no longer advancing a separate ground of appeal concerning failure by the Adjudicator to seek out the report referred to in Mr McDowall's evidence, senior counsel turned to make submissions regarding the treatment of Mr McDowall's evidence by the Adjudicator and what the Lord Ordinary had to say in relation thereto. Senior counsel drew our attention, in particular, to what the Lord Ordinary said at para.40 of his Opinion, namely:"Ultimately, it would seem that it was largely upon Mr McDowall's evidence that the Adjudicator was able to conclude that it had not been established that the petitioner would suffer persecution because of being an Alevi Kurd in military service even having been an evader of the draft".
That was, it was said, a complete misunderstanding or misreading of what the Adjudicator said she was doing. At para.27 of her Determination, in addressing the question of whether the reclaimer would face persecution as a returnee who had evaded military service, the Adjudicator appeared to reject Mr McDowall's evidence in relation to that question on the basis that another report, the CIPU report, did not support it. Her conclusion on this aspect of the case could not be read as being based on Mr McDowall's evidence. This point raised a further more general and fundamental problem with regard to the Adjudicator's approach to Mr McDowall's evidence. At no point did she indicate her views as to the credibility or reliability of Mr McDowall as a witness, in general, and apart from her apparent rejection of his evidence in relation to the reclaimer's position as a returnee, who had evaded military service, because it was not confirmed by the CPIU report, she gave no clue as to why, having regard to her ultimate decision, she apparently rejected his other evidence in support of the reclaimer's case. She also left some question mark as to why she found the CIPU report to be contradictory of the evidence of Mr McDowall on the specific issue mentioned, or at least as to why it fell to be preferred in relation thereto. Senior counsel proceeded to take the Court through the detail of Mr McDowall's evidence. None of this material, it was submitted was properly addressed by the Adjudicator and, in particular, why she considered it did not support the reclaimer's case that he was at risk of persecution.
[15] After submitting the additional grounds of appeal and amending the petition, senior counsel made certain further submissions relating to the Adjudicator's failure to give adequate or comprehensible reasons for her decision. There was, it was contended, significant support in the evidence of both the reclaimer and his wife for the reclaimer's position that he was an active member of HADEP. The Adjudicator provided no comprehensible reasons for rejecting that evidence. In addition, in any event, she appeared to accept that the reclaimer was at least a HADEP supporter. As has been seen at para.23 of her Determination she stated that:"The Government believes that many HADEP supporters had ties to the PKK or supported their Agenda".
She went on to state that because he was not an active member of HADEP he was not in danger of being suspected of being a threat to the Government on the grounds of any sympathy or support he had for HADEP. She simply gave no reasonable or properly reasoned explanation as to why he would not be at risk if he was a known supporter of HADEP. For all the foregoing reasons the decision of the Adjudicator should be reduced. It was a matter of agreement between the parties that because of recent legislative changes which had abolished the system of appeal, under which this particular application had been brought, the appropriate disposal of the case would be to reduce the Adjudicator's decision and return the application for consideration before the newly constituted Asylum and Immigration Tribunal under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004.
Submissions for the respondent
[16] In reply counsel for the respondent submitted that in addressing the Adjudicator's approach to the perceived discrepancies in the reclaimer's evidence, the ultimate touchstone was whether or not there had been a fair hearing. That was the way in which the Lord Ordinary had approached matters at paras.35 and 36 of his Opinion and his conclusion that there had been a fair hearing was sound. The "contradiction" or "discrepancy" which the Adjudicator had identified in the reclaimer's evidence was clear and apparent. It was for the reclaimer's representative to decide whether or not to highlight it by seeking to address it. Counsel for the respondent suggested that, in fact, the problem with the reclaimer's evidence in relation to his membership of political organisations was not so much that it involved a contradiction or discrepancy but that there was a "surprising development" in it. Counsel referred to the case of Hassan v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2001] Imm.A.R.83. In that case the applicant had been refused asylum by the Secretary of State. The appeal against that decision was dismissed by an Adjudicator. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal refused him leave to appeal. He sought judicial review of that refusal. The Adjudicator had concluded that the applicant's evidence was vague in material respects and found him to be incredible. The applicant sought judicial review on the ground that the Adjudicator had been unfair to conclude that his evidence was vague in material respects, without putting him on notice and giving him an opportunity to elaborate on his evidence. The Court of Appeal held that the Adjudicator had no obligation, having heard the evidence, and found it to be unsatisfactory, to put the applicant on notice and to allow him to start again. The Court of Appeal, at para.10, page 85 of its decision recorded that:"the Secretary of State in his letter refusing asylum ... had indicated extremely clearly that he did not accept the credibility of the applicant as an asylum seeker....It therefore must have been apparent to the applicant and to those advising him at the hearing before the special adjudicator that the credibility of his account ....was seriously in question".
The Court of Appeal then noted at para.11:
"The special adjudicator, having read the applicant's statement and having heard his evidence, did not believe what he had been told"
Counsel for the respondent relied on that authority for the proposition that it is enough for an applicant to know that his credibility is in issue and that he is given an opportunity to address the subject of his credibility. In the present case the reclaimer's representative was invited to address the Adjudicator on credibility. That met the guiding principle that the applicant should receive a fair hearing. The Lord Ordinary was well founded in saying that there had been a fair hearing before the Adjudicator because, (a) the reclaimer knew his credibility was an issue, (b) he was given a full opportunity to address that issue and (c) the evidence adverse to him was "out in the open", indeed it had been submitted by him or on his behalf. Counsel contended that it should have been clear to the reclaimer's representative that the discrepancies in the reclaimer's evidence would be relied upon by the Adjudicator reaching her decision. It was for the reclaimer or his representative to explain away this discrepancy if possible, if necessary by adducing other evidence. With regard to the authorities relied upon by the reclaimer in relation to this aspect of his case, counsel for the respondent submitted that the case of Campos-Sanchez was distinguishable from the present case because in that case the appellant had never had it brought to his attention that his credibility was an issue. The case of GuoHas was not particularly useful since the report did not reveal the particular facts and circumstances and, moreover, this Court should be slow to follow it without being properly informed as to what authority it carried in its own jurisdiction. It should certainly not be preferred to the approach of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hassan. The case of Mayisokele had been decided some years before the decision in Hassan.
[17] Turning to the treatment by the Adjudicator, in her Determination, of the evidence of Mr McDowall, counsel for the respondent noted that while senior counsel for the reclaimer had disclaimed the failure by the Adjudicator to obtain the ASFT report as requested by Mr McDowall, as a separate ground of appeal, he had nonetheless made criticisms, in the course of his submissions, about the Adjudicator's omission in that respect. Such criticisms were, in any event, baseless. In the first place the reclaimer himself had failed to produce the report and in its absence it was impossible to say if anything turned upon its content. Moreover, there was no obligation on an Adjudicator to go and search out such evidence. That was clear from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Keziban Kilinc [1999] Imm.AR.588 which was to the effect that there was no obligation on such Adjudicators to search for material which was not before them even if reference had been made to it. [18] On the question of the adequacy of the Adjudicator's reasons for her decision, counsel for the respondent invited us to endorse the statement of the Lord Ordinary, at para.41 of his Opinion where he said:"I am driven to the same conclusion as that reached by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal that this was a carefully considered determination by the Adjudicator in which her stated reasons for rejecting the petitioner's evidence are compelling and in which she reached conclusions which she was well entitled to reach".
Counsel for the respondent referred to the decision of the House of Lords in South Bucks District Council and Another v Porter (No.2) [2004] 1 W.L.R.1953. That case involved an appeal taken under the English planning legislation and the main issue involved a question of the adequacy of reasons given in deciding matters under that particular legislation. Notwithstanding its context, counsel submitted that a passage in the speech of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, with which the rest of their Lordships concurred, at page 1964, para.36 might be appropriately applied mutatis mutandis to decisions concerning immigration matters. The passage in question was to the following effect:
"The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the 'principal important controversial issues', disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision".
Counsel for the respondent focused principally on the observation in that passage that the reasons must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law. In the present case, it was submitted, no such substantial doubt arose. Counsel also referred to the case of Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2000 S.C.219, in which the First Division, in an Opinion delivered by Lord Weir, made observations at pages 222-223 on the nature and extent of the duty to give reasons in immigration appeals. The Court, in that case, held that as the decision in question left no reasonable doubt as to what the Adjudicator's reasons were or as to the material considerations which he took into account, the attack on the adequacy of the Adjudicator's reasons failed. The reclaimer's attack in the present case fell to be disposed of in a similar way. For all of the foregoing reasons the reclaiming motion should be refused. Counsel for the respondent did say that, if, however, the Court was not with him in relation to the reclaiming motion, he accepted that since the passing of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants Etc) Act 2004 the appropriate course would be to reduce the decision of the Adjudicator and refer the application to the new Asylum and Immigration Tribunal for a fresh hearing before that Tribunal.
Decision
[19] We entirely agree with counsel for the respondent's principal submission that this case falls to be decided in accordance with the overriding requirement that the reclaimer should have been given a fair hearing. That requirement, of course, is not confined to the actual conduct of the hearing itself before the Adjudicator but applies also to the process whereby the Adjudicator reaches his decision. Both under domestic law, and under the jurisprudence in relation to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the duty in relation to providing a fair hearing includes an obligation to ensure that the person whose rights are being affected adversely by a decision of the Tribunal or Court in question is informed adequately of why his case did not succeed. How that obligation is met will vary from one type of case to another, the nature of the issue before the Tribunal and the type of Tribunal in question. In the case of South Bucks DC cited supra Lord Brown made it clear, in the paragraph in his speech, immediately preceding that quoted above, and relied upon by counsel for the respondent in the present case, that their Lordships were concerned with giving guidance as to "the proper approach to a reasons challenge in the planning context". Nevertheless we consider that, at the very least, the first two sentences of the passage relied upon by the respondent in the present case can be applied to the requirement in relation to giving of reasons in an appeal which is of the sort with which we are concerned. At the beginning of paragraph 36 of his speech Lord Brown, in the sentences in question, said this:"The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the 'principal important controversial issues', disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved".
That approach is reflected, in the immigration context, in the decision of Lord Macfadyen in the case of Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department 1998 S.L.T.1370 at 1374J, referred to in the later case of Singh cited supra at page 222. Applying that approach to the Adjudicator's Determination in the present case, we have reached the conclusion that the reasons supplied by her for her decision are inadequate to the extent that there has been procedural unfairness which requires that the decision be reduced. Put shortly, the difficulty which this Court has had with the Adjudicator's Determination is that it leaves the reader with no real idea, or even clue, as to why the evidence of Mr McDowall, which appears to us, prima facie, to lend some support to the reclaimer's case, having regard not simply to one particular feature of the reclaimer's particular circumstances, but to a number of features which might cumulatively put him at risk of persecution, was rejected by the Adjudicator and in what respects it was rejected. In one respect only, as we read the Determination, does the Adjudicator address Mr McDowall's evidence as set against other evidence, i.e. at para.27, but even in that passage it is difficult to understand why the reference to the CIPU report undermined Mr McDowall's evidence in relation to the reclaimer's position both as an Alevi Kurd and a returnee who had evaded military service. There may have been very good reasons for the Adjudicator rejecting the entirety of Mr McDowall's evidence, or substantial parts of it, as providing any support for the reclaimer's case. The simple truth is that this Court is left not knowing what they are or if they exist. Where, as here, the reclaimer has gone to the trouble of instructing such evidence and it is accepted as competent evidence by the Adjudicator, then the appellant is, we consider, entitled to be provided with intelligible reasons for that evidence having been rejected. That has not been done in this case. We therefore disagree with the view of the Lord Ordinary as to the adequacy of the reasons set out in the Adjudicator's Determination. That is a sufficient basis for allowing the reclaiming motion.
[20] We should, however, say something about the other main ground relied upon by the reclaimer in attacking both the decision of the Lord Ordinary and that of the Adjudicator and which related to the treatment by the Adjudicator in her Determination of what she perceived as contradictions or discrepancies in the reclaimer's position, at various stages, regarding his involvement with HADEP. It is, we consider, an important feature of this case that the respondent was not represented at the hearing before the Adjudicator. There was no cross examination as such whereby any such inconsistencies, contradictions or discrepancies might well have been highlighted. To that extent, we are of the opinion that a good deal of the detailed treatment of this issue in the Lord Ordinary's Opinion, which essentially relates to the role of a cross examiner in the context of an ordinary contested civil litigation, is beside or misses the point. The point taken in this case was that, the discrepancies or inconsistencies having never been raised as such or mentioned by anyone, it was unfair for the Adjudicator to base her decision, as she appears to have done, to a material extent, on their existence without the reclaimer being given the opportunity to explain them. On one reading of the material before the Adjudicator, which she discussed at para.20 of her Determination in which she decided seriously damaged his credibility, it does not really involve any contradiction on the reclaimer's part but, as counsel for the respondent himself described it, a "development of his evidence". Again, with regret, we have to say that the reasoning of the Adjudicator in relation to this matter is somewhat opaque. In any event if, as seems to be the case, any perceived contradiction or inconsistency in the reclaimer's position was going to form a significant reason for rejecting his appeal then, in the particular circumstances of this case, it appears to us that fairness required that, prior to the issue of her decision, she gave the reclaimer or his representative an opportunity to comment upon, or seek to explain, it. We do not consider that that was done by the Adjudicator simply responding in the affirmative, in the way she did, when the reclaimer's representative inquired if she wanted to be addressed on credibility. We do not read what is said in the case of Hassan as being at odds with what we consider ought to have been done in the present case. That decision was concerned with rejecting a broader proposition than is argued for in the present case, namely that, when an Adjudicator reaches a view having heard all the evidence put forward by the applicant and having heard everything that the applicant and his representative wished him to hear, comes to the conclusion that the evidence was vague, he is under some obligation to ask the applicant to start again. (See para.18 of the judgment of Buxton, L.J.). On the other hand there is no doubt that the reclaimer obtains some international support from the cases of Guo and Campos-Sanchez in this area of jurisprudence, for the narrower proposition, advanced on his behalf in this case, that if the Adjudicator himself considers that he has identified certain inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence which could have a very significant effect on the decision, he should provide the applicant with an opportunity to explain these. While we recognise, for the reasons stated on behalf of the respondent, that caution has to be exercised in relying on what is said in those cases, as providing the foundation for any general rule in our law and practice, nevertheless, such an approach appears entirely constant with what is noted in the case summary of the case of Mayisokele as the appropriate practice for Adjudicators to follow. Moreover to consider that such an approach is required, in the particular circumstances of cases, when the Secretary of State is not represented at the hearing is, in our judgment, entirely in line with the spirit of the guidelines provided in the case of MNM v Secretary of State for Home Department, in particular guidelines (iv) and (vii) even though none of the guidelines themselves addresses the specific point. We are, of course, very conscious of the need not to impose undue or excessive burdens on the role of the specialised Tribunals dealing with these cases. In that respect we have in mind what was said by the First Division in the case of Singh cited above and in particular what said by Lord Penrose in the case of Mohammed Asif, Petitioner 1999 S.L.T.89 referred to in Singh. Nevertheless the litmus test remains whether or not in the particular circumstances of the case the Adjudicator has provided the applicant with a fair hearing. In this case we consider that the reclaimer has reason to consider that the Adjudicator's failure to put her concerns regarding what she perceived as contradictions or discrepancies of importance in his evidence to him, meant that the hearing was conducted unfairly. [21] Lastly, and for completeness, we should say that we accept entirely what counsel for the respondent had to say as to the criticism of the Adjudicator for failing to call for and obtain the ASFT report referred to in Mr McDowall's evidence. In this respect we endorse the views of the Court of Appeal in the case of Keziban Kilinc that an Adjudicator has no obligation to search for material of that kind not placed before him even when it is referred to. It is for the applicant and those representing him to ensure that any material which they wish the Tribunal to have regard to is placed before the Tribunal. [22] For the foregoing reasons we shall allow the reclaiming motion reducing the Determination of the Adjudicator and the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and remit the case for a rehearing before the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal.