EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
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Lord Marnoch Lord Osborne Lord Mackay of Drumadoon
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XA105/03 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD MARNOCH in APPEAL From the Sheriffdom of North Strathclyde at Greenock in the cause THE SCOTTISH LEGAL AID BOARD Pursuers and Respondents; against DUNCAN SHIELDS Defender and Appellant; _______ |
Act: Bowen; Solicitor for the Scottish Legal Aid Board (Pursuers and Respondents)
Alt: Party (Defender and Appellant)
18 March 2004
[1] This is an action at the instance of the Scottish Legal Aid Board for payment by the defender of the sum of £7,272.74 following termination by the Board of a grant of civil legal aid to the defender in terms of Regulation 32 of the Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 1996 (subsequently repealed and re-enacted by Regulation 32 of the Civil Legal Aid (Scotland) Regulations 2002).[2] In the Sheriff Court there was lodged as "defences" a lengthy document containing a variety of statements and submissions on the part of the defender. Perhaps generously to the defender that document was treated as the lodging of defences within the terms of the Sheriff Court Rules. However, following a hearing on 28 July 2003, the sheriff, at the instance of the pursuers, granted summary decree for the sum sued for. This is an appeal from that determination.
[3] In the course of an impassioned address the appellant frankly accepted that while he had been in receipt of legal aid the Board had paid to his solicitors the sum of £8,056.74 inclusive of VAT. He also accepted that he himself had made a contribution of £784. The difference between these two figures is, of course, the sum sued for. The appellant also accepted that correspondence had passed between the Board, himself and his solicitors in terms of No. 6/4.7-9 of process. In the letter 6/4.7 of process it is clear that the Board withdrew legal aid because the defender failed to disclose to them a material change of circumstances, namely his having been made redundant by British Telecom and having received at the termination of his employment a lump sum payment of £36,793.06. The appellant had no present recollection of how, if at all, he had replied to that letter but, on being shown No. 16 of process he readily agreed that that had indeed been his response. The appellant accepted that he had been made redundant and had received the lump sum payment in question. In the result, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the appellant did not disclose the material change of circumstances founded on by the respondent. The appellant was at pains to explain that he had been suffering from cancer at the time and this, indeed, is mentioned in his letter No. 16 of process. Nonetheless, it seems to us that the respondents were well entitled to withdraw legal aid in terms of Regulation 32.
[4] In all the foregoing circumstances, despite everything in the written grounds of appeal and despite everything said to us by Mr. Shields, including frequent references to the disturbing effect all this had had on his teenage daughter, we are satisfied that, as matter of law, there was, and is, no real defence to this action. That being so, this appeal must be dismissed.