FIRST DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
|
Lord Marnoch Lord Macfadyen Lord Abernethy
|
0729/5/98 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD MARNOCH in RECLAIMING MOTION by LINDA GEORGINA ELLISON Pursuer and Reclaimer; against INSPIRATIONS EAST LIMITED Defenders and Respondents;
_______ |
Act: O'Brien, QC, A Smith, QC; HBM Sayers
Alt: Mitchell, QC, R G Milligan; Simpson & Marwick, WS
12 December 2003
[1] This is a reclaiming motion against an interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary assoilzing the defenders from the conclusions of the summons. Although in form this is an action against travel agents based in contract, the real question (which arises out of the contract) is whether a coach driver in Turkey was to any extent negligent in relation to a collision which took place between the coach and a lorry on the Dalaman to Mugla Road in the early hours of 17 June 1995. The pursuer, together with a number of other holiday-makers whose actions are sisted pending the outcome of the present case, was at the time a passenger in the coach which was taking her and the other passengers from the airport to their hotel. As to the circumstances of the accident, the Lord Ordinary (who on this aspect of the case was not challenged) says this:"On a balance of probabilities I found it established that when the coach rounded the bend prior to the accident, the coach driver had a sight line ahead of him in excess of one kilometre. As he rounded the bend the lorry was on the wrong side of the road. The lorry returned to its correct side without any action being necessary on the part of the coach driver. It is not possible on the evidence for me to estimate the distance between the vehicles at this point of time. At some point thereafter the lorry again crossed over into the wrong lane. On this occasion the coach driver flashed his lights and the lorry returned to its own lane. On the evidence I am unable to determine the distance between the vehicles when this occurred. However, seconds before the point of impact the lorry again encroached into the lane occupied by the coach and was returning to its own lane when the impact occurred."
On behalf of the pursuer and reclaimer it was submitted that there had originally been three grounds of fault of which two remained extant, namely, (1) a failure on the part of the coach driver Dirgan Ucar to brake and slow down in anticipation of an accident and (2) a failure on his part to take emergency action, including emergency braking, when the third and final incursion by the lorry onto the wrong carriageway occurred. Counsel maintained that the Lord Ordinary had misdirected himself on both these matters.
[2] As to the first of the two grounds of fault, we are of the view that the Lord Ordinary dealt fully and adequately with both the evidence and all the submissions made to him. In particular, from the expert evidence regarding the speed of the coach when it overturned into a gully he was, in our view, well entitled to infer, as he does at para 19 of his Opinion, that Ucar had applied some precautionary braking after seeing the lorry's apparently uncontrolled movements as it proceeded towards him. Not only that, but as mentioned above, the Lord Ordinary also held established that Mr Ucar flashed his lights with the apparent result that the oncoming vehicle returned to its own lane. It was said that in reaching his conclusions on this branch of the case the Lord Ordinary had overlooked a "body of evidence" to the effect that no precautionary braking had taken place, this being a reference to the evidence of a number of passengers who deponed that they had been unaware of any such braking. Quite apart from the sheer improbability of passengers registering such braking, let alone recalling it after an interval of seven years, there was clear evidence from one of the expert witnesses, Mr Mighal, that, due to the type of coach seating and the nature of the brakes, normal braking might not be felt at all by the passengers. The Lord Ordinary expressly accepts this evidence. In the result, we are quite satisfied that the Lord Ordinary did not overlook this supposed "body of evidence" and that he was right not to be influenced by it. In any event, as counsel for the respondent pointed out, what in the end is important about braking is the resulting reduction in speed. No attempt was made by the appellant's counsel to quantify what would have been an appropriate reduced speed and, that being so, it is highly significant that the Lord Ordinary finds as a fact that, whatever else, the speed of the coach at the point of impact was "moderately slow". On the basis of the expert evidence which was read to us that would seem to have been a speed of around 25-30 mph. [3] In all the foregoing circumstances we are quite satisfied that there is no substance in the attack on the Lord Ordinary's disposal of this branch of the case.[4] As to the second of the two grounds of fault, with which, it is fair to say, the reclaiming motion was principally concerned, the Lord Ordinary says this:
"The time available to the coach driver to react to the final incursion by the lorry into the coach driver's lane was minimal. Even in that time the coach driver slowed down and swerved to his right."
Counsel for the pursuer and reclaimer submitted that on this matter the Lord Ordinary had misdirected himself in every possible respect. It was submitted at one point that there was quite simply no acceptable evidence to the effect that, following the lorry's final incursion onto the wrong carriageway, the coach driver had taken any action whatsoever, either by slowing down or swerving to his right. In our opinion, however, the hearsay evidence of the coach driver himself, taken along with the evidence of Mrs Sopel and, it may be, parts of the evidence of Mrs Reilly, as also the evidence of the expert witness, Mr Mighal, fully entitled the Lord Ordinary, as the judge of first instance, to make these findings. At a later point in the submissions, however, the argument came to be that, even if there was evidence of a swerve and a slowing down, there was no evidence of "emergency braking" which, it was said, was in the circumstances obviously necessary. It is true that there was no such evidence and the Lord Ordinary is careful not to claim otherwise. For the rest, however, it is necessary to examine the last point canvassed in this reclaiming motion, namely whether the Lord Ordinary was correct in categorising the time available to the coach driver for taking avoiding action at this stage as "minimal". This description was said to be at odds with a period of three seconds identified by the Lord Ordinary at para 18 of his Opinion. Even allowing for reaction time it was submitted that that period should have allowed Ucar, through the use of emergency braking, to reduce the speed of the coach to such an extent as, on a balance of probabilities, would have avoided the accident which occurred and any serious injuries to the pursuer and other passengers in the coach. In this connection, the expert evidence relied on by counsel was to the effect that controlled emergency braking could have reduced the speed of the coach by 8.8mph for each second of braking although we have to note that that figure was thought to be on the high side by the defenders' expert, Mr Mighal. Counsel also relied on the fact that the collision was described by Mr Mighal as a "cross-corner impact" although, in that connection, it should again be noted that the degree of "overlap" between the two frontages was as much as 25%.
[5] As to this branch of the case, since, for whatever reason, it was dealt with only very briefly by the Lord Ordinary, we have thought it right to consider the evidence de novo. Having done that, however, we are wholly unconvinced that there is any substance in it. In particular, the period of three seconds was only, as the Lord Ordinary says, his "best estimate" of the time involved for the lorry to move from its own lane to the point of impact. It is obvious, indeed, that the period cannot be other than some sort of estimate because its length must depend to some extent on the speed of the lorry, or what was described as the "violence" of its movements, and also on how far it encroached on the wrong side of the road before attempting to regain its own carriageway. In the nature of things both of these are "unknowns", as must be the precise interval of time in question. In the second place, the pursuer's expert evidence was to the effect that reaction time could vary between one and a half seconds and half a second depending on whether the driver was already alert to impending danger. Since the oncoming vehicle had apparently responded to the flashing of the coach lights, it cannot be assumed that the reaction time here in point lay at the bottom end of that scale. In the result, it seems to us that there is simply no proper basis for inferring that the time available to the coach driver to react to the final incursion by the lorry was other than, as the Lord Ordinary has held, "minimal". In any event, it cannot be held proved on a balance of probabilities that at this final stage in the tragedy the coach driver had time to complete an emergency stop, let alone avoid the accident which occurred, whether by controlled emergency braking or otherwise. We would only add that the conclusion we have reached on the expert evidence is one which is, we think, consistent with the body of evidence from the passengers in the coach.[6] We have, of course, reached our decision in this reclaiming motion on the basis that the onus of proof in this case was throughout on the pursuer. Under reference to Doonan v S.M.T. 1950 SLT 100 and certain of the authorities there cited counsel for the reclaimers did submit that as the coach had gone off the road the onus switched to the defenders to show how that had occurred without negligence on the part of the coach driver. In our opinion, however, the authorities to which reference was made are very clearly distinguishable and have no application to a case, such as the present, where the primary cause of the accident is known to be fault on the part of the driver of another vehicle involved in a collision.
[7] On the whole matter we shall refuse the reclaiming motion and adhere to the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary.