OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
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A640/00 |
OPINION OF LORD BONOMY in the cause NEIL ANTHONY PENNY Pursuer; against J. RAY McDERMOTT DIVING INTERNATIONAL INC. Defenders
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Pursuer: Dewar, Q.C., Love; Russell Jones & Walker
Defenders: Hofford; HBM Sayers
9 October 2003
INTRODUCTION
[1] Neil Anthony Penny, the pursuer, joined the Royal Navy on 25 May 1981 at the age of 17, shortly after leaving school. He immediately trained and qualified as a diver. His career in the Royal Navy was committed to diving. He retired from the Royal Navy on the expiry of his engagement on 14 October 1990, when he held the rank of leading seaman (diver), in which capacity he had certain supervisory duties. [2] His initial training was in air diving in which the diver works under-water using breathing apparatus and returns to land or his vessel at the end of the dive. In 1986 he undertook further training and qualified as a saturation diver. In saturation diving the diver's body is totally saturated with gas at pressure to enable him to spend longer periods working at depth. Divers might spend a number of days in saturation, during which they pass their non-working time on the surface in a pressurised chamber. The diver is conveyed between the chamber and the working area in a diving bell. [3] Following his retirement from the Royal Navy, the pursuer continued his diving career by undertaking work on contracts with commercial diving companies. His first contract was from June to August 1991. The contract, in the course of which he was injured on 11 November 1997, was the first commercial job in the North Sea for which he had been engaged. It involved saturation diving. Prior to that his work had been exclusively abroad in West Africa, India and the Middle East. The bulk of his commercial work had involved air diving.THE ACCIDENT
[4] On 11 November the pursuer was one of a number of divers working from the Diving Support Vessel, Norlift, for the defenders, who are diving contractors providing diving services to the oil and gas exploration and production industry. The divers worked in small teams. The pursuer was injured during dive no.71 of the contract. The pursuer and his colleague Neil Brogden were lowered, along with one other colleague, in the diving bell to the seabed at a depth of about 39 metres. There the pursuer and Brogden left the bell while their colleague remained. Their task was to assist in the placing of a series of protective coverings, called "grout mattresses", over a pipeline on the seabed. A grout mattress consists of a number of concrete blocks linked together to form a rectangular flexible blanket, measuring about 5 metres by 3 metres, which is lowered from the Diving Support Vessel to be laid over the pipeline. The outer blocks of the mattress were linked by lengths of rope. These mattresses were placed side-by-side to form a continuous protective cover. [5] The pursuer and Brogden were to receive and position mattress no.17. It was lowered to them suspended in a "U" shape from a handling frame attached to a crane on the deck of the vessel. As the mattress was lowered, each diver proceeded to assist in manoeuvring it into place. The pursuer expected that there would be lengths of rope called "tag lines", hanging from the mattress or the handling frame, and hanging lower than the bottom of the belly of the U. He anticipated taking hold of the two tag lines, which he expected would be hanging at the side of the mattress nearer him, to carry out this exercise. The tag lines attached to this particular mattress were shorter than the pursuer expected and ended above the belly of the U. The pursuer accordingly reached up and took hold of one of the ropes joining two of the outer blocks of the mattress. The combined movement of the vessel and the handling frame in the swell of the sea caused the mattress to rise and lift the pursuer from the seabed, so that he was hanging from the mattress by his right arm. The pursuer felt what he described as "excruciating pain" in his shoulder. He could hear the sound of his shoulder being wrenched as his arm was stretched. He described himself as having been snatched off his feet to a height of about one metre. Working at that depth in saturation, the pursuer's body weight was much less than normal and would not, therefore, offer great resistance to the rising pull of the mattress. For that reason, the rise of the mattress could not on its own account for the pursuer's shoulder being wrenched. There had to be some countervailing source of tension which prevented the pursuer from rising freely with the mattress. [6] These basic facts were not seriously disputed by the defenders. The medical evidence confirmed that his shoulder was injured in a manner that was consistent with his description of what happened to him. The dispute concerns the cause of the wrenching of the shoulder and whether the defender should be held liable therefore.THE CAUSE OF THE INJURY
The Mechanism of the Injury
[7] The first issue to be determined is the cause of the wrenching of the pursuer's shoulder. He explained it by a combination of two forces. He stated that his hand became jammed between the rope he was holding and one or both of the blocks which it linked, because the weight of his body and equipment was drawing his arm down and his body under the mattress. He could not let go and was pulled upwards. Simultaneously force was exerted from below to prevent him moving smoothly upwards. His umbilical, that is the series of tubes, hoses and cables wound together and attached to his back by a harness stretching back from him to the diving bell to provide air, power, etc., life support in general, became snagged somewhere, thus resisting the upward pull of the mattress attached to the handling frame. As the mattress descended in the swell, the umbilical came free. The pursuer can succeed only if that set of circumstances is established. No other possible explanation for the injury emerged in the course of the proof. [8] The pursuer stated that he felt the umbilical pulling at the harness and knew that it had snagged. After the accident he walked along it to investigate. He found that it was no longer snagged. However, about 20 to 25 feet along its length measuring from his back, he noticed that a piece of lead, wound into the umbilical to add weight to it, was protruding in the shape of a loop, and that the umbilical on either side of it looked as if it had been pulled tightly together. At that point the corner of one mattress was lying on top of the one next to it. Both had been laid previously. He concluded that that was the point at which the umbilical had snagged. [9] The pursuer's case was prepared and initially presented on the basis of a simple direct link between the umbilical snagging at a point 20 to 25 feet from the pursuer, or possibly a bit more, and the pursuer's body being held from below in a way that caused the upper movement of the mattress to stretch his arm and shoulder. The pursuer's diving expert, Dr John Bevan, prepared a report in which he considered that that provided a sufficient explanation of the source of the force which resisted the pull of the mattress. On the fourth day of the proof, before Dr Bevan gave evidence, a report prepared by the diving expert instructed by the defenders, Crawford Logan, was lodged. That report gave notice, albeit belatedly, of the evidence that he would give. Late lodging was, therefore, not opposed. It contained a diagram, based on the theorem of Pythagoras, in which the hypotenuse of a triangle was the umbilical stretching from the pursuer to the snagging point, and the other two sides of the triangle were formed by the height the pursuer was lifted from the seabed and the distance on the seabed from that point to the snag point. He calculated the extension, that is the additional strain put into the umbilical by the pursuer rising while the umbilical was snagged, as the difference between the hypotenuse when the pursuer reached his highest point and the length of the third side of the triangle, that is the distance on the seabed between the point from which the pursuer rose and snag point. He used a height of 2 metres in his calculation, being the height that Neil Brogden, the other diver working with the pursuer, described him as rising. As I have noted above, the pursuer gave the height as about 1 metre . The lower the height, the less would be the extension or additional strain. Taking Mr Brogden's impression of the height, since that situation was more favourable to the pursuer, the extension was about 5.4 inches. Dr Bevan accepted the accuracy of that calculation, and he and Mr Logan were agreed that these circumstances would not generate sufficient force to explain the injury. In addition, the pursuer's body would lean towards the snag point to some extent, thus reducing the strain further. [10] Faced with this difficulty, Dr Bevan suggested that the umbilical must have snagged in two places, one of which was immediately below the pursuer as he was pulled upwards. That was consistent with the evidence of Neil Brogden, who described the pursuer's umbilical as "going straight downwards". Brogden was cross-examined on that by Mr Hofford, counsel for the defenders, before Mr Logan's report had been lodged and before I, and I suspect the pursuer's counsel, were aware of the Pythagoras point. He was in no doubt that the umbilical went straight down. At the same time, the pursuer was hanging at an angle, with his legs off to one side, and seemed to Brogden like a "puppet on a string". He had not given any thought at the time to the umbilical or why it was going straight down. [11] The injury which the pursuer sustained was consistent with his arm being stretched. He sustained a tear to the soft tissue capsule surrounding the shoulder and a mild traction injury to the brachial plexus, that is the complex of nerves which pass from the neck under the clavicle into the shoulder and top of the arm. Stretching of the arm above the head affects, in particular, the lower part of the brachial plexus, causing altered sensation in the nerves in the arm. That is precisely the injury which the pursuer sustained. It was not disputed that tension in the umbilical directly below the pursuer, resisting the upward pull of the mattress, would account for that injury. I consider that that is probably what occurred. The pursuer has, therefore, established how the accident happened.The Witnesses
[12] Before explaining more fully why I have come to that conclusion and dealing with the question of fault, I should indicate at this stage my impression of the principal witnesses who gave evidence about the controversial issues in the case, other than the two eyewitnesses. [13] The diving experts were not called to give evidence about tests or experiments which they had carried, but to speak from knowledge and experience about various issues in the case, such as the use of tag lines, the weather conditions and the composition of the umbilical. Each also expressed opinions on the career patterns and earnings of divers. Both were challenged about adverse opinions expressed by judges about them in earlier cases. I found no assistance from these earlier cases because it was not possible in the course of this proof to explore the circumstances of these cases adequately to show that what happened there had any bearing on the evidence of these experts in this case. Although neither expert was a qualified saturation diver, each had wide ranging experience of the diving industry, including saturation diving. [14] Since 1976, Dr John Bevan has been managing director of a small company providing underwater safety and management consultancy services. Prior to that he had relevant experience as a diving consultant, as manager of the technical training and safety department of a diving company based in Aberdeen, and in the Ministry of Defence (Navy). Crawford Logan has more recent relevant experience of work in the North Sea and has recent experience which was particularly relevant to the assessment of the pursuer's loss. Mr Logan has been involved in the diving industry since 1978, initially for 5 years as the general manager of the then largest designer and manufacturer of saturation diving equipment in the world, followed by 2 years as full-time technical secretary of the Association of Offshore Diving Contractors, and 3 years in management roles with a diving company based in Aberdeen. Since 1988 he has been involved with his own company providing specialised consultancy services to the offshore industry. [15] As it turned out, there was little in dispute on which expert evidence was crucial. For reasons, which are rather different in relation to each of them, I lacked a measure of confidence in some of the views they expressed. In relation to Dr Bevan, I have already mentioned the failure to appreciate that the snagging of the umbilical some distance along the seabed would not account for the pursuer's injury. It also emerged in evidence that he had not had direct experience of the use of tag lines since 1985. It was not at all clear what records of the dive he had taken into account at the time of preparing his report. He may have seen the Daily Progress Report prepared by the diving superintendent with overall responsibility for the dive. However he probably saw the Bell Dive Report, which is a record kept by the diving supervisor with hands-on control of the dive, only a few days before the proof. He had formed his views principally on the basis of the account given to him by the pursuer as supplemented by Neil Brogden. He had taken no account of the information contained in the records in so far as it contradicted anything reported to him by the pursuer. He was not a confident witness. He was vague and uncertain about a number of matters which I would have expected him to have at his fingertips, and generally gave me the impression that he was not on top of his brief in this case. Mr Logan's position concerned me because he had been involved in the diving contract in issue. When the umbilical, which was being used by the pursuer at the time of the accident, was supplied for the contract, it was Mr Logan who had responsibility for calculating the amount of lead that required to be added to it to make it negatively buoyant for the purposes of the dive. When he was contacted shortly before the proof and instructed to provide a report on the accident, he did not consider that his involvement gave rise to any conflict of interest because he had not been responsible for the way in which the lead had been attached to the umbilical. He also had a history of working for the defenders on a number of contracts. His involvement in the job, albeit peripheral, his previous dealings with the defenders and the short time he had to investigate the accident, all contributed to making me somewhat uneasy about accepting his views. Unlike Dr Bevan, however, he was a confident witness who gave the clear impression of being on top of his brief. I cannot say that he was being other than objective, but I have been cautious about accepting his views on the accident. On the other hand, on questions of quantum I have not felt the same unease about Mr Logan's evidence. He clearly had much wider knowledge and experience than Dr Bevan on this particular issue. Indeed, Dr Bevan relied to a large extent on work done by Mr Logan, who had carried out research into the earnings and career profiles of all divers in the North Sea in the year 2000 on behalf of the International Marine Contractors' Association. He had also carried out a number of other surveys into earnings over the years in connection with the preparation of similar reports. [16] Neither of the diving supervisors saw what happened. At the time of the accident, the dive was being supervised by Brian Brockwell. He gave evidence over a video link from Singapore. His recollection of the dive was almost exclusively based on the Bell Dive Report which he was responsible for compiling as the dive progressed. At a later stage in the course of the dive, and before the pursuer and Brogden returned to the diving bell, Stewart Maddocks, the diving superintendent, took over as diving supervisor for part of the dive. He gave an extraordinary performance in the witness box and, following my intervention, acknowledged that he had not been giving a full and frank account. My impression is that his over-defensive and prevaricating pose was the result of a quite unjustified impression that he was being treated unfairly by being called to give evidence at all. In the end he gave evidence in a far more reasonable way than he did at the outset. Although it was suggested to both supervisors that they had not kept complete and accurate records of the dive, no satisfactory basis emerged in the evidence for me to conclude that the Bell Dive Report and the Daily Progress Report were other than accurate in all material respects, albeit they could have contained more detail in places.Reasons for my Decision on the Mechanism of Injury
[17] When Dr Bevan suggested that, in the light of the evidence of Mr Brogden, the umbilical must have snagged somewhere directly beneath the pursuer, he did so cautiously. He was concerned that he had had little time to reflect on the matter. I have had somewhat longer in which to reflect on the matter, and, as I have said above, consider that that is probably what happened. Mr Hofford, counsel for the defenders, did not suggest that the pursuer was not endeavouring to give an honest account in his evidence, and I have no hesitation in accepting him as an honest witness. [18] On the other hand, I consider that Brogden's description of the position of the umbilical is much more likely to be reliable than that of the pursuer. The accident happened without any warning. The pursuer was in no position to take note of the exact location of the umbilical at the moment the tension was imposed. He suffered a very painful injury. His account of events before and after he sustained injury is inconsistent with the records kept by the diving supervisors. The pursuer's recollection was that he returned to the diving bell within an hour of his accident and before any other mattress was laid. On the other hand, the Bell Dive Report recorded that the accident occurred at 15.50 pm, and that it was over three hours later that the pursuer returned to the bell after a further mattress had been laid. That record accorded with the recollection of Neil Brogden, and I accept that version of events. The pursuer also gave evidence that he had been involved in laying two other mattresses earlier in the dive and had complained that the tag lines on these mattresses were too short. In fact the Bell Dive Report and the recollection of Neil Brogden both contradicted that, and made it clear that the accident happened in laying the first mattress of the dive. The pursuer's recollection is of returning to the bell through the diving basket which is deployed when divers have to work on extended umbilicals. The basket was not deployed when the pursuer was injured, but was deployed thereafter in the laying of the next mattress. That is also clear from the Bell Dive Report and Brogden's recollection. It was not suggested that Neil Brogden was other than truthful. He was positioned a few metres from the pursuer and was looking straight across the mattress at him. He was in a good position to see exactly what happened. He gave evidence in a very straightforward manner. He could not possibly have appreciated the significance of his evidence about the umbilical when he gave that evidence. I have, therefore, no hesitation in accepting Neil Brogden's account as a true and reliable description of the position of the umbilical at the time of the accident. [19] That is entirely consistent with the pursuer's account of the tension and wrench being caused by the umbilical pulling against the mattress. The lowering of the mattress and the pursuer in the swell would release the tension from the umbilical and free it. The pursuer would return to seabed level. His umbilical would inevitably stretch out behind him in the direction of the diving bell. His examination of the umbilical identified a part at which it had at some stage snagged. That simply demonstrates the potential of this particular umbilical to snag. It was the evidence of Mr Logan and Stewart Maddocks that there is always a risk that any umbilical, or one of its tubes or hoses, will snag on something on the seabed. In Mr Logan's experience that regularly happened to a diver's umbilical several times a month. It is accordingly a common hazard of the job. It is, in my opinion, a reasonable inference to draw from the combined evidence of the pursuer and Brogden that the umbilical was trapped directly beneath the pursuer. The shoulder injury sustained was consistent with that. Whether the loop of lead which the pursuer saw resulted from a simultaneous or earlier snag is immaterial. What matters is that the strain was imposed on the umbilical immediately below the pursuer. The regularity of such events is sufficient to justify that conclusion in the absence of evidence that the umbilical was caught on any particular irregularity on the seabed. [20] The dive was video recorded. It is a great pity that the video was not retained but was simply reused, in spite of the fact that Mr Brockwell was aware the pursuer had sustained injury very shortly after it happened. Regulations introduced around the time of the accident require the video recording of a dive to be retained where a serious injury is sustained. I was advised that that was the practice of the defenders at the time of the accident. It may be that the gravity of the injury was not appreciated. [21] While I am able to draw the conclusion that the umbilical was caught somewhere directly under the pursuer, I am not in a position to say that the loop of lead played any part in the accident. Because the accident could have occurred whether or not the umbilical snagged at the point identified by the pursuer, there was not, in my opinion, a proper basis in the evidence for concluding that the umbilical did coincidentally snag at that point.LIABILITY
The Role of the Umbilical
[22] Even if I felt able to say that the umbilical snagged at the point of the protruding lead at the time of the accident, I could not attribute blame to the defenders for that. The pursuer presented two bases for concluding that the umbilical snagged at that point as a result of the defenders' negligence or the negligence of those for whom they are responsible. One relates to the way in which lengths of lead were added to the umbilical at intervals along its length; the other relates to a protective sheath which surrounded part of the umbilical when it was supplied. [23] Because the umbilical used by the pursuer had to be made less buoyant for the purposes of this dive, lead was incorporated into the umbilical in one metre or two metres sections at intervals along its full length. It was normal practice to secure the lead by wrapping duct tape round the umbilical at both ends and the centre of each length of lead. The issue over the additional lead related to the way in which it was added. Brogden spoke with most knowledge of the actual circumstances of the pursuer's umbilical and the two other umbilicals in the diving bell. His experience was that the lead did tend to work its way out and require to be repositioned and secured from time to time. That was principally the responsibility of the diver who remained in the bell and who paid the umbilicals out as his colleagues moved off to work on the seabed. He might or might not spot loose lead. Brogden was quite clear in his recollection that the lead was laid into the umbilical so that it lay in the valley between two adjacent tubes or hoses of the umbilical. That was normal practice. The pursuer, however, maintained that the lead had been wound round about the umbilical, creating an obvious hazard. On the third day of the proof the pursuer presented to his solicitor photographs taken on the day of the accident in the diving bell, and later, when recalled to give additional evidence, suggested that at two points in the photographs lead wound round about the umbilical could be seen. Dr Bevan thought that lead could be seen lying across the umbilical in one photograph but was far from clear on the point. Mr Logan did not think that the photographs showed lead wound round the umbilical. He did not consider that the photographs showed that the lead had been fitted other than by being laid into the umbilical in accordance with normal practice. Brogden's evidence on this was given confidently. The evidence of the pursuer, based principally on the photograph, and the evidence of Dr Bevan did not cause me to doubt the accuracy of what Brogden said. In my opinion the lead was fitted in accordance with normal practice. The system for checking and re-securing it was also in accordance with normal practice. [24] When the umbilicals, including the one used by the pursuer, were supplied to the defenders, each one was partly enclosed in a protective sheath made from polypropylene net. While there was differing evidence about the precise length of the sheath, it is clear that it did not extend for more than one half of the length of the umbilical. The pursuer alone thought that it ran the full length of the umbilical. The one half sheathed was that nearest the diving bell, since the purpose of the sheath was to protect the umbilical from damage as it was pulled out from, and into, the bell. Umbilicals were routinely supplied both with or without such sheaths. The sheath had been removed because of difficulties experienced by the divers. It was new and fairly stiff and inflexible. As a result, the divers found it awkward to wind the umbilical round its storage fitting in the diving bell. The loop in the lead identified by the pursuer was said by him to be about 20 to 25 feet along the umbilical from his body. That point was significantly further than half-way along the umbilical from the diving bell. The protruding lead was, therefore, at a point on the umbilical which was never sheathed. The point at which the umbilical was caught immediately beneath the pursuer was obviously even closer to him and was, therefore, also never sheathed. The crucial point at which the umbilical was caught was, therefore, far too close to the pursuer to have been at a point which ever had, or was meant to have, a sheath round it. There was insufficient evidence about the location of the pieces of lead added to the umbilical to conclude that one of those snagged directly below the pursuer. Indeed, the very fact, that the pursuer inspected the umbilical back to the point where he did find a piece of lead which had been pulled from its original position and did not find another piece en route, suggests that lead coming loose was not the cause of that snag.The Role of the Tag Lines
[25] The defenders did not contest the pursuer's account of suffering injury to his shoulder when his arm was stretched above him and he was holding the mattress. He was not seriously cross-examined about his account that his hand became trapped between the rope he was holding and the concrete structure of the mattress. [26] There was little dispute between the parties about the facts relating to the tag lines and the significance of tag lines in this operation. Parties were agreed that the purpose of a tag line is to facilitate the manual rotating of a suspended load. Both Dr Bevan and Mr Logan expected that tag lines would be attached to the lifting frame for use by the riggers on deck. The evidence did not make it clear whether the tag lines which were provided for the divers were the same ones or different ones, nor whether they were attached to the lifting frame or to the mattress. The two diving supervisors in charge at different stages of the dive, Maddocks and Brockwell, expected tag lines to be used. The divers themselves, the pursuer and Brogden, both assumed that control of the mattress would be taken by each taking hold of tag lines, and, with that in mind, they stood the breadth of the mattress apart awaiting its descent. There was evidence that some divers preferred not to use tag lines to gain control of the mattress but used them simply to adjust the final position of the mattress once it had been placed over the pipeline. However, the weight of evidence, which I accept, was that the standard practice was the one followed by the pursuers. It was the evidence of Maddocks and Logan that, by taking hold of tag lines, the divers would be able to stand clear of the line of descent of the mattress in an area of relative safety from which they would have a good view of its position and movement and could easily release the tag lines. As Dr Bevan explained, that would inevitably mean that the tag lines would be held at an angle to the mattress. He thought that the ideal angle would be about 45 degrees. All of that points to tag lines which would extend below the lowest point of the mattress. [27] The top of the pipeline, over which the mattress was to be laid, was about 31/2 - 4 feet off the seabed. There was already a mattress below it for added protection. The pursuer thought that he was standing on top of the pipeline, but Mr Brogden had no recollection of that. Both divers, however, sought to take control of the mattress at the earliest possible point, and were watching for tag lines, with a view to stretching up to take hold of them. Instead, the bottom of the U-shaped mattress appeared first of all, and they both stretched up to take hold of the nearest rope link between blocks of the mattress. It was not suggested by anyone that that was an inappropriate thing to do. Brogden's approach was to take hold of the rope with his palm facing upwards. He seemed to think that that might have enabled him to release the rope more easily. The pursuer grasped the rope by putting his right hand round it with his palm facing downwards and the back of his hand pointing upwards towards the surface of the sea. [28] The diving supervisor had recorded the weather conditions as including a one metre swell. While exact measurement of the swell was not possible, that was meant to be an estimate of the distance between the lowest and highest point of the swell. The spot on the pipeline where the mattress had to be deposited was so located in relation to the position of the vessel that the boom of the crane, to which the handling frame and mattress were slung, had to be extended right over the side of the vessel. In that position the roll of the vessel itself (and this particular vessel, according to Mr Logan, was known to roll quite a lot in the swell) meant that the average movement upwards and downwards of the lifting frame and mattress was likely to have been more than one metre. It is easy, therefore, to see that divers, who were at full stretch when taking hold of the mattress, might not be able to maintain their grip as it rose. Brogden had to release it on more then one occasion. The pursuer, however, was able, after taking hold of the rope, to descend to the seabed and lean in towards the pipeline to increase the purchase he had on the mattress to hold it in position and to stretch up and maintain his grip as it rose. A somewhat larger swell then pulled him off his feet. As the mattress rose, the pursuer could not let go. He tried to jerk his hand out, but was unable to do so. [29] Mr Logan said that he could not understand how the pursuer's hand became trapped. However, the pursuer was wearing thick neoprene gloves and had his hand clasped round the rope. It was not disputed that the space between the rope and the concrete blocks was fairly restricted and could accommodate only one hand. He was wearing gear that was weighted to ensure that he was negatively buoyant. Brogden described the pursuer as hanging at an angle with his legs kicked off to the side. The pursuer said that his body had gone under the mattress slightly as it rose. That is consistent with his evidence of leaning in towards the pipeline. I accept Mr Hofford's submission that the evidence in general about the way in which the lifting frame moved in the swell did not support the pursuer's impression that he was "snatched" upwards by the frame as it rose. His recollection was no doubt coloured by the sudden experience of extreme pain resulting from the tension imposed unexpectedly on his shoulder. However, he was lifted off his feet by the upward movement of the frame, and the combined effect of that and the resistant tension of the pursuer's body pulling downwards and inwards is, in my opinion, an adequate explanation for the rope loop which he was holding being pulled down and in towards the mattress and his hand becoming jammed against the lower part of the concrete blocks, thus preventing him from removing it. The pursuer must have been injured within seconds of being lifted off his feet. I find it not at all surprising that he would not be able to release his hand before the damage was done. The whole episode was over very quickly thereafter, as soon as the lifting frame began its descent in the cycle of the swell.[30] Tag lines were provided on slung loads as a matter of course. The pursuer was unsure whether there was one, or there were two, tag lines for each diver. Nothing turns on that. There were probably two. If, as was not disputed by the defenders, it was appropriate for the divers to take hold of the mattress at the earliest opportunity, tag lines were routinely used to enable them to do that, and tag lines were provided on this occasion for that purpose, then it seems to me to make no sense for the tag lines to be of such a length as to be inaccessible when the mattress was reachable. Common sense thus indicates that they should not fall materially short of the low point of the mattress. In this instance they plainly did. Brogden said that he could not reach the tag lines from the seabed and described them as 2 - 3 feet above the belly of the mattress. The pursuer was unable to reach the tag line which he saw and which he described as ending a foot - 18 inches short of the belly of the mattress. That difference may simply reflect tag lines of differing lengths or the difficulty of estimating the length in the circumstances that confronted the divers. I reject the view of Mr Logan that the tag lines described by the pursuer and Mr Brogden were of adequate length.
[31] There was considerable debate about what length tag lines should be. Mr Logan identified a number of risks in having tag lines that were much longer and came far below the mattress. He was responding mainly to Mr Brogden's assertion that the tag lines should have extended about 5 metres below the lowest point of the mattress. The pursuer expected tag lines about 4-6 feet longer than they were in this instance. It was clear that divers had different preferences as to the length of tag lines. The length envisaged by the pursuer, which seemed to me to be eminently sensible, would not have given rise to the dangers that Mr Logan had in mind. He was concerned that a tag line might become trapped under a mattress and move the mattress dangerously or snap unpredictably as the lifting frame was raised. Tag lines of the length envisaged by the pursuer would easily be kept clear of the laid mattress. Mr Logan's concerns were not directed at tag lines of the length envisaged by the pursuer. In any event, that problem would not arise if the tag lines were attached to the mattress rather than the lifting frame. Counsel for the defenders objected to questions about the length of tag lines early in the proof, on the basis that the record was too vague in failing to identify what lengths the tag lines should have been, and thus did not give fair notice of the pursuer's case. I considered the averment that the tag lines were "too short" to be sufficiently relevant. Specific lengths did not require to be averred to set out a relevant case. That averment gave adequate notice to the defenders of the pursuer's complaint about the tag lines, for which they were responsible and which their employees had attached to the load. [32] Since divers routinely aimed to secure control of the mattress at the earliest opportunity, it would be obvious to the defenders that the pursuer was likely to take hold of the mattress if he could not reach a tag line. It follows that I am satisfied that the pursuer's injury was caused when he did what the defenders must have anticipated that he would do.The Statutory Cases
[33] The pursuer presented two statutory cases under the Diving Operations at Work Regulations 1981 (SI 1981/399). One was based on the duties under Regulations 5 and 9 to issue diving rules in respect of each diving operation and to provide and maintain a diving operations log book. That case was not insisted upon. It was not suggested in evidence that proper records of the dive were not kept. There was considerable reference in the evidence to a document known as a Job Safety Analysis (JSA), which would deal with the arrangements for carrying out the mattress laying exercise being undertaken at the time. However, there was no evidence about what was, or should have been, in any such JSA. As a result, any issue over whether or not there was one became immaterial. [34] The other statutory case was based on Regulation 12, which is in the following terms:"12(4) All plant and equipment used in a diving operation shall ...
(b) be suitable for the conditions in which it is intended to be used ...".
The pursuer's case identified two items of equipment which his counsel, Mr Dewar, QC submitted were not suitable for the conditions in which they were intended to be used. One was the umbilical, because a protective sheath had been removed and the counterweight lead cable had not been properly secured. As I have already indicated, the evidence did not indicate that the removal of the protective sheath and the addition of the lead cable contributed to the accident. There is, therefore, no evidential basis on which that part of the case could succeed.
[35] The other item of equipment to which the pursuer invites the Court to apply Regulation 12 is the tag lines. Mr Hofford's submission was that tag lines could not possibly be described as "plant and equipment". He elaborated only to the extent of referring me to Guidance Notes to the Regulations, and in particular to page 4 and thereafter paragraphs 54 to 81, in which reference was made to a variety of forms of equipment, but there was no reference to tag lines. However, these references are by way of example only, and are clearly not meant to be definitive or exhaustive. In my opinion, as a matter of common sense, the tag lines deliberately attached to the load to enable it to be manoeuvred were plainly "equipment" used in a diving operation. The findings I have made lead inevitably to the conclusion that the tag lines available for the pursuer were not suitable for the conditions in which they were intended to be used. Because they were not of adequate length, the pursuer took hold of the mattress and thus sustained injury. The pursuer's case must, therefore, succeed on that basis, the defenders having conceded that the Regulation applies strictly, subject to any question of contributory negligence.The Common Law Cases
[36] The pursuer presented a number of common law cases. In Article 4 was a case based on the vicarious liability of the defenders for the failure of the deck crew on the vessel to fit tag lines of sufficient length that divers could use to manoeuvre mattresses into position with reasonable safety. There was no direct evidence about the fitting of the tag lines and the respective responsibilities therefor of the deck crew, the foreman and the diving supervisor. The only evidence to indicate the possibility that responsibility might be laid at the door of the deck crew was a statement attributed by Neil Brogden to Brian Brockwell who was the supervisor at the time of the incident. Brogden complained to him that the tag lines were too short. Brogden's recollection of his response was: "Yes, I've been trying to do my best with this crew on the deck, but I just can't get them to do what I want." While that statement might provide the basis for a case based on the failure of the deck crew to implement the instructions given to them, it does not provide a basis for concluding that Brockwell was acknowledging that on this occasion the tag lines fitted were shorter than Brockwell had instructed. Brockwell's evidence was that the length of the tag lines depended on the wishes of the diver. However, there was no evidence that either diver had stipulated a length of tag line by that stage in the operation. I could not, therefore, on the strength of the statement made by Brockwell, draw a conclusion that the crew had failed to implement an instruction which would have resulted in longer tag lines being attached to the load by the time of the accident. There was, therefore, no basis on which the pursuer's case of vicarious liability for fault could succeed. [37] A number of cases of common law fault were pled against the defenders directly. The pursuer's case that the defenders failed to provide a safe and suitable crane with an operative motion compensator was not insisted upon in the absence of evidence to support it. While there was considerable cross-examination on the state of the weather, the pursuer's case that the weather was too rough for mattresses to be laid was ultimately not insisted upon in final submissions. Mr Dewar contented himself with submitting that the equipment provided had to be viewed in the context of the prevailing weather conditions. The weather on the previous day had been severe enough to lead to the suspension of diving. By the time of the accident, the weather had come down from being unsuitable for diving to a swell of an acceptable, though significant, level. That swell was exaggerated by the position of the crane jib. The pursuer relied on the fact that the resultant vertical movement of the mattress was fairly substantial. [38] As I have already indicated, the evidence did not provide a basis for me to draw inferences on which the pursuer's case based on the removal of the protective web covering from the umbilical and the attachment of additional lead could succeed. [39] That leaves the case that the defenders ought to have provided longer tag lines. A further ancillary duty to instruct the pursuer to keep clear of the mattress until it had been grounded on the seabed was contrary to the evidence that the normal practice was for the diver to take control of the mattress as early as possible as it descended. [40] The common law case that the defenders failed to devise, institute and maintain a safe system of work, and failed to provide safe and suitable equipment for the task the pursuer was required to perform, by failing to provide tag lines of sufficient length to secure his safety, depends on the evidence about the tag lines which I have already reviewed in relation to the statutory case with, in addition, further evidence in relation to one particular matter. Both Brogden and the pursuer claimed to have made a complaint about the length of the tag lines. Initially, Brogden thought that he had done so on an earlier dive that day, but he came to accept that his complaint was made more or less simultaneously with the pursuer's accident. His complaint was made to Brockwell and was to the effect that he and the pursuer could not get to the tag lines before the mattress got to them. It evoked the response which I have already mentioned. That response led him to assume that someone else had already complained, but he acknowledged that it might be that the pursuer had made a complaint immediately before him. The pursuer claimed to have made a complaint about the length of the tag lines in relation to what he thought was the previous mattress. He would not be budged in cross-examination from his recollection that the accident did not happen on the first mattress that he was involved in laying in the course of that dive. The Bell Dive Report and the Daily Progress Report both clearly record the accident as having occurred in the course of the laying of the first mattress on that dive. I have already indicated that there is no reason for me to doubt the general accuracy of these documents. The pursuer's recollection of making such a complaint is not reliable. [41] It follows that the common law case of fault relating to the tag lines depends essentially on the same facts as bore upon the statutory case. It was acknowledged by the defenders' own expert witness, Mr Logan, that contact between a diver and a mattress being lowered on a lifting frame gave rise to a risk that the diver could be seriously injured. The lifting frame moved not only up and down but tended to revolve as it rose and fell. Since the mattress was flexible, its configuration could change to some extent in the swell. The particular danger that Mr Logan had in mind was that the mattress might strike the diver. However, the unpredictability of its movement plainly gave rise to the risk that any contact with the mattress would cause injury. As Mr Logan explained, tag lines were provided as a means of avoiding contact between mattress and diver. They enabled him to manoeuvre the mattress without having direct contact with it. They were easily released in the event that a problem developed. Standing the routine practice that the diver would endeavour to take control of the mattress at the first opportunity, then it ought to have been obvious to the defenders that, if a tag line could not be reached by the diver, he would take control of the mattress directly. It was, therefore, foreseeable that the provision of tag lines which fell materially short of the lowest point of the mattress would expose the pursuer unnecessarily to danger. In my opinion that case of fault at common law, based on the inadequate length of the tag lines, has also been made out, subject to the question of contributory negligence to which I now turn.Contributory Negligence
[42] The defenders' case that the pursuer ought to have realised that his umbilical was snagged was not insisted upon. The defenders' case for a finding of contributory negligence in excess of 50% came to be confined to the submission that the pursuer ought to have immediately reported to the supervisor that the tag lines were too short and refrained from carrying on with the operation which he had perceived to be unsafe. In my opinion, the pursuer cannot be faulted for acting as he did in the few moments that he had to decide what action to take in the absence of adequate tag lines. He simply followed the normal practice of endeavouring to take control of the mattress as soon as possible and took hold of it at the nearest point which he could grasp. Simultaneously his diving colleague did exactly the same. There was no failure in duty on the part of the pursuer.DAMAGES
Services
[43] By joint minute parties agreed that the appropriate award for loss of services would be £3,500, inclusive of interest on past services. They were at odds over solatium and loss of earnings.Solatium
[44] For solatium Mr Dewar proposed £30,000 and Mr Hofford £15,000, and that in spite of the fact that there was no material dispute over the medical evidence. The sequelae are both physical and mental. The main injury sustained is described in paragraph H above. The pursuer has suffered permanent limitation in the use of, and chronic pain in, his shoulder. He has some sciatic pain in his right leg. He has also suffered, and continues to suffer to some degree, from clinical depression. [45] Immediately after the accident, the pursuer was in considerable pain and unable to contribute further to the ongoing dive. When the dive was completed, he was taken to a decompression chamber, where he remained for the best part of two days, receiving only pain killing treatment. Since that was the end of his involvement in the diving operation, he decided to wait until he returned home on release from the decompression chamber to consult his own general practitioner. Regrettably the treatment he has undergone has not eliminated pain from his shoulder, nor restored its full function. Initially there was little, if any, improvement following steroid and anaesthetic injections and physiotherapy. In March 1998 he underwent arthroscopy and rotator cuff surgery. Following that operation he experienced severe pain and stiffness, and in June 1998 underwent a further arthroscopy operation and manipulation under anaesthesia for release of contractions of a frozen shoulder which had developed after the first operation. The pursuer was very active in attempts at his own rehabilitation but found that weight training and swimming tended to leave his shoulder weak and in pain. [46] In 1999 and 2000 the pursuer saw a number of consultants in a determined effort to obtain restoration of full function of the shoulder and relief from pain, but with little success. He has at least 75% normal function in his shoulder, but regular repetitive use of it exacerbates the pain from which he suffers to varying degrees constantly. He was a physically active man participating in weight training, surfing, swimming and cycling. He is no longer able to undertake these activities. He previously spent periods of contact with his daughters of 16 and 11, who lived with his estranged wife, engaging with them in sporting activities. He is no longer able to do that. As a result of his relative inactivity he has put on 5 stones in weight. He has not been, and will not be, able to resume his career as a diver. In addition, he will not be able to resume work involving appreciable physical activity, particularly where that activity is overhead. [47] His natural inclination is towards physical work, since he suffers from dyslexia to a significant decree and to the point where he has a specific learning difficulty with language processing, especially spelling. He now has a spelling age of about 9 years. As a result, he did not benefit from the academic side of education when he was at school. When he realised just how radical the change in his life had to be, he developed a mild to moderate degree of clinical depression in the course of 1999. The particular symptoms which occurred in his case were a feeling of despondency, a loss of interest in his usual activities for obvious reasons, irritability, low mood and anxiety. He would tend to waken early in a bad mood. This condition has persisted in the absence of treatment. It is unlikely that his general practitioner appreciated the full nature of the illness. However, the situation was clear by April 2002, when a change of treatment, by way of a higher dosage of anti-depressant medicine and cognitive therapy, was recommended. Had that recommendation been followed, the likelihood is that the pursuer would by now have recovered from his depression which by April 2002 was of a mild order. It may be that his depression partly accounts for the conclusion of Mr Lindsay, Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon, that he appeared to experience pain which was difficult to explain on a purely anatomical basis, for example in the elbow region, and that, when he was distracted, he was able to move his arm to a greater extent that he would allow in formal testing. Mr Lindsay did not consider that the pursuer was acting other than genuinely in his response to his examination. However, the very fact that he has suffered from clinical depression has led to him being declared unfit for commercial diving operations. The one career he has known has thus been cut short. It was plain that he derived great pleasure and satisfaction from his work as a diver. The award for solatium must reflect these elements of depression, loss of career and loss of congenial employment. [48] The pursuer's pain is fairly well managed by pain killing medication, although he often has difficulty finding a pain free sleeping position. Treatment will probably resolve his depression. Dr MacLellan, Consultant Psychologist, attributed the improvement in his depressive disorder as at April 2002 to the fact that he was undertaking a course in computing studies which he enjoyed. He continues to undertake that study. In the witness box he exhibited no signs of the various symptoms of his depressive disorder. There is, therefore, every likelihood that the pursuer's depression is well on the way to resolution. [49] In support of his submission that £30,000 should be awarded, Mr Dewar invited me to take account of "jury awards", but referred me to only one, viz George v Bank of Scotland, Lord MacLean, 30 April 1997 (Unreported), where £15,000 was awarded for a shoulder injury similar to that sustained by the pursuer. That award related entirely to the past, in respect of an accident which had occurred 21/2 years before and did not appear to include loss of career or clinical depression. In view of the comments of the Court in Shaher &c v British Aerospace Flying College Ltd, Extra Division, 20 May 2003 (Unreported), about the danger of placing too much weight on one jury award rather than a pattern emerging from a series of jury awards, I treated that authority with caution. Under reference to Mitchell v Inverclyde District Council 1998 SLT 1157, Doyle v Strathclyde Regional Council 1994 SLT 524 and Cole v Weir Pumps Ltd 1995 SLT 12, Mr Hofford pointed to the fairly modest awards of around £8,000 made in the early to mid-1990's for shoulder injuries similar to that sustained by the pursuer. I found greatest assistance in arriving at an appropriate figure for solatium from Re Holton, 27 April 1993, Criminal Injuries Compensation Board reported in Kemp & Kemp, Quantum of Damages, at H2-015. The claimant was 35, suffered a shoulder injury similar to that sustained by the pursuer causing chronic pain, and had to abandon her career. The award made was the equivalent of £22,500 today. My own impression is that the impact on the claimant in that case was approaching, but not quite as great as, that upon the pursuer in the present case. An award of £25,000 would be in line with the Judicial Studies Board Guidelines 3A, 6A and C. I accordingly assess solatium at £25,000 and attribute one half of that sum to the past.Loss of Income
[50] The pursuer envisaged diving for as long as possible. He had in mind following in the footsteps of friends who, he said, were still diving at the age of 53. He said that he would have worked as a saturation diver as long as possible. When he was unable to dive, he might have considered becoming a supervisor. However, he envisaged that he would have worked as a diver until he was over 50. [51] The first thing to be determined is the likely future pattern of the pursuer's career, had he not been injured. It is difficult to think of anyone better qualified to give evidence about the employment situation facing commercial divers than Mr Logan. For about twenty years he has been involved in the broader aspects of the profession and has presented numerous papers on technical and physiological topics at conferences and in specialist publications. He has recently carried out research into trends in the numbers of divers employed and their career patterns. In the year 2000, under the auspices of the International Marine Contractors Association, he carried out a major survey of the ages and employment profiles of all divers in the North Sea. The competing opinion of Dr Bevan was based much more on the pursuer's aspirations than knowledge of the industry in general. Mr Logan spoke from a far better informed point of view. He took account of the pursuer's aspirations and set them in the context of his knowledge and experience of the industry in general. [52] His evidence, based on that survey, was that the average age of retirement from diving in the North Sea was between 43 and 44 years of age. He referred to other studies in which an earlier average was identified. The evidence in general in the case was that the pursuer was a competent and reliable diver. It is a profession in which high standards are expected and delivered. That is the norm. So to be competent, reliable and thoroughly professional is the average. The pursuer fitted that description. The pursuer was injured when he was 34 years of age. He would probably have continued to dive for another 10 years at most. [53] It was obviously not easy for him to break into commercial diving initially. He had modest earnings between June 1991 and the early part of 1994. Thereafter a pattern began to emerge. He was working abroad. He had the benefit of a particular Inland Revenue arrangement that applies to divers working abroad and had no income tax liability. His relevant earnings for the three fiscal years immediately prior to the accident were - to 5 April 1995 he earned £21,420.39, to 5 April 1996 he earned £22,442.79, and to 5 April 1997 he earned £24,149.14. Throughout these three periods he was engaged exclusively by the defenders. From 6 April 1997 he continued to be engaged by them. The period between 6 April 1997 and the accident was the most lucrative of his career. His income to 31 October 1997 was £23,197.14. When divers work in saturation they earn more than when they are employed as air divers. That figure reflects an increase in the number of days that the pursuer was working in saturation and also the fact that his contract in October was in the North Sea, where earnings are higher, but are subject to the United Kingdom income tax. [54] In proposing figures for loss of earnings, Mr Dewar made his calculations on the basis of gross earnings in excess of £80,000 per annum from 1999. That figure was presented on the assumption that the pursuer's earnings immediately before the accident were likely to be maintained. [55] In my opinion it is unlikely that he would have continued to earn at that rate. It is unlikely that he would have continued to work in the North Sea with its higher rates of pay. The defenders abandoned their operations in the North Sea at the beginning of 1998. That reflects a reduction in the available business generally. North Sea work is now exclusively the province of three companies. The pursuer worked briefly in 1994 with a company which has a connection with one of the three. Mr Logan contacted the North Sea company to see what the prospects were of someone in the pursuer's position being employed in the North Sea by them. The indication given to him was that the prospects were nil. The pursuer did not lead evidence of any work that would have been available to him in the North Sea. The reduction in available work in the North Sea is reflected in the reduction in the number of divers working there since 1998. There were substantial reductions in 1999 and 2000. An increase in 2001 resulted in a total that was still14% less than that in 1997. The pursuer was no better qualified to work in the North Sea than many other divers. Work is often secured through personal contracts with supervisors and other colleagues in the industry. There was no evidence that the pursuer had contacts which would give him realistic prospects of securing regular work in the North Sea. New divers also continued to be trained and recruited. It would be pure speculation to conclude that the pursuer's earnings in the immediate future would have been more than twice the amount he earned in the three full years immediately preceding the accident. [56] Since he had been working for a considerable period of time with the defenders, it is likely that he would have continued to work regularly for them in their continuing operations abroad. He was likely, therefore, to have a similar income to that of the preceding 3 years. Mr Logan estimated that that would be about £25,000 t0 £30,000 per annum. Bearing in mind that he was on course to increase his earnings for the financial year in which the accident happened and that he was likely to endeavour to maintain that higher earnings level, it is reasonable in my view to take the figure of £30,000 as his average net annual income between the accident and the proof. Statistics produced by Mr Logan, which were not challenged, showed that the current annual increase in divers' wage rates is of the order of 2.5%, and that previously the figure was slightly greater at 3%. Had the pursuer's income increased by those percentages over the period from April 1997, the end of the last full year for which figures were available, it would have reached £30,000 in the year before the proof. For the balance of his diving career to age 44, a period of 41/2 years, I take an annual figure of £35,000 to reflect the likelihood that his greater experience would have enhanced his prospects of regular employment. [57] It was plain that prior to the accident the pursuer had given little thought to what he would do when his diving career came to an end. There was a possibility of becoming a supervisor. In the course of the proof that was elevated into something that he considered would have been the natural progression. In my opinion, there was never any realistic prospect of his becoming a supervisor. It was a major part of the pursuer's case in cross-examination of the supervisors who gave evidence, namely Maddocks and Brockwell, that they failed to keep accurate and complete records of the dive. It was recognised at all hands that recording significant parts of the dive was an important part of a responsibilities of a supervisor. Supervisors often have to write reports. It is the job of the supervisor to react to a developing situation by giving guidance and instructions to the divers. He has health and safety responsibilities. He is expected to refer to written guidance and instructions on the execution of the operation as well as on health and safety issues. He may require to refer to manuals as a matter of urgency in the course of an ongoing dive. The pursuer's dyslexia is such that it takes him four times as long as the average person to read and understand documents. He tends to write in block capitals and very slowly. When he was in the Royal Navy he had certain supervisory responsibilities in connection with air diving operations. However, there was no evidence of the nature of these supervisory responsibilities and no basis from that experience for suggesting that he would have a better prospect of becoming a supervisor than other divers would. Although there was evidence that there were diving supervisors in the industry who suffered from dyslexia, no one falling into that category was named. Obviously if it is known that there are such supervisors, it should have been possible to name them. I was not persuaded that anyone suffering a material degree of dyslexia is regularly engaged as a diving supervisor. Only about 10%-15% of divers attain that post. His diving career would, therefore, probably have ended when he was 44. [58] The defenders conceded that the steps which the pursuer has taken so far to secure alternative employment are reasonable. That was, in my opinion, a fairly major concession. Through his own efforts, the pursuer has become adept in the operation of computers. He has taken up an HND course in computing and multi-media studies. He was close to the end of the course at the time of the proof. Should he complete it successfully, which everyone anticipated he would, then he has the opportunity to study for a further year and obtain a degree. He then plans to establish his own multi-media computing business and work from home. Working from home should give him the opportunity to work at his own pace. However, his dyslexia will inevitably limit his capacity to compete with others who do not have that difficulty in what is an increasingly competitive market. The issue between the parties was whether he would be able to maintain an income of £10,000 or one of £20,000 or more per annum from that source from about a year hence. Both parties led the evidence of employment consultants. Much might be said on both sides. The best estimate I can make, therefore, is that he will earn somewhere between these figures, and I take £15,000 as the annual sum he is likely to earn from that source. [59] Within 4 years of commencing that business he will be 44 years of age, at which point he would have retired from diving and would have had to seek other employment. There was no evidence that the pursuer had given any thought to the work that he might undertake on retirement from diving. No evidence was led of what the possibilities open to him would be but for the injury he sustained. Had he chosen to follow the route of training in computer studies and associated businesses, then his income would have been exactly what it will be should be succeed in establishing the business he plans to. Since the earnings from that business are likely to be modest, it is likely that the pursuer would have turned his attention to other occupations and indeed may yet do so. Had he retained full fitness, then plainly more options would have been open to him. I can do no better than reflect this by awarding a lump sum that bears a relationship to the earnings of which he would be capable. I consider that a further award of the equivalent of 2 years income would be reasonable compensation for the extent to which his employability has been compromised by his injury. I therefore award £40,000 under this heading.CALCULATION OF DAMAGES
[60] Giving effect to these various findings, I calculate damages to be awarded as follows:
Loss of Services (Inclusive of Interest) |
£3,500 |
|
Solatium |
£25,000 |
|
Interest on Solatium at 4% on one half for 5.54 years |
£2,760 |
|
Loss of earnings to proof 5.54 years at £30,000 p.a. less received |
£166,200 £ 20,150 |
£146,050 |
Interest at 4% per annum for 5.54 years |
£32,365 |
|
One year future wage loss to June 2004 |
£35,000 |
|
31/2 years future wage loss @ £20,000 |
£70,000 |
|
Loss of employability |
£40,000 |
|
£354,675 |