FIRST DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
Lord President Lord Philip Lord Weir
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0140/17/98 OPINION OF THE COURT delivered by LORD PHILIP in APPEAL under section 82(4) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 by THE ASSESSOR FOR THE HIGHLAND & WESTERN ISLES VALUATION JOINT BOARD against A decision of the Highland & Western Isles Valuation Appeal Panel dated 7 September 1998 in respect of subjects at Parkend, Sandwick, Isle of Lewis ________ |
Act: R.W.J. Anderson, Q.C.; Biggart Baillie
Alt: No appearance
7 December 2000
[1] Section 70 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1992 required each local authority in Scotland to impose a council tax, to be payable in respect of dwellings situated in the authority's area. The amount of council tax payable in respect of each dwelling is calculated by reference to the valuation band into which the dwelling falls by virtue of section 74 of the Act. Section 84 required the local assessor for each council to compile on 1 April 1993, and to maintain, a valuation list showing each dwelling in the council's area and the valuation band applicable to it.
[2] Provisions governing the alteration of valuation lists are contained in The Council Tax (Alteration of Lists and Appeals)(Scotland) Regulations 1993. The circumstances in which taxpayers or owners of dwellings may make proposals for the alteration of valuation lists in respect of their dwellings are limited. Regulation 5 of the 1993 Regulations sets out the circumstances and periods in which such proposals may be made. In terms of subparagraph (6) of Regulation 5 one of the circumstances in which a proposal may be made is where a relevant decision in respect of a dwelling has been made. A relevant decision is defined in Regulation 3(2), as follows:
"(2) For the purposes of this Part, an appeal decision is a 'relevant decision' in respect of a dwelling if -
(a) it was made by -
(i) a valuation appeal committee for the area in which the dwelling
is situated;
(ii) the Court of Session; or
(iii) the House of Lords; and
(b) either because of a general principle stated in it or because it relates to
a comparable dwelling, the decision provides reasonable grounds for contending that the valuation band shown on the list in respect of the dwelling is not the one which should be shown."
[3] This is an appeal by the Assessor of the Highland & Western Isles Valuation Joint Board against a decision of the Highland & Western Isles Valuation Appeal Panel dated 7 September 1998 following on a reference to the panel under Regulation 15(1) of the 1993 Regulations of proposals for the alteration of the valuation list in relation to nine dwellinghouses at Parkend, Sandwick, Isle of Lewis, owned by the local authority. At the time of the reference all nine dwellinghouses were entered in the list under Band B. The proposals for alteration of the list were made by the taxpayers, who are the tenants of the dwellinghouses, in terms of Regulation 5(6) of the Regulations, following a relevant decision made by the panel in relation to a comparable dwelling, namely No. 39 Parkend. The relevant decision was made on 7 June 1994 and related to Nos. 56 and 73 Parkend as well as to No. 39 Parkend. The decision was that Nos. 56 and 73 were correctly entered in Band B but that No. 39 Parkend should be entered in Band A. The taxpayers' proposal was that the nine properties Nos. 5, 26, 28, 37, 40, 41, 49, 51 and 55 Parkend should be entered in Band A rather than in Band B, the band in which they had been entered prior to the proposal being made.
[4] The decision of the panel dated 7 September 1998 against which this appeal is brought by the assessor was in the following terms:
"I refer to the below listed properties and to the Valuation Appeal Hearing of 16 June 1998 during which the Committee considered its decision on 39 Parkend on 7 June 1994 to be a relevant decision in relation to the Parkend properties, and has therefore found that those properties are comparable and should be in Band A of the Council Tax".
The nine dwellinghouses were then listed.
[5] At the hearing of the appeal before this court the assessor was represented by counsel. There was no appearance on behalf of the taxpayers. The argument for the assessor was that the inference from the terms of the panel's decision was that they had considered themselves bound by the decision of 7 June 1994 in relation to 39 Parkend, or alternatively that they considered that they did not require to consider the valuation of the nine dwellinghouses on their merits. In doing so they had misunderstood the effect of Regulation 5. The effect of the making of a relevant decision was merely to enable an owner or a taxpayer to make a proposal for the alteration of a valuation list. Once such a proposal had been made, Regulation 13 required the assessor to carry out a valuation of the dwelling in accordance with section 86(2) of the 1992 Act. In considering the reference the panel had to have regard to the valuation carried out by the assessor. The panel had failed to do so and so erred in law.
[6] Part II of the 1993 Regulations contains provisions prescribing the manner of making proposals and the steps which the assessor requires to take on receipt of a proposal. He may treat the proposal as invalid or, if he considers it to be valid he requires to determine whether it is well founded or not. Any valuation which he carries out in connection with the proposal is required by Regulation 13 to be carried out in accordance with section 86(2) of the 1992 Act, the same basis as that on which all valuations under the Act are carried out. It is clear, therefore, that each proposal must be looked at on its own merits, and there is nothing in either the Act or the Regulations which provides that either the assessor or the panel is bound by the terms of a relevant decision. We accept the assessor's submission that the decision of the panel - and especially their use of "therefore" - must be read as indicating that they considered themselves to be bound by the relevant decision in question, or alternatively, that they were under no obligation to consider the valuation of the appeal subjects on their own merits. In these circumstances we find that the panel erred in law and remit the appeal back to them in order that they may consider the valuations of the appeal subjects on their own merits.