Scottish Court of Session Decisions

[1] The pursuer was an employee of the predecessor of the defenders and worked in their factory at Shettleston Road, Glasgow. On 23 September 1996, at about 2.00pm, the pursuer fell to the floor of the room in which boot sinks and the hand sink were situated between the low and high risk areas of the premises. The term "high risk" is utilised to describe the food production in the premises and not the condition of the premises themselves. The pursuer avers that she was walking across the concrete floor between the boot sinks and the hand sink in that area when she slipped and fell. I did not find her a reliable witness. The floor was not concrete but had a special surface as hereafter noted.

[2] Her account of what she was doing when she fell varied three times in the course of examination-in-chief, all of which in turn varied from the averments. The first account she gave was that she went and washed her hands, put her overall up, turned round and then slipped. She then said that she slipped at a point on the floor which was close to the sink. The second account was that she was going to take her wellingtons off and was walking from the sinks to a bench, shown on the photographs produced, whereas in cross she said she was taking her overall off at the time after having washed her boots in the boot sink. She stated that water caused her to slip but she did not look at the floor afterwards and did not see water. She inferred that water had caused her to slip because the back of her overall was wet. She said she had told Mrs Linda Jamieson that she had slipped on water.

[3] Mrs Linda Jamieson's evidence was that the pursuer was found by her sitting on the bench crying. She said she had slipped and hurt herself of the floor. She said she slipped at the sink between the sink and the foot bath and pointed to where she slipped. Mrs Jamieson however could not recall if there was water on the floor that day, although the pursuer had said she slipped on a wet floor.

[4] Accordingly, on the factual evidence, the pursuer was unable to say in what circumstances her accident occurred or where on the floor it had occurred. She did not speak to seeing water where she slipped, at whatever part of the floor that occurred, nor did Mrs Jamieson see water despite the fact that the pursuer had said that she slipped on a wet floor.

[5] In that state of her evidence the pursuer simply has not established that the accident occurred in the manner she averred, or at any location at which any significant water was or might be as a matter of fact.

[6] The pursuer made a case about the floor being slippy because of water thereon. The court heard evidence about the floor surface. It was described as being the safest floor in the factory by the defenders' witnesses and by their expert, Mr Glen. His evidence was that the mere presence of water on that floor would not cause someone to slip. It was a specially constructed floor and from tests he conducted he concluded that water was not a substance which, if present on the floor in question, may cause someone to slip. His report is 7/1 of process. I accepted his evidence.

[7] Accordingly, had it been necessary to do so, I would have found that the pursuer had failed to establish her statutory case. She failed to establish any breach of the regulations. Further it cannot be affirmed, first of all, that water is a substance which is likely per se to cause someone to slip. Regard must be had to the context of where it is and in the present context it was not such substance because it was on a surface which had properties which mean that water upon it would not cause a person to slip. Further there was no evidence about the quantity of water upon which the pursuer was alleged to have slipped. The regulations cannot mean that any drop of water means a breach. It might be different with other substances such as oil or grease, but that is not the present case. The pursuer accordingly failed to establish that any breach of the regulations did cause her accident.

[8] I should only add that damages in this case had been agreed at £5,000.

[9] In the light of the above findings I repelled the pursuer's pleas-in-law, sustained the defenders' second and third pleas-in-law and assoilzied the defenders from the conclusion of the summons.