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Cite as: [1999] ScotCS 152

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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

OPINION OF LORD DAWSON

in Appeal under

THE TOWN & COUNTRY PLANNING (SCOTLAND) ACT 1997

HUGH MACRAE & COMPANY (BUILDERS) LIMITED

Appellants:

against

A decision of a Reporter appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland dated and communicated to the Appellants on 27 December 1997

________________

Appellants: Martin, Q.C., Paull & Williamsons

First Respondent: Tyre, Q.C., Solicitor for Secretary of State for Scotland;

Second Respondents: I W F Ferguson, Bennett & Robertson

18 June 1999

This is an appeal against the decision of a Reporter at an Inquiry in terms of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997. The Appellants submitted an application for planning permission for a development of 124 houses at Woodside Farm, Cove Road, Charleston, Nigg, to the City of Aberdeen Council ("the planning authority"). The Appellants appealed against the failure of the planning authority to issue a decision on said application within the prescribed period. A public local inquiry into said appeal ("the Inquiry") was held on 4th to 6th November 1997 before Mr Allan Walker, a Reporter appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland ("the Reporter"). Following the Inquiry, the Reporter dismissed the appeal and refused to grant permission for the said development. His decision was announced in a letter dated 29 December 1997 ("the decision letter"). The Appellants now challenge that decision by application to this Court under Section 239 of the Act.

Mr Martin for the Appellant made two criticisms of the decision - making process - viz. that in construing the relevant policies in the applicable Structure Plan the Reporter erred and in particular failed to have regard to two previous decisions of other Reporters on the same policies, which decisions were to the opposite effect. In support these criticisms, Mr Martin made four submissions - (1) the Reporter misconstrued the policy ; (2) the Reporter failed to have regard to a relevant material consideration ; (3) the Reporter acted unreasonably in construing the policy and (4) the Reporter failed to explain adequately his reasons for the above.

Mr Martin then explained the provenance of the relevant policies which he submitted the Reporter was obliged to take into account (Act Sections 37, 48, 24 and 25). The applicable Structure Plan was formulated by the local authority in February 1995 (No 5/1 of Process). It was approved by the Secretary of State with modifications in July 1997 (No 5/2 of Process). There were three relevant policies. Housing Policy 4 ("H.P. 4") - Housing Land Supply - originally provided :-

"The Regional Councils and District Council shall seek, through the Development Plan, to maintain a minimum five year effective housing land supply while avoiding over allocation".

The last four words were deleted by the Secretary of State's modification and the words "at all times" were substituted.

Housing Policy 6 - Housing Provision in the Aberdeen Housing Market Area - ("H.P. 6") reads, as modified, thus :-

"In addition to the effective housing land supply at January 1995 there is an overall housing shortfall of 4,500 for the period up to mid - 2001 which shall be met by the residual of the January 1993 housing allowances as set out below ...........

City South 20...

Local Plans shall take account of the following indicative housing allowances for development in meeting a housing shortfall of 6,200 in the period beyond 2001 up to 2006. These allowances shall be the subject of review in the next Structure Plan Review ......

City South 100...

The relevant modification reduced the first above figure from 100 to 20. The site of the present proposed development was within the area described as "City South".

Housing Policy 9 - Permissions in Advance of Local Plan Adoption - ("H.P.9") reads, as modified thus :-

"Permission may be granted for housing development in addition to the January 1995 established land supply and in advance of Local Plan adoption provided that the Regional Council is satisfied that:-

a) the release is taken from the land in Housing Policies 6 and 7 for development in the period up to 2001;

b) adequate infrastructure is available or can be provided;

c) the land supply is required to maintain a five year effective supply in

the Housing Market Area; and

d) development would conform with other policies of the Structure Plan, with particular reference to protecting Green Belt, safeguarding and protecting the environment, and protecting prime agricultural land". The modifications in this case consisted in deleting the word "major" where it previously occurred in the first line and before the word "development" in a) and deleting the words "and seeking agreements on the provision of community facilities where they previously occurred as the end of d)".

Mr Martin then referred me to the very extensive terms of the Reporter's decision letter which is appended to the original Appeal. In summary, he suggested that the Reporter had found that the proposed development was not supported by H.P.6 in that that policy limited development in the area to 20 houses only. He further found that the development was not supported by the requirement to maintain a 5 year supply at all times contained in H.P.4. Also he went on to find that the development was not justified prior to the adoption of a local plan in terms of H.P.9.

Mr Martin then went on to refer to the decisions of the other two Reporters. The first, dated May 1997, was an application for a residential development at Banchory (No. 5/5 of Process). At that time the new Structure Plan had not come into effect and the earlier 1986 Plan was still in force. The relevant policies in that plan were referred to in Paragraph 10. The new Structure Plan and its modifications were known to the parties and were taken into account (Paragraph 19). The Reporter to that Inquiry expressed his views on the issues and the relevant policies as follows (Paragraphs 80 & 81) :-

"I find that Housing Policies 4 and 6 are the policy expressions of two distinct, albeit related, issues. Policy 4, in seeking to maintain a minimum five year effective supply represents an ongoing duty. Policy 6, on the other hand, sets out allowances for specific periods and may have been intended to provide an ongoing five year supply. The Policy 6 allowance for Banchory has been taken up by the consent at Hill of Banchory, but the allowances were altered in the course of plan preparation. Housing land supply is dynamic and releases in line with the allowances may no longer be sufficient to meet that objective -

............. I find the determining issues in the Appeal to be whether further land in the Aberdeen H.M.A. should be released for housing to maintain a minimum effective five year supply and, if so, whether the appeal site would be suitable for the purpose".

That view, said Mr Martin, was in stark contrast to the approach of the Reporter in the present case who said

(Paragraphs 68 and 70) :-

"I find that the release of greenfield land for the construction of 124 houses at Cove at this point in time would be inconsistent with the provisions of approved structure plan 1995 housing policy 6.

I find that the clear intention of housing policy 4 is in that the development plan is to be the medium through which the minimum 5 year supply is to be maintained. I find nothing ....... which would lead me to conclude that housing policy 4 should take priority over housing policy 6. In my opinion they are entirely complementary".

Accordingly, said Mr Martin, the same two policies were being interpreted differently. Further, the Banchory decision was before the Reporter but he did not distinguish it and therefore failed to have regard to a relevant material consideration and failed to give adequate reasons for ignoring it.

Mr Martin then referred to the decision of another reporter given in March 1997 (No.5/6 of {Process). This concerned an application for a proposed development of 174 houses at Newmachar. In that appeal the Reporter took a similar approach to the housing policies as the Reporter had in the Banchory appeal concluding - "I find that although the appeal proposal is not in strict accordance with the terms of the proposed modification to policy H.P.6 the departure is a matter of timing and not of substance". Mr Martin submitted that the approach of that Reporter was again contrary to that of the Reporter in the present case. That decision was also before the present Reporter and there was no reference to it in his decision.

Mr Martin then returned to his four submissions, firstly that the Reporter misconstrued the relevant policies and as a result his decision should be quashed. In the Appeal, Article 10 this proposition was stated as "a matter of law". Mr Martin conceded however that this might not be strictly speaking a matter of law and suggested instead that it should be looked at "on a proper analysis". He submitted that if the Reporter was correct in his approach H.P.4 was given no content whatsoever. H.P.6 in so far as the period up to 2001 was concerned had three components -

1) the effective housing land supply as at January 1995 ;

2) an overall housing shortfall of 4,500 and

3) the meeting of that shortfall.

The last was to be met by an allowance of 3,080 with the balance coming from brownfield development in the City. As far as any individual part of the H.M.A. was concerned the Secretary of State had identified the effective shortfall and had provided that it should be made up in City South by 20 units. Mr Martin submitted that H.P.9 referred to the first part of H.P.6 and meant permission in addition to the 1995 supply. If the Reporter was correct proviso (a) would mean only 20 houses in City South as the brownfield balance applied only to Aberdeen City. Again if the Reporter was correct proviso (c) could not effectively add to that 20. In that case it would have no meaning at all. Similarly H.P.4 would be without meaning.

Accordingly the conclusion which the Reporter draws in Paragraph 74 is simply wrong as it gives no substance to H.P.9 (c) or H.P.4.

Mr Martin submitted that the Plan as a whole must be construed so as to give effect to those provisions. He submitted that the approach of the Reporter in the Banchory Appeal was correct and gave meaning to the three policies read together.

Mr Martin's second submission was that looking at the decision letter the Reporter failed to have regard to two relevant material considerations namely, the two other decisions dealing with the same policies. Some explanation ought to have been given but was not.

His third submission was that the Reporter acted ultra vires in that he reached an unreasonable conclusion on the terms and application of the policies in question.

Fourthly, Mr Martin contended that the Reporter had failed to explain adequately the reason for his decision on the construction of the policies as explained in Paragraph 74. More particularly he failed to give any adequate explanation for choosing a construction which was directly contrary to the other two earlier decisions.

In support of his submissions, Mr Martin referred to a number of cases. In Wordie Property Co Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland 1984 SLT 345, the Lord President at p348 and Lord Cameron at p356 referred to the necessity to give proper and adequate reasons. Any failure to do so was a failure to comply with the statutory requirements of Section 329 with the result that the decision should be quashed. In Save Britain's Heritage v Number One Poultry Ltd 1991 IWLR 153 Lord Bridge at p167 said -

"The single individual question, in my opinion, which the Court must ask itself whenever a planning decision is challenged on the ground of a failure to give reasons, is whether the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced by the deficiency of the reasons given .... Normally such prejudice will arise from one of three causes .... Secondly a developer whose application for permission is refused may be substantially prejudiced where the planning considerations on which the decision is based are not explained sufficiently clearly to assess the prospects of succeeding in an application for some alternative form of development".

That was the case in the present appeal, said Mr Martin. The Appellant was a developer of houses within the HMA. He was being faced with an interpretation of Structure Plan policy which was directly opposite to the interpretation in two previous identical cases. In these circumstances, he needed to know where he can go within the H.M.A.

In City of Edinburgh Council v Secretary of State 1998 SC (HL) 33 Lord Clyde identified the process which ought to be undertaken by the decision maker under Section 25 of the Act (p44 G - 45B). At p50 A his Lordship said "It is necessary that an account should be given of the reasoning on the main issues which were in dispute sufficient to enable the parties and the Court to understand that reasoning. If that degree of explanation was not achieved the parties might well be prejudiced. But elaboration is not to be looked for and a detailed consideration of every point which was raised is not to be expected.

In Perth & Kinross Council v Secretary of State (unreported 4 November 1998), the Lord Justice Clerk applied Wordie and City of Edinburgh Council and quashed the Reporter's decision on the ground that his reasons were insufficient.

In England, where the structure is the same, Mr Martin referred to Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing 1965 IWLR 1320. In that case, Lord Denning at p1326 described the power of the Court to intervene in terms similar to that of Lord President Emslie in Wordie. In Seddon Properties Ltd v Secretary of State 1981 42 P&C Reports 26 Forbes J - enunciated five principles which governed the review of Reporters' decisions by the Courts. In Council of the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service 1985 AC 374, Lord Diplock defined a concept of "irrationality" in the context of Judicial Review. In Mr Martin's submission, applying that definition, the decision of the Reporter was irrational in the absence of reasons relating to the other decisions. Mr Martin suggested that the cases above referred to illuminated his submission of unreasonableness. Finally, on the question of construction of planning policy as a matter of law, Mr Martin referred to Virgin Cinema Properties Ltd v Secretary of State 1998 PLCR 1 and to the review of the Deputy High Court Judge at p6E - 8F.

Mr Martin then submitted five propositions:-

1) in this case either the construction of the policies is a matter of law and the Reporter erred, or

2) there is only one reasonable construction and the Reporter acted unreasonably in coming to a different construction, or

3) the Reporter acted perversely in coming to the opposite conclusions from the two other Reporters, or

4) he failed to have regard to the two other decisions which were relevant material considerations, or

5) he failed properly to explain his conclusion in reaching an opposite decision.

Finally Mr Martin referred to Rockhold Ltd v Secretary of State 1986 J.P.L. 130 where Forbes J said "Just because one Inspector took one view on a matter of opinion, it did not necessarily follow that every subsequent Inspector had to follow that view ... If one Inspector, having had his attention drawn to the view of his predecessor, wished to disagree with it, he would in accordance with the rules have to say so and give reasons for disagreeing and the developer would then know where he was".

In the whole matter Mr Martin invited me to hold that the Reporter erred and acted ultra vires. In terms of Section 239 of the Act, his decision should be quashed.

Mr Tyre for the Secretary of State opened his submissions by replying to the five propositions advanced by Mr Martin. In relation to the first he submitted that it was not a question of law and in any event that the Reporter did not make any error in the construction of H.P. 4 and 6. He did give content to H.P. 4 and treated H.P.4 and H.P. 6 as complementary. In declining to follow the view that H.P.4 had priority he was entitled to take that decision. Secondly, the Reporter gave H.P. 9 an interpretation he was entitled to make and gave adequate and intelligible reasons for rejecting the Appellant's argument. Thirdly, it was not unreasonable for the Reporter to have reached a different conclusion from someone else. In any event the Reporter did not reach an opposite conclusion as the cases were not identical. Fourthly, the reasoning of another Reporter in another appeal regarding a different case was not a "relevant material consideration" in the proper sense of that term. Fifthly, the Reporter had given proper, adequate and intelligible reasons for his decision that the release of land from the post 2001 allocation was not justified. As a subsidiary point, Mr Tyre submitted that even if the Reporter ought to have referred to the earlier decisions, his decision should still not be quashed. The Appellants had sustained no prejudice as the other decisions were based on radically different evidence.

Mr Tyre then referred to the decision of Lord Clyde in City of Edinburgh Council v Secretary of State op.cit at 44B where he mentioned "the well established distinction in principle between those matters which are properly within the jurisdiction of the decision maker and those matters in which a court can properly intervene.". The court does not concern itself with planning judgement. Policy is a matter of judgement. Construction, even the interaction of two policies, is a matter of judgement. Mr Tyre submitted that the Reporter was quite entitled to construe H.P.4 and H.P.6 as he did. The Appellants had failed to give meaning to the words "through the Development Plan" in the second column of H.P.6. H.P.6 was an instance of the Development Plan maintaining supply by releasing certain lands in certain areas. Maintaining supply was an ongoing process. The structure plan could be reviewed from time to time, a process envisaged by H.P.6. Thus the allowances provided for in H.P.6 were provisional and could be reviewed before 2001. This ongoing process is recognised in the text of the Plan (p49 Paragraph 5.35 of No 6/1 of Process). The phrase "at all times" in H.P.4 must be looked at realistically, not week by week but within the ongoing review of the Structure Plan. It is clear from Paragraph 21 of the Reporter's decision that that review is under way.

Mr Tyre submitted that that was what was meant by maintaining supply "through the Plan", not just by reacting to applications by developers. In these circumstances, the interpretation of the policies adopted by the Reporter was not only reasonable, it was correct.

Mr Tyre then turned to H.P.9. He suggested that that Policy provided a mechanism to deal with any gap in time until the Plan was updated, so that matters did not stagnate. The Appellants sought to draw a parallel with some priority of H.P.4 over H.P.6 and the same priority of H.P.9 c) and H.P.9 a). In paragraph 74 of his decision the Reporter dealt with this argument and found it to "have no sound basis" since H.P.6 will change with the passage of time. Mr Tyre submitted that it cannot be said that there was only one reasonable construction of H.P.9 which was not that of the Reporter. The Reporter was therefore entitled to reach his decision which was not unreasonable. Mr Tyre further submitted that that was an end of the matter whether he referred to the decisions of the other Reporters or not. If the decision was one he was entitled to reach then there is no ground for quashing.

Paragraph 9 of the Appeal avers "In paragraph 70 of the decision letter, the Reporter found that the requirement in H.P.4 for a minimum five year supply to be maintained did not take priority over H.P.6. In doing so the Reporter reached a conclusion on this issue which was directly contradictory to that reached by (the other Reporters)". Mr Tyre however, suggested that the other Reporters made no such finding. They did not accept the priority argument and did not disagree with the present Reporter on that point. They held merely that in the particular circumstances of their appeals a departure from the figures in H.P.6 was warranted. They did not mention H.P.9 at all. Mr Tyre submitted that the Appellants argument on this point had no substance.

Mr Tyre then referred to the argument that by failing to take proper account of the other two decisions, the Reporter had ignored a relevant material consideration. The Appellant's point came to be that the reasoning on interpretation of policy by two other Reporters in appeals relating to developments elsewhere in the H.M.A. was a "material consideration". Mr Tyre submitted that this was a novel proposition. The phrase had been considered in a number of cases. In Tesco Stores v Environment Secretary 1995 IWLR 759, Lord Keith at 764 G -H said

"Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in the course of his judgement in this case said that 'material' meant 'relevant' and in my opinion he was correct in this. It is for the courts, if the matter is brought before them, to decide what is a relevant consideration. If the decision maker wrongly takes the view that some consideration is not relevant, and therefore has no regard to it, his decision cannot stand and he must be required to think again. But it is entirely for the decision maker to attribute to the relevant considerations such weight as he thinks fit and the courts will not interfere unless he has acted unreasonably in the Wednesbury sense".

In Stringer v Minister of Housing 1970 IWLR 1281 Cooke J at 1294 said

"It must be conceded at once that the material considerations to which the Minister is entitled and bound to have regard in deciding the appeal must be considerations of a planning nature....... In principle, it seems to me that any consideration which relates to the use and development of land is capable of being a planning consideration".

Reference was also made to the exposition on this subject in Young Rowan Robinson - Scottish Planning Law and Procedure at pp212-214 in the course of which the authors said

"First of all they must be planning considerations, that is they must have consequences for the use and development of land. Secondly, they must be material in the circumstances of the case, that is they must be prompted by the application".

Mr Tyre submitted that this double test was not satisfied with regard to the acceptance of arguments in other cases which was not relevant to the present appeal. Mr Tyre did not say that a previous decision could never be material, such as where it related to the same site (eg. Rockhold Ltd v Secretary of State op cit). This was so that there should be consistency in the appeal process. (North Wiltshire DC v Secretary of State 1992 J.P.L. 955). Mr Tyre submitted that the function of the Reporter was to decide the appeal before him on its merits, having regard to the Development Plan and other material considerations and not whether it is on all fours with some previous decisions. That is the statutory requirement on him.

As far as the Reporter's failure to give reasons for not taking the other decisions into account, an invitation for him to do so was recorded in paragraph 51 of the decision letter. That invitation was declined by the Reporter in paragraphs 71 and 72. In particular, the Reporter gave his reasons for so doing, in paragraph 72 in these terms:-

Given the emphasis placed in structure plan 1995 on the balance of housing shortfall being met from brownfield development within Aberdeen City, the fact that no limit is placed on contributions from this source, the fact that structure plan 1995 was approved as recently as July 1997, and the imminence of the replacement city-wide local plan. I am not persuaded that the small deficit in the minimum 5 year effective housing land supply is so critical at this point in time to justify the release of additional greenfield land to accommodate 124 houses at Cove.

Mr Tyre submitted that those observations fulfilled his duty to give adequate reasons. The informed reader was left in no doubt as to the reason why the Reporter did not regard release of the post - 2001 land as justified.

In any event, Mr Tyre submitted that no prejudice had been sustained by any absence of reference to the other decisions. There were material distinctions on the facts, especially in relation to the amount of the housing shortfall. The reason for the present refusal was a small shortfall; in the other two cases there was a large shortfall. The question of prejudice was relevant to the discretion to quash (S239 (5) (b) of the Act).

Mr Ferguson for Aberdeen City Council adopted the submissions of Mr Tyre and in addition referred me to the decision in Bolton MDC v Secretary for Environment 1995 3PLR 37 where the House of Lords made certain observations on the duty of a Reporter to give reasons. In particular, Lord Lloyd criticised the observations of Glidewell L.J. on which Mr Martin relied. Accordingly to Lord Lloyd, the Reporter "has to have regard to every material consideration; but he need not mention them all". (p.42DE). Mr Ferguson submitted that the question was whether the shortfall justified diversion from the Development Plan. The Reporter did address that question and did give adequate reasons.

This Appeal is an application to the Court of Session in terms of Section 239 of the Act in respect that the decision of the Reporter was not within the powers of the Act or that some of the relevant requirements have not been complied with in relation to that decision. The scope of such appeals is defined by Lord President Emslie in Wordie Property Company Ltd v Secretary of State op. cit. as follows:

"A decision of the Secretary of State acting within his statutory remit is ultra vires if it is based upon a material error of law going to the root of the question for determination. It will be ultra vires too if the Secretary of State has taken into account irrelevant considerations or has failed to take account of relevant and material considerations which ought to have been taken into account. Similarly, it will fall to be quashed on that ground if, where it is one for which a factual basis is required, there is no proper basis in fact to support it. It will also fall to be quashed if it..... is so unreasonable that no reasonable Secretary of State could have reached it".

Within that legal framework I turn to deal with Mr Martin's four submissions. The first was that "on a proper analysis" the Reporter had misconstrued the relevant housing policies. In essence his argument was that the primary policy was H.P.4, namely the maintenance of an effective 5 year housing supply. H.P. 6 allocated to various areas a certain allocation to meet that requirement. At the time of the decision there was a shortfall in supply which could not be met by the allocation in City South. Therefore further releases should be made in that area to meet the shortfall and maintain the overriding policy of H.P.4. That was what was envisaged by H.P.9. Mr Martin submitted that that was the only reasonable construction and that the Reporter acted unreasonably in coming to a different interpretation.

I do not agree with that strict approach. In my view the construction of the policies adopted by the Reporter was one which, in the circumstances, he was entitled to make. The important phrase used in the policies was that land would only be released "through the Development Plan". That meant, according to the Reporter, that while it was policy to maintain an effective five year supply (H.P.4) that objective would be achieved by releasing certain lands from certain areas in the first instance. An assessment had been made in the Structure Plan as to how best to distribute such releases (H.P.6). It was recognised that that assessment might not meet the original objective and therefore provision was made for review of the Plan in this regard. Thus the allowances provided for in H.P.6 could be reviewed before 2001. In this regard, I accept that the submission made by Mr Tyre as to the view to be taken of the phrase "at all times" is one that is consistent with the Reporter's construction, namely that it must be looked at realistically, not week by week but within the ongoing review of the Structure Plan. I also accept, taking this view of the policies, that H.P.9 could be said to provide a mechanism to deal with any gap in time until the Plan was updated, in recognition of the fact that such gaps might in the nature of things occur. That, indeed, was the approach taken by the Reporter (Paragraph 74) and is a conclusion on the meaning of a planning policy which, in my opinion is a matter for the decision maker. I cannot say that the Reporter has attributed to the policies a meaning which they could not bear. In these circumstances, therefore, I do not hold that the Reporter erred in his construction of the policy and I reject Mr Martin's first submission.

Mr Martin's second submission was to the effect that on the face of the decision letter the Reporter failed to have regard to two relevant material considerations put before him - namely the two decision letters dealing with the same policies. In my opinion the Reporter did not so fail. He spent a considerable part of his discussion in rehearsing and evaluating the submissions made by the Appellants including the views of the Reporters in the other two appeals.(eg Paragraphs 51, 53 & 59). At Paragraph 53 he stated that line taken in the previous appeals as being "Whether further land in the Aberdeen HMA should be released for housing to maintain a minimum effective five year supply of land and, if so, whether the appeal site would be suitable for the purpose". In his conclusions at Paragraph 63 he accepted that as the determining issue. Throughout his conclusions he repeatedly stated that he based his decisions on "the evidence the submissions and the productions". To the informed reader, in my opinion, that must be taken to mean that he did have regard to what was put to him as the views of the Reporters in the other two decisions. In any event, I agree with the proposition advanced by Mr Tyre that the function of the Reporter was to decide the appeal before him on its merits, having regard to the Development Plan and other material considerations and not whether it is on all fours with some previous decisions. I am satisfied that reading the decision letter as a whole that is what he did. I therefore reject Mr Martin's second submission. I also reject his third submission - that the Reporter acted unreasonably in the construction of the policies - for the reasons that I have already given. In my opinion, he properly took into account all relevant matters and was uninfluenced by irrelevant material.

As far as the Reporter's failure to give reasons for allegedly rejecting the decisions of the other two Reporters is concerned, it is true to say that he did not do so in express terms. Nevertheless, on a proper reading of the decision letter as a whole, it is my opinion that sufficient reasons can be found by the informed reader. At Paragraph 5, the Reporter was invited to accept the line taken in the other two decisions. He declined that invitation at Paragraphs 71 and 72. In Paragraph 72 he gave his reasons for so doing in these terms:-

"Given the emphasis placed in Structure Plan 1995 on the balance of housing shortfall being met by brownfield development within Aberdeen City, the fact that no limit is placed on contributions from this source, the fact that structure plan 1995 was approved as recently as July 1997 and the imminence of the replacement city-wide local plan I am not persuaded that the small deficit in the minimum five year effective housing land supply is so critical at this point in time to justify the release of additional greenfield land to accommodate 124 houses at Cove".

In my opinion, that account of the Reporter's reasoning is sufficient to enable the parties and the court to understand it. Greater elaboration was not in my view necessary. (City of Edinburgh Council v Secretary of State op. cit.)

In the whole matter therefore, I refuse the appeal.