Lord President (Clyde).—The powers under which it is possible for the Court to deal with petitions such as this are peculiar and delicate. I think it necessary to say that the principle of approximation properly applies only to cases in which the object of a charitable foundation can—owing to changed circumstances—no longer be carried into practical effect in the particular form or by the particular means prescribed by the founder. In such cases the Court has power to vary the means, and to substitute for a particular form of charity another form approximating as closely as may be to the old one. But the principle does not apply to cases in which—there being neither failure of object nor obsolescence of method—the changing circumstances of society have made the duties of the trustees and managers of the foundation much more arduous to perform and discouraging in their results. If we opened the door to applications in which the ground for appealing to our jurisdiction was only that, owing to a change of circumstances, the achievement of the purpose of the charity has come to make heavy demands on the services and persistence of the trustees and managers, then I am afraid we should be very likely to exceed the powers which we possess. The present case is near the border line. The training of young women for domestic service by means of instruction in a home is an object by no means out of date. On the other hand the financial circumstances in which this institution has found itself since the war do present something like an impossibility of continuance. Without saying more as to the circumstances of the case, I think the application is one that we may pass.
Lord Skerrington.—While I doubt whether this petition does not involve an illegitimate extension of the doctrine of cy près, it is, in my judgment, impossible to refuse it without reconsidering at the same time certain decisions pronounced by the Court within recent years on applications of a very similar character. The present, however, does not appear to me to be a suitable occasion for taking that course. As regards the merits, I confess that at first I felt some difficulty as to the propriety of transferring a Home, which, judging from its written constitution, I assumed to have been entirely undenominational, to a body of managers whose duty it will be to subject the inmates of the Home to religious influences of a kind which will be unacceptable to many girls who might otherwise have taken advantage of this charity. It was stated, however, by counsel for the petitioners that their Home has hitherto been managed upon substantially similar lines, and as this was presumably done with the knowledge and approval of the subscribers, this objection disappears. As regards the proposal to hand over a portion of the petitioners' assets to the National Vigilance Association of Scotland, I could not have given my assent to it but for the statement by the petitioners' counsel to the effect that girls taking advantage of the temporary home provided by the Association will not be subjected to instruction of which many of the subscribers would, in my opinion, have disapproved.
Lord Sands.—I agree with your Lordship in the chair. I think the case, as your Lordship has pointed out, is a narrow one. The Court cannot arrogate to itself the authority of a commission with a discretionary power of remodelling a charity. This application reaches the border line; but does not, in my view, go beyond it.
