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[Sheriff Court at Glasgow.
The Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 enacts, section 1 (3)—“If any question arises in any proceedings under this Act as to the liability to pay compensation under this Act … the question, if not settled by agreement, shall … be settled by arbitration. …”
The C.A.S., 1913, enacts, L, xiii, 2—“An application for the settlement of any claim for compensation under the Act shall not be made unless and until some question has arisen between the parties and such question has not been settled by agreement. The application shall state concisely the question which has arisen.”
A workman wrote to. his employers on 4th November 1915, alleging that he had been incapacitated by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and requesting a reply within the next three days as to whether they admitted liability. The employers replied on 5th November, requesting the workman to submit himself to a medical examination, and stating that they would then be in a
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position to deal with his claim. The workman was examined on 9th November. Without hearing further from his employers, he instituted arbitration proceedings, in which the first deliverance was granted on 22nd November. Held that no question had arisen, and that the arbitration was incompetent.
In an arbitration under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. VII, cap. 58), in the Sheriff Court at Glasgow, between Andrew Crone, fireman, Glasgow, appellant, and Donaldson Line, Limited, respondents, the Sheriff-Substitute ( David J. Mackenzie) dismissed the case as incompetent and stated a Case for appeal.
The Case stated—“In the petition the appellant averred that he was a marine fireman in the employment of the respondents on board the s. s. Cabotia; that on 30th September 1915 he met with an accident at sea on board said ship, arising out of and in the course of his said employment; that said ship arrived in Glasgow on 2nd November 1915, when he was discharged; that he has been incapacitated as the result of said accident; that his wages were at the rate of £6, 10s. per month, together with board valued at 11s. 8d. weekly; and that he had been paid wages by the respondents up till 2nd November 1915.
The last article of the condescendence in said petition is as follows:—‘7. The defenders, although called upon to do so, refuse or delay to pay compensation to the pursuer, and this action has been rendered necessary.’
The first deliverance on said petition is dated 22nd November 1915.
The case called in Court on 30th November 1915, when the respondents, while admitting liability to pay compensation to the appellant under said Act, pleaded in defence that the proceedings were premature. They lodged in process the following letters, which were admitted, at the Bar:—
1. Letter from appellant's agent to respondents, dated 4th November 1915, which is as follows:—
‘Dear Sir,—I have been consulted by Andrew Crone, fireman, 44 Richard Street, Anderston, Glasgow, with regard to an accident which occurred to him, as already reported, while in your employment on board the s.s. “Cabotia” on 15th September last, whereby he sustained injuries to his right foot through same being scalded by steam. He is incapacitated for work, and it is not known when he may recover. For the injuries sustained he holds you liable, and has instructed me to make a claim against you (1) under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, and (2) at common law. I shall be glad to hear within the next three days whether you admit liability.—Yours faithfully, John M. Crosthwaite.’
2. Copy letter by the Shipping Federation, Limited, on behalf of the respondents, to the appellant's agent, dated 6th November 1915, which is as follows:—
“‘ A. Crone ex s.s. “ Cabotia.”
‘Dear Sir,—Your letter of the 3rd inst., addressed to the owners of this vessel, has been handed to me. You might be good enough to ask your client to call at our office in James Watt Street, when he will be medically examined, and will then be in a position to deal with his claim.—Yours faithfully, Walter Patterson, Secretary.’
3. Letter by the appellant's agent to said Shipping Federation, Limited, dated 8th November 1915, which is as follows:—
“‘ A. Crone— s.s. “Cabotia.”
Dear Sir,—I have yours of 6th inst., and will ask my client to call as desired.—Yours faithfully, John M. Crosthwaite.’
I thereupon heard parties, and in the course of the debate it was admitted at the Bar that the appellant had presented himself for medical examination on 9th November 1915; that the appellant received or made no further communication from or to the respondents, and thereupon instituted these proceedings, in which the first deliverance was granted on 22nd November 1915.
On 16th December 1915 I issued an award finding that in respect that it had not been shown that any question had arisen as to the respondents' liability to pay compensation to the appellant, the petition was incompetent. I therefore dismissed the same, and found no expenses due to or by either party.”
The questions of law for the opinion of the Court were—“1. Whether the arbitrator was, in the circumstances above set forth, entitled to find that the petition was incompetent, and to dismiss the same? 2. Whether the arbitrator, in the circumstances above set forth, was entitled to find no expenses due to or by either party?”
The Sheriff-Substitute appended the following note to his award:—
Note.—“In this case the pursuer is said to have been premature in raising his action, as no question had arisen between the parties, which is a necessary preliminary to arbitration. A claim was made on 4th November last in respect of an accident which is said to have happened at sea on 30th September, the ship having reached Glasgow on 2nd November. I understand it to be admitted that there was no denial of liability by the defenders, but that the pursuer was asked to present himself for medical examination. This he did on 9th November, and nothing further was said or done by the defenders. On the 22nd November this action was raised.
In view of the case of Kennedy v. The Caledon Shipbuilding Company, (1906) 8 F. 960, 43 S. L. R. 687, and Lord Pearson's opinion therein, which is often quoted, and is to the effect that arbitration is to be ‘the last resort of persons who find themselves unable to agree,’ I cannot find that there was here a question in dispute. There may have been some delay, and I think, on the mere statement of dates, that there was some delay in not at once answering the claim either one way or another from the 9th to the 22nd November. But there was no dispute as to liability or any other matter.
I therefore think the petition must be dismissed, but in the whole circumstances I do not award expenses to either party.
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(See the case of M'Donald v. Rowan & Company, 23rd November 1914, in this Court.)” Argued for the appellant—Liability to pay compensation was never admitted, and the Court was therefore bound to infer the existence of a dispute—Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. VII, cap. 58), section 1 (3). Caledon Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Limited v. Kennedy, 1906, 8 F. 960, 43 S.L.R. 687, was not in point, for in it the application for arbitration was presented before the compensation, if the employers were liable for it, became due. Further, it followed Field v. Longden & Sons, [1902] 1 KB 47, which did not apply, as in it the full rate of compensation under the Act was being paid when the application was brought.
Counsel for the respondents were not called upon.
The situation is that the accident occurred, and a letter was written on behalf of the workman intimating the claim, and saying—“I shall be glad to hear within the next three days whether you admit liability.” Had that remained the only letter, if three days had elapsed and no notice been taken of it, I do not say what the workman's rights would have been. But that is not the situation here. Notice is taken of the matter, and the parties so far come together that a letter is written on behalf of the employers requesting that the workman should call for the purpose of the statutory medical examination. Now I think that that created a new situation, different from that which stood upon the letter of 4th November. I think it indicated that the employers were not taking a hostile attitude at once, but were saying, “We wish time and opportunity to see what has happened to the man,” and there was nothing whatever in it to show that they were going to dispute the workman's rights either on the merits or as to the amount.
It is quite true that they did allow more than was reasonable time to elapse without giving any further reply, but I cannot see that that necessarily involves that they are to dispute anything, and the reasonable course would have been for the agent for the workman again to write to them—“You have had your medical examination, I shall be obliged by your giving me a reply to my letter, and if I do not hear within next three days I shall take proceedings.”
Now that would have brought the matter to a head, and there would have been something to go to arbitration about. The agent for the workman has chosen, instead of taking that reasonable and inexpensive course, to rush his client into Court in proceedings which must necessarily, against the intention of the Legislature as evinced in the statute, cost him a good deal more than the obtaining an award of compensation itself would have done. I think that was unreasonable, and that there is not as yet, in the sense of the statute and of the Act of Sederunt, any question between the parties which can go to arbitration.
In this case, in my opinion, there could only be said to be a question if we could come to the conclusion that the workman was justified in drawing the inference from the letters and actings of those who were charged with the duty of settling this claim, that it was to be disputed. Now I find no express denial of liability, and nothing which justified the workman in implying that liability was denied. It may be that there was a delay after the medical examination in coming to terms in regard to the amount of compensation to be paid. But in my opinion it was necessary for his adviser to make sure that there was a question or dispute between the parties before he brought the matter into Court by way of a petition. And I think that the arbitrator—who may be presumed to know what is best for the conduct of business in his Court—has followed a salutary rule. I do not anticipate that that rule will work any injustice to workmen. If I thought that it would, I should be very slow to give any countenance to it, but I think it will secure that cases are not brought into Court until it is made quite clear that there are questions which, in the language of the Act of Sederunt, can be concisely stated in the application. I find no reason for supposing that any such statement was made or could have been in the present application.
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I should have been disposed to construe the correspondence as showing that the defenders were playing with the pursuer, and that they did dispute liability; but as your Lordships take a different view as to the meaning and effect of these particular letters it would serve no good purpose for me to dissent.
The
The Court answered both questions of law in the affirmative, and allowed the respondents the expenses of the appeal.
Counsel for the Appellant— Constable, K.C.— MacRobert. Agents— Gardiner & Macfie, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Respondents— Moncrieff, K.C.— Dykes. Agents— Boyd, Jameson, & Young, W.S.