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(Single Bills.)
As a general rule, when a motion is made by the reclaimer or appellant for the refusal of a reclaiming note or an appeal which has already been sent to the roll, the respondent will be allowed, in the case of a reclaiming note two guineas, and in the case of an appeal three guineas, of expenses. But in certain exceptional cases a remit will be made to the Auditor to tax the respondent's expenses. Where an appeal or a reclaiming note has appeared in the roll, or in the ordinary course would soon appear in the rolls, then the respondent may, after communication with his opponent, proceed to print such documents as he thinks necessary for the presentation of his case to the Court, and if he does so then his expenses will be allowed if the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, think that his preparations were reasonable.”— Per the Lord President.
H. R. Marsden, Limited, pursuers, raised an action against Alexander Brunton &
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Sons, defenders, and on 18th June 1913 the Lord Ordinary ( Dewar) decerned against the defenders in terms of the conclusions of the summons. The defenders reclaimed, and on 9th July 1913 the case was sent to the roll. On Friday 12th June 1914 the case was put out in the roll for the week following. On the same day, 12th June, the reclaimers intimated to the respondents that they intended to abandon the reclaiming note, and, on 13th June, presented a note to the Lord President praying him “to move the Court to refuse the said reclaiming note, and to find the reclaimers liable in two pounds two shillings of modified expenses.”
On 17th June 1914, on counsel for the reclaimers moving the Court to grant the prayer of the note, counsel for the respondents moved for full expenses and for a remit to the Auditor stating that though no documents had already been printed, nor counsel instructed, yet certain preparations had been made by the respondents for the hearing, and in particular that copies had been made for the printers of certain documents which the respondents considered necessary for their case. It was not stated that any notice of these preparations had been given to the reclaimers.
The Court stated that they would consult the other Division on the matter, and subsequently requested a note of the cases on which the parties relied.
Authorities for the reclaimers.— Kirkwood v. Knox, June 4, 1868, 6 Macph. 898; Robertson v. Robertson's Executors, November 8, 1899, 2 F. 77, 37 S.L.R. 58; Davidson & Others v. Allen, March 14, 1878, 5 R. 763; Maclachlan v. Mackay, November 24, 1899, 2 F. 163, 37 S.L.R. 118; Gilchrist & Company v. Smith, January 9, 1901, 3 F. 329, 38 S.L.R. 238; Wyllie v. Richard, November 28, 1837, 16 S. III; Gordon v. Kellie, November 29, 1848, 11 D. 166; Smith Sligo v. Knox, November 20, 1880, 8 R. 41, 18 S.L.R. 39.
Authorities for the respondents— Little Ormes Head Limestone Company, Limited v. Hendry & Company, November 25, 1897, 25 R. 124, 35 S.L.R. 124; Johnston v. Rae, June 24, 1876, 3 R. 879; M'Guire v. Union Cold Storage Company, Limited, 1909 S.C. 384, 46 S.L.R. 323; Gilchrist & Company v. Smith ( cit. sup.); Smith Sligo v. Knox ( cit. sup.); Henderson v. Menzies, June 1, 1901, 3 F. 858, 38 S.L.R. 639.
It is of course impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule with regard to the time within which such preparation may be considered justified and the expenses allowable. Each case must depend upon its own special circumstances.
We think that it ought to be a general rule, but not an invariable rule, that communication with the other side on the question of printing is indispensable, if there is to be a remit of the respondent's expenses to the Auditor.
The present case we think falls under the general rule, and the respondents should have two guineas of expenses, because they had not communicated with the other side before making such preparations as they say they had made in anticipation of the the hearing.
When one considers the matter in principle and practice, there is no doubt in principle that documents put in evidence are part of the proof, and that strictly the reclaimer would be bound to print the documents just as much as the proof. But there is equally little doubt that the reclaimer is by practice allowed to select the documents which he considers necessary for his own case; still he cannot but know that the documents selected by him may require to be supplemented to include his opponent's case, and common sense, if not professional courtesy, requires that the reclaimer should submit to the respondent what he proposes to print in order that it may be supplemented if necessary.
Now that appears to me to be a duty the performance or non-performance of which should affect the question of expenses. But then I do not think that the respondent is entitled to incur expenses without communicating with the appellant as to what he wishes, and with a proper intimation that if he is not met he is to protect himself by printing what he requires. I think there ought to be reasonable communication between the parties, and that only on proof of such communication and intimation as I have referred to can a respondent claim expenses in such circumstances as we have here.
Counsel for the Pursuers and Respondents— Macquisten. Agents— Clark&Macdonald, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Defenders and Reclaimers— Paton. Agents— Wallace & Pennell, S.S.C.