Page: 469↓
[Sheriff Court at Glasgow.
Held that 306 days was not an impossible period of gestation.
On 19th July 1911 Isabella Williamson, Albert Terrace, Ayr, pursuer, brought an action of affiliation and aliment against James M'Clelland, draper's assistant, Morrin Street, Glasgow, defender, in which, after a proof, the Sheriff-Substitute ( Boyd) on 8th December 1911 granted decree as craved.
The defender appealed to the Sheriff ( Millar), who on 29th February 1912 recalled his Substitute's interlocutor and assoilzied the defender on the ground that on the evidence it was more likely the pursuer had had connection with some other man subsequent to that with the defender, than that the period of gestation had been so prolonged as it must otherwise have been, viz., 306 days, and consequently that the pursuer had failed to prove her case.
The pursuer appealed.
Argued for appellant— Esto that the period of gestation was beyond the normal one, it was still within the maximum—Taylor's Medical Evidence (6th ed.), vol. ii, at pp. 43, 56–59, 60, and 93. That being so, and connection being admitted, the pursuer had proved her case— Cook v. Rattray, December 4, 1880, 8 R. 217, 18 S.L.R. 128; Whyte v. Whyte, March 17, 1884, 11 R. 710, 21 S.L.R. 470. The cases of Gibson v. M'Fagan, March 20, 1874, 1 R. 853, and Boyd v. Kerr, June 17, 1843, 5 D. 1213, were distinguishable, for there the fact of connection was disputed.
Argued for respondent—The normal period of gestation was 280 days, and where, as here, the period was four weeks beyond the normal the defender could not be the father of the pursuer's child. Esto that there was always a limit of error, the maximum of such limit of error was twenty-five days. Here the limit of error had been exceeded by three days. That being so, the presumption against the defender had been displaced— Innes v. Innes, February 20, 1837, 2 Sh. & M'L. 417.
At advising—
There is only one witness examined in the case upon this matter—Dr M'Kenna—and I think the result of his evidence fairly comes to this, that he is unable to say that the period is so long as to make the paternity of the defender an impossibility. On a matter like this I think it would be unfortunate if we were to consider ourselves bound by the evidence of one witness in a case in which it was quite natural that there should not be a large amount of expert testimony led. I have therefore not felt myself to be restricted to the evidence of Dr M'Kenna, but have thought myself entitled to consider the matter in the light of what has been said by learned judges in other cases, and of what one knows to be the opinion of experts as disclosed in medical books.
It is absolutely clear that neither in law nor in medical science is it possible to fix an actual number of days as the extreme period of gestation. In certain systems of law the matter has been dealt with by statute, and a limit has been arbitrarily fixed, but in our system there is no such limit. That does not lead to the conclusion that a period might not be submitted to the consideration of the Court of such length that the Court would refuse to hold that the parentage had been proved. The Court is left free to deal with each case as it occurs. In the present case, although the period is unusually long, there is nothing that has led me to think that it would be beyond the province of the Court to hold that it is not impossibly long, Then we have the undoubted fact of connection, the birth of the child, and the absence of suggestion of any other man as the father. The result seems to me to be inevitable.
I am therefore of opinion that your Lordships should allow the appeal, recal the interlocutor of the Sheriff, and restore the interlocutor of the Sheriff-Substitute.
The Court recalled the Sheriff's interlocutor and affirmed that of the Sheriff-Substitute.
Counsel for Pursuer (Appellant)— Fenton. Agent— Robert Gibb, W.S.
Counsel for Defender (Respondent)— J. A. T. Robertson. Agents— Henderson & Mackenzie, S.S.C.