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Lord Skerrington.
Held that a person who held an assignation of the interest of a beneficiary in a trust estate in security of advances was entitled to see the trust accounts.
Observed that where the exercise of this right of inspection of the trust accounts involved unusual or excessive expense, it was proper that the assignee should pay a reasonable fee to the law agents of the trustees.
Mrs Bella Salamon, widow, residing at Oxford Gardens, Notting Hill, London, pursuer, brought an action against James Logan Strang and others, trustees acting under the trust-disposition and settlement of the deceased Hugh Morrison, 22 Bute
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Gardens, Hillhead, Glasgow, defenders, in which she sought to have the defenders ordained to produce the accounts of the trust estate under their charge in order that “the true amount thereof in which the pursuer has presumptive or expectant shares may be ascertained.” It appeared from the averments in the case that the pursuer had advanced certain sums to two of the beneficiaries under Hugh Morrison's trust disposition and settlement, and held in security therefor bonds and assignations in security over their whole interests in the trust estate, present and future, vested and contingent, and whether of income or of capital.
The arguments of parties sufficiently appear from the opinion of the Lord Ordinary ( infra). The following additional authorities were referred to at the discussion:— Springett v. Dashwood, 1860, 2 Giff. 521; Ottley v. Gilby, 1845, 8 Beav 602; Kemp v. Burn, 1863, 4 Giff. 348; Cowin v. Gravett, 1886, 33 Ch. Div. 179; Selkirk v. Service, October 22, 1880, 8 R. 29, 18 S.L.R. 9.
At advising—
The defenders' counsel argued that a person who holds an assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust estate is in an entirely different position from that occupied by his cedent so far as regards the right to see the trust accounts. The maxim assignatus utitur jure auctoris had no application unless the cedent transferred his whole right out and out to a single assignee whom he thus substituted for himself as the beneficiary. He argued that a trust beneficiary and an assignee of a part only of his share could not each simultaneously possess and exercise the same right of inspection. A right cannot be assigned and at the same timeretained. In the present case the assignation was on its face a security, and if the pursuer's contention was sound it followed that the assignation doubled the number of persons who had a right to see the accounts in respect of one particular share. The beneficiary might equally well execute a score or indeed any number of partial assignations either ex facie absolute or in security, and so multiply indefinitely the expense of managing the trust and the duties of the trustees. These arguments overlook the fact that a share, whether vested or unvested, in the capital of a trust estate is in law assignable either in whole or in part. I do not need to consider whether in Scotland a testator can effectually prohibit alienation by inserting a clause of defeasance and gift over, because nothing of that kind was attempted in the present case. A beneficiary's right to inspect the trust accounts does not in my view arise from any fiction or presumption as to what the truster intended. It arises as a natural incident to the particular kind of property which he has chosen to create. Again, I do not need to consider whether a testator could effectually by means of apt language or of a clause of forfeiture deprive a beneficiary of a right to see the trust accounts, not because in the special circumstances secrecy was desirable as it often is in the carrying on of a commercial business, but merely in order to secure that his trustees should be absolutely free from criticism and control. There is nothing in the trust deed or in the circumstances to exclude the right of inspection which a beneficiary ordinarily enjoys. The defenders' counsel expressly conceded that if the action had been at the instance of the pursuer's cedent there would have been no good defence to it. But the right to examine the accounts is just as valuable and indeed necessary to a partial assignee as it is to an original beneficiary, and if one denies it to the former one gratuitously deprives this species of property of one of its natural incidents, with the result that it becomes less marketable and consequently less valuable to the beneficiary. Does any valid reason exist why a partial assignee should not be entitled to take the best means of satisfying himself that the trust is being properly managed, and of ascertaining the value and nature of the trust estate? I am aware of none. If a number of such assignations are granted some extra trouble may fall upon the trustees, but trustees must not assume when they accept office that they will have to deal only with the beneficiaries named or pointed out in the will. They are, however, entitled to employ and pay solicitors for taking charge of the trust accounts and exhibiting them when necessary. A beneficiary cannot involve the trust—that is his fellow beneficiaries—in unusual and excessive expenses merely because he chooses to dispose of his contingent or deferred share in a particular manner. The hypothetical score of partial assignees must either appoint a single representative to inspect the accounts on their behalf or they must indemnify the trust by paying for the
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The defenders' counsel founded upon the decision in the case of Jacks' Trustee v. Jacks' Trustees ( 1910 S.C. 34, 47 S.L.R. 32), and particularly upon certain passages in the opinion of the Lord President. These observations had reference to the question before the Court, viz., the true construction of certain sections of the Bankruptcy Act, and had no reference to the present question, which his Lordship had no occasion to consider. Counsel also cited Brower's Executor v. Ramsay's Trustees (July 12, 1912, 49 S.L.R. 962), in which the pursuer had obtained a decree adjudging a beneficiary's right to the fee of a trust estate subject to a liferent. This case does not help the present defenders, as the adjudging creditor was allowed by the Lord Ordinary (Guthrie) to see the accounts and to lodge objections. In the Inner House the Court negatived any duty on the part of the trustees to fortify the pursuer's position as legal assignee by doing anything which they would not have done in the ordinary course of administration. This decision has no bearing on the present question, as the pursuer is not attempting to interfere with the management of the trust. Nor has the following dictum of Lord Lindley (L.J.) in Low v. Bouverie, 1891, 3 Ch. 99-100, any application—“But it is no part of the duty of a trustee to tell his cestui que trust what incumbrances the latter has created, nor which of his incumbrancers have given notice of their respective charges. It is no part of the duty of a trustee to assist his cestui que trust in selling or mortgaging his beneficial interest and in squandering or anticipating his fortune, and it is clear that a person who proposes to buy or lend money on it has no greater rights than the cestui que trust himself. There is no trust or other relation between a trustee and a stranger about to deal with a cestui que trust, and although probably such a person in making inquiries may be regarded as authorised by the cestui que trust to make them, this view of the stranger's position will not give him-a right to information which the cestui que trust himself is not entitled to demand. The trustee therefore is in my opinion under no obligation to answer such an inquiry. He can refer the person making it to the cestui que trust himself.” In the present case a trust does exist as between the pursuer and the defenders, and she asks for no information which a beneficiary could not legally demand. I shall find that the pursuer is entitled to see the trust accounts. If the defenders think that the matter should not be further litigated I have no doubt that they will give effect to this finding. In the meanwhile I shall pronounce no order upon them. It is of course premature and out of the question to fix the amount of the trust estate as concluded for, but the defenders' counsel did not ask me to dismiss the action on that ground. Though I decide against the defenders, I think that, acting in the interest of the beneficiaries other than the pursuer's cedent, they were entitled to obtain a judgment, as there is very little authority in regard to the rights of assignees in the position of the pursuer.
The Lord Ordinary found that the pursuer was entitled to see the accounts, and continued the cause.
Counsel for the Pursuer— Macmillan, K.C.— Macquisten. Agents— Cowan & Stewart, W.S.
Counsel for the Defenders— Sandeman, K.C.— Hon. W. Watson. Agents— Dove, Lockhart, & Smart, S.S.C.