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A testator directed his trustees to invest a certain sum for behoof of his children in alimentary liferent, to divide the residue among his children on a certain event, and to pay themselves a certain sum annually.
Held that, on arrival of the period for division of the residue, the trustees were not entitled to retain part thereof to provide for the annual payment to themselves, but must charge the same against the income of the alimentary fund.
A Special Case was presented for the opinion and judgment of the Court by John Macdonald Kirkwood and others, the four children of the late James Kirkwood, printer in Edinburgh ( first parties), and the Rev. Thomas Nicol, D.D., and others, the trustees acting under James Kirkwood's trust-disposition and settlement ( second parties).
The late James Kirkwood, who died on 25th March 1901, by his trust-disposition and settlement conveyed his whole estate to certain persons named and such others as might be assumed, “and the acceptors and acceptor, survivors and survivor of them, and the heir of the last survivor,” as trustees, and after directing payment of mournings for his children and household debts, deathbed and funeral expenses, and the expenses of executing the trust and certain legacies, provided as follows—“ In the sixth place, with the view of securing to my children an alimentary provision, I direct my trustees on my decease to set aside out of the first available funds of my estate the sum of Sixteen thousand pounds sterling, to be held by them in trust for my children equally,” for, inter alia, payment to the children and the survivors or survivor equally among them of the free annual income of the said sum in liferent alimentary: … “ And in the seventh place, I direct my trustees to hold and retain the whole residue and remainder of my means and estate for behoof of my children equally, share and share alike,… and, subject to the discretion hereinafter conferred on my trustees, I direct them to make payment to my sons of their shares at the first term of Whitsunday or Martinmas which shall happen after my death, and after they shall respectively attain twenty-five years of age; and in regard to the shares of my daughters, I direct my trustees at the first term of Whitsunday or Martinmas which shall happen after my death, and after my daughters respectively attain twenty-five years of age or be married with the approbation of my trustees, whichever of these events shall first happen, to pay or to settle on my daughters, exclusive of the jus mariti and right of administration of their husbands, their respective shares. …: And I hereby direct my trustees to pay to themselves annually the sum of Twenty-six pounds five shillings sterling, to be divided equally among them, but I declare that the acceptance by them of said sum shall not deprive them of the powers, privileges, and immunities of gratuitous trustees as conferred by statute.”
The Case stated—“5. The second parties, in terms of the testator's directions, set aside the alimentary trust fund of £16,000 provided for by the sixth purpose of the trust-disposition and settlement, and have paid the revenue thereof to the first parties regularly. They have also divided among the first parties the residue of the estate, but have retained the sum of £900 or thereby to meet the legacy of £26, 5s. per annum payable to the trustees. …
“6.… The first parties maintain that the said legacy forms a proper charge against the said alimentary fund of £16,000, upon the ground that the trust administration only now subsists for the purposes of this particular fund, and that the said sum of £900 retained out of the general residue to meet the said legacy falls to be divided among the first parties as residuary legatees of the testator.
7. In the event of the Court being of opinion that the said legacy of £26, 5s. cannot be charged against the alimentary fund, the second parties hereby express their willingness to discharge the said legacy. Upon this further ground the first parties also maintain that they are entitled to an immediate division among them of the said sum of £900.
8. The second parties maintain that the said legacy is a charge upon the general estate of the testator, and that the said alimentary fund of £16,000 is not liable to be charged with the said legacy or any part thereof. Further, the second parties have been advised that it is doubtful whether, in the event of a discharge by them of their annual legacy, they would be in safety to divide the said sum of £900 or thereby among the first parties as residuary legatees of the testator, as he directed the said legacy to be paid yearly to his trustees for the time being, whether original or assumed, and that, although they should discharge their said legacy, their discharge would not bind future trustees who may hereafter be assumed.”
The questions of law were—“(1) Are the second parties, in the circumstances set forth in the case, entitled to charge their annual legacy against the alimentary fund of £16,000? (2) In the event of the first question being answered in the affirmative, or, otherwise, in the event of the second parties discharging their annual legacy,
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are the second parties entitled to divide among the first parties the residue of £900 retained by them?”
Now the beneficiaries who are entitled to the residue maintain that this £900 ought not to be reserved, but ought to be paid to them as being part of the residue, the practical result of which will be that if the gift to the trustees is to continue to be paid, it must be paid out of the annual proceeds of the £16,000. The present trustees state their willingness to give it up altogether, and that would remove any difficulty as regards them personally, but then it is said that these trustees may gradually disappear, and that the heir of the last survivor is to be the trustee in the event of their all dying without assuming other trustees, and that he then accepting the trusteeship must assume certain other trustees. Therefore the present trustees point out that a renunciation by them might not bind their successors.
I am decidedly of opinion that the trustees are not entitled to retain this sum of £900 in their hands for the purpose stated. It is part of the residue, and in my opinion must be divided among the beneficiaries. The purpose of the trust being to pay liferents out of the proceeds of the £16,000, I think the income derived from this sum must suffer deduction of all the expenses which the trustees have to meet, including the payment to themselves, before distribution of the balance among the persons entitled to it.
I agree that the view presented by Lord Salvesen as to the meaning of the word “residue” is sound. Further, if one considers the clause providing for payment of the expenses of executing the trust, I am not at all clear that on a true construction of the settlement that was intended to include anything except the ordinary expenses of executing every trust in every case. I do not think that the subsequent purpose at the end of the will, by which the truster makes this unusual but extremely appropriate and proper provision
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The Court answered the first question in the affirmative, and the second question by declaring that the second parties were entitled to divide among the first parties the residue of £900.
Counsel for the First Parties— Ballingall. Agents— W. & W. Saunders, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Second Parties— Wilton. Agents— Cairns, M'Intosh, & Morton, W.S.