Page: 831↓
[Sheriff Court at Paisley.
A carter, employed as a brakesman, had as his duty to walk continuously at the rear of a lorry, ready to apply the brakes when directed to do so by the driver. He got upon the lorry, which he was expressly forbidden to do, and took a seat in front by the driver, with whom he began to talk on matters which had nothing to do with the work on hand. While he was in that position the driver called upon him to put on the brakes. In jumping off the lorry, with the intention of obeying the order, he fell and was injured.
Held that the facts justified a finding that the accident did not arise out of his employment in the sense of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906.
John Revie, carter, 15 Storie Street, Paisley, appellant claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. VII, cap. 58), from William Cumming, contractor, Paisley, respondent, in respect of injuries sustained by him while at work in the respondent's employment. The Sheriff-Substitute ( Lyell) having refused compensation, a case for appeal was stated.
The facts were as follows — “(1) The appellant is a carter, and on 31st October 1910 was in the employment of the respondent, who is a contractor in Paisley. (2) On the morning of the said 31st October 1910 the appellant was one of a squad of four men in charge of a lorry belonging to the respondent, to which were harnessed five horses, three abreast as wheelers, and two abreast as leaders. (3) The said lorry weighed about three tons, and on the morning in question was laden with a casting some ten or eleven tons in weight, which was being conveyed from the engineering works of Messrs A. F. Craig & Co., Paisley, along the road leading from Paisley to Glasgow. (4) Of the four carters accompanying the lorry and its load, one was seated on the front of the lorry and driving the wheelers, two were leading the leaders, and the fourth (the appellant) was engaged as brakesman. (5) There are two brakes on this lorry, one for each of the back wheels, which can be applied only by a man on the ground behind the lorry, and are manipulated by two turning screws, one for each of the brakes. (6) There may be periods, long or short, during which the application of the brake is not required; but it is the duty of the brakesman in such circumstances to walk continuously at the rear of the lorry, ready to apply the brakes—by means of which alone the pace of the lorry can be controlled—not only on the slightest incline, but also in the event of any emergency, such as the breaking of a trace, the fall of a horse, or any similar accidental occurrence. The appellant might use his own discretion as to the use of the brakes; but he was also bound to obey the instructions of the driver of the wheelers, who had authority to order him to apply and release the brakes as he should require. (7) It is a rule of the respondent's business that in such circumstances as those of the present case no carter accompanying the lorry is to ride on the lorry with the exception of the carter driving the wheelers. The appellant was well aware of this rule, and was familiar with the duties of his employment as brakesman, and in particular was well aware that he could not fulfil these duties while riding on the lorry. (8) On the morning in question, while the said lorry was proceeding with its load towards Glasgow, and at a point of the road near Bellahouston Park, the appellant jumped on to the lorry, and sat down at the front, on the near side, by the driver, with whom he entered into conversation about matters which had nothing to do with the work on hand. The driver made no objection to his riding on the lorry. (9) When the lorry had proceeded along the road for a quarter of a mile beyond Bellahouston Park, the driver found it necessary to turn into Copeland Road on his near side. (10) As he made to turn the corner the driver shouted to the appellant to put on the brakes, whereupon the appellant made to jump off the lorry with the intention of obeying these instructions, when in some way he slipped on the lorry and fell to the ground, and his left foot was caught by the front near wheel of the lorry and so severely crushed that it had subsequently to be amputated. (11) While on the lorry the appellant was unable to perform the duties of his employment as brakesman, and thus voluntarily, and for his own purposes, put himself in a
Page: 832↓
position in which he could not attend to his said duties, and from which he could not descend without risk of such an accident as actually occurred.” The Sheriff-Substitute further stated — “In these circumstances I found in law that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the appellant's employment, in the sense of the statute.”
The question of law was—“Whether on these facts the arbitrator was right in holding that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the appellant's employment in the sense of the statute?”
Argued for appellant—The accident arose out of the appellant's employment, for he was in the course of his employment and obeying instructions at the time. It was immaterial that immediately prior thereto he had been sitting on the cart. Reference was made to the following cases— Johnson v. Marshall, Sons, & Company, Limited, [19061 A.C. 409; Clover, Clayton, & Company, Limited v. Hughes, [1910] AC 242; Hendry v. United Collieries, Limited, [1910] S.C. 709, 47 S.L.R. 635; M'Lauchlan v. Anderson, February 1, 1911, 48 S.L.R. 349; Douglas v. United Mineral Company, Limited, 1900, vide Elliott's Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, p. 32.
Argued for respondent—The appellant's accident did not arise out of the employment, for he voluntarily chose to encounter a risk not within the contemplation of parties or incidental to the employment. He had broken a rule, and it was in connection with that breach that the accident took place. The appellant therefore had no claim to compensation— Smith v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, [1899] 1 QB 141; Morrison v. Clyde Navigation Trustees, 1909 S.C. 59, per Lord M'Laren 46 S.L.R. 40; Brice v. Edward Lloyd, Limited, [1909] 2 KB 804; Kane v. Merry & Cuninghame, Limited, February 7, 1911, 48 S.L.R. 430; M'Daid v. Steel, 48 S.L.R. 765.
Now the Sheriff-Substitute has held as arbitrator that the accident did not arise out of the applicant's employment, and we are asked in this appeal to hold that he was wrong. I do not think that we can hold that he was wrong. I think there are ample facts to support his finding. I shall assume that so far as the general operation is concerned of going with the lorry, and so far as the time element therein is concerned, that this accident happened at a time when the applicant was in the course of his employment. But did the accident arise out of his employment? I think it did not; and I think it did not because I do not think the accident was the result of the order to go and turn on the brakes. The accident was the result of his being in a place where he had gone, not for the purposes of his employment but for his own purposes, and where the danger which he thereby incurred was a danger which was not ordinarily incidental to his employment.
I cannot do better, I think, than borrow the words of Lord Justice Kennedy in the case of Brice v. Lloyd, [1909] 2 KB 804, where he says, speaking of a case where the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment—“The test is whether the risk of the accident is one which may be reasonably looked upon as incidental to the employment.” Now I think this risk was not incidental to the employment. I think it was an added risk, and it seems to me that a workman has no right by his own conduct for his own purposes to add a risk which is not incidental to the employment in which he is engaged. The employment in this case was to attend to the brakes, and the whole risks incidental to that employment did not include the risk of having to jump down from the front part of the lorry while it was in motion. Being on the front part of the lorry and jumping down, was no part of his employment. He had no business to be there. I do not put it that that was disobedience, but simply that it was not part of his employment, and therefore I think that the learned Sheriff's decision here is right.
Page: 833↓
The Court answered the question of law in the affirmative and dismissed the appeal.
Counsel for Appellant— Sandeman, K.C.— M'Robert. Agents— Fyfe, Ireland, & Company, W.S.
Counsel for Respondent— Horne, K.C.— Duffes. Agents— Erskine Dods & Rhind, S.S.C.