Scottish Court of Session Decisions

Lord President—The question that is raised in this stated case is as to the computation of time. The second section of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that “proceedings for recovery under this Act of compensation for an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice of the accident has been given as soon as practicable, and unless the claim for compensation in respect of such accident has been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury, or in case of death, within six months from the time of death.”

Now the accident here happened on the 24th November 1908, and a claim was made on 24th May 1909. Prima facie that would seem to be timeous, because the 24th May is the twenty-fourth day of the sixth month after November. But it has been argued to us that the claim was not made timeously, because as a matter of fact the accident happened at 11·30 a.m., whereas the claim was not made till either 5·30 or 11 p.m.—there seem to have been two claims put in.

I adhere to what I said in the recent case of Parish Council of Cavers v. Parish Council of Smailholm ( 1909 Session Cases 195), where, in dealing with the computation of a period, I said this—“I do not think that the Court will ever be concerned with the question of what happens inside a day—that is to say, I do not think that it will go into an inquiry as to the particular hour of the day at which the period commences and at which it ends; and in that sense the maxim dies inceptus pro completo habetur is applicable.” I think that remark is borne out by the whole of the decided cases, and I see no reason why the remark should not apply also to this case. The truth is, that you must, in one sense, take rather a rough and ready manner when you come to a computation of time which is not prescribed in days but is prescribed in months, because a month is not a stable unit of time. It has long ago been decided that the meaning of the Legislature in speaking of a “month” or “six months” is “calendar month” or “months.” But these calendar months are not units of time; and the practical and obvious conclusion has been come to, that when a period of six months or twelve months is spoken of, the corresponding day in the sixth or twelfth month thereafter is to be taken as the termination of the period. That is not scientifically accurate, because the place which a particular day occupies in a month is not the same in every month; for instance, the 24th May bears a different relation to the fractional parts of the month that are behind it and in front of it from that which the 24th June bears to the corresponding fractional parts of its month, because there are thirty-one days in the one month and thirty in the other—but for practical purposes the rule has been established.

I think, therefore, that the claim here was timeously made, that the Sheriff-Substitute has rightly decided the matter, and that the question ought to be answered in the affirmative.

Lord Kinnear—I agree with what your Lordship has said. The statute does not require the time to be reckoned by hours or minutes, but it prescribes that a certain claim shall be made within the six months from the occurrence of the accident. I agree with what was decided in the case of Parish Council of Cavers v. Smailholm, which I think we should follow. As I understand that case, when the thing to be determined is an interval of time, which is expressed in terms of a division of the calendar, then, as Lord M'Laren said, “the interval is to be reckoned from the day when it begins to the corresponding day in the next division of the calendar.” The time is to be reckoned from, for example, 24th May to 24th November, without reference to the particular moment in the time of the day at which the event in question occurs or the notice is given.

Lord Dundas—I quite agree, and I think the decision in this case is really concluded

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