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[Sheriff Court of Lanark at Glasgow.
The Employers Liability Act 1880 enacts—Section 6 (3) … “In Scotland any action under this Act may be removed to the Court of Session at the instance of either party, in the manner provided by, and subject to the conditions prescribed by, section 9 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1877.”
The Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1877 (40 and 41 Vict. cap. 50), enacts, with regard to actions removed from the Sheriff Court to the Court of Session, section 9 (2)—“The Court of Session, or either Division thereof, or any Lord Ordinary therein, may, if of opinion that the action might have been properly tried in the Sheriff Court, allow the defender who removed the action to the Court of Session, in the event of his being successful therein, such expenses only as they may consider
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that he would have been entitled to if successful in the action in the Sheriff Court.” The case of Paton v. Niddrie and Benhar Coal Company, January 14, 1885, 12 R. 538, 22 S.L.R. 345, decided that section 6 of the Employers Liability Act 1880 did not by implication abolish the right of either party to an action in the Sheriff Court to have it removed to the Court of Session with a view to jury trial under the 40th section of the Judicature Act 1825 (6 Geo. IV, cap. 120).
Held that any action founded on the Employers Liability Act, if removed from the Sheriff Court to the Court of Session, is subject to the condition as to expenses set forth in section 9 (2) of the Sheriff Court Act 1877, whether its removal to the Court of Session is under the provisions of the Employers Liability Act or of the Judicature Act, in pursuance of the decision in Paton v. Niddrie and Benhar Coal Company, cit. sup., which decision doubted.
This was an action raised in the Sheriff Court at Glasgow by Archibald Kane, docker, 17 Grace Street, Anderston, Glasgow, against The Singer Manufacturing Company, Kilbowie, Clydebank, in which the pursuer sought to recover damages for personal injury under the Employers' Liability Act.
On 10th December 1903 the Sheriff-Substitute ( Mitchell) allowed a proof before answer.
The pursuer appealed to the Court of Session for jury trial.
At the calling of the appeal the question was raised per curiam whether the appeal was competent in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Employers Liability Act 1880 (43 and 44 Vict. cap. 42). The provisions referred to are quoted in the rubric.
Argued for the respondents—Section 6 of the Employers Liability Act prescribed a special mode of removal to the Court of Session for actions under that Act, and that special mode should be held to exclude all others. It had been held not to exclude removal under the Judicature Act for jury trial, but that was in the case of an action founded not only on the Employers Liability Act but alternatively on common law— Paton v. Niddrie and Benhar Coal Company, January 14, 1885, 12 R. 538, 22 S.L.R. 345.
Argued for the appellant—The provisions of the Act were to be read along with the established rule of practice which had been fixed by the case of Paton v. Niddrie and Benhar Coal Company, cit. sup. Standing that decision the respondents' contention could not receive effect.
At advising—
But the question may come up again, and I wish to give this warning to parties who in future may seek to have an action which has been raised under the Employers Liability Act removed from the Sheriff Court to the Court of Session under the 40th section of the Judicature Act, that before doing so they should study the only terms on which such removal is allowed. The 6th section of the Employers Liability Act provides that “In Scotland any action under this Act may be removed to the Court of Session at the instance of either party in the manner provided by, and subject to the conditions prescribed by, section 9 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1877.” Section 9 of the Sheriff Courts Act 1877 provides (1) that the action may be removed to the Court of Session on the party taking the proper steps either before the interlocutor closing the record or within six days thereafter, and (2) “The Court of Session, or either Division thereof, or any Lord Ordinary therein, may, if of opinion that the action might have been properly tried in the Sheriff Court, allow the defender who removed the action to the Court of Session, in the event of his being successful therein, such expenses only as they may consider that he would have been entitled to if successful in the action in the Sheriff Court.” The provisions in this section regarding the removal of actions at the instance of the defender are extended by the 6th section of the Employers Liability Act to actions at the instance of either
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My object in making these observations is to say that it is not impossible or improbable that this question, if it comes before us again, may be remitted to a larger Court with the view of having the case of Paton reconsidered; and parties will be well advised if in future they comply strictly with the conditions imposed in the Act of 1880.
Apart from the condition as to expenses provided by reference in that Act, I may say that I think that this Court has in all cases an inherent power of modifying or disallowing expenses should they think such a course proper.
The Court then heard counsel on the merits of the cause, to which it is unnecessary to refer for the purposes of this report.
Counsel for the Pursuer and Appellant— Trotter. Agent— J. Struthers Soutar, Solicitor.
Counsel for the Defenders and Respondents— Younger. Agents— J. W. & J. Mackenzie, W.S.