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[Sheriff Court of Lothians at Linlithgow.
A workman in the course of his employment sustained an injury to the elbow of his right arm, consisting of a fracture of the head of the radius, which disabled him from following his occupation and rendered it improbable that he could resume it unless he submitted to a surgical operation consisting of opening into the elbow joint in order that a loose piece of bone might be removed. Two medical practitioners examined the workman on behalf of the employers, and both advised him to undergo the operation. The operation was an “important minor operation,” established in surgical practice, and not attended by any appreciable risk. It was stated in the case to be such an operation as a reasonable man not claiming compensation would elect to undergo. The workman having refused to undergo the operation, the arbitrator found that in respect of his refusal he was precluded from meantime insisting further in his application for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897.
In an appeal it was stated at the bar on behalf of the workman, and admitted on behalf of the employers, that the workman had been advised by an eminent surgeon, who had treated him after his injury and had examined him again after the arbitrator's decision, to have no operation performed.
Held that the workman by his refusal to undergo the surgical operation had not precluded himself from insisting further in his application for compensation.
This was a stated case in an appeal by Robert Sweeney, miner, Bathgate, the claimant in an arbitration under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897, brought by him against the Pumpherston Oil Company, Limited, Bathgate, in the Sheriff Court of the Lothians at Linlithgow, for compensation at the rate of 16s. 9d. per week from and after 10th June 1902, until the claimant was able to earn his full wages or until the further orders of the Court.
The Sheriff-Substitute ( M'Leod) stated as follows:—“The appellant was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act from the respondents for an injury to the elbow of his right arm, received by him on 3rd June 1901 while in their employment. The injury thus received by the appellant still unfits him from following his ordinary occupation as a miner, and there is no reasonable prospect that his right arm will become a useful limb unless he submits himself to the operation after mentioned. The appellant, who is a very healthy subject, was examined on 15th March 1902 by a medical practitioner on behalf of the respondents, and was also examined on 18th July 1902 by another medical practitioner on behalf of the respondents, and was on both occasions advised that he ought to undergo the operation after mentioned; but even though the compensation pay of 16s. 9d. a-week, which the respondents had paid him up to 10th June 1902, was stopped as at that date, the appellant has hitherto refused to submit himself to the said operation. The injury received by the appellant was a fracture of the head of the radius, one-half of which became separated, and is now partially united in a faulty position, and the result of the injury is interference with and consequent pain upon the movements of the elbow joint. The operation advised is that of opening into the elbow joint in order that the loose piece of bone may be removed. This operation (1) is an important minor operation; (2) is not in the nature of an experiment, but is established in surgical practice; (3) has been attended by complete success in all the similar cases (five in number) regarding which evidence was led before me; (4) is not attended by any appreciable risk, the risk of septic mischief (that being practically the only danger which might arise) being indeed less than in the case of the operation which was advised in the case of Anderson v. Baird & Company, January 15, 1903 (for in this case I had the advantage of the evidence of the eminent surgeon who advised both in the case just cited and in this case); (5) will in all probability within two months, or a little longer, restore to the appellant the use of his right arm, and enable him to earn wages as before; and (6) is such as a reasonable man not claiming compensation or damages would, for his own advantage and comfort, elect to undergo.
“Being of opinion that the case of Anderson v. Baird, January 1903, applied to the foregoing facts, I advised the appellant to reconsider his position, and of date 6th February 1903 continued the case till 1st May next, in order that he might, if so advised, submit himself to the operation, and that it might be ascertained whether he had then been enabled to earn wages as before.
However on 20th February 1903 the appellant intimated that he had decided not to undergo the operation, and craved me to proceed as if the 1st of May had arrived, and to dispose of his application aforesaid.
Accordingly on 20th February 1903 I found in law (following the above recited case of Anderson v. Baird & Company) that the appellant was, in respect of his refusal to undergo the above-mentioned operation, precluded from meantime insisting further in the application above narrated, but in order to keep the matter open
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for future developments I awarded him the sum of one penny weekly until the further order of the Court.” The question of law for the opinion of the Court was—“Whether the applicant, by his refusal to undergo the operation referred to, is meantime precluded from insisting further in his application?”
It was stated by counsel for the appellant that Professor Annandale, who treated the appellant in the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary after his accident, had declined to operate, upon the ground that the success of an operation was not certain, and that Professor Annandale having subsequently examined the appellant on 25th February 1903, had written, of date 2nd March 1903, a letter to the appellant's agent in these terms:—“I have again carefully examined Robert Sweeney's arm and I find that the movements of his elbow joint have much improved. I have strongly advised him to have no operation performed, therefore adhering to my former opinion.” Counsel for the respondents admitted the authenticity of this letter.
Argued for the appellant—The Sheriff-Substitute had proceeded solely on the authority of Anderson v. William Baird & Company, Limited, January 15, 1903, 40 S.L.R. 263. In that case the interlocutor was pronounced of consent, and the judicial opinions for and against the view that the workman was bound to submit to the surgical operation there in question were equally balanced. The question was whether in the circumstances the surgical operation was such as any reasonable man would adopt—per Lord Adam in Dowds v. Bennie & Son, December 19, 1902, 40 S.L.R. 239. In Dowds the medical treatment proposed was of a very simple and common kind, and in Anderson the operation was described as a “simple operation not attended with serious risk or pain.” In the present case, however, the surgical operation was described as an “important minor operation,” and in face of the strong advice of Professor Annandale to the appellant to have no operation performed, it was certainly not unreasonable in him to decline to submit to the proposed operation. There were five findings in fact by the Sheriff, in respect of which the Sheriff had come to a sixth finding viz., that the operation was such as a reasonable man would elect to undergo; but this sixth finding was really a finding in law to the effect that the appellant was bound in law to submit to the operation, and would forfeit his right to compensation by refusing so to do. Such a finding in law was unwarranted by the statute.
Argued for the respondents—On the facts stated in the case the operation proposed was such as a reasonable man would elect to undergo. The Sheriff-Substitute in his sixth finding had expressly found this as a fact, and it was not competent to consider evidence of facts outside the stated case— Rae v. Fraser, June 28, 1899, 1 F. 1017, 36 S.L.R. 782. The statements made at the bar as to Professor Annandale's opinion were, accordingly, irrelevant. The case was a fortiori of Anderson v. William Baird & Company ( supra), in respect that in the latter case the workman had already submitted to two operations without success, and there it undoubtedly had been held that the refusal of a workman to submit to a remedy that would remove his incapacity for wage-earning involved forfeiture of his right to compensation. It was open to the appellant to submit himself to a medical practitioner appointed for the put poses of the Act— M'Avan v. Boase Spinning Company, July 11, 1901, 3 F. 1048, 38 S.L.R. 772; Ferrier v. Gourlay Brothers, March 18, 1902, 4 F. 711, 39 S.L.R. 453.
The material facts are that the appellant became entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act from the respondents for an injury to the elbow of his right arm received by him on 3rd June 1901 while in their employment; that the injury thus received by the appellant still unfits him from following his ordinary occupation as a miner; and that there is no reasonable prospect that his right arm will become a useful limb unless he submits himself to an operation. The appellant, who is stated to be a very healthy subject, was examined on 15th March 1902 by a medical practitioner on behalf of the respondents, and was also examined on 18th July 1902 by another medical practitioner on their behalf, and was on both occasions advised that he ought to undergo the operation before mentioned, but although the compensation pay of 16s. 9d. a-week which the respondents had paid to him up to 10th June 1902 was stopped as at that date, the appellant has refused to submit himself to the operation. The injury which he had received was a fracture of the head of the radius, one half of which became separated, and is now partially united in a faulty position, and the result of the injury is interference with and consequent pain upon the movements of the elbow joint. The operation advised is that of opening into the elbow joint in order that the loose piece of bone may be removed. It is stated in the case that this operation (1) is an important minor operation, (2) is not of the nature of an experiment, but is established in surgical practice, (3) has been attended by complete success in all the similar cases (five in number) regarding which evidence was led, (4) is not attended by any appreciable risk, the risk of septic mischief (that being practically the only danger which might arise) being indeed less than in the case of the operation which was advised in the case of Anderson v. Baird & Company, 15th January 1903, (5) will in all probability within two months or a little longer restore to the appellant the use of his right arm and enable him to earn wages as before, and (6) is such as a reasonable man not claiming compensation or damages would for his own advantage and comfort elect to undergo.
The Sheriff found that the appellant was in respect of his refusal to undergo the above-mentioned
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I do not say that an operation might not be of such a slight character that a person who declined to submit to it might be held thereby to have forfeited his right to compensation, but even assuming (without deciding) this, it appears to me that the operation proposed is not of a slight or trivial character. It is described in the case as “an important minor operation,” thereby no doubt distinguishing it from those serious operations which in surgical practice are known as major operations, and it appears to me that a person might quite honestly and conscientiously decline to submit himself to such an operation. But without going into the question as to the character or gravity of the operation, it is probably sufficient for the purposes of the present question to say that it was stated at the bar, and as I understood admitted by the respondents, that the appellant had been advised by his own eminent surgical adviser (Professor Annandale) not to undergo the operation. I do not think that in the absence of any provision in the Act of 1897 that injured workmen should be required to submit to any operation which might be advised by medical men, consulted by their employers, the Court would be justified in holding that they were bound to undergo such operations as a condition of receiving compensation. This would be adding another condition to those specified in the Act. Upon the facts stated I think a person might quite honestly and conscientiously shrink from submitting himself to such an operation, and we would not in my judgment be warranted in holding that because he did so he should be deprived of the statutory compensation. The present case appears to me to be materially different from those of Dowds v. Bennie & Company and Anderson v. Baird & Company, which were referred to in the argument.
For these reasons I am of opinion that the answer to the question put in the case should be that the applicant is not by his refusal to undergo the operation mentioned precluded from insisting further in his application for compensation.
That is an argument to which we were asked to give effect, and there is this to be said in support of it—that we cannot review the Sheriff's judgment upon questions of fact, because the statute expressly limits the right of appeal to questions of law which are stated for us in a special case by the Sheriff. But then it sometimes requires a good deal of law to get rid of law and to state a question exactly in pure terms of fact, and I am not at all sure that this has been done with perfect success when an arbiter puts to himself the question whether a man's conduct in rejecting a condition proposed to him by his employer is reasonable and ought to be supported or not. I rather think that the true intent and meaning of this last finding in the Sheriff's statement is that the workman was under an obligation at law to submit to the operation proposed to him by his employer, and that he has forfeited his claim to compensation by declining to do so. That seems to me the true meaning of the Sheriff's judgment, and I must say I know of no principle upon which any such doctrine could be maintained. I agree entirely in both reasons for rejecting it given by your Lordship. In the first place, I think with the Lord President that if we take the statement as it stands, without reference to anything that is not brought before us by the statement of facts in this special case, no man is under obligation to submit to what surgeons call an important operation if he has any reason sufficient to his mind at the time deterring him from doing so,
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The Court pronounced this interlocutor—
“Find in answer to the question in the case that by his refusal to undergo the operation referred to in the case the appellant has not precluded himself from insisting further in his application, and decern.”
Counsel for the Appellant— Watt, K.C.— Munro. Agents— St Clair Swanson & Manson, W.S.
Counsel for the Respondents— Campbell, K.C.— Hunter. Agents— W. & J. Burness, W.S.