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The provisions of the Town Councils (Scotland) Act 1900, relative to the appointment of auditors of burgh accounts by the Secretary for Scotland, do rot apply in cases where the audit of the burgh accounts is provided for by a local Act.
The question in this case was whether the right of the Corporation of the Burgh of Irvine to appoint an auditor of the burgh accounts under the provisions of the Irvine Burgh Act 1881 was superseded by the Town Councils (Scotland) Act 1900.
The provisions of the Irvine Burgh Act, so far as material to the present report, are quoted in the opinion of the Lord President, infra.
The Town Councils (Scotland) Act 1900, after providing (sections 91, 92, and 93) for the accounts of a burgh being made up yearly to the 15th of May in each year, enacts:—Section 94—“The Secretary for Scotland shall annually appoint an auditor for the purpose of auditing the accounts of the burgh, and in case of dispute, shall, on the application of either party, fix the fee to be paid to such auditor; and in case the office of such auditor shall, before such accounts are audited by him, become vacant by death or from any other cause, shall, subject to the like incidents, appoint an auditor to supply such vacancy.” Section 95—“The council shall deliver to the auditor, as soon as may be after the said fifteenth day of May annually, all the accounts, together with their books and vouchers; and it shall be the duty of the auditor to audit such accounts, and either make a special report thereon in any case where it appears to him expedient so to do, or simply confirm the same, provided that the auditor shall make a special report in every case where he is of opinion that any statutory or other requirement with respect to the repayment or extinction of debt has not been observed, or that any debt is not being duly repaid.” Section 117—“Nothing in this Act contained shall supersede, prejudice, or affect the provisions of any local Act applicable to any burgh, or the forms of prosecutions and procedure in use therein under such Act.”
Thomas Smith, C.A., Glasgow, was appointed by the Secretary for Scotland, under the powers conferred by section 94 of the Town Councils (Scotland) Act 1900, (quoted supra), to audit the accounts of the Town Council of the Burgh of Irvine for
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year ending 15th May 1902. On intimating his appointment to the Town Clerk, and inquiring whether the books were ready for audit, he was informed that the Corporation maintained their right to appoint an auditor of their public accounts. Mr Smith accordingly presented a petition, with the consent and concurrence of the Secretary for Scotland, under section 91 of the Court of Session Act 1868, to have the Provost, Magistrates, and Town. Council of Irvine ordained “instantly to deliver to the petitioner all the accounts of the said Burgh, together with the books and vouchers for the year ending 15th May 1902.” Answers were lodged for the Corporation of Irvine, in which, after narrating the provisions of the Irvine Burgh Act 1881 (quoted in the opinion of the Lord President, infra), they made the following statement:—“In accordance with these provisions the respondents' predecessors, on 4th May 1882, appointed as their auditor Mr John Young, one of the agents of the Royal Bank of Scotland in Glasgow, and the appointment was duly approved by the Sheriff of Ayrshire on 14th July 1882. Since that time Mr Young has regularly audited the accounts of the Burgh, and the respondents are bound to render their accounts to him and to remunerate him for the audit. Section 117 of the Town Councils Act was specially inserted at the instance of various burgh authorities, including the predecessors of the respondents, for the purpose of preserving their rights under their local Acts, and the respondents maintain that the Secretary for Scotland was not entitled in the case of the Burgh of Irvine to exercise the power of appointment conferred by section 94 of the Town Councils Act, and so to supersede the provisions of their local Act of 1881 relating to the appointment of an auditor. They accordingly submit that they are under no obligation to render accounts to the petitioner, and that the petition should be refused.”
On 29th July 1902 the Lord Ordinary on the Bills (Stormonth Darling) pronounced an interlocutor, by which he refused the prayer of the petition.
Opinion.—“This petition is brought under the 91st section of the Court of Session Act of 1868, and proceeds upon the footing that the respondents, the Magistrates of Irvine, are failing to perform a statutory duty incumbent upon them. Accordingly I am asked, as Lord Ordinary on the Bills, to order the specific performance of that duty….
The case of the petitioner is, that the particular statutory duty which the Magistrates of Irvine have failed to perform is that they have refused to deliver to the petitioner the accounts of the burgh, together with the books and vouchers, for the year ending 15th May 1902, he being the auditor of the burgh appointed by the Secretary for Scotland under the Town Councils Act of 1900. Now, it cannot be the duty of the Magistrates to deliver these accounts and books to the petitioner if there are no such accounts, and it cannot be their duty to deliver them if the accounts are lawfully and properly in the hands of another official, and they make both of these answers. They say that the accounts of the burgh are by its special Act directed to be closed as at 15th October in each year, and there can be no doubt that the special Act stands in full force. It is nowhere repealed by the general Act of 1900. If that were all, the general Act might be held to prevail, in any case of conflict between the two, as being the later expression of the will of Parliament. But the general Act contains in section 117 this very important clause—‘Nothing in this Act contained shall supersede, prejudice, or affect the provisions of any local Act applicable to any burgh.’ The question therefore comes to be—Are the provisions in the general Act with regard to the appointment of an auditor such as to ‘supersede, prejudice, or affect’ the provisions of the local Act? In my opinion they are. If I were to grant the prayer of this petition, I should make it impossible for the Magistrates of Irvine to fulfil their statutory duty under the local Act. That duty is to make their accounts up for the year ending 15th October. They cannot do that if they are to close their accounts as at 15th May. Their statutory duty is to appoint an auditor of their own. It is said that they may do that, although the Secretary for Scotland appoints another auditor to do the same work. That is possible, but it would be so extremely inconvenient that I cannot assume that Parliament intended any course so wasteful and troublesome as that there should be two auditors dealing with the same accounts, tumbling over each other in the prosecution of their audit, and, I suppose, fighting for possession of the accounts. Such a construction seems to me out of the question, if the Act of Parliament can be construed in any other way.
I do not decide whether the auditor appointed by the burgh is bound by some of the provisions of the general Act or not. It is said that there are provisions, very useful provisions no doubt, requiring the audit of the Common Good. It may be that these provisions apply. I have nothing to do with that. All I am called upon to say is whether I ought to order delivery by the Magistrates of Irvine to the auditor appointed by the Secretary for Scotland of all their accounts and papers down to a certain date. I cannot do that consistently with the Irvine Act. To do so would be a direct supersession of the Irvine Act, and by the Act of 1900 nothing in the general Act is to have any such effect.
I should add that this view of the statute of 1900 seems in entire accordance with the recent decision of the First Division in the case of the Town Council of Aberdeen, reported at 4 Fraser, 6. The obiter dicta in that case about the appointment of auditors were intended to save this question, not to decide it.
Accordingly I shall refuse the petition, with expenses.”
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The petitioner reclaimed.
The arguments of the parties sufficiently appear in the opinions of the Judges.
At advising—
By section 172 of the Irvine Burgh Act 1881 it is provided that the Corporation shall keep separate and distinct accounts of their receipts, credits, payments and liabilities in relation to their waterworks, gasworks, street improvements, police assessments, and all other rates or sources of income of the Corporation, and of all sums of money received and paid by the Corporation in connection therewith for the purposes of the Act. The accounts thus directed to be kept appear to cover all the branches of municipal administration. Section 176 of the Act requires that the books of the Corporation containing the several accounts by the Act authorised and required to be kept separate and distinct shall be balanced once a-year, and shall be open for inspection as therein provided. Section 177 requires that the Corporation shall appoint an auditor to audit its accounts, and section 179 requires that the Corporation shall every year cause an annual account in abstract to be prepared, stating the total receipts and expenditure of all moneys levied and received by virtue of the Act, for the year ending on the 15th day of October, or some other convenient day, in each year, under the several distinct heads of receipts and expenditure, with a statement of the balance of the account, duly audited and certified by the auditor and two or more members of the Corporation, and shall cause such account to be printed and lodged, free of charge, with the clerk on or before the 20th day of October then next, or some other convenient day in each year, as also that the account shall be open to public inspection at all reasonable hours on payment of one shilling for every such inspection.
The effect of the petitioner's demand is that all these provisions shall be held as repealed and superseded, and that the provisions of the Town Councils Act 1900, which requires the accounts of burghs to which it applies to be made up to 15th May in each year shall come in their place.
The first answer which the respondents make to this demand is that they cannot deliver to the petitioner the books or accounts which he claims, because they have no accounts made up to 15th May 1902, and they further say that even if they had them they would not be bound to deliver them to the petitioner, because in compliance with the provisions of the Irvine Burgh Act 1881 they are in the hands of an auditor duly appointed by the respondents under that Act. The question therefore comes to be whether the provisions of the Irvine Burgh Act of 1881 in regard to the matter of audit are repealed or superseded by the Town Councils Act of 1900, and I am of opinion that they are not. Section 117 of the Act of 1900 declares that “nothing in this Act contained shall supersede, prejudice, or affect the provisions of any local Act applicable to any burgh, or the forms of procedure in use therein under such Act.” The effect of this enactment is to provide that where an Act such as the Irvine Burgh Act 1881 contains provisions inconsistent with those of the Act of 1900 the provisions of the earlier Act shall remain in force. The important question therefore comes to be whether there is an inconsistency between the provisions of the Town Councils Act of 1900 and those of the Irvine Burgh Act of 1881 in regard to the matters to which the petition relates, and I am of opinion that there is such an inconsistency. The Act of 1881, as has already been shown, requires that the accounts shall be made up to 15th October, “or some other convenient day,” while the Act of 1900 requires that they shall be made up to 15th May in each year. It was suggested by the petitioner's counsel that under the words “or some other convenient day” the 15th of May can be included, but it seems to me that under the Act of 1881 the burgh authorities were to be the judges of the convenience of the day, and an imperative provision that the books were to be made up to 15th May would deprive them of the power of judging as to this. This appears to me to be a very material difference, and there are other differences, some of which have been already adverted to, e.g., in regard to the appointment of an auditor, and whereever there are such differences that the provisions of the two Acts cannot stand together, the provisions of the earlier Act are saved by section 117 of the later Act. It cannot, in my judgment, have been intended that there should be two sets of books and accounts or two audits. This is the view taken by the Lord Ordinary, and as it is, in my judgment, the correct view, I consider that his Lordship's judgment should be adhered to.
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The Court adhered.
Counsel for the Petitioner and Reclaimer— C. N. Johnston, K.C.—Pitman. Agent— George Inglis, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Respondents— H. Johnston, K.C.—Constable. Agents— Morton, Smart, Macdonald, & Prosser, W.S.