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[Sheriff Court of the Lothians and Peebles.
A mason's labourer aged sixty-three, who earned a wage of £1, 2s. 6d. per week, claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 for the death of his last surviving son and child, which occurred under circumstances to which the Act applied, on the ground that he was wholly or in part dependent upon the earnings of the deceased at the date of his death. The deceased had lived in family with the claimant, a sister of the claimant who acted as housekeeper to the family, and a crippled brother of the claimant who was unable to earn anything, but towards whose support the other brothers and sisters of the claimant contributed. The deceased had contributed a large part of his wages when in work towards the family expenses, and had paid the rent for the current year. In consequence of the death of the deceased the claimant was unable any longer to keep up a house of his own, and had been obliged to occupy a room in the house of a married sister. Held that the claimant was at the date of his son's death in part dependent upon the earnings of the deceased in the sense of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897.
Question whether this was not a pure question of fact upon which appeal was not competent.
This was an appeal upon a stated case from the Sheriff Court of the Lothians and Peebles at Edinburgh in an arbitration under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 between Robert Legget & Sons, tanners, Damside, Water of Leith, Edinburgh, appellants, and William Burke, mason's labourer, Edinburgh, claimant and respondent.
Burke claimed from the appellants the sum of £150 as compensation in respect of the death of his son Andrew Burke.
The facts which the Sheriff-Substitute ( Henderson) found proved or admitted were as follows Andrew Burke, the respondent's son, died upon 23rd April 1901 at the age of twenty-two from injuries which he received in consequence of an
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accident that day, which arose out of and in the course of his employment in the appellants' tannery, which is a factory within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He was employed by the appellants at the date of his death as a labourer at a wage of 17s. a-week, and met with the accident which caused his death on the first day of his employment by them. He was the last surviving son and child of the respondent, and lived in family with him. The respondent, who is a widower, sixty-three years of age, is a mason's labourer, and earns, and has for the last three years earned, an average weekly wage of £1, 2s. 6d. In addition to himself and the deceased, the respondent at the time of his son's death had in family with him a sister who acted as housekeeper for him and the deceased, and had while so acting no other means of support, and a cripple brother who was unable to earn anything, but towards whose maintenance the respondent's other brothers and sisters contributed either in money or provisions. The deceased during his apprenticeship, when his earnings were 10s. a-week, was in the habit of contributing to the household expenses almost to the full extent of his earnings. After the expiry of his apprenticeship, which took place on 30th September 1899 until some nine weeks before his death, the deceased contributed more largely to the family expenses, his contributions amounting to between 16s. and 20s. a-week. His earnings during this latter time averaged £1, 9s. 11 d. per working week. The respondent's sister had become housekeeper to the respondent and deceased, at the deceased's request, and her so acting saved the cost of a paid charwoman, who had received when so employed 2s. a-day. In consequence of the death of his son the respondent was unable any longer to keep up a house of his own, the deceased having after the expiry of his apprenticeship and while he was in full work, paid the rent (£9 a-year), taxes, and gas of the house they lived in, and the respondent has since been obliged to occupy a room in the house of a married sister, whither his housekeeper sister and his cripple brother also removed. For nine weeks prior to his death the deceased was out of work and earning no wages, during which time the household was dependent on the respondent's own earnings and upon what the housekeeper sister obtained by pawning her personal property. The respondent suffers from rheumatism, and is not therefore in the future certain to be able to work regularly at his occupation as a labourer.” 1 2 On these facts the Sheriff-Substitute held in law that the respondent, at the time of his son's death, was in part dependent on the earnings of the deceased, and assessed the compensation due to him at £75, for which sum he granted decree against the appellants, and also found them liable in expenses.
The question of law for the opinion of the Court was—“Whether in these circumstances the respondent at the date of the death of his son Andrew Burke was in part dependent upon the earnings of the said Andrew Burke in the sense of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897?”
The Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 (60 and 61 Vict. c. 37) enacts as follows:—Sec. 7 (2)—“Dependants means—… ( b) in Scotland, such of the persons entitled, according to the law of Scotland, to sue the employer for damages or solatium in respect of the death of the workman as were wholly or in part dependent upon the earnings of the workman at the time of his death.”
Argued for the appellants—The Sheriff-Substitute had put a wrong interpretation on the words “in part dependent.” “Dependants” was defined insection 7 of the Act, sub-section 2 ( b), as meaning “in Scotland, such of the persons entitled, according to the law of Scotland, to sue the employer for damages or solatium in respect of the death of the workman, as were wholly or in part dependent upon the earnings of the workman at the time of his death.” In the present case the deceased was not supporting his father, but was himself in receipt of support. The respondent was supporting his cripple brother from charitable motives, and his employment of his sister as housekeeper was solely for his own convenience. Therefore there was here no “family” in the sense used by the Lord Chancellor in the case of Davies (cited infra), for the obligation which the respondent had taken upon himself was purely voluntary. The legal obligations alone ought to be taken into account. The Sheriff-Substitute had also been influenced by facts which ought not to have weighed with him in deciding the legal question, e.g., the fact that the respondent was suffering from rheumatism and might not in future be able to work regularly at his occupation as a labourer. The question of what was meant by “dependants” had been considered so far as regards England in the case of Simmons v. White Brothers, March 11, 1899 [1899], 1 Q.B. 1005; and the Main Colliery Company, Limited v. Davies, June 22, 1900 [1900], A.C. 358; and as regards Scotland in Cunningham v. M'Gregor & Company, May 14, 1901, 3 F. 775, 38 S.L.R. 574.
Argued for the respondent—There were persons living in family with him, for his sister had become housekeeper to him and the deceased at the latter's request, and her so acting had saved the cost of a paid charwoman. The mode of the respondent's life must be looked at in order to see if there was actual pecuniary deprivation by the death of his son. Now, in consequence of his son's death the respondent had to give up his house and to occupy a room in the house of a married sister. The fact that the person alleged to be a dependant of a workman can maintain himself without the deceased's assistance does not of itself prevent him from being a dependant— Howell v. Vivian & Sons, November 8, 1901, 18 T.L.R. 36.
At advising—
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We cannot entertain this appeal unless it raises a question of law; and assuming that it does, we cannot sustain it unless we are satisfied that there was no evidence on which the Sheriff-Substitute was entitled to decide as he did. I greatly doubt whether any question of law is raised, because assuming that the person claiming compensation possesses the requisite title in point of relationship, the question whether he was dependent, and if so, to what extent, seems to me to be a question of fact to be decided by the arbitrator.
The only way in which such a case can be represented as raising a question of law is that on the statement in the case there is no evidence to support the arbitrator's finding, and on that footing such appeals have been considered— Simmons v. White Brothers, L.R., 1899, 1 Q.B. 1005, and The Main Colliery Company v. Davies, L.R. 1900, App. Ca. 358.
If this appeal is competent to any extent, I can only say that I cannot affirm that there was no evidence to support the finding of the Sheriff-Substitute. We have nothing to do with the amount which he has awarded. That is not before us, and therefore we are not called upon to consider how much the award has been increased or diminished by the consideration that the respondent was burdened with the support of a brother and sister.
While I should have preferred to find that no question of law is properly raised, I am prepared to concur in answering the question put to us in the affirmative.
The Court pronounced this interlocutor—
“The Lords having heard counsel for the parties to the stated case, answer the question of law therein stated in the affirmative: Therefore affirm the award of the arbitrator and decern: Find the respondent entitled to expenses since the date of the award of the arbitrator, and remit,” &c.
Counsel for the Appellants— M'Kenzie, K.C.— Macphail. Agents— Menzies, Black, & Menzies, W.S.
Counsel for the Respondent— Crabb Watt— Sanderson. Agents— Wishart & Sanderson, W.S.