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[Sheriff Court of Renfrew.
The commissioners of a burgh brought an action in the Sheriff Court against the owner of certain heritable subjects within the sheriffdom to recover part of the expense incurred by them in repairing a private street upon which these subjects abutted. The defender resided beyond, and was not personally cited within the sheriffdom. Held that the Sheriff had no jurisdiction to deal with the action.
M'Bey v. Knight, November 22, 1879, 7 R. 255, followed; Culross Special Water Supply District v. Smith Sligo's Trustees, November 6, 1891, 19 R. 58, distinguished,
An action was raised in the Sheriff Court of Renfrew and Bute by the Commissioners of the burgh of barony of Pollokshaws against Mary Gardner M'Lean, residing at 109 South Portland Street, Glasgow, owner of the heritable subjects No. 53 New Street, Pollokshaws, and against Robert Millar, contractor, tenant and occupier of the said subjects.
The pursuers craved the Court to grant decree against the defenders jointly and severally for payment of a sum of £26, which the pursuers averred was the proportionate share due by Miss M'Lean as owner of the subjects, in respect of repairs executed by them on the street upon which the subjects abutted. The decree craved against the tenant was restricted to the amount of rent due by him for the subjects to Miss M'Lean.
No appearance was made for the tenant.
Miss M'Lean pleaded—“(1) No jurisdiction. The defender Mary Gardner M'Lean has no domicile within the sheriffdom of Renfrew and Bute.”
The Sheriff-Substitute ( Henderson) on 4th July pronounced the following interlocutor:—“Sustains the first plea-in-law for the defender Miss Mary Gardner M'Lean, to the effect that he has no jurisdiction in the action as it at present stands, the said defender residing outwith the county of Renfrew, and not having been personally cited: Accordingly dismisses the petition so far as it is directed against the defender, the said Mary Gardner M'Lean,” &c.
The pursuers appealed to the Sheriff ( Cheyne), who on 9th September 1898 sustained the appeal, recalled the interlocutor of the Sheriff-Substitute, repelled the defender's preliminary pleas, and allowed the parties a proof.
Note.—“While it is quite true that the fact of possession of heritable property in a county does not by itself give the Sheriff of that county jurisdiction over the owner
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of the property, it has been held ( Culross Special Water Supply District Committee v. Smith Sligo's Trustees, 1891, 19 R. 58) that in all actions relating to the possession of his property, or of things locally situated within it, an owner must answer in the Sheriff Court of the county where the property lies, though he does not reside and has not been personally cited within the county, and the present Lord Kincairney, as Sheriff of Stirlingshire, held himself entitled to entertain an action of damages for failure to implement the conditions of a lease of a Stirlingshire farm, though the defender, the owner of the farm, lived in Renfrewshire and was served with the action there— Taylor v. Shaw Stewart, 1881, 2 Guth. Sel. Cas. 244; and it humbly appears to me that, though I may be somewhat extending, I am not unduly straining, the principles of these two cases when I hold, as by repelling Miss M'Lean's first plea I do, that notwithstanding her being resident and having been cited in another county, I may competently deal with the present action on the ground that, albeit the claim is of the nature of a personal debt, it is founded upon a statutory obligation attaching to Miss M'Lean qua owner of property in Renfrewshire, and indeed arises directly from the fact of her ownership.” A proof was led before the Sheriff-Substitute, who on 22nd November 1898 granted decree against the defender Miss M'Lean for the amount concluded for in the action. The defender appealed to the First Division on the question of jurisdiction, and argued—The mere possession of heritage in a county was insufficient to render a person subject to the jurisdiction of the Sheriff in a personal action if he resided outside the county— M'Bey v. Knight, November 22, 1879, 7 R. 255. The Sheriff's ground of decision that the pursuer's claim was founded upon a statutory obligation attaching to the defender qua owner of property in Renfrewshire, and that therefore she was subject to his jurisdiction, was not supported by the case quoted by him— Culross Special Water Supply District v. Smith Sligo's Trustees, November 6, 1891, 19 R. 58. That case related to the possession of the property itself, and accordingly it was in a different position from the present case, which related merely to a claim for the recovery of an ordinary debt, payment of which could be enforced in the same manner as that of any other debt.
Argued for respondents'—The case of Smith Sligo's Trustees, though not identical with the present one, was a strong authority for the proposition that where a debt was founded upon a statutory obligation attaching to a person qua owner of property within a sheriffdom, such person would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Sheriff of the county. While the pursuers were seeking to recover this debt, in the manner in which ordinary debts were recoverable by the law of Scotland, it would have been open to them to do so in a manner which was by statute specially appropriated to the sheriff within whose sheriffdom the subjects were situated— Burgh Police Act 1892 (55 and 56 Vict. c. 55), secs. 353 and 369. That supported the view that though the pursuers had chosen to recover the debt by an ordinary action, it would still fall within the Sheriff's jurisdiction.
At advising—
The case of M'Bey v. Knight, 7 R. 255, decided by the Second Division of the Court in 1879, is a clear authority to the effect that the possession of heritable property in a county does not per se render the owner subject to the jurisdiction of the Sheriff in a personal action. It is pointed out in the opinions of Lord Ormidale and Lord Gifford that ownership of heritable estate in Scotland is sufficient to found jurisdiction against a non-resident defender in the supreme courts, but that the ratio rei sitæ had never been extended as a ground of ordinary jurisdiction to Sheriff Court actions. Prima facie, then, the objection to the jurisdiction would appear to be well founded.
But the Sheriff has expressed the opinion, founded on a more recent case in this Division of the Court, that the local jurisdiction may be sustained on the ground that, while the claim is of the nature of a personal debt, it is founded upon a statutory obligation attaching to the owner, as such, of property in Renfrewshire, and arising directly from the fact of ownership.
The case cited by the Sheriff is the Culross Special Water Supply v. Smith Sligo's Trustees, reported 19 R. 58. It was an action of interdict at the instance of the local authority to restrain the defender from making use of a supply of water (which he had obtained for a limited purpose by agreement with the local authority) for the benefit of property other than that
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Now, I think that to argue from the judgment in Smith-Sligo's case that the Sheriff has universal jurisdiction ratione rei sitae, is an example of unsound induction from an isolated case. In our judgment we did not consider any case except that of disputed possession; and the authority of the case of M'Bey v. Knight is in no way affected by anything that was said in Smith-Sligo's case by the judges of this Division of the Court.
I wish to guard myself against being supposed to touch the question of the effect of a statutory warrant of distress or other legal process directed against a plurality of defaulting ratepayers.
It may be that where the name of a non-resident owner is lawfully included in such a list the statute is a warrant for diligence against his estate within the county. In the present case the local authority has elected to proceed by way of action against the owner-ratepayer, and our decision only applies to the jurisdiction of the Sheriff under an ordinary action in his Court.
I think we should return to the judgment of the Sheriff-Substitute of 4th July 1898; sustain the appeal, and dismiss the action.
The Court pronounced the following interlocutor—
“Sustain the appeal: Find in terms of the findings in fact and in law in the interlocutor of the Sheriff-Substitute, dated 4th July 1898; Affirm the said interlocutor: Recal the interlocutor of the Sheriff, dated 9th September 1898: Of new dismiss the petition so far as it is directed against the defender Mary Gardner or M'Lean, and decern: Find said defender entitled to expenses to 4th July 1898, and to additional expenses from said date, and remit the accounts of said expenses to the Auditor to tax and to report: Also dismiss the action against the defender Robert Millar.”
Counsel for Pursuers— Guthrie, Q.C.— Guy. Agent— F. J. Martin, W.S.
Counsel for Defender— Findlay. Agents— Gill & Pringle, W.S.