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Succession — Legitim — Exclusion of Legitim — Partial or Universal Settlement.
A testator left a will and a codicil both of the same date. By the will he left and bequeathed to his wife “my whole estate, heritable and moveable, whom I appoint my sole executrix, under the obligation of her paying all my just and lawful debts, and bringing up and educating my children, and I appoint her the guardian and curator of my children, and I grant her full power of sale of said estate.” He further appointed a solicitor whom he named “to be law-agent on the said estate.” By the codicil he appointed two persons nominatim “to act along with my wife as executors and curators to my said children.”
Held that these provisions constituted a trust in favour of the testator's wife and children in the three executors named, and did not entitle the widow to an absolute conveyance of the testator's estate subject to a mere personal obligation to maintain and educate the children.
By his testamentary deeds a testator conveyed his estate to executors as trustees for payment of his whole estate to his wife, subject (1) to payment of his debts, and (2) to payment of the cost of upbringing and educating his children.
Held that the testator's children were entitled to legitim out of his moveable estate, and also to the expense of their upbringing and education out of the remainder of the whole trust-estate, but only in so far as the shares of legitim falling to the children were insufficient for their upbringing and education.
John Smith Urquhart, distiller, Elgin, died on 13th February 1898. He had been twice married, and was survived by five children by his first marriage, of whom two were minors and the others in pupilarity. He was also survived by his second wife Mrs Mary Simon or Urquhart, and by one child of his second marriage Olivia Urquhart, born in February 1896. There was no marriage-contract between Mr Urquhart and either of his wives.
On 29th November 1897 the said John Smith Urquhart executed two testamentary writings in the following terms:—“I, John Smith Urquhart, in the event of my death, do hereby leave and dispone to my wife Mrs Mary Simon or Urquhart, all and whole my whole estate, heritable and moveable, whom I appoint my sole executrix, under the obligation of her paying all my just and lawful debts, and bringing up
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and educating my children, and I appoint her sole guardian and curator of my children, and I grant her full power of sale of said estate, and I appoint William Scott, solicitor, Elgin, to be law-agent on the said estate, he receiving the usual remuneration for his trouble.” The second was as follows—“I appoint the Reverend Robert Cowan, Elgin, and Charles C. Doig, architect, Elgin, to act along with my wife as executors and curators to my said children.” The testator left both heritable and moveable estate. The moveable estate amounted to £3709, 13s. 6d, and the nett total estate, both heritable and moveable, to £6259, 13s. 6d.
Some time after the testator's death his widow married John Carson Abbott, with whom she went to live in Birmingham. Her child Olivia Urquhart lived with her. The testator's other children were boarded in Elgin, where they attended the Elgin Academy, a high class secondary school. Mrs Abbott did not desire the children of the testator's first marriage to live in family with her, but was willing to concur with their guardians in making all reasonable provision for their maintenance and education.
In these circumstances various points arose, for the settlement of which a special case was presented to the Court by (1) Mr Urquhart's executors appointed in his testamentary writings; (2) Mrs Abbott, with consent of her husband; and (3) Mr Urquhart's children and their curators and guardians.
The questions at law were, inter alia, the following:—“(1) On a just construction of the settlement and codicil of the said John Smith Urquhart, is the second party beneficially entitled to his whole estate, heritable and moveable, and entitled to have said estate conveyed to her, or has a trust been thereby constituted in the persons of the first parties? (10) Are the testator's children entitled to claim legitim out of his estate in addition to implement of the obligation imposed by his settlement on the second party with regard to the upbringing and education of the children?”
Argued for the third parties— On the first question—By the testator's settlement and codicil a continuing trust was constituted for payment of the testator's debts, and thereafter (1) for application of the free annual income of the testator's estate, in the first place, for the upbringing and education of the testator's children in a manner suitable to their station (which application was to continue as regards each child until he or she was actually self-supporting); and in the second place for payment to the second party of the balance of the income not expended upon the children; and (2) for payment of the capital of the testator's estate to the second party on the foregoing trust purposes being fulfilled. It Ainslie v. Ainslie, December 8, 1886, 14 R. 209, the word “executors” had been construed to mean “trustees.” It was plain in the present case from the obligations laid upon the executors, from the power of sale granted to them, and from the appointment of a law-agent on the estate that a continuing trust was constituted by the deeds— Macphcrson v. Macphersn's Curator Bonis, January 17, 1894, 21 R. 386. 2. On the tenth question—In any view, the testator's children were entitled when they were of age to claim legitim out of his moveable estate without prejudice to the obligations imposed by his settlement upon the second party by providing for their upbringing and education— Howden v. Crichton, May 18, 1821, 1 S. 14; Nicolson's Assignee v. Macalister's Trustees, March 2, 1841, 5 D. 675: White v. Finlay, November 15, 1861, 24 D. 38.
Argued for second party—On a sound construction of the settlement and codicil the second party was beneficially entitled to the whole estate, heritable and moveable, of the testator, and was entitled to have the estate handed over to her. The obligation imposed on her of bringing up and educating the children was a purely personal obligation. The children and their guardians had only a right to enforce performance by her of this personal obligation, and to apply for behoof of the children the funds which she might hand over to them from time to time for the upbringing and education of the children, and her obligation was limited to the period when the children respectively reached an age when they were able to maintain themselves. This was a small estate, and the intention of the testator was to give his widow a free hand in dealing with it, and not tie her down to have to invest the funds in trust investments. No trust was constituted, and the widow was entitled to deal with the funds as she chose.— Murray v. Macfarlane's Trustees, July 17, 1895, 22 R. 927; Lamb v. Eames, 1871, L.R., 6 Ch. App. 597. The case of Macpherson, supra, did not apply, as in that case there was unquestionably an absolute gift, while Ainslie, supra, was a typical case in which it was absolutely certain that the testator in appointing executors had meant to appoint trustees. 2. On the tenth question—It was settled that a provision under a partial settlement did not exclude legitim if the latter was not specifically excluded. But that was not the case where the settlement was universal. In such a case if benefit was taken from a provision, he who took the benefit was not also entitled to legitim. In short, the children were not entitled to legitim over and above the provisions in their favour in the settlement— Macfarlane's Trustees v. Oliver, July 20, 1882, 9 R. 1138; Davidson's Trustees v. Davidson, July 15, 1871, 9 Macph. 995. The case referred to on the other side did not help their case, In Howden, supra, the settlement was treated as a partial one; in Nicolson, supra, it was held that the legacy must be imputed towards legitim, and the case of White, supra, was entirely in favour of the contention of the second party.
The first question is not unattended with
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With regard to the tenth question, I entertain no doubt that the children of the testator are entitled to claim legitim. It is their legal right, and has not been in any way excluded or discharged. It has been suggested that the children must make their election between their legitim and the provisions of the will in their favour. But the will confers nothing on the children. It puts on the second party an obligation with regard to the children which would have fallen on her as a debt of the deceased had the children never been mentioned. The children have therefore nothing with regard to which they can exercise an election.
The children, however, can only claim from their father's estate what they would have claimed from him had he been alive, and that is, the amount necessary for their maintenance and upbringing beyond what they possess in their own right. Accordingly, if the children get their legitim they can only claim from their father's estate whatever may be necessary beyond their legitim for their maintenance until they are able to maintain themselves. How large their claim may be, and how long demandable, depend on circumstances that cannot now be determined or foreseen. These things will depend upon the health of the children, their capacity to earn a livelihood, &c. In this view, and to the effect I have explained, I think the tenth question should be answered in the affirmative.
But the deed proceeds:—“I grant her full power of sale of said estate,” including heritable estate, a power which would have been unnecessary had a trust not been intended, and “I appoint William Scott, solicitor, Elgin, to be law-agent on the said estate,” that is, the whole estate, heritable and moveable, “he receiving the usual remuneration for his trouble.” This appointment again seems to indicate a trust of considerable duration. Therefore, taking the settlement by itself I think its construction is fairly enough given in the third question put to us, namely, that it constitutes a family trust under which the widow should hold the estate in trust, first, for payment of debts; secondly, for the maintenance of the family, including the bringing up and education of the children; and thirdly, after those purposes have been fully satisfied, for payment to herself of what remains of the capital of the estate.
Next we have to consider the effect of the codicil, by which the testator appoints two gentlemen “to act along with my wife as executors and curators to my said children.”
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On the whole matter I think, in the first place, that the terms of the codicil strengthen the view that a trust was created by the settlement; and secondly, that the testator intended the so-called “executors” to act as trustees along with the second party for the purposes which I have indicated.
The only other question which it is necessary for us to answer is the tenth: “Are the testator's children entitled to claim legitim out of his estate in addition to implement of the obligation imposed by his settlement on the second party with regard to the upbringing and education of the children?” If by this it is meant to be asked whether the children are entitled to claim legitim, and in addition to throw the whole of the expense of their maintenance and education upon the rest of the estate, I should answer the question in the negative. But I am prepared to answer the question in the affirmative with this qualification, that, primo loco, legitim if claimed shall be applied or imputed towards the maintenance and education of the children. If in this way the legitim is exhausted, the children will be entitled thereafter to be maintained and educated at the expense of the trust.
The settlement is a total settlement, and deals with the whole estate, including the legitim fund, and although no provisions are made for the children beyond what may be required for their maintenance and education, those provisions will in the end probably considerably exceed the amount of the legitim fund. I am therefore of opinion that the children are not entitled both to claim legitim and throw the whole burden of their maintenance and education on the second party.
At the same time the settlement does not exclude the claim of legitim; and therefore I think that on the footing of equitable compensation a child who claims and receives legitim will be entitled, when the legitim has been exhausted in maintaining and educating him, to receive such additional advances as may be required for those purposes out of the trust-estate; Macfarlane's Trustees v. Oliver, 9 R. 1138.
I therefore arrive at the same result as Lord Trayner.
The Court pronounced this interlocutor:—
“Answer the second alternative of the first question therein stated in the affirmative: answer the tenth question therein stated by declaring that the children of the said deceased John Smith Urquhart are entitled to legitim out of his moveable estate, and also to the expense of their upbringing and education out of the remainder of the whole trust-estate of the said deceased John Smith Urquhart, but only in so far as the shares of legitim falling to the said children are insufficient for their upbringing and education: Find it unnecessary to answer the other questions, and decern.”
Counsel for First Parties— C. D. Murray. Agent— Alex. Mustard, S.S.C.
Counsel for Second Party— Guthrie, Q.C.— Chree. Agents— Mill & Bruce, S.S.C.
Counsel for Third Parties— Ure, Q.C.— M'Lennan. Agent— Alex. Mustard, S.S.C.