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[Sheriff of Lanarkshire.
The Court will not send back a case to the Sheriff for amendment under the Act of Sederunt, section 9 ( g), in order to enable either party to raise a new point of law as to which the Sheriff has given no determination, and which, from anything that appears, has not been argued before him.
This was a case stated by the Sheriff-Substitute of Lanarkshire at Glasgow ( Spens) in an arbitration under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897, in which Janet Rae sought payment from A. Fraser of £300 in respect of the death of her husband through an accident while in Mr Fraser's employment.
The facts established by the proof were thus stated by the Sheriff-Substitute:—“(1) The appellant is the widow of John Rae, who was killed on 10th February 1899, while engaged along with James Golding and Andrew Fraser junior, all in the respondent's employment, in lifting a certain air compresser, then lying on the quay at Glasgow, by means of a hydraulic jack. (2) The air compresser in question had been used in connection with the new bridge across the Clyde at Jamaica Street, but having served its purpose it had been, inter alia, sold. (3) The respondent's contract was with the purchaser, and it merely was to lift the air compresser from where it was, lying resting upon two blocks sufficiently high to enable a lorry to be placed underneath, and to place it upon the lorry. (4) Somehow the jack got off the plumb, and the compresser in consequence shifted its position and came down upon the said deceased John Rae, crushing him to death.
In these circumstances,” the Sheriff-Substitute continued, “I found that the accident is not one for which compensation falls to be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act. I therefore dismissed the claim as I was of opinion that the contract which the respondent had undertaken, and which was simply to lift the air compresser sufficiently high to put a lorry under it, and to load it on the lorry, did not bring the respondent within the definition of ‘undertaker,’ nor did his contract fall within the definition of ‘engineering work’ in section 7 (2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897.”
The question of law submitted to the Court was as follows:—“Whether the word ‘alteration’ in the definition of engineering work,’ in section 7 of the said Act, means structural alteration only, and does not apply to the raising of an air compresser by means of a hydraulic jack so as to place it on a lorry?”
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The Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 (60 and 61 Vict. cap. 37), sec. 7, sub-sec. (1) enacts—“This Act shall apply only to employment by the undertakers as hereinafter defined on or in or about a railway, factory, mine, quarry, or engineering work.” … By sub-section (2) Engineering work is defined as “any work of construction or alteration or repair of a railroad, harbour, dock, canal, or sewer, and includes any other work for the construction, alteration, or repair of which machinery driven by steam, water, or other mechanical power is used.”
By the same sub-section “Factory” is declared to have the same meaning as in the Factory and Workshop Acts 1878 to 1891, “and also includes any dock, wharf, quay, warehouse, machinery, or plant to which any provision of the Factory Acts is applied by the Factory and Workshop Act 1895 (58 and 59 Vict. cap. 37).
By Act of Sederunt, 3rd June 1898, sec. 9, sub-sec. ( g), the Court are empowered, before giving their determination, to send back the case to the Sheriff for amendment.
Argued for the appellant—What the Sheriff had determined here was something more than the limited issue set forth in the question submitted to the Court. He had decided the much broader point “that the accident is not one for which compensation falls to be awarded” under the Act. That finding made it competent for the appellant to argue the question whether the fact that this accident had occurred on a quay, to which the provisions of the Factory Acts had been applied by the Factory Act of 1895, did not bring the present case within the Act of 1897. If it were not open to the appellant at that stage to argue that question, the case should be sent back to the Sheriff for re-statement in terms of the Act of Sederunt. [It is unnecessary to recapitulate the appellant's argument on section 7].
Counsel for the respondent were not called upon.
Then Mr Hunter says, “That may be, but there was another question which was not argued before the Sheriff, which I should like to argue, and I make use of this stated case on one specific question in order to introduce to your notice another point which I omitted to state to the Sheriff, and which I should like an opportunity of stating to the Sheriff.” What right have we to make use of a case stated on this specific question in order to have a hearing before the Sheriff of a point omitted before the Sheriff? The condition on which these cases are stated is that the Sheriff has to determine the case summarily, and then to state the question which has been argued to him and decided by him, for the consideration of this Court. To that question we are confined. We may send the case down to the Sheriff in order to have a clearer statement of that question, or if the case be obscure, we may require him to re-state it, but that does not authorise us to ask for a statement of another question of law, or require him to have a rehearing. I am therefore clearly of opinion that we must answer the latter part of the question in the negative and do nothing more, for the Sheriff has disposed of the case in accordance with what we regard as a right determination of the question of law.
I also agree that there is no occasion for a remit to the Sheriff with a view to the case being amended. An amendment must be a variation on the questions sent to us, or the introduction of others consequential upon them. The purpose of the proposed amendment is to state a question entirely independent of that in the case, and on which the Sheriff, so far as we know, may not have formed an opinion. I am clearly of opinion that we have no power to remit to the Sheriff for any such purpose as I have described.
The Court answered the latter part of the question in the negative.
Counsel for the Appellant— Guy— Hunter. Agent— Henry Robertson, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Respondent— Kennedy— Glegg. Agents— Macpherson & Mackay, S.S.C.