Scottish Court of Session Decisions

I should certainly think this is a case which ought not to be sent before a jury, but I am not able to see any ground for refusing the pursuer's motion. The cases which were quoted to us by Mr Salvesen were both cases in which there were special difficulties which might have raised questions at the trial which would have necessitated rulings by the presiding judge, and perhaps led to a bill of exceptions. In this case there are no such complications or difficulties, and I am therefore reluctantly driven to the opinion that the case must be sent to a jury.

Lord Young—I am of the same opinion. I have more than once expressed my views as to the expediency of allowing a pursuer as matter of right to demand a trial by jury in such cases as the present. I should suggest that it is a question whether the statutory rules upon this matter ought not to be modified. But as matters at present stand the pursuer has only exercised his statutory right, and in the case of an action of this kind—a simple case of damages for personal injuries sustained by being run over in the street—there is no precedent for refusing to send the case to a jury if the pursuer desires it. The statutory rule which gives him a right to demand a jury trial has not yet been altered, and I am not disposed in this case to make a first precedent for refusing his demand. The only ground suggested for doing so is that the injuries are admittedly inconsiderable, and the pursuer's damage is estimated by himself—and we may certainly assume not underestimated—at the sum of £50. It would be a very good rule that pursuers were not to be entitled to appeal for trial by jury when the damages sustained are only estimated at £50. Of course, if the limit were raised in point of amount, that could easily be evaded by putting the sum claimed sufficiently high to entitle the pursuer to have his case tried by jury, but other means might be taken to ensure that cases which are chiefly brought in the hope that defenders may be compelled by the certainty of being involved in great expense to pay something, although they are conscientiously persuaded that nothing is due, should not necessarily be sent to a jury. These means would require to be carefully considered, but though there are difficulties I do not think they are insuperable. At one time of my life I had occasion to consider the matter, and I came to the conclusion that the difficulties were not insuperable. But these are hardships for which a remedy must be sought elsewhere, and as the rule stands at present I think this case must go to a jury.

Lord Trayner—I agree; but I do so with reluctance. I do not think this case should be sent to a jury, but as the law now stands I do not think we can refuse the pursuer's demand if he presses it. The injuries said to have been sustained were, on the statement of them, trifling, and the damages are estimated—and we may be sure not underestimated—at £50. The witnesses who can speak to the facts are all at Coatbridge, and the Sheriff is perfectly competent to try the case. The expense of bringing these witnesses here for the trial will nearly equal the whole amount which is claimed by the pursuer. I should like to add that in the event of the pursuer getting a verdict I shall not hold myself precluded by that fact from considering whether expenses should not be limited to expenses on the Sheriff Court scale.

Lord Moncreiff—I am of the same opinion. I regret that we must send this case to a jury, but as the law now stands I think we have no alternative. It will be for consideration whether if the pursuer is successful he should be allowed more than Sheriff Court expenses.

Of consent the Court sent the case to trial on the record without an issue.